In Plato’s Apology, Socrates famously claimed to know nothing. This Socratic claim to ignorance pervades all of Plato’s early dialogues, and it raises many puzzling questions. By working through these puzzles, we can come to understand the figure of Socrates much better, and we can also gain some insight into the nature and purpose of philosophy.

A recent stream of epistemology gives special relevance to ignorance within the framework of an epistemological theory. Indeed, some want to give a significant role to ignorance in epistemological theorizing. In this paper, we argue that a particular sort of ignorance, which involves recognition of the fact that one is ignorant, is central to the acquisition of knowledge given the epistemic structure of society. It is clear, we hold, that Socrates realized the relevance of what we call (...) ‘Socratic ignorance’ in the acquisition of knowledge and was aware of the division of epistemic and cognitive labor that we find in our society. We shall explain the way we understand this Socratic ignorance, as opposed to what we will call ‘stubborn ignorance’ and the role this ignorance of Socratic overtones and related character traits can play in the acquisition of knowledge from others and with others. (shrink)

Socrates’ inquiry into the nature of the virtues and human excellence led him to experience Socratic ignorance, a practical puzzlement experienced by his recognition that his central life commitments were conceptually problematic. This practical perplexity was not, however, an epistemic weakness but a reflection of his wisdom. I argue that Socratic ignorance, a concept that has not received scholarly attention in business ethics, is a central aim that business practitioners should seek. It is what a truthful, (...) thorough, and courageous inquiry into their professional roles and commitments leads to. It wakes them up from the moral complacency engendered by organizations, forcing them to become much more critical of their day-to-day activities and more intentional about living virtuously. It curbs the corrupting potential of authority positions and prevents the tendency of subordinates to routinely conform to sanctioned norms and expectations. Finally, it opens up novel and creative moral avenues and provides a promising model to deal with the conflicts posed by our globalized and increasingly polarized world. (shrink)

Argues that Socrates’s fundamental role in the dialogues is to guide us toward self-inquiry and self-knowledge. In this highly original and provocative book, Sara Ahbel-Rappe argues that the Platonic dialogues contain an esoteric Socrates who signifies a profound commitment to self-knowledge and whose appearances in the dialogues are meant to foster the practice of self-inquiry. According to Ahbel-Rappe, the elenchus, or inner examination, and the thesis that virtue is knowledge, are tools for a contemplative practice that teaches us how to (...) investigate the mind and its objects directly. In other words, the Socratic persona of the dialogues represents wisdom, which is distinct from and serves as the larger space in which Platonic knowledge—ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics—is constructed. Ahbel-Rappe offers complete readings of the Apology, Charmides, Alcibiades I, Euthyphro, Lysis, Phaedrus, Theaetetus, and Parmenides, as well as parts of the Republic. Her interpretation challenges two common approaches to the figure of Socrates: the thesis that the dialogues represent an “early” Plato who later disavows his reliance on Socratic wisdom, and the thesis that Socratic ethics can best be expressed by the construct of eudaimonism or egoism. (shrink)

Argues that the Socratic profession of wisdom is not an expression of skepticism. Plato's Socrates claims to know things and says that others also know things. The profession of ignorance is a profession about wisdom, not about any other type of knowledge.

Rappe's book argues for a "contemplative" understanding of Socrates and proposes to distinguish between an "outer Socrates," the one who strives for definitions and denies being wise, and an "inner Socrates," who exemplifies a wisdom that consists in self-investigation. The introduction, "Socratic Ignorance and Platonic Knowledge," presents Socrates as being part of the western "esoteric tradition"—as Rappe calls it—in so far as he stands for an initiation to philosophy that is in essence self-knowledge. According to Rappe, this esoteric (...) tradition is not to be confused with dogmatic or ironic esotericism, but stands for a "lived experience"... (shrink)

