Featuring an exceptionally clear writing style and a wealth of real-world examples and exercises, Logic, Second Edition, shows how logic relates to everyday life, demonstrating its applications in such areas as the workplace, media and entertainment, politics, science and technology, student life, and elsewhere.Thoroughly revised and expanded in this second edition, the text now features 2600 exercises, more than 1000 of them new; three new chapters on legal arguments, moral arguments, and analyzing a long essay; enhanced pedagogy; and much more.FEATURES* (...) 2600 exercises--more than 1000 of them new--breathe new life into logic* Real-world examples help bring logic down to earth for students* A unique, extended explanation or model of the answer to the first question of each "Check Your Understanding" section shows students what is expected of their answers* An additional 25% of the exercises are answered at the back of the book* "Profiles in Logic" provide short sketches of logicians, philosophers, mathematicians, and others associated with logic* "Logic Challenge" problems present puzzles and paradoxes that end each chapter on a fun note* Additional pedagogical elements--marginal definitions, key terms, a glossary, reference boxes, and bulleted chapter summaries--make the material even more accessible* Detailed guides help students learn to create "truth tables" and Venn diagramsSUPPORT PACKAGEAn Instructor's Manual with Computerized Test Bank on CD includes: Solutions to all exercises in the book, enhanced by explanations and answers that elucidate the details of the correct answersKey Terms and a summary for each chapterA customizable Computerized Test Bank--with multiple-choice, true/false, and fill-in-the-blank questions--that allows instructors to give exams or homework problems that can be auto-gradedA traditional "pencil-and-paper" Test Bank and answer key containing the same questions as the Computerized Test BankPowerPoint-based lecture outlinesThe Instructor's Manual with Computerized Test Bank and the traditional Test Bank are also available in printed format.A Companion Website offers:Instructor Resources :A downloadable version of the Instructor's Manual PowerPoint-based lecture outlinesStudent Resources:Brief chapter summariesInteractive Flash Cards with key terms and definitionsWeb links and other media resourcesPractice quizzes with answers and explanations The Learning Management System Cartridges include, in a fully downloadable format:Instructor's Manual and Computerized Test Bank Student material from the companion websiteThe Perfect Text for Your Course... No Matter How You Teach ItYour course is unique; you have your own teaching philosophy and style. Whether you teach traditional Introduction to Logic, Critical Thinking/Informal Logic, or Formal Logic, Baronett: Logic, Second Edition, can be tailored to fulfill your course needs.We'll make it easy for you; choose one of our Alternate Editions or build the book you want, chapter by chapter.Option 1. Author Stan Baronett has suggested four Alternate Editions that may work for you. Each Alternate Edition comes in full color, with answers to problems, a full glossary, and an index. The books are in stock and available for ordering. Please see the ISBN information below.Logic: Concise EditionChapters 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8Order using ISBN: 978-0-19-994129-2Logic: An Emphasis on Critical Thinking and Informal LogicChapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 13 A-E, 14, 15Order using ISBN: 978-0-19-994128-5Logic: An Emphasis on Formal LogicChapters 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9Order using ISBN: 978-0-19-994126-1Logic: With Diagramming used in Chapter 4. Informal FallaciesFull textOrder using ISBN: 978-0-19-997081-0Option 2. Create your own customized textbook by choosing the specific chapters that you need for your course. Please contact your Oxford University Press Sales Representative or call 800.280.0280 for details. (shrink)

There is an interesting historical detour in the dissemination of one of the seventeenth century’s most praised discoveries: the reception of Harvey’s account of the circulation of the blood is closely intertwined, especially in the Low Countries, with Descartes’ account of the origin of the heartbeat. Descartes was one of the first figures to support the circulation of the blood and to give credit to Harvey for it, although he presumably arrived at the same conclusion independently through his own anatomical (...) experiments. He did so while vocally rejecting Harvey’s views on the muscular nature of the heart and his explanation of cardiac motion, to promote his own mechanistic solutions instead. Although Descartes’ .. (shrink)

