The article examines the subjective attitudes towards life chances of the Lithuanian youth (aged 18–35). Following the concept of life chances introduced by M. Weber (1920) (cited by Grusky 2001), the theoretical aspects of life chances are analysed. The empirical part of the paper is to survey the research results on the life chances of young people in Lithuania in 2023. Based on the analysis of scientific literature and survey research data, we can state that the subjective attitudes of young (...) people to life chances vary depending on age, gender, employment, and parents’ socio-economic status when the respondent is 14–15 years old. The survey research revealed that young people, who are currently not working or studying, or who identify themselves and their family with the lowest social class, most unfavourably evaluate their life chances. The scientific research is funded by the Lithuanian Science Council researchers group’s Project ‘Socio-economic Factors of Youth Life Chances Differentiation in Lithuania’ (Reg. No. S-MIP-22-42, contract date 18.03.2022). (shrink)

Yannis Ritsos es uno de los poetas más influyentes de la generación griega de 1930, análoga a la generación del ‘27 en España. Los poetas de esa generación trajeron el surrealismo a la poesía griega, y, algunos como Ritsos, un claro compromiso político, reflejado en su poesía. Su obra más conocida/traducida es de carácter políticamente comprometido, de tono seco y épico. La "Sonata del claro de luna", el poema aquí traducido, es de un lirismo marcadamente diferente, y es menos (...) conocido, aunque sea de una belleza y recursos artísticos impactantes.PALABRAS CLAVE: Yannis Ritsos, Sonata del claro de luna, generación de 1930, poesía griega del siglo XX, poesía y contexto histórico.Yannis Ritsos is one of the most influential poets of the socalled 1930 generation of Greek poets who introduced surrealism in Greek poetry, and for some, such as Ritsos, a strong political engagement reflected in their poetry. His most read/translated work is imbued by a politically engaged, stark and epic tone. The poem translated/presented herewith is of a markedly different, lyrical character, and is less well-known, despite its arresting beauty and artistic elements.KEYWORDS: Yannis Ritsos, Moonlight Sonata, 1930 generation, XX-century Greek poetry, poetry and its historical context. (shrink)

La forma sonata es una de las estructuras musicales más empleadas desde el siglo XVIII, tanto en obras para instrumento solista como en música de cámara, sinfónica e incluso en ópera. La disposición formal de este tipo de construcciones se basa en las relaciones establecidas entre las sensaciones sonoras de reposo, inestabi-lidad y tensión, generadas inicialmente en el discurso armónico. Sin embargo, estas relaciones se pueden situar también en los niveles melódico, rítmico y tímbrico. En este documento se presenta (...) el primer movi-miento del Cuarteto No 1 Op. 18 en Fa Mayor de Ludwig van Beethoven, compuesto en forma de sonata, como estructura basada en relaciones rítmicas. El principal fundamento teórico de este estudio se halla en la Teoría de Estratos de Nicolai Hartmann. (shrink)

The subject of the study is the Sonata for flute and piano "Pan's Flute" by J. Mouquet. The purpose of the study is to consider the traditional pastoral techniques that the composer uses in his composition. When writing the article, both general research methods (analytical, deductive, inductive, etc.) and musicological (holistic, intonation, harmonic, genre, structural and compositional) were used. Methodologically important in writing the article were the works of A. G. Korobova. Based on the works of the scientist in (...) the Sonata of J. Muke analyzed the pastoral topic of the composition, and also determined its pastoral model. The culturological approach was carried out on the basis of the research of V. V. Azarova, O. A. Gagarina, V. A. Zakharova. With the help of him, certain French traditions were derived in the article, which influenced the work of J. Flour. In the scientific article, for the first time, an attempt is made to analyze one of the most famous compositions of J. Mouquet – the Sonata "Pan's Flute". In this work, two aspects are considered in detail – verbal and actually musical. In both aspects, there are connections with the French pastoral musical and theatrical tradition, as well as a commonality in the symbolic interpretation of neoanticism and neobucolics with the works of C. Debussy. During the analysis, it was found that J. Muke applied an anti-politicized pastoral model. Pastoral topics are found at different levels of composition – intonation, tonal-harmonic, textural, timbre, formative, dramatic. This article can be used in the field of art criticism for further study of the work of J. Mouquet, French music of the turn of the XIX – XX centuries and in the study of pastoral musical works. Analysis of the Sonata by J. Muke will also be useful in performing practice for a better understanding of the composer's idea and the dramaturgy of the composition. (shrink)

