Bodies of Information initiates the Routledge Advances in the History of Bioethics series by encompassing interdisciplinary Bioethical discussions on a wide range of descriptions of bodies in relation to their contexts from varying perspectives: including literary analysis, sociology, criminology, anthropology, osteology and cultural studies, to read a variety of types of artefacts, from the Romano-British period to Hip Hop. Van Renslaer Potter coined the phrase Global Bioethics to define human relationships with their contexts. This and subsequent volumes return to Potter's (...) founding vision from historical perspectives, and asks, how did we get here from then? (shrink)

The essays in this book explore the different ways the body has been experienced and interpreted in history, from the medieval to the modern period. Challenging the negative perceptions that the term {u2019}disability{u2019} suggests, the essays together present a mosaic of literary representations of bodies and accounts of real lives lived in their particularity and peculiarity. The book does not attempt to be exhaustive, but rather it celebrates the fact that it is not. By presenting a group of individual cases (...) from different periods in history, the collection demonstrates that any overarching way of describing bodies, or unifying description of the experience of the myriad ways of being in a body, is reductive and unhelpful. The variability of each body in its context is our subject. (shrink)

What, according to proponents of doxastic deontologism, is responsible belief? In this paper, we examine two proposals. Firstly, that responsible belief is blameless belief (a position we call DDB) and, secondly, that responsible belief is praiseworthy belief (a position we call DDP). We consider whether recent arguments in favor of DDP, mostly those recently offered by Brian Weatherson, stand up to scrutiny and argue that they do not. Given other considerations in favor of DDP, we conclude that the deontologist should (...) maintain that doxastic responsibility is a concept about freedom from appropriate blame. (shrink)

Moral nihilists need an answer: if moral discourse is fatally flawed, how are we to proceed? A popular option is fictionalism, to uphold the flawed discourse in the mode of a fiction. My thesis is that fictionalism is not the best available answer to the nihilist; a better one is revisionism, the proposal to refashion the discourse so as to cure it of all flaws. Should it be possible to revise the discredited practice, by removing what is erroneous while keeping (...) what is beneficial, the twisted allegiance to the original practice already recognized as flawed which characterizes fictionalism becomes entirely moot. Fictionalism fully worked out, I argue in this paper, is going to lead us to the very doorsteps of revisionism. (shrink)

Intuitions may seem to play a fundamental role in philosophy: but their role and their value have been challenged recently. What are intuitions? Should we ever trust them? And if so, when? Do they have an indispensable role in science—in thought experiments, for instance—as well as in philosophy? Or should appeal to intuitions be abandoned altogether? This collection brings together leading philosophers, from early to late career, to tackle such questions. It presents the state of the art thinking on the (...) topic.Readership: Scholars and advanced students of philosophy. (shrink)

In a recent set of articles (Klein et al., 2023; Klein & Loftus, 2024), my colleagues and I used the logic of adaptationism—the application of evolutionary principles to study the functional design of naturally selected systems (e.g., Klein et al., 2002)—to help make sense of the role natural selection played in the evolution of consciousness. To avoid well-known, seemingly intractable problems that accompany efforts to explain “how consciousness is possible in a world that consists in physical objects and their relations” (...) (the so-called “hard problem of consciousness”), we limited investigation to the question of “why natural selection favored consciousness?” In the present article, I try to make amends for this evasion by addressing some of the conceptual challenges posed by the hard problem. Drawing on insights from Klein et al.’s (2023) evolutionary excursion into the why of consciousness, I identify a potential alteration in the referential identity of “subject” and “object” when they are taken as properties of a mental state, and discuss how these changes might offer insight into the how question of consciousness. (shrink)

In her re-analysis of the evidence presented in Klein and Nichols (2012) to support their argument that patient R.B. temporarily lost possessory custody of consciously apprehended objects (in this case, objects that normally would be non-inferentially taken as episodic memory), Professor Roache concludes Klein and Nichols's claims are untenable. I argue that Professor Roache is incorrect in her re-interpretation, and that this is due, in part, to lack of sufficient familiarity with psychological theory on memory as well as clinical literature (...) on felt loss of ownership of one’s intentional objects. (shrink)