This paper presents Duns Scotus’s theory of mixture in the context of medieval discussions over Aristotle’s theory of mixed bodies. It revisits the accounts of mixture given by Avicenna, Averroes, and Thomas Aquinas, before presenting Scotus’s account as a reaction to Averroes. It argues that Duns Scotus rejected the Aristotelian theory of mixture altogether and that his account went contrary to the entire Latin tradition. Scotus denies that mixts arise out of the four classical elements and he maintains that both (...) the elemental forms and the elemental qualities are lost in the mixture. Consequently, he denies the distinction between the process of mixture and that of substantial change through generation and corruption. The reassessment of Scotus’s account modifies the current historical representation of this discussion, inherited from Anneliese Maier. (shrink)

This paper investigates Péter Pázmány’s theory of mixtures from his exegesis of Meteorologica IV, in the context of sixteenth-century scholarship on Aristotle’s Meteorologica. It aims to contribute to a discussion of Anneliese Maier’s thesis concerning the incompatibility between hylomorphism and the theory of elements in the Aristotelian tradition. It presents two problems: the placement of Meteorologica IV in the Jesuit cursus on physics and the conceptualization of putrefaction as a type of substantial mutation. Through an analysis of these issues, it (...) shows how sixteenth-century exegesis imposes the hylomorphic thesis onto the subject matter of meteorology and how the hylomorphic theory of substantial change can be adapted in order to accommodate the theory of elements. The case being made is that Meteorologica is a privileged place where hylomorphism and the theory of elements meet and that the late Aristotelian theory of mixtures sought to accommodate both theories of material substance. (shrink)

Klein, Nguyen, & Zhang (in press) argued that the evolutionary transition from respondent to agent during the Cambrian Explosion would be a promising vantage point from which to gain insight into the evolution of organic sentience. They focused on how increased competition for resources -- in consequence of the proliferation of new, neurally sophisticated life-forms -- made awareness of the external world (in the service of agentic acts) an adaptive priority. The explanatory scope of Klein et al (in press) was (...) limited to consideration of the conscious apprehension of externally sourced content – i.e., content delivered from the sensory registration of objects occupying phenomenal space. But consciousness – at least for humans -- takes its objects from internal as well as external sources. In the present article we extend their analysis to the question of how internally sourced content (i.e., mental states) became the object of conscious apprehension. (shrink)

In his article on The Liabilities of Mobility, Merker asserts that “Consciousness presents us with a stable arena for our actions—the world …” and argues for this property as providing evolutionary pressure for the evolution of consciousness. In this commentary, I will explore the implications of Merker’s ideas for consciousness in artificial agents as well as animals, and also meet some possible objections to his evolutionary pressure claim.

This book presents an exploration of concepts central to health care practice. In exploring such concepts as Subjectivity, Life, Personhood, and Death in deep philosophical terms, the book aims to draw out the ethical demands that arise when we encounter these phenomena, and also the moral resources of health care workers for meeting those demands. The series _Values in Bioethics_ makes available original philosophical books in all areas of bioethics, including medical and nursing ethics, health care ethics, research ethics, environmental (...) ethics, and global bioethics. (shrink)

Memory of past episodes provides a sense of personal identity — the sense that I am the same person as someone in the past. We present a neurological case study of a patient who has accurate memories of scenes from his past, but for whom the memories lack the sense of mineness. On the basis of this case study, we propose that the sense of identity derives from two components, one delivering the content of the memory and the other generating (...) the sense of mineness. We argue that this new model of the sense of identity has implications for debates about quasi-memory. In addition, articulating the components of the sense of identity promises to bear on the extent to which this sense of identity provides evidence of personal identity. (shrink)

Dealing with the continuously increasing rates of families wanting to either significantly delay or completely postpone their infant's vaccines has created an alarmingly untenable dilemma for the general pediatricians dealing with these families on a daily basis. Pediatricians must decide whether to continue to provide substandard care by foregoing many or most of the infant's highly recommended protective vaccines, or whether to dismiss from the practice the family who refuses vaccines. Much has been written about why they should retain these (...) families, but this paper will discuss some reasonable rationales as to why nearly 40% of pediatricians choose dismissal of these families. (shrink)

This book explores the multiple meaning of the notion of otherness in Søren Kierkegaard’s thought. Leo Stan discusses in detail the threefold structure of human existence in Kierkegaard’s authorship as a whole, both pseudonymous and self-signed.