Tolstoy's remarkably economical novella The Kreutzer Sonata manages to create one of the most intense, vivid, and thought-provoking portraits of jealousy in the canon, and is as disturbing to read today as it no doubt was in 1889. The rather unhinged protagonist, Pozdnyshev, explains to his traveling companion and narrator: “Of all the passions, it is sexual, carnal love that is the strongest, the most malignant and the most unyielding” (48). This article identifies not only the “bestial” element of (...) human sexuality in Tolstoy's story but also the array of animals which the author offers to ventriloquize a certain complex (and times confused) polemic about gender relations. In other words, this analysis offers an interpretation of The Kreutzer Sonata as bestiary; one which offers a moral taxonomy of creaturely life and creaturely love. From the green-eyed monster of jealousy itself, through the Venus fly-trap and porcine couple, right up to the wild murderous beast, Pozdnyshev's confession is read via this zoological trope in order to emphasize, and question, that mobile border which separates the human from the inhuman, the civilized from the uncivilized. And it does so in order to highlight the incoherencies of the anthropocentric discursive regulation of this very same borderline. Animality and animosity are thus presented as the twin avatars of Tolstoy's intense and challenging vision. (shrink)

It is proposed that one musically interesting way to characterise and compare different performances or recordings of the same piece is by correlating them with different Schenkerian interpretations through the medium of grouping. This approach is demonstrated through an examination of four 'either/or' passages from the first movement of Beethoven's Piano Sonata in E Major, Op. 81a, passages in which at least two Schenkerian interpretations are possible. Schenker's own published and unpublished sketches, among others, are considered alongside recordings by (...) Vladimir Ashkenazy, Emil Gilels, Richard Goode, Murray Perahia and Artur Rubinstein. The approach is not meant to be self-sufficient, but rather to contribute a new set of tools to the emerging multidisciplinary field of performance studies. (shrink)

Summary The young Hermann Helmholtz, in an 1838 letter home, declared that he always appreciated music much more when he played it for himself. Though a frequent concert-goer, and celebrated for his highly influential 1863 work on the physiological basis of music theory, Die Lehre von den Tonempfindungen, it is likely that Helmholtz's enduring engagement with music began with his initial, personal experience of playing music for himself. I develop this idea, shifting the discussion of Helmholtz's work on sound sensation (...) back to its origins, and examine the role of his material interaction with musical instruments and music itself. In his sound sensation studies, Helmholtz understood sound as an external, physical object. But Helmholtz also conceived of sound in musical terms. Further, Helmholtz's particular musical tastes as well as his deeply personal interaction with musical instruments allowed him to reconcile his conception of sound as physical object with his conception of sound as music. Helmholtz's physiological theory of sound sensation was both the product of and constitutive of how he heard and created sound. I argue that Helmholtz himself was the embodied reconciliation of his physiological theory of sound sensation and his belief that musical aesthetics were historically and culturally contingent. (shrink)

The concept of the sinthome - the construction which provides a unique structuring of jouissance, but which is divested of any symbolic meaning - arrived late in Lacan’s work, in his seminar on 1975-6. The sinthom’s most notable application in Žižek’s output is found in Part I of his The Sublime Object of Ideology, in which he explores the homology between the form of commodities and of dreams. It has since been used widely in discussions of literature, art, and cinema, (...) but is missing from musicology, aside from the occasional remark from Žižek himself. This paper demonstrates that the medial caesura which deflects the tonal trajectory of a sonata exposition, and not the themes themselves, should be identified as the locus of this aspect of Schubert’s compositional voice. Drawing on ideas emerging from Žižek’s critique of Hitchcock, the aim is to demonstrate how the Lacanian concept of the sinthom reveals a deeper, more fundamental intertextuality in Schubert’s compositional project than has hitherto been available. (shrink)