Eukaryogenesis is widely viewed as an improbable evolutionary transition uniquely affecting the evolution of life on this planet. However, scientific and popular rhetoric extolling this event as a singularity lacks rigorous evidential and statistical support. Here, we question several of the usual claims about the specialness of eukaryogenesis, focusing on both eukaryogenesis as a process and its outcome, the eukaryotic cell. We argue in favor of four ideas. First, the criteria by which we judge eukaryogenesis to have required a genuinely (...) unlikely series of events 2 billion years in the making are being eroded by discoveries that fill in the gaps of the prokaryote:eukaryote “discontinuity.” Second, eukaryogenesis confronts evolutionary theory in ways not different from other evolutionary transitions in individuality; parallel systems can be found at several hierarchical levels. Third, identifying which of several complex cellular features confer on eukaryotes a putative richer evolutionary potential remains an area of speculation: various keys to success have been proposed and rejected over the five-decade history of research in this area. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, it is difficult and may be impossible to eliminate eukaryocentric bias from the measures by which eukaryotes as a whole are judged to have achieved greater success than prokaryotes as a whole. Overall, we question whether premises of existing theories about the uniqueness of eukaryogenesis and the greater evolutionary potential of eukaryotes have been objectively formulated and whether, despite widespread acceptance that eukaryogenesis was “special,” any such notion has more than rhetorical value. (shrink)

In _The Company We Keep_, Wayne C. Booth argues for the relocation of ethics to the center of our engagement with literature. But the questions he asks are not confined to morality. Returning ethics to its root sense, Booth proposes that the ethical critic will be interested in any effect on the ethos, the total character or quality of tellers and listeners. Ethical criticism will risk talking about the quality of _this_ particular encounter with _this_ particular work. Yet (...) it will give up the old hope for definitive judgments of "good" work and "bad." Rather it will be a conversation about _many_ kinds of personal and social goods that fictions can serve or destroy. While not ignoring the consequences for conduct of engaging with powerful stories, it will attend to that more immediate topic, What happens to us _as we read_? Who am I, _during the hours of reading or listening_? What is the quality of the life I lead in the company of these would-be friends? Through a wide variety of periods and genres and scores of particular works, Booth pursues various metaphors for such engagements: "friendship with books," "the exchange of gifts," "the colonizing of worlds," "the constitution of commonwealths." He concludes with extended explorations of the ethical powers and potential dangers of works by Rabelais, D. H. Lawrence, Jane Austen, and Mark Twain. (shrink)

In his article on The Liabilities of Mobility, Merker asserts that “Consciousness presents us with a stable arena for our actions—the world …” and argues for this property as providing evolutionary pressure for the evolution of consciousness. In this commentary, I will explore the implications of Merker’s ideas for consciousness in artificial agents as well as animals, and also meet some possible objections to his evolutionary pressure claim.

Throughout a career spanning half a century, Stan Brakhage--the foremost experimental filmmaker in America, and perhaps the world--wrote controversial essays on the art of film and its intersections with poetry, music, dance, and painting. Published in small circulation literary and arts journals, they were gathered later into such books as Metaphors on Vision and Film at Wit's End. Beginning in 1989, and for a decade thereafter, Brakhage wrote the essays in Telling Time as an occasional column for Musicworks, a (...) Toronto quarterly. Ostensibly about the relation of film to music, they soon enlarged to explore primary concerns beyond film, including Brakhage's aesthetic theories based on the phenomenology of human cognition. In these essays he is as brilliant discussing Gertrude Stein or romantic love as he is on child psychology, astronomy, and physiology, all the while teasing out vital correspondences between the arts, and upending conventional ideas of how we perceive. His investigations of other artists are models of sympathetic intuition and generosity. Above all, he shares his theories, discoveries and understandings in the spirit of establishing a groundwork for many varieties of human liberation. His prose is filled with flashes of insight, elaborated metaphors, playful elisions, shorthand puns and neologisms, personal digressions, surprising epiphanies, leaps of faith, affronts to authority. He appeals to the imagination, and invites us to a more profound and personal experience of art. (shrink)

Memory of past episodes provides a sense of personal identity — the sense that I am the same person as someone in the past. We present a neurological case study of a patient who has accurate memories of scenes from his past, but for whom the memories lack the sense of mineness. On the basis of this case study, we propose that the sense of identity derives from two components, one delivering the content of the memory and the other generating (...) the sense of mineness. We argue that this new model of the sense of identity has implications for debates about quasi-memory. In addition, articulating the components of the sense of identity promises to bear on the extent to which this sense of identity provides evidence of personal identity. (shrink)