Plato's Socrates denies that he knows. Yet he frequently claims that he does have certainty and knowledge. How can he avoid contradiction between his general stance about knowledge and his particular claims to have it? Socrates' disavowal of knowledge is central to his defence in the Apology. For here he rebuts the accusation that he teaches – and thus corrupts – the young by telling the jury that he cannot teach just because he knows nothing. Hence his disavowal of knowledge (...) is important to Socrates. Why does he make this claim? And how then can he justify engaging in any philosophical activity at all? (shrink)

G. W. F. Hegel is stuck between a rock and a hard place in the history of moral philosophy. On one hand, he is frequently regarded as an infamous critic of Kantian moral individualism. From the standpoint of Kierkegaard’s Socratic revival, Hegel is seen as ignoring or even suppressing the individual in favor of a ‘systematic’ form of philosophy. This paper addresses both criticisms by reconstructing Hegel’s unique contribution to the history of moral philosophy. Refusing to reduce Hegel to (...) a foil for either Kant or Kierkegaard reveals his own inheritance of a Socratic ethic. I argue that Hegel revives a long-suppressed form of moral and practical philosophy: the Bildung of one’s self-understanding that involves both self-knowledge and self-transformation. Understanding the way in which Hegel resurrects and reinterprets this conception of moral philosophy requires that one pay attention to the close connection between his systematic method and his unique version of skepticism. (shrink)

An interpretation of the Platonic corpus which takes as its guiding theme the paradoxes and ironies built into the Socratic notion of self-knowledge. Ballard develops the theme of the knowledge which is aware of its own limitations by distinguishing between the kinds of unity involved in a self trying to know itself and the unity of the Platonic forms, with a consequent distinction between two kinds of participation. He finds the participation of forms in each other as spelled out (...) in the Sophist to be entirely satisfactory, but material participation, or the relation between sensibles, including the human self, is, in principle, not entirely intelligible. The intrinsic unintelligibility of material participation receives its explanation in the form of myth, particularly the myth of the Timaeus. According to Ballard, the interplay between precise doctrine and myth constitutes the context in which the Socratic quest must be understood. The author offers a suggestive interpretation of the Parmenides as a dialogue which marks out the limits of rational discourse and makes explicit the conception of a functional whole with an ideal unity. It is this kind of unity which is attributable to the self, the arts, the state, and the forms, with significant distinctions in each case. In the course of his analysis, Ballard rejects the view of immortality presented in the Phaedo as part of Plato's final philosophy. Similarly, the notion of the self-predication of the forms is denied. The book should be welcomed by students of Plato as much for its illuminating insights into a central Platonic theme as for its bolder speculations into a comprehensive view of Plato's total philosophic enterprise.—L. W. (shrink)

In this paper I identify Schleiermacher as an intermediary between the two stages of the religious set forth in Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Gesturing toward categories integral to the Kierkegaardian project at large, I also argue that he occupies a pivotal role between Socratic ignorance and second immediacy. These schemata uncover answers to a dilemma that has recently been articulated: whereas Kierkegaard administers highest praise to Schleiermacher at the beginning of his pseudonymous authorship, he becomes inexplicably hostile toward him (...) at the end of his life and authorship. (shrink)

This article responds to scholars that claim that Xenophon’s Socrates, unlike Plato’s Socrates, never professes ignorance about moral matters (§1). I cite instances when the behavior of Xenophon’s Socrates implies that he acknowledges ignorance about particular moral matters. Implied acknowledgement of ignorance amounts to implicit profession (§2). I then consider passages that are evidence that Xenophon’s Socrates professed his ignorance about ‘the greatest things’, which include ethical matters much larger than particular (§3).