In this chapter we examine the tendency to view future-oriented mental time travel as a unitary faculty that, despite task-driven surface variation, ultimately reduces to a common phenomenological state. We review evidence that FMTT is neither unitary nor beholden to episodic memory: Rather, it is varied both in its memorial underpinnings and experiential realization. We conclude that the phenomenological diversity characterizing FMTT is dependent not on the type of memory activated during task performance, but on the kind of subjective temporality (...) associated with the memory in play. (shrink)

In the target article, Baars has offered both a theory of consciousness and a strategy for scientifically testing the theory. This commentary is intended as an addendum. I'd like to suggest implementing global workspace agents as both an additional strategy toward scientific testing, and as a means of fleshing out the theory.

Faith in the universal moral equality of people enjoys close to unanimous consensus in present moral and political philosophy. Yet its philosophical justification remains precarious. The search for the basis of equality encounters insurmountable difficulties. Nothing short of a miracle seems required to stabilize universal equality in moral status amidst a vast space of distinctions sprawling between people. The difficulties of stabilizing equality against differentiation are not specific to any particular choice regarding the basis of equality. To show this, I (...) will provide a general diagnosis of the difficulty together with its application to the arguably best attempt at a solution, namely to ground moral equality in a form of subjectivity. In his recent book Equality for Nonegalitarians, George Sher advances the view that “we are moral equals because we are equally centers of consciousness. …The fact that we are equals in this respect—that each is a world unto himself—…explains why each person’s interests are of equal moral importance”. Yet the worlds we are unto ourselves can no more withstand the force of differentiation than previous candidates suggested in the literature, and the reasons why run deeper than even some critics have recognized. The prospects for vindicating universal moral equality remain bleak. (shrink)

: Radical meta-normative skepticism is the view that no standard, norm, or principle has objective authority or normative force. It does not deny that there are norms, standards of correctness, and principles of various kinds that render it possible that we succeed or fail in measuring up to their prerogatives. Rather, it denies that any norm has the status of commanding with objective authority, of giving rise to normative reasons to take seriously and follow its demands. Two powerful transcendental arguments (...) challenge this view. First, skepticism is said to be self-defeating: Settling what to accept, and in particular whether to accept skepticism, appears to be a reason-guided enterprise. How can skeptics coherently support their view by citing reasons in their favor after they just rejected them throughout? Second, there is the practical-deliberative version, most recently developed by David Enoch: We are essentially deliberative creatures. Yet deliberation appears to require that there are correct answers in the form of normative reasons to our practical questions. Thus confidence in the sensible nature of deliberation should inspire confidence in reasons. The essay undermines both transcendental arguments by demonstrating, first, how to support skepticism without deserting its tenets, and, second, how to deliberate in skeptical fashion. (shrink)

Moral nihilists need an answer: if moral discourse is fatally flawed, how are we to proceed? A popular option is fictionalism, to uphold the flawed discourse in the mode of a fiction. My thesis is that fictionalism is not the best available answer to the nihilist; a better one is revisionism, the proposal to refashion the discourse so as to cure it of all flaws. Should it be possible to revise the discredited practice, by removing what is erroneous while keeping (...) what is beneficial, the twisted allegiance to the original practice already recognized as flawed which characterizes fictionalism becomes entirely moot. Fictionalism fully worked out, I argue in this paper, is going to lead us to the very doorsteps of revisionism. (shrink)

I argue that our current practice of ascribing the term “ memory ” to mental states and processes lacks epistemic warrant. Memory, according to the “received view”, is any state or process that results from the sequential stages of encoding, storage and retrieval. By these criteria, memory, or its footprint, can be seen in virtually every mental state we are capable of having. This, I argue, stretches the term to the breaking point. I draw on phenomenological, historical and conceptual considerations (...) to make the case that an act of memory entails a direct, non-inferential feeling of re-acquaintance with one’s past. It does so by linking content retrieved from storage with autonoetic awareness during retrieval. On this view, memory is not the content of experience, but the manner in which that content is experienced. I discuss some theoretical and practical implications and advantages of adopting this more nuanced view of memory. -/-. (shrink)

Setting the stage -- Informal logic -- Formal logic -- Inductive logic.

