A mentally-ill Belgian woman sought euthanasia to escape her problems. The doctors told her, sure, why not?

Conceptual features differ in how mentally tranformable they are. A robin that does not eat is harder to imagine than a robin that does not chirp. We argue that features are immutable to the extent that they are central in a network of dependency relations. The immutability of a feature reflects how much the internal structure of a concept depends on that feature; i.e., how much the feature contributes to the concept's coherence. Complementarily, mutability reflects the aspects in which a (...) concept is flexible. We show that features can be reliably ordered according to their mutability using tasks that require people to conceive of objects missing a feature, and that mutability (conceptual centrality) can be distinguished from category centrality and from diagnosticity and salience. We test a model of mutability based on asymmetric, unlabeled, pairwise dependency relations. With no free parameters, the model provides reasonable fits to data. Qualitative tests of the model show that mutability judgments are unaffected by the type of dependency relation and that dependency structure influences judgments of variability. (shrink)

In this dissertation I argue that the concept of a moral right is best explicated by means of the concept of morally legitimate coercion. This thesis, which I call the enforceability thesis, says that to have a right is to have a claim such that one would be justified in pursuing a course of action up to and including harm should the claim be dissatisfied. I contend that this thesis, if it is true, explains much about our intuitions concerning moral (...) rights, accounts for the historical importance of rights-talk in the context of events such as revolutions and political reforms, and explains why rights are a necessary part of the moral vocabulary. If rights do not set out conditions under which coercion is morally appropriate, then they do nothing that other moral concepts could not do. ;Drawing on the work of H. L. A. Hart, John Rawls, and others, I argue that the philosophical strength and practical efficacy of rights on the enforceability thesis is best realized when rights are treated as action-guiding principles set within a framework of moral decision making under reflective equilibrium. Using the process of reflective equilibrium as a backdrop, I argue that rights can have sufficient normative force to play an important role in moral and political theory without being either impracticably stringent or subject to so many exceptions that they lose their efficacy. ;With this background in place I next set out and argue for a view of human rights which, because human rights turn out to be best understood as rights to primary goods, I call the theory of primary rights. The account I give of primary rights emphasizes their justificatory place in arguments for coercion, their importance to the moral integrity of the individual, and the practical applicability of the overarching theory of rights developed in this dissertation. (shrink)

We propose a causal model theory to explain asymmetries in judgments of the intentionality of a foreseen side-effect that is either negative or positive (Knobe, 2003). The theory is implemented as a Bayesian network relating types of mental states, actions, and consequences that integrates previous hypotheses. It appeals to two inferential routes to judgment about the intentionality of someone else's action: bottom-up from action to desire and top-down from character and disposition. Support for the theory comes from three experiments that (...) test the prediction that bottom-up inference should occur only when the actor's primary objective is known. The model fits intentionality judgments reasonably well with no free parameters. (shrink)

This paper takes Gandhi's satyagraha, which he defined as "holding on to truth" (associating it simultaneously with knowing and doing) as a basis for a political philosophy of nonviolence that draws on voices familiar from twentieth century nonviolent struggles as well as sociobiology, literary criticism, and feminist approaches to sacrifice.

Patient To examine neural responses to aurally-presented sentences, a sparse imaging technique was used to minimize interference from scanner noise. The patient was played a single sentence (or noise-equivalent) in the 7.4s silent period before a single 1.6s scan with stimulus timing jittered relative to scan onset. There were 118 spoken sentences trials, 59 signal correlated noise trials, and an additional 60 silent trials for the purpose of monitoring data quality. The signal correlated noise stimuli had the same duration, spectral (...) profile and amplitude envelope as the original speech, but were entirely unintelligible (S1). The experiment was divided into three sessions of 79 trials with events pseudo-randomly ordered within each scanning session. The sentences were presented using a MRI compatible auditory stimulusdelivery system (Resonance Technology, Northridge, CA), with insert earplugs to further attenuate scanner noise. DMDX software running on a Windows XP PC was used to present the stimulus items. (shrink)

This book develops the idea that meaningfulness is specified as a relation between an acknowledged appeal and an adopted attitude. In the Axial Age classics and again in modern refoundings of philosophy and theology, ideals of a fully commanding supreme appeal and a fully adequate orientation to the world in cognizance of that appeal--a sovereign attitude--are intellectually and spiritually central. Some of the most fundamental challenges of pluralism stem from differences in appeal and attitude ideals.

Describes the life and accomplishments of the nineteenth-century author best known for his work "Walden" and his dedication to expanding the philosophy of ...

Examination of the concept of "beauty" as found across Plato's works. What is beautiful may well be what substantiates sophysune, a concept that refers to orderliness and measure.

A collection of essays on contemporary issues in justice and law.