Featuring an exceptionally clear writing style and a wealth of real-world examples and exercises, Logic, Second Edition, shows how logic relates to everyday life, demonstrating its applications in such areas as the workplace, media and entertainment, politics, science and technology, student life, and elsewhere.Thoroughly revised and expanded in this second edition, the text now features 2600 exercises, more than 1000 of them new; three new chapters on legal arguments, moral arguments, and analyzing a long essay; enhanced pedagogy; and much more.FEATURES* (...) 2600 exercises--more than 1000 of them new--breathe new life into logic* Real-world examples help bring logic down to earth for students* A unique, extended explanation or model of the answer to the first question of each "Check Your Understanding" section shows students what is expected of their answers* An additional 25% of the exercises are answered at the back of the book* "Profiles in Logic" provide short sketches of logicians, philosophers, mathematicians, and others associated with logic* "Logic Challenge" problems present puzzles and paradoxes that end each chapter on a fun note* Additional pedagogical elements--marginal definitions, key terms, a glossary, reference boxes, and bulleted chapter summaries--make the material even more accessible* Detailed guides help students learn to create "truth tables" and Venn diagramsSUPPORT PACKAGEAn Instructor's Manual with Computerized Test Bank on CD includes: Solutions to all exercises in the book, enhanced by explanations and answers that elucidate the details of the correct answersKey Terms and a summary for each chapterA customizable Computerized Test Bank--with multiple-choice, true/false, and fill-in-the-blank questions--that allows instructors to give exams or homework problems that can be auto-gradedA traditional "pencil-and-paper" Test Bank and answer key containing the same questions as the Computerized Test BankPowerPoint-based lecture outlinesThe Instructor's Manual with Computerized Test Bank and the traditional Test Bank are also available in printed format.A Companion Website offers:Instructor Resources :A downloadable version of the Instructor's Manual PowerPoint-based lecture outlinesStudent Resources:Brief chapter summariesInteractive Flash Cards with key terms and definitionsWeb links and other media resourcesPractice quizzes with answers and explanations The Learning Management System Cartridges include, in a fully downloadable format:Instructor's Manual and Computerized Test Bank Student material from the companion websiteThe Perfect Text for Your Course... No Matter How You Teach ItYour course is unique; you have your own teaching philosophy and style. Whether you teach traditional Introduction to Logic, Critical Thinking/Informal Logic, or Formal Logic, Baronett: Logic, Second Edition, can be tailored to fulfill your course needs.We'll make it easy for you; choose one of our Alternate Editions or build the book you want, chapter by chapter.Option 1. Author Stan Baronett has suggested four Alternate Editions that may work for you. Each Alternate Edition comes in full color, with answers to problems, a full glossary, and an index. The books are in stock and available for ordering. Please see the ISBN information below.Logic: Concise EditionChapters 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8Order using ISBN: 978-0-19-994129-2Logic: An Emphasis on Critical Thinking and Informal LogicChapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 13 A-E, 14, 15Order using ISBN: 978-0-19-994128-5Logic: An Emphasis on Formal LogicChapters 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9Order using ISBN: 978-0-19-994126-1Logic: With Diagramming used in Chapter 4. Informal FallaciesFull textOrder using ISBN: 978-0-19-997081-0Option 2. Create your own customized textbook by choosing the specific chapters that you need for your course. Please contact your Oxford University Press Sales Representative or call 800.280.0280 for details. (shrink)

This volume looks outward to the twenty-first century and to the dynamics of this first truly global age. It asks the fundamental question: how might human societies live? In contrast to the orthodoxies of academic Philosophy and International Relations in much of the twentieth century, which marginalised or rejected the study of ethics, the contributors here believe that there is nothing more political than ethics, and therefore deserving of scholarly analysis. By exploring some of the oldest questions about duties and (...) obligations within and beyond humanly constructed boundaries, the essays help us ponder the most profound question in world politics today: who will the twenty-first century be for? (shrink)

: Radical meta-normative skepticism is the view that no standard, norm, or principle has objective authority or normative force. It does not deny that there are norms, standards of correctness, and principles of various kinds that render it possible that we succeed or fail in measuring up to their prerogatives. Rather, it denies that any norm has the status of commanding with objective authority, of giving rise to normative reasons to take seriously and follow its demands. Two powerful transcendental arguments (...) challenge this view. First, skepticism is said to be self-defeating: Settling what to accept, and in particular whether to accept skepticism, appears to be a reason-guided enterprise. How can skeptics coherently support their view by citing reasons in their favor after they just rejected them throughout? Second, there is the practical-deliberative version, most recently developed by David Enoch: We are essentially deliberative creatures. Yet deliberation appears to require that there are correct answers in the form of normative reasons to our practical questions. Thus confidence in the sensible nature of deliberation should inspire confidence in reasons. The essay undermines both transcendental arguments by demonstrating, first, how to support skepticism without deserting its tenets, and, second, how to deliberate in skeptical fashion. (shrink)

Setting the stage -- Informal logic -- Formal logic -- Inductive logic.