Deligny¹s contribution to the contemporary thinking of community is to map the topos of a community which can be hardly described by words but can be traced by lines. Deligny¹s use of lines differ from any other form of mapping exactly because they do not pretend to represent anything other than our own ignorance about what is mapped. Rather than a negative thinking, it is an active form of negative mapping of what is common within the members of an « (...) impossible community ». (shrink)

In a recent set of articles (Klein et al., 2023; Klein & Loftus, 2024), my colleagues and I used the logic of adaptationism—the application of evolutionary principles to study the functional design of naturally selected systems (e.g., Klein et al., 2002)—to help make sense of the role natural selection played in the evolution of consciousness. To avoid well-known, seemingly intractable problems that accompany efforts to explain “how consciousness is possible in a world that consists in physical objects and their relations” (...) (the so-called “hard problem of consciousness”), we limited investigation to the question of “why natural selection favored consciousness?” In the present article, I try to make amends for this evasion by addressing some of the conceptual challenges posed by the hard problem. Drawing on insights from Klein et al.’s (2023) evolutionary excursion into the why of consciousness, I identify a potential alteration in the referential identity of “subject” and “object” when they are taken as properties of a mental state, and discuss how these changes might offer insight into the how question of consciousness. (shrink)

Throughout a career spanning half a century, Stan Brakhage--the foremost experimental filmmaker in America, and perhaps the world--wrote controversial essays on the art of film and its intersections with poetry, music, dance, and painting. Published in small circulation literary and arts journals, they were gathered later into such books as Metaphors on Vision and Film at Wit's End. Beginning in 1989, and for a decade thereafter, Brakhage wrote the essays in Telling Time as an occasional column for Musicworks, a (...) Toronto quarterly. Ostensibly about the relation of film to music, they soon enlarged to explore primary concerns beyond film, including Brakhage's aesthetic theories based on the phenomenology of human cognition. In these essays he is as brilliant discussing Gertrude Stein or romantic love as he is on child psychology, astronomy, and physiology, all the while teasing out vital correspondences between the arts, and upending conventional ideas of how we perceive. His investigations of other artists are models of sympathetic intuition and generosity. Above all, he shares his theories, discoveries and understandings in the spirit of establishing a groundwork for many varieties of human liberation. His prose is filled with flashes of insight, elaborated metaphors, playful elisions, shorthand puns and neologisms, personal digressions, surprising epiphanies, leaps of faith, affronts to authority. He appeals to the imagination, and invites us to a more profound and personal experience of art. (shrink)

Get the answers to 365 of the most commonly asked questions about Lightroom Photographers who are getting acquainted with Photoshop Lightroom and all its advantages for managing large quantities of images will find this handy book an indispensable resource. Veteran photographer Stan Sholik answers 365 of the most frequently asked questions about the new Lightroom 4 in an informative, practical format, making it easy to find what you're looking for and put the information to use. Sample photos illustrate questions (...) and answers, and a quick-reference guide provides easy access to must-have information. This guide is the first in a new series designed to provide practical answers to common questions about popular technologies Written by a veteran commercial and illustrative photographer who has developed a national reputation for his wide range of technology-oriented specialties Offers practical information about Lightroom 4 that photographers can use immediately Designed to provide succinct, usable answers to common questions, with actual photos to illustrate and a format that makes it easy to locate the desired information Photoshop Lightroom 4 FAQz helps you take full advantage of all Lightroom 4 has to offer. (shrink)

I argue that the feeling that one is the owner of his or her mental states is not an intrinsic property of those states. Rather, it consists in a contingent relation between consciousness and its intentional objects. As such, there are (a variety of) circumstances, varying in their interpretive clarity, in which this relation can come undone. When this happens, the content of consciousness still is apprehended, but the feeling that the content “belongs to me” no longer is secured. I (...) discuss the implications of a mechanism enabling personal ownership for understanding a variety of clinical syndromes as well normal mental function. (shrink)

