The relationship between dementia and criminal behavior perplexes legal and health care systems. Dementia is a progressive clinical syndrome defined by impairment in at least two cognitive domains that interferes with one's activities of daily. Dementia symptoms have been associated with behaviors that violate social norms and constitute criminal actions. A failure to address a gap in policies that support appropriate management of individuals with dementia reflects a failure in our social obligation to care for those who (...) are most vulnerable amongst us. Categorical protections, informed by precedent models applied to juveniles and individuals with psychiatric illness, could help meet a social obligation to provide protections to individuals with dementia. We propose an approach that integrates affirmative defenses to mitigate criminal liability and sentencing restrictions to prevent cruel and unusual punishment. (shrink)

It has long been taken for granted that clinical research involving human subjects is ethical only if it holds out the prospect of producing socially valuable knowledge. Recently, this social value requirement has come under scrutiny, with prominent ethicists arguing that the social value requirement cannot be substantiated as an ethical limit on clinical research, and others attempting to offer new support. In this paper, I argue that both criticisms and existing defenses of the social value requirement (...) are predicated on what I call the “transactional model of stakeholder obligations”. I go on to problematize this framework, and to introduce an alternative framework for conceptualizing ethical obligations within clinical research. In defending this framework, which I call the “basic structure model of stakeholder obligations”, I also demonstrate how it provides a stronger grounding for the social value requirement that is not vulnerable to critiques grounded in the transactional model. (shrink)

This paper examines Laura Valentini’s attempt to explain political obligations through her account of social norms, her ‘Agency-Respect View’ (ARV). A great strength of ARV is preserving the ‘content-independence’ of political obligations. However, ARV does not mesh well with the moral phenomenology of political obligations. ARV is able to generate moral requirements that are strikingly weak. Accounting for the far stronger moral force of requirements to obey the law requires appealing to law-independent considerations. Valentini’s account of these factors suggests (...) greater explanatory force of an alternative view she dismisses, to which she refers as the ‘deflationary view.’ In addition, among alternative theories that Valentini rejects is one based on the principle of fair play. I respond to Valentini’s criticisms, thereby demonstrating the continuing applicability of fair play. (shrink)

John Horton has argued for an associative theory of political obligation in which such obligation is seen as a concomitant of membership of a particular polity, where a polity provides the generic goods of order and security. Accompanying these substantive claims is a methodological thesis about the centrality of the phenomenology of ordinary moral consciousness to our understanding of the problem of political obligation. The phenomenological strategy seems modest but in some way it is far-reaching promising to (...) dissolve some long-standing problems of political theory. However, it fails at just the point at which a theory of political obligation is needed, namely when individuals question the grounds of their political obligation. A principle of obligation is needed to provide individuals with a reason for compliance with authoritative social rules when the exercise of that obligation is irksome. It is at this point that we need to invoke the idea of society as an implicit social contract, in which obligations are seen as stemming from those terms that it would be in the interests of individuals to agree in a social contract. This is consistent with the method of reflective equilibrium. (shrink)

We propose that corporations should be subject to a legal obligation to identify and internalise their social costs or negative externalities. Our proposal reframes corporate social responsibility as obligated internalisation of social costs, and relies on reflexive governance through mandated hybrid fora. We argue that our approach advances theory, as well as practice and policy, by building on and going beyond prior attempts to address social costs, such as prescriptive government regulation, Coasian bargaining and political (...) CSR. (shrink)

According to prominent bioethics scholars and international guidelines, researchers and sponsors have obligations to ensure that the products of their research are reasonably available to research participants and their communities. In other words, the claim is that research is unethical unless it has local social value. In this article, we argue that the existing conception of reasonable availability should be replaced with a social value obligation that extends to the global poor. To the extent the social (...) value requirement has been understood as geographically constrained to the communities that host research and the countries that can afford the products of research, it has neglected to include the global poor as members of the relevant society. We argue that a new conception of social value obligations is needed for two reasons. First, duties of global beneficence give reason for researchers, sponsors, and institutions to take steps to make their products more widely accessible. Second, public commitments made by many institutions acknowledge and engender responsibilities to make the products of research more accessible to the global poor. Future research is needed to help researchers and sponsors discharge these obligations in ways that unlock their full potential. (shrink)