This book presents an exploration of concepts central to health care practice. In exploring such concepts as Subjectivity, Life, Personhood, and Death in deep philosophical terms, the book aims to draw out the ethical demands that arise when we encounter these phenomena, and also the moral resources of health care workers for meeting those demands. The series _Values in Bioethics_ makes available original philosophical books in all areas of bioethics, including medical and nursing ethics, health care ethics, research ethics, environmental (...) ethics, and global bioethics. (shrink)

This paper brings about a conversation between Schumpeterian and Polanyian perspectives on markets and their central role in the capitalist economy. For Schumpeter, markets were critical to the process of selftransformation of economic activity, but in his vision, markets as such were largely taken for granted. Markets enabled the introduction of new processes and products equally as well as rendering economic activities obsolete, with the entrepreneur and firm as agents of change, generating new combinations of activities and driven by the (...) creative power of knowledge. Innovation and markets are jointly the engines of endogenous growth. For Karl Polanyi, by contrast, although markets were the central feature of the capitalist economy from the beginning of the nineteenth century, his main interest is the constant impulse for markets as institutions to expand into every aspect of social life and the countermovement of regulation to restrain what he sees as their essentially destructive nature. His focus is therefore on markets as instituted economic processes, driven by the double movement of regulation and de-regulation. He scarcely considers innovation in production or consumption, concentrating on institutions of exchange and distribution. The paper explores the two perspectives in order to ask the question that their confrontation raises: What is the relation between intra-market endogenous change and marketframework institutional change? To test out each perspective, a schematic “long-duration” empirical account of the United Kingdom food distribution markets is subjected to a Schumpeterian and Polanyian reading, and each is exposed for complementary deficits. A broader explanatory framework is sketched that proposes analysis of innovation in market institutions--especially processes exchange and distribution-- in combination with innovation in production and consumption. It is suggested that to explore the constant change of capitalist economies, these four economic domains each involve different orders of innovation and transformation that have complex feedbacks and interactions with each other. Rather than according primacy to one or other order of change, we require a complex causal account embracing multiple instituted economic processes.Cet article discute de la vision des marchés et de leur rôle central dans l’économie capitaliste selon Schumpeter et Polanyi. Pour Schumpeter, les marchés sont essentiels au processus d’auto transformation de l’activité économique, mais dans son approche il présuppose l’existence des marchés. Les marchés permettent l’introduction de nouveaux processus et produits et rendent en même temps les activités économiques obsolètes. Les marchés, avec l’entrepreneur et la firme comme agents du changement, créent de nouvelles combinaisons d’activités et sont dynamisés par le pouvoir créatif de la connaissance. L’innovation et les marchés sont conjointement les moteurs de la croissance endogène. Chez Karl Polanyi, en revanche, bien que les marchés soient un élément central de l’économie capitaliste dès le début du 19ème siècle, l’attention se porte sur le mouvement permament des marchés-institutions à s’étendre à tous les domaines de la vie sociale ainsi que sur le contre-mouvement de la régulation à limiter ce que Polanyi considère comme la nature destructrice des marchés. Son interêt se porte ainsi aux marchés comme des processus économiques établis, conduits par un double mouvement de régulation et de dérégulation. Il ne considère que rarement l’innovation de production ou de consommation, et se concentre sur les institutions de l’échange et de la distribution.L’article explore les deux visions afin de sinterroger sur ce que la confrontation des approches soulève comme question: Quelle est la relation entre les changements endogènes intra marché et les changements institutionnels de la structure de marché? Pour tester chacune des visions, un compte-rendu empirique sur longue période de la distribution alimentaire au Royaume-Uni est soumis à une lecture Schumpeterienne et Polanyienne.Un cadre explicatif plus large est esquissé et suggère une analyse de l’innovation des institutions de marché - particulièrement des processus d’échange et de distribution - conjointement à l’innovation de production et de consommation. Il est suggéré que pour analyser le changement permanent des économies capitalistes, il faut considérer les ordres d’innovation et de transformation de ces quatres domaines économiques qui connaissent des “effets de retour” ainsi des interactions. Au lieu d’accorder la primauté à un des ordres de changement, il est nécessaire de rendre compte d’une causalité complexe qui prend en compte des processus économiques multiples. (shrink)

