This paper looks at the development of certain Foucauldian concepts and themes within the work of the Italian philosopher, Giorgio Agamben. Where Agamben is well-known for his critique of biopower in Homo Sacer, his recent work a more complex engagement with Foucault both in terms of his subject matter, governmentality and economy, and his critical methodology, most notably, his reaffirmation of the value of Foucault’s archaeological method. Focusing on three of Agamben’s recent publications, Signatura Rerum: Sul Metodo, Il regno e (...) la gloria. Per una genealogia teologica dell'economia e del governo and What is an Apparatus?, the article looks first at Agamben’s development of Foucault’s archaeological method within his own concept of the signature. It then goes on to consider Agamben’s identification of an economic theology in contradistinction to Schmitt’s political theology and how Agamben’s discussion of collateral damage might be related to Foucault’s notion of security as developed in Security, Territory, Population. Finally, the article considers how Agamben links Foucault’s notion of ‘dispositif’ [apparatus] to an economic theology of government, calling for the development of counter-apparatuses in a similar way to Foucault’s call for ‘resistances.’ The article concludes by considering both the benefits and the limitations of Agamben’s engagement with Foucault. (shrink)

Social epistemology may be defined as the conceptual and normative study of the social dimensions of knowledge. It studies the bearing of social relations, interests, roles, and institutions – what I will term “social conditions” – on the conceptual and normative conditions of knowledge. It differs from the sociology of knowledge in being a conceptual and normative, and not primarily empirical, study, and in limning the necessary and not merely the contingent social conditions of knowledge. The central question of social (...) epistemology is whether, and to what extent, the conditions of knowledge include social conditions. Is knowledge a property of knowers in isolation from their social setting (and in what sense of “isolation”), or does it involve a relation between knowers and their social circumstances? This question can take various forms and admit diverse answers, depending on the kinds of knowers, knowledge, and social relations we ask about. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose to draw two considerations regarding the ontological notion of the brute being, present in Maurice Merleau-Ponty's late philosophy: (i) that the aforementioned notion can be understood according to the irreducibility of Being to our linguistic instruments and, in this sense, consists of a being-Other that, in a raw and permanently wild state, never allows itself to be enclosed in the domain of the word; (ii) assuming that the "ultimate support of all things" ineluctably becomes the (...) otherness of that which is phenomenally manifested to us, leaving only an indirect access to the Absolute considered in a non-substantial way, we suggest the inference that such allusive access cannot be restricted to the verbal regime, given that any path that directs us in this direction of ontogenesis always lacks preeminence and, for this very reason, it becomes incoherent to presuppose and agree with a privilege of the word. We assert, then, that the non-verbal expressive routes must be able to lead (each in its own way) to a certain contact with the Other-being. We will try to situate the interpretations of some specialists in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy on this point, as well as to briefly introduce a possible framing of this philosophy according to Michel Foucault's analysis of modern discourses, with the intention of offering an alternative to the interpretation of the notion of brute being as one more figure of the thought of the Same, thus reaffirming the radical alterity of the being-Other that foreshadows, we believe, our author's late ontology. (shrink)

This paper is about rewilding and the tensions it involves. Rewilding is a relatively novel approach to nature conservation, which seeks to be proactive and ambitious in the face of continuing environmental decline. Whilst definitions of rewilding place a strong emphasis on non-human agency, it is an inescapably human aspiration resulting in a range of social conflicts. The paper focuses on the case study of the Cambrian Wildwood project in Mid Wales (UK), evaluating the ways in which debate and strategic (...) action to advance rewilding is proceeding, assessing the extent to which compromise and learning has occurred amongst advocates. As such, we provide an important addition to the field, by detailing how conflicts play out over time and how actors’ positioning and approach shifts, and why. In this case, tempers have flared around the threat that rewilding is seen to pose to resident farming communities. Tensions discussed include the differing social constructions of landscape and nature involved; the distribution of impacts on different stakeholders; and the relative power of different actors to make decisions and gain representation. Responding to these, the paper outlines how rewilding advocates have sought to advance a more peopled and culturally responsive vision, which seeks to champion sustainable livelihood strategies. The changes in approach detailed demonstrate a reflexive stance from rewilders, which suggests that learning and adaptation can occur. Nonetheless, caution is expressed regarding the extent to which rewilding can truly advance inclusive opportunities for rural change, given a continued return amongst stakeholders to exclusionary narratives of belonging and authenticity, suggesting substantive difficulty in moving beyond longstanding concerns over identity and the re-imagination of place. Rewilding, it would seem, is about who we think we are and how we co-constitute our sense of self. We, therefore, close by arguing that tactics and politicking can only have so much bearing, tensions over rewilding are unavoidably emotional. (shrink)

Socializing Metaphysics supplies diverse answers to the basic questions of social metaphysics, from a broad array of voices. It will interest all philosophers and social scientists concerned with mind, action, or the foundations of social theory.