We seem to talk about repeatable artworks, like symphonies, films, and novels, all the time. We say things like, "The Moonlight Sonata has three movements" and "Duck Soup makes me laugh". How are these sentences to be understood? We argue against the simple subject/predicate view, on which the subjects of the sentences refer to individuals and the sentences are true iff the referents of the subjects have the properties picked out by the predicates. We then consider two alternative responses (...) that involve reading these sentences as generics, similar to "The polar bear has four paws". The first response takes these sentences to be about kinds, and the second takes the relevant noun-phrases to act as predicates. We reject these accounts, but offer a third alternative which is informed by both, and which enables us to deny the existence of repeatable artworks while endorsing the truth of sentences seemingly about them. (shrink)

Quanto spazio concedono alla libertà dell'interprete un testo sacro come una sonata di Beethoven o un articolo della Costituzione? Nella musica così come nel diritto, di fronte a una legge o a una suite di Bach, l'interprete si muove sempre in una delicata zona di confine che si situa tra l'eseguire e il creare. Dall'anelito alla perfezione alla deriva dei virtuosismi, dal gusto dell'improvvisazione alla necessità dell'innovazione, il compito più alto, e arduo, dell'interprete è quello di farsi tramite fra (...) passato e futuro. (shrink)

This article analyses the book on Beethoven, which Adorno worked on for more than 30 years without having time to complete it. The long-awaited French translation now makes it possible to fully appreciate the importance of this volume, which is, at the same time, a workshop and an echo chamber for Adorno’s entire work. The main thrust of the book is the connection between Beethoven and Hegel, which raises the issue of a relationship between identity and difference that ensures that (...) otherness is not absorbed into the economy of speculative thought. In this respect, we should first bear in mind that, for Adorno, it is to the very extent that Beethovenian form aims at the constitution of an “intensive totality” that it leads to the exposure, within and through aesthetic appearance, of the arbitrary character of such primacy granted to the whole. If this is the “truth content” of this music, then we might consider that Beethoven’s “late style” (a reasoning present from the first to the last of Adorno’s texts on the composer) constitutes its full unfolding, as a critique, immanent in the musical material, of the illusion of the reconciled. While it is well known that the last quartets or sonatas are exemplary of such a gesture, we wished to show that it was both duplicated and altered in the composition of the Missa solemnis, which Adorno said he could not understand. We, therefore, put forward the following assumption: this tension between two forms of distancing, or “estrangement” (Verfremdung), expresses in an eminent way untimeliness that runs through the whole of Beethoven’s work, and at the same time crystallises the fundamental theoretical requirements of this reform of dialectics that Adorno calls negative dialectics, and, inseparably, of the concept of a non-linear, non-teleological historical temporality. (shrink)

A theory of musical narrative. An introduction to narrative analysis : Chopin's prelude in G major, op. 28, no. 3 ; Perspectives and critiques ; A theory of musical narrative : conceptual considerations ; A theory of musical narrative : analytical considerations ; Narrative and topic -- Archetypal narratives and phases. Romance narratives and Micznik's degrees of narrativity ; Tragic narratives : an extended analysis of Schubert, piano sonata in B flat major, D. 960, first movement ; Ironic narratives (...) : subtypes and phases ; Comic narratives and discursive strategies ; Summary and conclusion. (shrink)

Miran Božovič, an expert in modern philosophy, in his new work begins to read some literary works from the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries in the light of philosophical theories, either explicitly or implicitly contained in them. These range from little-known novels such as G. Daniel's Journey to the World of Descartes (1690) and Fontenell's State of the Philosophers (1682), through 18th century classics, Diderot's Rameau's nephew, to one of the greatest 19th century novels, Melville's Moby Dick (1851) and Tolstoy's (...) short stories Kreutzer's Sonata (1889)--Publisher's website. (shrink)

Forms of failure in later Beethoven.- In the later style of Beethoven can be seen certain modes of expression which could be understood as a criticism of absolute idealism. The way in which the sonata-form breaks up is what best illustrates the failure of hegemonic subjecti-vity.