The hermeneutic turn of philosophy, initiated by Dilthey and Heidegger, led to a reevaluation of understanding of the classical disciplines of philosophy, from ontology and epistemology to aesthetics and ethics. The cognitive importance of these disciplines have been relativized to the cultural conditions in which they operate. With regard to ethics, it does not lead to the creation of some new "hermeneutic ethics," but to the hermeneutic approach to ethics which underlines the value of existing morality and reduces the pretensions (...) of philosophical ethics to universal validity. This book presents it on the ground of a solid and innovatory analysis of ethical considerations of Schleiermacher, Nietzsche, Dilthey, Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur, and Guenter Abel. (Series: Philosophy: Research and Science / Philosophie: Forschung und Wissenschaft, Vol. 46) [Subject: Philosophy, Religious Studies, Ethics]. (shrink)

In Morality and Socially Constructed Norms, Laura Valentini argues that moral obligations to respect social norms can be explained without invoking the concept of ‘joint commitment.’ Her resulting account is, in one important sense, individualistic, and therefore struggles to account for widely held intuitions about the normative significance of social norms. I argue that we can rescue the notion of joint commitment from Valentini’s objections, and incorporate it into a version of her account that preserves its insights.

This paper takes a unique approach to framing the political obligation social media companies like Twitter and Facebook have in a democratic society by casting the public sphere as a common-pool resource. Over the last decade or so much of our civic discourse has moved to social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. This paper argues that just as citizens have an obligation to one another, social media companies have an obligation to promote (...) agonistic forms of civic, political discourse through their algorithms. This algorithmic obligation that social media companies have must be reconciled with social media companies’ formulation of their fiduciary shareholder obligations. We posit that a commons based view of social media discourse allows these companies to make both a democratic health and fiduciary interest argument. (shrink)

Many governments are failing to act sufficiently strongly on climate change. Given this, what should motivated affluent individuals in high-consumption societies do? This paper argues that social norms are a particularly valuable target for individual climate action. Within norm-promotion, the paper makes the case for a focus on anti-fossil fuel norms specifically. Section 1 outlines gaps in the existing literature on individuals’ climate change obligations. Section 2 characterises social norms. Section 3 provides seven reasons why social norms (...) are a particularly worthy target for individual climate actors. Section 4 asks which social norms individuals should emphasise, arguing that anti-fossil fuel norms have advantages over emissions reduction and offsetting norms. Section 5 outlines the pathways and mechanisms individuals might exploit to promote anti-fossil fuel norms. (shrink)

Rights and obligations—sometimes referred to as deontology or deontic powers—are key to most contemporary conceptions of social ontology. Both Cambridge Social Ontology and the dominant analytic conception associated, most prominently, with John Searle, place rights and obligations at the centre of their accounts. Such a common emphasis has led some to consider deontology to be a point of similarity between these different theories. This is a mistake. In this paper, I show that a distinctive conception of rights and (...) obligations underpins Cambridge Social Ontology and its social positioning theory. Moreover, I argue that a fuller understanding of the account of rights and obligations defended in Cambridge in fact reveals that it can be differentiated from other conceptions and, most importantly, Searle's, by its recognition that a practical dimension is always involved in social constitution. (shrink)

In this article, I explore the way in which Korsgaard’s approach to obligation as springing from the reflective rejection of that which threatens one’s own identity can account for obligations towards others, without making the latter relative to obligations to oneself. To this end, I begin by stressing the role of reflexivity in ethical relationships, and show how this reflexivity is mediated by reference to law, which applies both to the self and to the other. On this basis, I (...) then argue that Korsgaard’s account of the interplay between practical and moral identity reflects the very structure of practical reason, which requires both a particular and a universal premise in order to issue practical reasons for action– and the corresponding obligations. Within this framework, I argue that Korsgaard’s solution to the problem outlined above lies in having stressed the shareable character of reasons such that it is neither your reason nor my reason that obligates me, but rather reason as such. This solution, however, requires a further argument aimed at clarifying what makes your reasons different from my own. (shrink)

