Egalitarians have traditionally been suspicious of equality of opportunity, but recently there has been a sea-change in thinking about that concept. Shlomi Segall brings together these developments and offers a new account of 'radical equality of opportunity', which removes all obstacles (to one's opportunity-set) that lie outside one's control.

Health, Luck, and Justice is the first attempt to systematically apply luck egalitarianism to the just distribution of health and health care.

The normative principle of description invariance presupposes that rational preferences must be complete. The completeness axiom is normatively dubious, however, and its rejection opens the door to rational framing effects. In this commentary, we suggest that Bermúdez's insightful challenge to the standard normative view of framing can be clarified and extended by situating it within a broader critique of completeness.

Equality is a key concept in our moral and political vocabulary. There is wide agreement on its instrumental value and its favourable impact on many aspects of society, but less certainty over whether it has a non-instrumental or intrinsic value that can be demonstrated. In this project, Shlomi Segall explores and defends the view that it does. He argues that the value of equality is not reducible to a concern we might have for the worse off, or to ensuring (...) that individuals do not fall into poverty and destitution; instead he claims that undeserved inequalities, wherever and whenever we might find them, are bad in themselves. Assessing the strength of competing accounts, such as sufficientarianism and prioritarianism, he brings together for the first time discussions of the moral value of equality with luck- or responsibility-sensitive accounts of distributive justice. His book will interest readers in political and moral philosophy. (shrink)

In recent work, Norman Daniels extends the application of Rawls's principle of ‘fair equality of opportunity’ from health care to health proper. Crucial to that account is the view that health care, and now also health, is special. Daniels also claims that a rival theory of distributive justice, namely luck egalitarianism (or ‘equal opportunity for welfare’), cannot provide an adequate account of justice in health and health care. He argues that the application of that theory to health policy would result (...) in an account that is, in a sense, too narrow, for it denies treatment to imprudent patients (e.g. lung cancer patients who smoked). In a different sense, Daniels argues, luck egalitarian health policy would be too wide: it arguably tells us to treat individuals for such brute-luck conditions as shyness, stupidity, ugliness, and having the ‘wrong’ skin colour. I seek to advance three claims in response to Daniels's revised theory, and in defence of a luck egalitarian view of health policy. First, I question Daniels's assertion regarding the specialness of health. While he is right to abandon his insistence on the specialness of health care, it is doubtful that health proper can be depicted as special. Second, I try and meet Daniels's objections to luck egalitarianism. Luck egalitarian health policy escapes being too narrow for it does not in fact require denying basic care to imprudent patients. As for it being allegedly too wide, I try to show that it is not, after all, counterintuitive to rid individuals of unfortunate and disadvantageous biological traits (say, a disadvantageous skin colour). And third, I question whether Daniels's own Rawlsian account is in fact wide enough. I argue that fair equality of opportunity fails to justify some standard medical procedures that many health systems do already practice. (shrink)

One fine day, Hermann Sörgel receives the complete memory of William Shakespeare. A scholar who has devoted his life to studying the bard's works, the professor understands that he has been given a priceless treasure. With the key to understanding the poet's consciousness in his hand, he will be able to perfectly interpret all his writings. Gradually, Shakespeare's memories are being absorbed into his mind. He is surprised to realize, however, that possession of the bard's memory has only given him (...) access to a "chaos of vague possibilities." At this point, he begins to grasp that he still cannot decipher the enigma of Shakespeare's luminous oeuvre, the poet's memory revealing only the "circumstances of the man... (shrink)

Part 1: Philosophical inquisitions -- Labyrinthal paradigms: western philosophy in Borges' Oeuvre -- Literary philosophers: Mythos and Logos in Borges and Plato -- Philosophy and ideology: dialectical Orientalism in Borges' writings -- Part 2: Comparative perspectives -- Borges and Schopenhauer: microcosms and aesthetic observation -- Borges, Herclitus, and the River of Time -- A view from eternity: the archetypal quest -- Borges and Levinas face to face: writing and riddle of subjectivity -- Narrative aspect change and alternating systems of justice: (...) A Wittgensteinian reading of Borges -- Borges, Wittgenstein, and Kierkegaard on the boundaries of language: mystical silence and indirect communication -- Borges and Berkeley: idealism and the ontology of the fantastical object. (shrink)