The form of this paper is unconventional. Just as composers sometimes want a change from the traditional sonata form and write a movement in the form of theme and variations, so I would like to depart from the orthodox form of philosophical paper, which contains a closely reasoned discussion of some particular problem, by stating a theme which will be a principle of pure logic, then sketching a number of applications of it in different areas of philosophy. But the (...) variations on my theme will not be entirely disconnected with each other, for I suspect that it is a theme which could have especially important applications in philosophical theology. So my later variations on it will be increasingly oriented to concepts of God, and I will close with a coda which will consist of some controversial remarks about the controversial concept of transcendence. (shrink)

The representational arts seem friendly territory for “symbol” theories of aesthetics. Much of the initial resistance one may feel to the idea that a Mondrian composition or a Scarlatti sonata is a symbol evaporates when we switch to a portrait of Mozart, Michelangelo’s Pietá, or Dickens’s A Tale of Two Cities. These representational works have reference to things outside themselves. The portrait is a picture of Mozart; the Pietá is a sculpture of Christ and his Mother; A Tale of (...) Two Cities is about London, Paris, and the French Revolution. It is natural enough to consider the relation between these works and what they are of or about a semantic one. And if the representational is to be understood in terms of this semantic relation it is reasonable to hold that to be representational is to be a symbol of a certain kind. (shrink)

Mozart's skull -- The case of the purloined partitur -- A tale of two authenticities -- Ancient authenticities -- Operatic authenticity -- Messiah's message -- Is nothing sacred? -- Sound in sound -- Music, science, and semantics -- Authorial intention and the pure musical parameters -- Leonard Meyer's sonata.

This short essay constitutes a vindication of Adorno’s work on Beethoven as a profound text that sheds light on the understanding of the Frankfurtian’s thought. It will focus on the conclusions to which the late Beethovenian compositional technique leads and its role in a reconception of reason that represents a model from which to base a 21st century philosophy. It will start from the distinction made by Adorno of the different ways that Beethoven, throughout his styles of composition, elaborated to (...) confront or, rather, approach different moments and compositional techniques within a sonata form, delving into how those uses by the Late Beethoven were an influence on Adorno’s thought, to the point of hiding the key to the adornian problem: the overcoming of the Enlightenment through the Enlightenment itself. (shrink)