Poetic translation of Tibullus Elegy I.3.

It has recently been claimed (1) that mental states such as beliefs are theoretical entities and (2) that they are therefore, in principle, subject to theoretical elimination if intentional psychology were to be supplanted by a psychology not employing mentalistic notions. Debate over these two issues is seriously hampered by the fact that the key terms 'theoretical' and 'belief' are ambiguous. This article argues that there is only one sense of 'theoretical' that is of use to the eliminativist, and in (...) this sense some kinds of "belief" (dispositional states, infra-conscious states and the Freudian unconscious) are indeed "theoretical" and hence possible candidates for elimination, while others (consciously occurring thoughts like judgements and perceptual Gestalten) are not theoretical and hence not candidates for elimination. (shrink)

This volume surveys the interpretation of St. Paul by patristic and medieval exegetes. It also examines the use of Paul by medieval reformers, canon lawyers, and spiritual teachers and Paul’s portrayal in medieval literature and art.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AsphyxiationsSteven Connor (bio)Recent events and sociorhetorical expatiations upon them have reaffirmed breathing as the ideal form of free and unimpeded life, that struggles against the throttlings of oppression. The root meaning of oppression, from the past participle of Latin opprimere, is to press, crush or bear down upon, and the word oppression has commonly been used to signify the feeling of the difficulty of breathing, through some constriction or (...) pressure, as in the nocturnal attentions of the nightmare, the spirit imagined as settling suffocatingly on the chest of the sleeper. As a mare that rides rather than being ridden, the spirit is often imagined as a female succubus, though in Fuseli's 1781 painting the mare is accompanied by a simian incubus who squats on the chest of a female sleeper, prompting these lines from Erasmus Darwin:So on his Nightmare through the evening fogFlits the squab Fiend o'er fen, and lake, and bog;Seeks some love-wilder'd maid with sleep oppress'd,Alights, and grinning sits upon her breast.(Darwin 2.16)'Pressing' meant the forcing of somebody into some condition or service, typically the army or navy. In oppressive weather, the clouds may seem to 'lower', or the humid air to cramp and confine the body.We think of breathing as opening or release, of a piece with open windows and unbounded spaces. Human beings have brewed up fantasies for centuries of more complete modes of breathing that would overcome the constriction represented by the respiratory apparatus, exhorting themselves and each other to breathe more deeply, suffusing, not just the lungs, but the diaphragm, the head, and other items of phantasmal physiology. Indeed, the factitiously hollow spaces of the body–the head that we seek to keep 'clear'–are the proof of the belief in the strange principle of vital vacuity, the idea that we exist most fully in empty spaces of innerness, bodily enclosures evacuated of body. Without this sense of the animating function of the breath, the body suffers the inanition of a "want of living [End Page 74] breath in its lungs, which are full of gases but empty of spirit" (Wilkinson 78). In being taken in and given out, breath seems to commute between what Wittgenstein calls "two kinds of worlds, worlds built of different materials." The fact that "the mental world in fact is liable to be imagined as gaseous, or rather, aethereal," seems to Wittgenstein to be related to "the queer role which the gaseous and the aethereal play in philosophy,–when we perceive that a substantive is not used as what in general we should call the name of an object, and when therefore we can't help saying to ourselves that it is the name of an aethereal object" (Wittgenstein 47). The conception of the soul as an afflatus, or a special kind of magic gas, which has been common among so many different peoples, suggests just this kind of aethereal object-that-is-not-one. It embodies the conviction that we are most essentially present as ourselves where we are closest to being nothing, in an out-of-body kind of body.We breathe out–phew, originally in the seventeenth century a violent expression of disgust or emancipatory emptying, as we might nowadays plosively and purifyingly say poo–when we 'ex-press', as we say, our sense of being, as we also say, 'relieved,' from re + levare, to lift up, implying a lightening, or levitation, that approaches in imagination the condition of air itself. To ventilate is to levitate. To be relieved is to dream of remission from the clinging pressure of your own embodiment, as though you could simply emit or expel your own weight. To inhale is to prepare for stress and struggle: to exhale is to relax, to sigh into satisfaction, converting becoming momentarily to being. Exhalation is therefore the decorporizing of the body, or the corporealization of the incorporeal. But though human beings exalt imaginary emptying, as the purifying expulsion of what is evil, infective, invasive, persecutory, expiration is also death. Speech is the expressive sound formed from the impressing of exhaled breath, the dissolving openness of air given imaginary... (shrink)