Klein, Nguyen, & Zhang (in press) argued that the evolutionary transition from respondent to agent during the Cambrian Explosion would be a promising vantage point from which to gain insight into the evolution of organic sentience. They focused on how increased competition for resources -- in consequence of the proliferation of new, neurally sophisticated life-forms -- made awareness of the external world (in the service of agentic acts) an adaptive priority. The explanatory scope of Klein et al (in press) was (...) limited to consideration of the conscious apprehension of externally sourced content – i.e., content delivered from the sensory registration of objects occupying phenomenal space. But consciousness – at least for humans -- takes its objects from internal as well as external sources. In the present article we extend their analysis to the question of how internally sourced content (i.e., mental states) became the object of conscious apprehension. (shrink)

I argue that our current practice of ascribing the term “ memory ” to mental states and processes lacks epistemic warrant. Memory, according to the “received view”, is any state or process that results from the sequential stages of encoding, storage and retrieval. By these criteria, memory, or its footprint, can be seen in virtually every mental state we are capable of having. This, I argue, stretches the term to the breaking point. I draw on phenomenological, historical and conceptual considerations (...) to make the case that an act of memory entails a direct, non-inferential feeling of re-acquaintance with one’s past. It does so by linking content retrieved from storage with autonoetic awareness during retrieval. On this view, memory is not the content of experience, but the manner in which that content is experienced. I discuss some theoretical and practical implications and advantages of adopting this more nuanced view of memory. -/-. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss two claims; the first is the claim that state-given reasons for belief are of a radically different kind to object-given reasons for belief. The second is that, where this last claim is true, epistemic reasons are object-given reasons for belief (EOG). I argue that EOG has two implausible consequences: (i) that suspension of judgement can never be epistemically justified, and (ii) that the reason that epistemically justifies a belief that p can never be the reason (...) for which one believes that p. (shrink)

Orthodox semantics for natural language modals give rise to two puzzles for their interactions with disjunction: Ross’s puzzle and the puzzle of free choice permission. It is widely assumed that each puzzle can be explained in terms of the licensing of ‘Diversity’ inferences: from the truth of a possibility or necessity modal with an embedded disjunction, hearers infer that each disjunct is compatible with the relevant set of worlds. I argue that Diversity inferences are too weak to explain the full (...) range of data. Instead, I argue, modals with embedded disjunctions license ‘Independence’ inferences: from the truth of a modal with an embedded disjunction, hearers infer that each disjunct is an independent alternative among the relevant set of worlds. I then develop a bilateral inquisitive semantics for modals that predicts the validity of these Independence inferences. My account vindicates common intuitions about both Ross’s puzzle and the puzzle of free choice permission, and explains the full range of data. (shrink)

This book explores the multiple meaning of the notion of otherness in Søren Kierkegaard’s thought. Leo Stan discusses in detail the threefold structure of human existence in Kierkegaard’s authorship as a whole, both pseudonymous and self-signed.

We agree that human culture is unique. However, we also believe that an understanding of the evolution of culture requires a comparative approach. We offer examples of collaborative behaviors from dolphin play, and argue that consideration should be given to whether various forms of culture are best viewed as falling along a continuum or as discrete categories.

What is it to do justice to the absent victims of past injustice, given the distance that separates us from them? Grounded in political theory and guided by the literature on historical justice, W. James Booth restores the dead to their central place at the heart of our understanding of why and how to deal with past injustice. Testimonies and accounts from the race war in the United States, the Holocaust, post-apartheid South Africa, Argentina's Dirty War and the conflict (...) in Northern Ireland help advance and defend Booth's claim that caring for the dead is a central part of addressing past injustice. Memory, Historic Injustice, and Responsibility is an insightful and original book on the relationship of past and present in thinking about what it means to do justice. A valuable addition to the currently available literature on historical justice, the volume will be of great interest to students and scholars of political science, philosophy, history, and law. (shrink)