This chapter deals with a crucial component of our position, the presumption that there are objective grounds for preferring one thing to another within the various cultural institutions we deal with, that there are better or worse symphonies, soufflés and theories of the atom. The task of showing this is more urgent for some institutions than others. While philosophers can doubt anything, most people are persuaded of the objectivity of our efforts to comprehend the physical world and to weigh, count (...) and measure accurately in many areas of human activity. Again, when we are faced with a choice among functional objects or processes, most people will admit that we can ground a preference for a knife or an exercise routine on objectively established facts: sharpness, or measurable increase in strength. Here, certainly, various conflicting desiderata may enter and make actual decisions more difficult — the sharpest knife may also be the most expensive; we may need to worry about its safety features; it may be ugly; and so on. But many will doubt that our judgements of comparative worth for non-functional objects such as paintings or sonatas can claim a similarly objective basis. We shall, therefore, concentrate our efforts on the most doubted areas, but will begin with the less contentious, where we think it is useful to draw attention to the genuine problems some philosophers have stressed, to show in fact that what we believe to be popular unconcern deserves to be somewhat ruffled. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Extraordinary Rendition:On Politics, Music, and Circular MeaningsRandall Everett AllsupThe purpose of this symposium is to look at music, education, and politics. I will begin with an examination of how musical meanings are politically rendered, and how these understandings are attached to moral consequences. Highly resistant to classification, musical meanings are those things we come to understand about ourselves through music, as opposed to musical knowledge which is demonstrable know-how. (...) While marching bands and flute sonatas can be judged with scores estimated to the 100th decimal point, the meanings that are created between the standards of practice of a given genre and the worldview of the listener or performer are provisional at best. Seen in this light, even seemingly secure or knowable realms like Christian heavy metal or anti-war movies are in fact highly un-objective and unpredictable. (More on Christian rock and movies in a moment). The challenge this paper seeks to uncover is participation on the hither side of fact, where understandings are rendered in a world that is contingent, political, and always in motion. What better example of the unclassifiable than the moving axes of politics and art?So what occurs between art and human or so-called "world" experience? [End Page 144] Let's agree that there is always motion, non-neutral, political movement in this interaction. We need not be students of French post-structuralism to recognize that we are part of many ever-evolving human-made systems, some of control, regulation, reward, punishment, and pleasure, but each with their own gravitation pull.1 I like Susan Sontag's take the best when she wrote that every place, every history has its own "sensibility," its own ineffable way of being in the world.2 Sensibilities—perhaps a clearer way of referring to politics in the context of art and experience—do not exist apart from their environment, yet they are more elusive than an idea or recognizable behavior.3 The sensibility of a time and place makes possible multiple discourses through which we make meaning.4 Some discourses, Foucault would remind us, are intensified by a history's particular sensibility and so appear louder than others. Such a discourse might speak so loudly that it shapes the meanings we make, drowning out options, and thus appearing obvious or commonsensical. The logic of musical assessment and evaluation—scoring marching bands and flute sonatas to the 100th decimal—is one such example.In spite of authoritative voices and reasonable discourses, each history's sensibility has its own escape routes, its own distortions and contradictions. I am fascinated by how we comply with or resist these pulls, as they are matters of agency and identity, matters of equity and social justice. In the present-day context of neo-liberalism and conservative values, especially 21st Century American fundamentalism, we would do well to ask how—not whether—such a fundamentalist sensibility shapes our ways of doing and knowing.5 My attempt is to locate music education in such a project.Shortly after the invasion of Iraq, I wrote a short piece on the fundamentalist imagination and its pull on the arts and education.6 This research took place at the 2003 MENC biennial where Bennett Reimer asks philosophy SRIG participants to consider (among other things) the role of metaphor in music education.7 I viewed the fundamentalist imagination as antithetical to metaphor: to paraphrase, the fundamentalist philosophy of education was "a philosophy for, not with, its initiates. Judgments are passed, not reached; answers are given, not argued... [Most importantly,] it is an educational method that emphasizes and then measures what is literal."8Since then, the voices of American literalism have appeared in increasingly loud volume seeking to discourage interpretation and argument in favor of handed-down teachings and binary logic. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia decries the folly of a "living" constitution, in favor of a strict or literal reading. Retired Cardinal Bernard Law of Boston, in response to a common ground initiative by the late Joseph Bernadin, labels an appeal to "dialogue" a "fundamental flaw."9 Law sniffed, "Dissent from revealed truth or the authoritative [End Page 145] teaching of the church cannot... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Extraordinary Rendition:On Politics, Music, and Circular MeaningsRandall Everett AllsupThe purpose of this symposium is to look at music, education, and politics. I will begin with an examination of how musical meanings are politically rendered, and how these understandings are attached to moral consequences. Highly resistant to classification, musical meanings are those things we come to understand about ourselves through music, as opposed to musical knowledge which is demonstrable know-how. (...) While marching bands and flute sonatas can be judged with scores estimated to the 100th decimal point, the meanings that are created between the standards of practice of a given genre and the worldview of the listener or performer are provisional at best. Seen in this light, even seemingly secure or knowable realms like Christian heavy metal or anti-war movies are in fact highly un-objective and unpredictable. (More on Christian rock and movies in a moment). The challenge this paper seeks to uncover is participation on the hither side of fact, where understandings are rendered in a world that is contingent, political, and always in motion. What better example of the unclassifiable than the moving axes of politics and art?So what occurs between art and human or so-called "world" experience? [End Page 144] Let's agree that there is always motion, non-neutral, political movement in this interaction. We need not be students of French post-structuralism to recognize that we are part of many ever-evolving human-made systems, some of control, regulation, reward, punishment, and pleasure, but each with their own gravitation pull.1 I like Susan Sontag's take the best when she wrote that every place, every history has its own "sensibility," its own ineffable way of being in the world.2 Sensibilities—perhaps a clearer way of referring to politics in the context of art and experience—do not exist apart from their environment, yet they are more elusive than an idea or recognizable behavior.3 The sensibility of a time and place makes possible multiple discourses through which we make meaning.4 Some discourses, Foucault would remind us, are intensified by a history's particular sensibility and so appear louder than others. Such a discourse might speak so loudly that it shapes the meanings we make, drowning out options, and thus appearing obvious or commonsensical. The logic of musical assessment and evaluation—scoring marching bands and flute sonatas to the 100th decimal—is one such example.In spite of authoritative voices and reasonable discourses, each history's sensibility has its own escape routes, its own distortions and contradictions. I am fascinated by how we comply with or resist these pulls, as they are matters of agency and identity, matters of equity and social justice. In the present-day context of neo-liberalism and conservative values, especially 21st Century American fundamentalism, we would do well to ask how—not whether—such a fundamentalist sensibility shapes our ways of doing and knowing.5 My attempt is to locate music education in such a project.Shortly after the invasion of Iraq, I wrote a short piece on the fundamentalist imagination and its pull on the arts and education.6 This research took place at the 2003 MENC biennial where Bennett Reimer asks philosophy SRIG participants to consider (among other things) the role of metaphor in music education.7 I viewed the fundamentalist imagination as antithetical to metaphor: to paraphrase, the fundamentalist philosophy of education was "a philosophy for, not with, its initiates. Judgments are passed, not reached; answers are given, not argued... [Most importantly,] it is an educational method that emphasizes and then measures what is literal."8Since then, the voices of American literalism have appeared in increasingly loud volume seeking to discourage interpretation and argument in favor of handed-down teachings and binary logic. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia decries the folly of a "living" constitution, in favor of a strict or literal reading. Retired Cardinal Bernard Law of Boston, in response to a common ground initiative by the late Joseph Bernadin, labels an appeal to "dialogue" a "fundamental flaw."9 Law sniffed, "Dissent from revealed truth or the authoritative [End Page 145] teaching of the church cannot... (shrink)