Discovering obligations that are ascribed to them by others is potentially an important element in the development of the moral imagination of engineers. Moral imagination cannot reasonably be developed by contemplating oneself and one’s task alone: there must be some element of discovering the expectations of people one could put at risk. In practice it may be impossible to meet ascribed obligations if they are completely general and allow no exceptions — for example if they demand an unlimited duty to (...) avoid harm. But they can still serve to modify engineers’ prior ethics, for example by limiting a purely utilitarian approach to deciding who should bear risk and how much risk they should bear. Ascribed obligations can also give engineers insight into the public reaction to risks that arise from engineered systems, and the consequent expectations that the public have about how much protection is desirable and where the responsibility for this protection lies. This article analyses the case for taking ascribed obligations seriously, and reviews some of the obligations that have been ascribed in the aftermath of recent engineering failures. It also proposes ways in which ascribed obligations could be used in engineers’ moral development. (shrink)

First published in 1987. This study is concerned with the problem of political obligation, the normative question of why one should obey the law, and with social contract thought as an answer to this question. It is entitled a critique, but the critique is not of social contract theory as such, but rather of the "orthodox" treatment of contract that yields so readily to the rough handling and easy rejection that is the normal lot of contractarianism in (...) contemporary treatments. In its place will be suggested a reinterpretation of contract that sees it as making different assumptions and requiring different premises, and that is proof against many of the orthodox refutations of social contract theory; the reinterpretation is thus in the nature of a vindication. First, from an examination of the most commonly cited champions of contractarianism will be derive a reinterpretation of contract in the form of a new model or syllogism, the features of which will be brought out by contrasting it first with the contemporary ideas of John Rawls and then with the orthodox model itself. Democratic consent theory, as the heir to the remnants of the orthodox model, will be examined, and the ideas of T. H. Green will be considered as embodying an important feature of contractarianism omitted or ignored by the orthodox model Finally, the new model of contract will be suggested as a potentially useful approach to the problem of political obligation in the modern context. This title will be of interest to student of politics and philosophy. (shrink)

The two justificatory roles of the social contract are establishing whether or not a state is legitimate simpliciter and establishing whether any particular individual is politically obligated to obey the dictates of its governing institutions. Rawls's theory is obviously designed to address the first role but less obviously the other. Rawls does offer a duty-based theory of political obligation that has been criticized by neo-Lockean A. John Simmons. I assess Simmons's criticisms and the possible responses that could be (...) made to them, including those offered by Samuel Freeman. I conclude they rest on a Rawlsian equivocation and ultimately fail. (shrink)

Scientists’ sense of social responsibility is particularly relevant for emerging technologies. Since a regulatory vacuum can sometimes occur in the early stages of these technologies, individual scientists’ social responsibility might be one of the most significant checks on the risks and negative consequences of this scientific research. In this article, we analyze data from a 2011 mail survey of leading U.S. nanoscientists to explore their perceptions the regarding social and ethical responsibilities for their nanotechnology research. Our analyses (...) show that leading U.S. nanoscientists express a moderate level of social responsibility about their research. Yet, they have a strong sense of ethical obligation to protect laboratory workers from unhealthy exposure to nanomaterials. We also find that there are significant differences in scientists’ sense of social and ethical responsibility depending on their demographic characteristics, job affiliation, attention to media content, risk perceptions and benefit perceptions. We conclude with some implications for future research. (shrink)

Members of some social groups hold other members to have special obligations in virtue of their membership. But is this justified? And if so, how? I argue that there is a deep connection between the structure of certain social groups and some special obligations. The issue, then, is to determine how one might have obligations in virtue of one's membership in a particular group. In this dissertation I argue that groups capable of collective action have, as elements of (...) their structure, interpersonal relations that generate commitments and these commitments, in turn, constitute special obligations. ;I begin by arguing that groups capable of collective action must be able to coordinate or monitor the coordination of the members, and to do so within certain normative constraints. To coordinate members according to these constraints, groups must implement some form of decision procedure, a scheme by which the intentions and actions of individual members of a group are coordinated toward some collective purpose or goal. This coordination requires that in groups capable of collective action, there must be some authority system by which the members are coordinated. This authority system must be able to authorize the implementation of norms through members' practices, endorsements, or sanctions, and to adjudicate conflicts that might arise between constraints. I argue that these authority systems may be largely tacit. ;Members of groups capable of collective action do not, however, acquire obligations because of their commitments to the group per se. Rather, members of such groups acquire obligations because of the nature of the relationships they cannot help but form with one another. Their obligations form because of the commitments they have to one another in virtue of being a part of a group capable of collective action. While these obligations may not constitute all-things-considered normative requirements, they do constitute normative considerations that members of groups need to acknowledge when they determine what they ought or ought not to do. I conclude that insofar as a group is capable of collective action, members of those groups have at least these limited obligations toward one another. (shrink)