The New Semantics (NS) introduced by Kripke and Putnam is often thought to block antiphysicalist arguments that involve an inference from an explanatory gap to a failure of supervenience. But this “NS Rebuttal” depends upon two assumptions that are shown to be dubious. First, it assumes that mental-kind terms are among the kinds of terms to which NS analysis is properly applied. However, there are important differences in this regard between the behavior of notions like ‘pain’ and notions like ‘water’, (...) as Kripke himself has argued. Second, even on the assumption that NS analysis is appropriate to mental-kind terms, it is further assumed that this would block the anti-physicalist premise that an abiding and principled explanatory gap would entail a failure of metaphysical supervenience. But the paradigm examples of NS analysis show nothing of the sort. What they show is that there are a posteriori necessities (e.g., “water contains hydrogen”) that cannot be inferred from the sense of natural kind terms. But they do not show that such necessities cannot be derived from an adequate scientific understanding of the phenomena in question. Indeed, such derivations are often available with kinds like water, but seem unavailable with mental kinds like ‘pain’ and ‘belief’. (shrink)

Emmanuel Levinas gave an account of radical, asymmetrical responsibility for the Other that is phenomenologically sensible in the proximity of face-to-face relation. This original arrangement, however, is not interminable. The approach of the third party equalizes and creates distance between self and Other by introducing ontology and epistemology. It is a necessary process of totalization that moves from a primordial ethics to justice and institutional fairness. However, Levinas was aware that the third party's presence brought with it a possible forgetting (...) of the Other and a covering over of radical ethics. In this presentation, we propose that the psychotherapeutic process represents a context that bears the proximal dimension described by Levinas while also representing an institution that is, in definition and purpose, totalizing. Furthermore, using a play on words that represents a significant issue in contemporary psychotherapeutic practice, we explore the common presence and impact of third-party payers on the therapeutic relationship, and how third-party payers are disingenuously a-proximal and constantly approximating; faceless and consequently effacing the patient's august dignity, causing a forgetfulness of the justice to which Levinas called institutions. Lastly, we suggest some strategies by which therapists may recover the never-absolved proximity to the Other in a profession susceptible to the a-proximal effects of third-party economics. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

A response to Kenneth Schmitz's "Created Receptivity and the Philosophy of the Concrete" The Thomist vol. 61 no. 3 p. 339.

A teoria da informação integrada, proposta inicialmente por Giulio Tononi em 2004 e atualizada em 2014, pretende explicar a experiência consciente por meio do entendimento das ações de elementos dentro de um sistema experimental tal como o cérebro, e o estabelecimento de princípios e operações de mensuração que podem ser utilizados para decidir níveis de consciência. Alguns dos postulados da TII têm muito em comum com a semiótica peirciana. Entre esses estão a presença de operações hierarquizadas recursivamente, a importância de (...) estruturas relacionais na formação da experiência consciente, a dicotomia sujeito/objeto, e uma instância objetivista que requer um sistema que seja verdadeiramente afetado para que a consciência ou a semiose avance. Entretanto, problemas desafiadores confrontam alguém que espera encontrar uma tradução entre os dois programas, em especial, com respeito aos conceitos fundacionais de tempo e continuidade. Argumento que é possível transpor os problemas de tempo e continuidade através de dois movimentos. Primeiro, apresento a noção de dwell, um período do real, se indeterminado, duração na semiose, durante a qual um juízo ou tentativa de conclusão é atingido. Em segundo, com respeito à continuidade, argumento que uma análise de um sistema de interpretação não possui a pureza ontológica do sistema que ela tenta entender. Em vez disso, qualquer avaliação analítica de um sistema de interpretação deve ser considerado corte sintético e expediente dentro do continuum. Assim, o continuum da experiência permanece não afetado mesmo que a de entendimento do continuum aconteça através de tais estruturas analíticas artificiais. O valor de TII de “emaranhamento” e a semiótica peirciana é que a semiótica pode ser vista como um esquema estrutural que mapeia o território conceitual da experiência consciente para a qual os princípios e mensurações de TII, por sua vez, fornecem ferramentas úteis de compilação de dados empíricos. (shrink)

The development of a metaphysics of actuality is reconstructed from Plato through Bergson to capitalize on Bergson's suggestion that mind and matter can be understood as inversions of each other, or as respectively a centering and an extending of forms. This view avoids the pitfalls of reductive monism and disjunctive dualism: it is dyadic (cognizant at once of mind-matter difference and of the unity of reality), symmetrical (not apt to close off prematurely our reckoning with complexity and change, on either (...) side), and correlational (able to track relations of form, energy, and sequence between mental and material items). (shrink)

One of the most common policy-related messages that economists present to non-economists is the superiority of cash over in-kind transfers as a policy tool. A good deal of government policy on behalf of the poor consists, of course, of various forms of in-kind assistance, such as medical care or food stamps. However, if we wish to help the poor, the argument goes, in-kind transfers are an inferior way to do so.