What does it mean to say that music perception is nonconceptual? As the passages from Meyer and Budd illustrate, one frequently encounters claims of this kind: it is often suggested that there is a level of perceptual contact with, or understanding or enjoyment of, music—one in which listeners typically engage—that does not require conceptualization. But just what does a claim of this sort amount to, and what arguments may be adduced for it? And is all musical hearing nonconceptual, or are (...) there ways of enjoying fugues and sonatas that do involve conceptualizing cadences and contrapuntal devices? If the latter, how are we to conceive of the relationship between conceptual and nonconceptual ways of hearing? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Adjudicating the Debate Over Two Models of Nature AppreciationSheila Lintott (bio)It seems commonplace to point out that we aesthetically appreciate a wide variety of objects: that is, art objects are not the only good candidates for aesthetic appreciation.1 We know from experience that one can aesthetically appreciate not only Georgia O'Keefe's White Trumpet Flower, but also a white trumpet flower. Similarly, we can aesthetically appreciate both a pictorial representation (...) of the human form and that form instantiated in certain prime specimens. We do so, moreover, without classifying either flowers or human beings as art objects. Yet, the paradigm of aesthetic appreciation today, in both everyday life and in educative contexts, is the appreciation of art, which explains why we tend to try to understand what makes aesthetic appreciation appropriate in terms of what makes art appreciation appropriate. This approach may not be entirely mistaken, for beginning with the familiar is always a good plan. However, it must be done with care, otherwise important differences between our relationships with the art we appreciate and with the nature we appreciate may be overlooked, thereby obscuring salient differences in the appreciation of each.In this essay, I focus on the issue of the appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature and offer an overview of a contemporary debate on the topic. I begin with a general discussion of art and nature appreciation. I then summarize Kendall Walton's theory of appropriate art appreciation and explain his skepticism regarding the possibility of appropriate and inappropriate nature appreciation. Next, I discuss two models according to which Walton is mistaken, as the philosophers who present these models, Allen Carlson and Noël Carroll, do so to illustrate how nature appreciation can be properly considered appropriate or inappropriate. It may seem that given the recent proliferation of models of nature appreciation, the last thing we should seek is yet another model. However, in the end, I shall argue the need for a new and different kind of model, one that is a revisionist and extensionist model of nature appreciation. [End Page 52]Art and Nature AppreciationConcerning the perceptual activity of the audience, how we ought to appreciate artworks is largely uncontroversial. Perhaps this is why Carlson opens his attempt to understand the aesthetic appreciation of nature with a presentation of the aesthetic appreciation of art, explaining that "with art objects there is a straightforward sense in which we know both what and how to aesthetically appreciate."2 Although not all artworks offer "straightforward" examples of aesthetic appreciation, Carlson's general point is reasonably motivated. As Kendall Walton succinctly explains: "Paintings and sculptures are to be looked at; sonatas and songs are to be heard. What is important about these works of art, as works of art, is what can be seen or heard in them."3 That we ought to look at paintings and listen to sonatas seems obvious for at least two reasons. First, via formal education and informal interactions, we have grown familiar with the conventions of art appreciation; second, such conventions find experiential reinforcement when, for example, our auditory sense is tickled by a Mozart concerto.4Underlying our relative lack of confidence when it comes to nature appreciation is the obvious fact that nature, unlike art, is not an artifact. Nature was not made by beings like us; it was made neither for our use, nor for our entertainment, nor for our appreciation.5 As Carlson puts it, "art objects are our own creations; it is for this reason that we know what is and what is not part of a work, which of its aspects are of aesthetic significance, and how to appreciate them" (ANE, 41). We need, therefore, a model of nature appreciation that will serve as a source of education regarding how best to appreciate nature and will offer the confidence we lack and the guidance we seek.It might seem that we should simply apply our knowledge of art to nature appreciation — that is, appreciate nature as if it were art. However, as numerous philosophers have noticed, this approach is mistaken.6 The mistake is both theoretical and practical. Theoretically, it is a category error... (shrink)