Find out what connects logic and humor in this alternative guide to logical reasoning. Combining jokes, stories, and ironic situations, Stan Baronett shows how it is possible to always ground the formal, symbolic language of logic in everyday experience. Each chapter introduces a basic logical reasoning concept through a plausible premise based on happenings in daily life. Using jokes as his examples, Baronett reveals the inner workings of logic. After all an effective joke often relies on an unanticipated assumption (...) that leads to an unexpected result. The assumption changes the normal context of an everyday situation, so we are surprised by the ending. A complex mind that learns from experience, and builds a storehouse of regularly recurring patterns, is a great survival tool. But for a joke to work, the punch line has to be something our minds don't logically anticipate. The ending jolts our minds for a split second while we grasp the absurdity of the situation. This is how logic works: one part of your mind determines whether the information you are receiving is true or false, while another part of your mind deals with logical consequences of fact. These ideas are explained and illustrated by showing how an effective joke may rely on an unanticipated assumption that leads to an unexpected result. Injecting a sense of humor into logical language, Baronett helps us understand how to analyze basic causal reasoning and provides light relief for anyone daunted by the complex world of logic. (shrink)

In the course of making nearly 400 films over the past 50 years, "Stan Brakhage" became synonymous with independent American filmmaking, particularly its avant-garde component. This major collection of writings draws primarily upon two long out-of-print books--Metaphors on Vision and Brakhage Scrapbook. Brakhage examines filmmaking in relation to social and professional contexts, the nature of influence and collaboration, the aesthetics of personal experience, and the conditions under which various films were made. Brakhage discusses his predecessors and contemporaries, relates film (...) to dance and poetry, and in "A Moving Picture Giving and Taking Book" provides a manual for the novice filmmaker. Lectures, interviews, essays, and manifestos document Brakhage's personal vision and public persona. (shrink)

In this paper, I attempt to develop what I call an ‘Analytic, Fārābian’ conception of Orientalism. The motivation for this conception is that it helps us with the task––identified by Wael B. Hallaq––of going beyond ‘rudimentary political slogans’ attached to the theory of Orientalism and instead to identifying Orientalism’s underlying ‘psycho-epistemic pathology’ (Hallaq 2018, 4). In order to do this properly, according to Hallaq, we need to find a methodological alternative to that which makes Orientalist discourse possible. Hallaq identifies the (...) underlying problem as a commitment to secular humanism, and the solution its abandonment. However, I think the problem is a deeper one, which can roughly be stated as follows: how can we accept the pervasiveness of ideological influence without abandoning the idea that our theories aim (and to some extent succeed) at representing objective reality—such that we can say that Orientalism is a real phenomenon, and not merely something we happen to believe is a phenomenon. Conceiving Orientalism from within a Fārābian epistemology and using analytic tools to understand it (which I argue constitutes a unique and distinctive kind of fallibilism) makes head-way here where other conceptions fail. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss philosophical and psychological treatments of the question "how do we decide that an occurrent mental state is a memory and not, say a thought or imagination?" This issue has proven notoriously difficult to resolve, with most proposed indices, criteria and heuristics failing to achieve consensus. Part of the difficulty, I argue, is that the indices and analytic solutions thus far offered seldom have been situated within a well-specified theory of memory function. As I hope to (...) show, when such an approach is adopted, not only does a new, functionally-grounded answer emerge; we also gain insight into the adaptive significance of the process proposed to underwrite our belief in the memorial status of a mental state (i.e.,autonoetic awareness). (shrink)

Life-support technology may become a death-prolonging horror, and some people may fear that an over-intellectualized interpretation of traditional moral teaching has led us astray from what a compassionate God wills for the dying. The author addresses this fear. Those who defend “orthodox” teaching on end-of-life issues have a serious obligation not to obscure the compassion implicit in the traditional distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means. There is no medical or moral obligation to prolong dying or make it more burdensome with (...) interventions that offer little benefit, and there is nothing immoral about pain relief. What is prohibited is killing: any action or omission that has the express or implicit purpose of ending a life. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 10.4 (Winter 2010): 695–705. (shrink)

The subject of this book, which is the first to be devoted to a single photograph, is Camille Silvy's remarkable River Scene.

Life and work of the French photographer Camille Silvy.

This article takes the theme of Pope Benedict’s Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation, Africae Munus, on reconciliation, justice and peace in Africa as its starting point. It analyses how the commitments of African Christians at the Second African Synod can be realized through a transformative missional theological praxis. This theological approach is proposed as a deeper concern on how to bring about the fruits of the eschatological harvest of God’s kingdom to bear on the present complex African social context. This article proposes (...) two ways of doing this: The first is a socio-theological analysis of Africa’s social context, and the second is showing how to mine the spiritual, religious, cultural, human, and material resources of Africa. The article proposes an outline for an African transformative missional theology and a praxis of African development built on such a theology. (shrink)