My central thesis is that Socrates of Plato’s “early” dialogues believes he has the very wisdom he famously disavows. Eschewing the usual tack of analyzing his various avowals and disavowals of knowledge, I focus on other claims which entail a belief that he has wisdom par excellence—not just selfawareness of ignorance and not just so-called elenctic wisdom. First, I correct the common misimpression that Socrates is willing only to ask but not to answer questions. Indeed, he describes his own (...) answers as a crucial part of his exhortative message, which, I show, involves not just an exhortation to participate in “elenctic” discussion; his exhortation to virtue is not aimed just at getting his interlocutors to understand that virtue—whatever it is!—must be pursued first and foremost. The elenchus, I argue, is only a prerequisite for understanding the much more substantive lessons of his exhortative practice, which produces “the greatest good”—indeed “happiness” itself. This interpretation, I explain, goes hand in hand with Socrates’ belief that he is a “good man”, invulnerable to injury, who rationally and independently always makes unerring decisions aimed at justice. In light of such beliefs, as well as his fearless claims about others’ injustices, I offer a plausible explanation of why Socrates denies having bona fide wisdom and being a “teacher” of it. (shrink)

The Profession of Ignorance provides a readable discussion in dialogue form of the philosophy of "ignorance" as practiced by Socrates, who claimed a kind of knowledge of ignorance as human wisdom. Martin McAvoy shows that understanding this profession of ignorance is essential to understanding the character of Plato's Socrates. He begins by explaining that to comprehend this concept, Socrates' repeated claim that he is ignorant must be believed. In claiming this ignorance, Socrates claims a kind (...) of knowledge. This knowledge of ignorance is the central paradox of Socrates' wisdom, generating his mission and elenchus. McAvoy presents the concept of thinking as a dialogue between knowledge and ignorance. In this dialogue, one asks as if ignorant, and one answers as if knowing. This very form questions the reality of knowledge. McAvoy questions the nature of knowledge, since it appears that one can not be sure exactly what is knowledge, but can recognize that it exists, though always ignorant of precisely what it is. He acknowledges and utilizes the presence of a double irony, that in an important sense, makes the profession of ignorance sincere. The use of the dialogue form reflects this double irony, and exhibits McAvoy's profession of ignorance as a claim to knowledge, just as in the case of Plato's. (shrink)

I examine here a wide array of interlocking Socratic doctrines, especially as they show up in the ideas of Socratic Ignorance and the Examined Life —along with such other Socratic claims as the following. First, that No one errs willingly. Second, that, in acting intentionally, everyone is always seeking their own greatest available good, given their present circumstances, where that greatest good is taken over the rest of their lives. Third, that those who don’t see that (...) harming others will not, over the rest of their lives, serve their own greatest good, deserve not punishment but instruction. I conduct this examination with my eye on two blatant contemporary inequalities across race and class. The first is that involved in differentially funding different schools and thereby shortchanging the ability of those of our children who need it most to work out better means to their own greatest good over the rest of their lives; the second is that across race, class, and educational background in our extensive incarceration practices. In the longest part of this essay, I argue that a principal philosophical presupposition of punishment practices can be shown to be well wide of the mark by the Socratic theory I explore here. This is the presupposition that there is some kind of philosophical justification—for example, in modern “under the description” theories—for the decidedly questionable view that we can almost always determine quite sufficiently what a person’s intentions are for purposes of justifiably and usefully punishing supposed malefactors. (shrink)

In hisCommentary on the AlcibiadesiProclus often discusses and links the peculiar epistemological category of “double ignorance” with evil and grievous error. To understand this more fully, the following analyzes Proclus’ concept of double ignorance, its characteristics and its causes. Markedly, due to his understanding of double ignorance, Proclus offers a response to the “Socratic” idea that no one willingly errs as this particular category of not-knowing enables him to explain how individuals, despite desiring and in some (...) sense knowing the good, fail or ‘miss the mark’ in articulating and doing the good. (shrink)