In this paper I address the issue of narrativity in music. The central question is the extent to which pure instrumental music in the classical tradition can or should be understood as narrative, that is, as narrating a story of some kind. I am interested in the varying potential and aptness for narrative construal of different sorts of instrumental music, and in what the content of such narratives might plausibly be thought to be. But ultimately I explore, at greater length, (...) an alternative way of construing musical process, namely, as dramatic rather than narrative in nature, following the lead of two musicologists, Anthony Newcomb and Fred Maus. After a comparison of the respective merits of narrative and dramatic construals of music, the paper concludes with an illustrative reading, in dramatic mode, of part of the opening movement of Schubert's Piano Sonata in A minor, D. 845. (shrink)

Philosophy is the soul of art, and art is great because of philosophy. All kinds of philosophical thoughts seep into artists' minds like water flooding the beach, affecting their world outlook and outlook on life, and providing theoretical guidance for their artistic creation from aesthetic thoughts to creative methods. Beethoven used musical language to express the deepest worries in the hearts of the advanced people of his time. This paper attempts to explore the internal development law of art philosophy from (...) the perspectives of the orientation of art philosophy, the aesthetic construction of "meaningful form" and "poetic dwelling" of art philosophy, the thinking of the final conclusion of art philosophy, the development destination of art philosophy, and the integration and development. In the long history of art development, the form and function of art are constantly changing. Philosophy provides a continuous source of creative ideas for art and works of art often show profound philosophical views. Kant's lofty aesthetic concept affects the infinite emotional capacity in Beethoven's music. However, the expression of the ubiquitous contradictions and conflicts in Beethoven's music is also deeply influenced by Kant's view of nature. In Beethoven's view, the development of the universe is similar to a person's mental journey, and its essence is also a large symphony or sonata. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Self-Knowledge and the Limitations of NarrativeJeanette BicknellIn this passage from his Confessions, St. Augustine recounts some youthful shenanigans: "In a garden nearby to our vineyard there was a pear tree.... Late one night—to which hour, according to our pestilential custom, we had kept up our street games, a group of very bad youngsters set out to shake down and rob this tree. We took great loads of fruit from (...) it, not for our own eating, but rather to throw it to the pigs.... Foul was the evil, and I loved it... I loved my fault itself. Base in soul was I...."1Here a mature Augustine looks back on his boyhood self with recrimination and reproach. Stealing pears is not seen as an immature prank but as evidence of a base soul. Yet for all the force and gravity of his words, it is not difficult to imagine a younger Augustine, before his conversion to Christianity, light-heartedly reminiscing with friends about these very same incidents. Of these two stories—the one he tells in the Confessions and the one he might have told—which provides a more accurate portrayal of Augustine's boyhood soul? Which is closer to the truth?Narrative and personal identity would seem to be inextricably bound.2 Telling stories or imposing a narrative coherence on events is one of the main ways in which we make sense of our experience. We also get to know others by listening to their stories, thus learning the narrative coherence they have placed on events in their own lives. Over the course of a lifetime stories may change. Characters first dismissed as "bit players" may gain importance. Gestures or words earlier thought to [End Page 406] be unimportant may, in retrospect, take on greater significance. With time and reflection one's past may be re-interpreted as displaying error, alienation or ignorance. A cataclysmic religious conversion is only one of many factors which might prompt such reflection and reinterpretation. Illness, divorce, and the death of loved ones are other possible causes.Here is my worry: presumably we would like to believe that our "new" stories are improvements on the old, and that they reflect greater self-knowledge, possibly even greater moral awareness. Yet given that any number of possible narratives can make sense of a set of events, how can we determine that any one story or way of understanding the past is better than any other? How are we to distinguish those stories which reflect greater understanding from those which are simply re-descriptions or re-interpretations without greater insight on the part of the individual? We may disagree about particular cases; those with a religious world view are likely to believe that, post-conversion, Augustine is telling the "right" story about the pear theft. However most would concede that some ways of understanding the world are simply less adequate than others—"less adequate" both in the sense of "less reflective of the truth" and "less conducive to good relations with others." Few would defend the worldview of the inveterate racist, for example. The problem of determining whether a story reflects greater understanding and self-understanding is all the more challenging if we take seriously the view that narrative structure is the organizing principle, not only of experiences and actions, but of the very self that experiences and acts.3 How radically must one's personal narratives change before her very identity has also changed?Concerns about the epistemological status of personal narratives bring us up against the limitations of narrative as a tool for understanding persons. Given the under-determination of narrative by events, listening to a person's stories will not be enough to understand her. In this paper I do two things. First, I illustrate some of my worries about the epistemological status of narratives through an examination of Tolstoy's short novel The Kreutzer Sonata. I argue that, despite protestations to the contrary, the protagonist has not acquired greater self-knowledge. He has changed the stories he tells about himself without having understood his past or those around him any better. Then I sketch what a genuine increase in self... (shrink)