Whose Keeper? is a profound and creative treatise on modernity and its challenge to social science. Alan Wolfe argues that modern liberal democracies, such as the United States and Scandinavia, have broken with traditional sources of mortality and instead have relied upon economic and political frameworks to define their obligations to one another. Wolfe calls for reinvigorating a sense of community and thus a sense of obligation to the larger society.

'. . . this book will be valuable to upper-division and graduate students interested in the validity of SC theories.'-PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICAL SCIENCE.

L’entreprenariat social nous engage dans deux formes de responsabilité, l’une obligataire, qui ressortit au registre juridique et moral, l’autre mondaine ou cosmologique, qui ressortit au registre de l’action et de la création. La pratique entrepreneuriale en tant que telle honore prioritairement la responsabilité cosmologique, tandis que la dimension sociale de cette pratique réfère, quant à elle, au caractère obligataire. Dans cet article, nous proposons de revenir sur la généalogie de ces deux acceptions fondamentales de la responsabilité, qui ont trouvé (...) dans le kantisme à la fois leur lieu de formulation philosophique et leur point de bifurcation, mais aussi de dégager la portée et les limites de leur dialectisation dans l’activité sociale-entrepreneuriale aujourd’hui. Nous montrons que la première convoque en son sein plusieurs traditions de philosophie morale impliquant différentes extensions du concept, ce qui oblige à nous interroger sur sa propre opérabilité. La seconde, que nous aurons à cœur d’illustrer en rapportant certains discours d’entrepreneurs, a été davantage honorée à l’époque contemporaine par les approches phénoménologiques et de philosophie de l’action de tendance analytique. Nous terminons en envisageant la possibilité pour l’entrepreneur social de s’extraire de cet atermoiement entre deux formes de responsabilité dans le contexte actuel, naguère anticipé par Hans Jonas et dont témoignent aujourd’hui le succès des thèmes de l’écologie politique et du développement durable, opérant ainsi un renversement du rapport de l’action humaine à la peur de l’avenir – peur à laquelle s’est substituée au fil du temps la projection raisonnée d’un futur malheureux, toutes choses égales ailleurs. Classification JEL : M13, M14. (shrink)

This paper has two aims. First, it raises the issue whether and how contractarian political theory can justify political obligations toward some particular political authority. Second, it attempts to draw some brief conclusion from this regarding the prospect of Europe as a political community. The paper argues that there is a common assumption to almost all contemporary versions of contractarian political theory which must be dropped in order to make room for the contractarian justification of such obligations. The assumption of (...) mutual unconcern seems to make it impossible for such theories to rationally justify particular obligations towards a particular political authority. I suggest that this limitation can be theoretically overcome. But I also suggest that the feeling of mutual concern of citizens towards each other is a necessary condition of their rationally justifiable obligations towards the decisions of a political authority. The development of this social emotion is a precondition of Europe as a political community. (shrink)

Tomasello describes how the sense of moral obligation emerges from a shared perspective with collaborative partners and in-group members. Our commentary expands this framework to accommodate multiple social identities, where the normative standards associated with diverse group memberships can often conflict with one another. Reconciling these conflicting obligations is argued to be a central part of human morality.