Drawing on ideas from philosophy (in particular, epistemology), I argue that one of memory’s most important functions is to provide its owner with knowledge of the physical world. This knowledge helps satisfy the organism’s need to confer stability on an ever-changing reality so the objects in which it consists can be identified and reidentified. I then draw a distinction between sources of knowledge (i.e., from physical vs. subjective reality) and argue—based on evolutionary principles—that because memory was designed by natural selection (...) to interface with the physical world, knowledge acquired via sensory/perceptual experiences should be better remembered than internally generated knowledge made available by introspection. A study conducted to test this hypothesis provides support. I conclude that a serious interdisciplinary approach to issues typically considered the purview of psychology best enables researchers to craft well-specified, theoretically based hypotheses that directly target functions of the mind. (shrink)

Some environmental views characterise the human abuse of nature as an offence against nature itself. What conception of nature would best fit that characterisation? To focus upon such a conception, aesthetic offences against nature are examined and distinguished at the outset from moral offences. Aesthetic offences are divided into those internal to our cultural outlook and external to it. The external outlook, conceiving nature as a thing wholly apart from us, is shown to be necessary to any view of nature (...) being offended against. Central to the external outlook is a conception of nature as the victim of offence without ever being itself an offending agent. Best fitting this is the notion of nature as primordially innocent. Given this metaphorical extension, the awkward consequence arises that any human use of nature constitutes thereby an abuse of it from the external standpoint. (shrink)

Historically, it has been presumed that being an experienced researcher was enough in itself to guarantee effective supervision. This has always been a dubious presumption, and it has become an untenable one in the light of global developments in the doctorate itself and in the candidate population which have transformed demands upon expectations of supervisors. This handbook will assist both new and experienced supervisors to respond to these changes. Divided into six parts the book looks at the following issues: * (...) Changing contexts of doctoral supervision * Recruiting, selecting and working with doctoral candidates * Supporting the research project * Supporting candidates of all nationalities and academic backgrounds * Supporting completion of projects and examination * Evaluation and dissemination of practice. A Handbook for Doctoral Supervisors focuses on the practical needs of supervisors, draws examples from a wide range of countries and uses self-interrogation as a means of encouraging readers to reflect upon their practice, making it an essential read for anyone involved in doctoral supervision. (shrink)

Research on future-oriented mental time travel (FMTT) is highly active yet somewhat unruly. I believe this is due, in large part, to the complexity of both the tasks used to test FMTT and the concepts involved. Extraordinary care is a necessity when grappling with such complex and perplexing metaphysical constructs as self and time and their co-instantiation in memory. In this review, I first discuss the relation between future mental time travel and types of memory (episodic and semantic). I then (...) examine the nature of both the types of self-knowledge assumed to be projected into the future and the types of temporalities that constitute projective temporal experience. Finally, I argue that a person lacking episodic memory should nonetheless be able to imagine a personal future by virtue of (a) the fact that semantic, as well as episodic, memory can be self-referential, (b) autonoetic awareness is not a prerequisite for FMTT, and (c) semantic memory does, in fact, enable certain forms of personally-oriented FMTT. (shrink)

I argue that academic psychology’s quest to achieve scientific respectability by reliance on quantification and objectification is deeply flawed. Specifically, psychological theory typically cannot support prognostication beyond the binary opposition of “effect present/effect absent”. Accordingly, the “numbers” assigned to experimental results amount to little more than affixing names (e.g., more than, less than) to the members of an ordered sequence of outcomes. This, in conjunction with the conceptual under-specification characterizing the targets of experimental inquiry, is, I contend, a primary reason (...) why psychologists find it difficult to discriminate between competing, explanations of the effects of mind on behavior. Absent well-specified theory capable of enabling precise and detailed quantitative prediction, inferring underlying mental mechanisms from experimental outcomes becomes a difficult, if not impossible, task. (shrink)

As Roger Ariew shows, one of the most fascinating challenges for the authors trying to create a Cartesian complete course on philosophy was coming up with a Cartesian Logic based on the existing texts of the master. Were the few simple rules from the Discourse on Method the "logic" of Descartes? Were the Rules for the Direction of the Mind "logic"? How can we even have a logic without syllogism? When looking at the authors studied by Ariew one finds that (...) the best that they could come up was adding some Cartesian elements on what remains basically a traditional Aristotelian Logic. It seems that there was no Cartesian Logic after all.I want to show here that Cartesian Logic is something else, not exactly... (shrink)