" Il faut philosopher " : cette formule se rencontre en diverses oeuvres de l'Antiquité destinées à exhorter un public à pratiquer la sagesse ou la philosophie, et, en particulier, dans certains des rares témoignages sur le Protreptique d'Aristote désormais perdu. Plusieurs philologues, à partir de la fin du me siècle, crurent retrouver un vaste ensemble de " fragments " de celui-ci dans l'ouvrage homonyme du néoplatonicien Jamblique. Cette " découverte " déboucha sur de nombreux travaux autour de l'authenticité aristotélicienne (...) des chapitres V à XII du livre de Jamblique, et sur différentes tentatives, au demeurant hypothétiques, pour " reconstruire " l'original aristotélicien. Le statut des extraits de Jamblique est paradoxal : si leur contenu correspond, en majorité, aux doctrines du corpus aristotélicien et semble formulé dans le cadre d'une exhortation, jamais, toutefois, l'auteur ne se réfère explicitement au Stagirite. La perspective du présent ouvrage tient compte de ce paradoxe : pour désigner l'ensemble comprenant les quelques témoignages et les rares citations de l'ouvrage aristotélicien extérieures à Jamblique, ainsi que les extraits de ce dernier, nous avons donc préféré au titre de Protreptique d'Aristote celui d'Exhortations aristotéliciennes. Cet appel à la prudence est aussi un moyen de déplacer l'intérêt de ces textes. Cet intérêt a été souvent grevé, en effet, par les questions de l'authenticité aristotélicienne, sans doute trop présentes, au détriment de ce que la traduction et le commentaire proposés dans cette édition veulent mettre en évidence : la richesse des réflexions sur le sens et la valeur de la philosophie développées dans ces extraits, source d'inspiration pour de nombreux auteurs de l'Antiquité plus tardive. L'introduction montre ainsi que la philosophie des Exhortations aristotéliciennes se situe au croisement de deux modèles conceptuels fondamentaux : elle est tantôt technique et science, tantôt accomplissement des facultés naturelles de l'homme. Ce qui explique aussi l'attention apportée, dans cette édition, à l'argumentation des Exhortations et aux questions rhétoriques, largement abordées dans une dernière partie de l'introduction. (shrink)

According to dispositional realism, or dispositionalism, the entities inhabiting our world possess irreducibly dispositional properties – often called ‘powers’ – by means of which they are sources of change. Dispositionalism has become increasingly popular among metaphysicians in the last three decades as it offers a realist account of causation and provides novel avenues for understanding modality, laws of nature, agency, free will and other key concepts in metaphysics. At the same time, it is receiving growing interest among philosophers of science. (...) This reflects the substantial role scientific findings play in arguments for dispositionalism which, as a metaphysics of science, aims to unveil the very foundations of science. The present collection of essays brings together both strands of interest. It elucidates the ontological profile of dispositionalism by exploring its ontological commitments, and it discusses these from the perspective of the philosophy of science. The essays are written by both proponents of dispositionalism and sceptics so as to initiate an open-minded, constructive dialogue. (shrink)

Eric Olson distinguishes his animalistic account of transtemporal personal identity from the apparently similar Bodily Criterion, among other things, by accusing the latter of being contaminated with Cartesian implications owing to its usage of the term ‚body‘. In contrast, Olson argues, Animalism is able to avoid these implications by substituting the concept of body for the concept of organism, which makes Animalism not only a distinct position, but also the better alternative to the Bodily Criterion. The paper critically reconstructs Olson’s (...) charge of Cartesianism against the Bodily Criterion, thereby differentiating between several variants of it. This eventually adds up to an evaluation of how suitable these criticisms are for defending Animalism at the expense of the Bodily Criterion. (shrink)

Der logische Status dessen, was in der Hegelschen Terminologie «Begriff» heisst, kann nur als seine eigene Genese zur Darstellung kommen. In ihm sind die Formen der Positivität, die durch die Subjekt-Objekt-Relation charakterisiert sind, als Momente enthalten. Die Einsicht in die einzelnen Formen der Positivität ermöglicht es, sich einen Begriff von der Sprachlichkeit des Selbstbewusstseins zu machen.

The author argues that merleau-Ponty's conception of his task as a philosopher changed between "the structure of behavior" (1942) and "the phenomenology of perception" (1945) and that the latter is accordingly written in a nonscientific style susceptible of misinterpretation. Focusing first on the earlier work, He examines terminological confusions and logical difficulties in merleau-Ponty's critique of realism, And argues that the central concept of form is scientifically useless and philosophically unnecessary. He then discusses merleau-Ponty's later views on language before considering (...) his rejection of objectivism and formulating the significant philosophical issues raised by his work. (staff). (shrink)