In the present paper I analyze some relevant textual keys of Plato's Apology to show the many strands underlying Socrates' claims of ignorance. I advocate a position that seeks to reevaluate the use of epistemic lexica by considering other evidence, such as cultural and dramatic context, the use of hypothetical clauses, the comparative and the rhetoric of the pair real/apparent. From this approach, I hope to show that there are good reasons to interpret Socrates' claims of ignorance in (...) the light of amiable irony, whereby the use of language and other literary devices create layers of meaning to express the full sense of Socratic wisdom for the audience without resorting to the charge of contradiction or insincerity. Against a position that reduces Socrates' message to the use of epistemic lexica to interpret it either by synonymy, equivocity or low/high cognitive grading, I propose to read Socrates' claims of ignorance, always in comparison to others' claim of wisdom, as a sort of cultural appropriation and revaluation of the traditional title σοφία/σοφός. (shrink)

This paper bases on a (great!) wrongful act which was made to Greek philosophy, and especially to the pre-Socratic one: the unilateral abatement of thestudies to those of cosmological nature. The big mutation would take place in Socrates’ time, who by the anthropology of the discourse takes philosophy to a theory of knowledge, through a program which would be perfected by Plato and especially by Aristotle. This is a point of view co-substantial to history of philosophy, which some times (...) risks to charge in an alethic (good/bad) way a paradigm based on false discussions. Pre-Socratics were not only preoccupied by ontology, or even cosmology, as well as Aristotle was not a radical empirist. In the economy of thought the nuances are more important than a classification often made for our epistemological comfort. (shrink)

Socrates is an flusive figure, Sarah Kofman asserts, and he is necessarily so since he did not write or directly state his beliefs. Kofman suggests that Socrates' avowal of ignorance was meant to be ironic. Later philosophers who interpreted his text invariably resisted the profoundly ironic character of his way of life and diverged widely in their interpretations of him. Kofman focuses especially on the views of Plato, Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche.

Plato, as a poet, employs muthos extensively to express his philosophical dialectical development, so the majority of his dialogues are comprised of muthoi. We cannot separate his muthos from his philosophical thought, since the former has great influence in the latter. So the methodology of this paper is first to discuss the dialogue "Theaetetus" to find out why he compares Socrates to the Greek goddess Artemis; then his concept of Maieutikē will be investigated. At the beginning of Plato’s "Theaetetus", Socrates (...) first likens himself to the goddess Artemis, who, though unmarried, has a duty to assist women in labour. Socrates’ role, as Plato portrays, is the same as that of Artemis; and the technē he possesses is Maieutikē, which is to assist his students in giving birth to their mental offspring. This paper will focus on discussion on the Socratic mythological role in Platonic interpretation and dialectics so as to reveal the philosophical meaning of Socratic ignorance. (shrink)

For Socrates, philosophy is not like Christian conversion from error to truth, but rather it is like the pagan process whereby a young man is initiated into cult mysteries by a more experienced man - the mystagogos - who prepares him and leads him to the sacred precinct. In Greek cult religion, the mystagogos prepared the initiate for the esoteric mysteries revealed by the hierophant. Socrates treats traditional wisdom with scepticism, and this makes him appear ridiculous or dangerous in the (...) eyes of cultural conservatives. Nevertheless, his scepticism is not radical: custom is not something on which we must turn our backs if we are to pursue the truth. Socrates assumes an epistemology and employs a method by which he induces his companions to begin the critical and self-critical process of philosophical inquiry, not ignoring conventional wisdom, but thinking through and reinterpreting it as they make constructive progress towards the truth. He provides conclusive and convincing arguments in support of controversial answers to some of the most important moral questions he poses. (shrink)

To dismiss the problems of Socratic moral intellectualism as well as Socratic irony (with respect to his claims of ignorance) in the following we shall first discuss how there are different forms of not-knowing in the Platonic dialogues. By referencing various passages throughout Plato’s entire corpus we shall see that like his nuanced understanding of knowledge, Plato also delineated between kinds of ignorance with only one denying virtue and the good life to individuals. This will prove (...) that Socrates does not associate with a reprehensible state when he claims ignorance and thus there is no need to appeal to irony when he makes such avowals of not-knowing. In the second half of this essay I will also suggest that the knowledge to which Socrates appeals is not an “ironic” appeal to human knowledge, as various scholars have argued, but is a sincere appeal to divine knowledge, i.e. immediate wisdom, which all human beings possess and rely on in their daily lives. In other words, Socratic knowing is a kind of enigmatic knowing which must be understood as a pre-theoretical, unexamined or innate wisdom. For Socrates all individuals “possess” such wisdom but in order to do the work that is “properly” human, i.e. the work allowing for virtue, one must enigmatically marry this “knowledge” with recognized ignorance. (shrink)