Contractual moralists, such as Bowie and Donaldson, have argued that contractual agreement explains why corporations have a moral obligation towards the society in which they operate. They argue that a corporation’s moral obligation emerges from a hypothetical social contract that establishes its legitimacy to operate in society. Their assumption appears to indicate a logically necessary relationship between a corporation’s moral obligation and contractual agreement that establishes the corporation. We argue that there is no such relationship: a (...) corporation’s moral obligation does not necessarily emerge from a social contract. We suggest that instead of assuming that a corporation’s moral obligation emerges from a social contract, it should be said that a corporation’s moral obligation is sustained by a social contract. This helps answer the question of why corporations have a moral obligation towards the society where they operate in a better light. (shrink)

Background The world is urbanizing rapidly; more than half the world’s population now lives in urban areas, leading to significant transition in lifestyles and social behaviours globally. While offering many advantages, urban environments also concentrate health risks and introduce health hazards for the poor. In Bangladesh, although many public policies are directed towards equity and protecting people’s rights, these are not comprehensively and inclusively applied in ways that prioritize the health rights of citizens. The country is thus facing many (...) issues that raise moral and ethical concerns. Methods A narrative literature review was conducted between October 2016 and November 2017 on issues related to social justice, health, and human rights in urban Bangladesh. The key questions discussed here are: i) ethical dilemmas and inclusion of the urban poor to pursue social justice; and ii) the ethical obligations and moral responsibilities of the state and non-state sectors in serving Bangladesh’s urban poor. Using a Rawlsian theory of equality of opportunity to ensure social justice, we identified key health-related ethical issues in the country’s rapidly changing urban landscape, especially among the poor. Results We examined ethical dilemmas in Bangladesh’s health system through the rural–urban divide and the lack of coordination among implementing agencies. The unregulated profusion of the private sector and immoral practices of service providers result in high out-of-pocket expenditures for urban poor, leading to debt and further impoverishment. We also highlight policy and programmatic gaps, as well as entry points for safeguarding the right to health for Bangladeshi citizens. Conclusions The urban health system in Bangladesh needs a reform in which state and non-state actors should work together, understanding and acknowledging their moral responsibilities for improving the health of the urban poor by engaging multiple sectors. The social determinants of health should be taken into account when formulating policies and programs to achieve universal health coverage and ensure social justice for the urban poor in Bangladesh. (shrink)

The case describes researchers who are seeking ethics guidance on communicating with participants in a phase-1 COVD-19 vaccine trial about FDA-authorized COVID-19 vaccines (Wilfond, Duenas, and Johnson 2023). The researchers want help choosing among three options they have identified for encouraging participants to obtain one of the authorized vaccines. We argue that research ethics consultants should consider going beyond this question to address another ethics concern the researchers might have overlooked.

As inpatient nurses spend the majority of their work time caring for patients at the bedside, they are often firsthand witnesses to the devastating outcomes of inadequate preventive healthcare and structural injustices within current social systems. This experience should obligate inpatient nurses to be involved in meeting the social justice needs of their patients. Many nursing codes of ethics mandate some degree of involvement in the social justice needs of society, though how this is to be achieved (...) is not detailed in these general guidelines. Acknowledging an explicit obligation for inpatient nurses to address the social justice issues of their patients would facilitate better overall understanding of social justice issues and reduce preventable admissions. If implementation of such an obligation is done with care, having inpatient nurses participate in justice projects could also mitigate compassion fatigue, allow for better job satisfaction among these nurses, and provide a sense of revitalization in nurses’ role as health promoters. (shrink)

The current prevailing view is that participation in biomedical research is above and beyond the call of duty. While some commentators have offered reasons against this, we propose a novel public goods argument for an obligation to participate in biomedical research. Biomedical knowledge is a public good, available to any individual even if that individual does not contribute to it. Participation in research is a critical way to support an important public good. Consequently, all have a duty to participate. (...) The current social norm is that individuals participate only if they have a good reason to do so. The public goods argument implies that individuals should participate unless they have a good reason not to. Such a shift would be of great aid to the progress of biomedical research, eventually making society significantly healthier and longer lived. (shrink)

SOCREAL 2010: 2nd International Workshop on Philosophy and Ethics of Social Reality. Sapporo, Japan, 2010-03-27/28. Session 4: Argumentations and Speech Acts.

Social obligation begins far before people establish explicit cooperative relationships. Research on trust suggests that people feel obligated to trust other people even at zero acquaintance, thus trusting complete strangers even though they privately expect to be exploited. Such obligations promote mutually beneficial behavior among strangers and likely help people build goodwill needed for more long-lasting relationships.