Socrates argued that the unexamined life is not worth living. What this means is we are so ignorant that we are guilty of criminal negligence how to lead our lives, unless we do our due diligence by philosophising.

Socrates does not use the Laws' Speech in the Crito principally to persuade Crito to accept his coming execution. It is used instead to persuade Crito to examine and work on his inadequate view of justice. Crito's view of justice fails to coordinate one's duties to friends and those to the law. The Laws' Speech accomplishes this persuasive goal by accompanying Crito’s earlier speech. Both start from the same view of justice, one that Crito accepts, but reach opposing conclusions. Crito (...) cannot judge between the two appealing speeches. His understanding of justice is too confused for him to decide well how to help Socrates. His need to explain what happened the morning he visited Socrates will prompt him and others to examine this indeterminate view of justice. Socrates foregoes direct refutation because Crito will not abide that usual way of interrogation. Engaging in short question-and-answer conversation is not the only way to bring a person to aporia and the intention to examine oneself. Socrates does not here undermine his assertions in the Apology about his ignorance, lack of interest in teaching, constant philosophizing, and his belief that what he does is question, examine, and test those he talks to. (shrink)

Ignorance is commonly assumed to be a lack of knowledge in Plato’s Socratic dialogues. I challenge that assumption. In the Protagoras, ignorance is conceived to be a substantive, structural psychic flaw—the soul’s domination by inferior elements that are by nature fit to be ruled. Ignorant people are characterized by both false beliefs about evaluative matters in specific situations and an enduring deception about their own psychic conditions. On my interpretation, akrasia, moral vices, and epistemic vices are products (...) or forms of ignorance, and a person who lacks knowledge is not necessarily ignorant. (shrink)

This essay addresses the role of aporetic thinking and aporetic dialogue in the early “Socratic” dialogues of Plato. It aims to provide a new angle on why and how puzzlement induced by Socrates should benefit his interlocutors but often fails to do so. After discussing criteria for what is to count as an aporetic dialogue, the essay explains how and why Socrates’ aporia-inducing conversations point to a conception of virtue as grounded in a form of self-transparent wisdom. In combination (...) with a knowledge criterion that requires the ability to articulate and successfully defend one’s views under critical examination, this conception of virtue entails that failure under Socratic examination is an indication of not just intellectual but also ethical deficits. I then show (against a still prevailing view among scholars) that at least the grown-ups among Socrates’ interlocutors in these dialogues fail to realize that their aporia is a proof of ignorance. Laches, for instance, thinks that his failure under Socratic examination has been caused by his inexperience with debates, while Meno blames it on Socrates’ alleged trickery. In the Euthydemus, Plato aims to blunt the charge of sophistry by contrasting “sophistic” trickery with Socrates’ philosophical exhortation. Yet, as I argue, the most important difference between sophistic and Socratic examination lies in the underlying ethos, not in the argumentative techniques, as these are partly similar. The final section of the essay analyses the intellectual and ethical benefits of aporia-inducing discourse for those who do fully acknowledge their ignorance and follow the urge to overcome ignorance. (shrink)

This paper is a reconsideration of Platonic dialogues in the light of Taoist insights. The application of Socratic Ignorance to the entire corpus of Plato reveals the yin and yang not only in the internal dialogue between Socrates and Plato, but also between Plato and his reader. Furthermore, this approach brings to the surface the necessity of the dialectic relation between the yang of Western analysis and the yin of Asian intuition to the revelation of the Tao.