The need for ethical leadership in navigating today’s complex, global and competitive organisations has been established. While research has confirmed the importance of ethical leaders in promoting positive organisational and employee outcomes, scant research has examined the antecedents of ethical leadership. Furthermore, there has been a call for further examination of leadership models, particularly indigenous leadership models. Responding to these issues, this study suggests Māori leaders’ values add insights into enhancing ethical leadership. Three studies confirm the role of Māori values (...) and ethical leadership. Study one, based on kaupapa Māori research methods, is an exploratory 22-interview study of Māori leaders and identifies five values, as common to successful indigenous leaders. In study two, 249 employees rate their leaders on these five dimensions in relation to their ethical leadership and exchange relationships. Structural equation modelling shows strong support for the distinct nature of the five values and their positive influence on ethical leadership perceptions and quality exchange relationships. Study three, on 122 employees, reinforces the findings of study two—and demonstrates that LMX predicts job outcomes both indirectly and directly, with humility and collectivism also directly predicting outcomes. Our findings suggest that indigenous leaders’ values enhance perceptions and outcomes of ethical leadership for employees. (shrink)

The article argues that discrimination is bad as such when and because it undermines equality of opportunity. It shows, first, that other accounts, such as those concerning intent, efficiency, false representation, prejudice, respect and desert cannot account for the badness of discrimination as such. The inequality of opportunity account, in contrast, captures everything that is bad about discrimination. The article then addresses some counter-examples of practices that are discriminatory without arguably entailing inequality of opportunity, where the notable case is that (...) of segregation. It is further demonstrated that the account successfully handles some of the tricky aspects associated with discrimination, such as those concerning the confinement of discrimination to salient groups, discriminatees by means of financial compensation, in the selection of life partners, and the duties of employers. (shrink)

Abstract:The paper seeks to defend Telic Egalitarianism (TE) by distinguishing two distinct categories into which typical objections to it fall. According to one category of objections (for example, levelling down) TE isgroundless. That is, there is simply no good reason to think that inequality as such is bad. The other type of objections to TE focuses on itscounterintuitiveimplications: it is forced to condemn inequalities between ourselves and long-dead Inca peasants, or between us and worse-off aliens from other planets. The paper (...) shows that once we unpack these two types of objections to TE they become much less persuasive. (shrink)

Michel Haar argues that Heidegger went too far in transferring all traditional properties of man to being.

Can outcome equality (say, in welfare) ever be unjust? Despite the extensive inquiry into the nature of luck egalitarianism in recent years, this question is curiously under-explored. Leading luck egalitarians pay little attention to the issue of unjust equalities, and when they do, they appear not to speak in one voice. To facilitate the inquiry into the potential injustice of equalities, the paper introduces two rival interpretations of egalitarianism: the responsibility view, which may condemn equalities as unjust (when they reflect (...) unequal levels of personal responsibility); and, the non-responsibility view, which does not. It then teases out the implications of these two views, in the hope of establishing that the latter is at least as plausible as the former. The paper thus establishes that the egalitarian ideal can be plausibly formulated in a way that condemns only (certain) inequalities but never equalities, and that this formulation is both coherent and attractive. (shrink)

In a recent article, Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve argue that prioritarianism fails to account for the shift in moral significance in gains to individuals in interpersonal as compared to intrapersonal cases. In this article, I show that the priority view escapes this objection but in a way that deprives it of (some of) its anti-egalitarian stance. Despite Otsuka and Voorhoeve, prioritarianism, rightly understood, provides consistent and attractive recommendations in both single- and multi-person cases. Yet prioritarians, the article goes on (...) to show, cannot do so while availing themselves of the leveling down objection (LDO) to egalitarianism. They may not do so because similarly to egalitarianism, prioritarianism also must reject the principle of personal good. That is, egalitarians and prioritarians may sometime recommend certain actions and outcomes even when these are better for no one. Prioritarians may survive the Otsuka–Voorhoeve critique, but to do so they must abandon their anti-egalitarian stance (or at the very least, the LDO). (shrink)

The paper examines the view that individuals have a claim to the jobs for which they are the best qualified. It seeks to show this view to be groundless, and to offer, instead, a luck egalitarian account of justice in hiring. That account consists of three components: monism, non-meritocracy, and non-discrimination. To demonstrate the coherence of this view, two particular internal conflicts are addressed. First, luck egalitarian monism (the view that jobs are not special) may end up violating the non-discrimination (...) requirement. Second, non-discrimination, it is often suggested, cannot be defined without reference to qualifications, thus violating the non-meritocracy requirement. The paper seeks to address these, as well as other, potential objections, and show that whereas meritocratic accounts are without basis, luck egalitarianism provides a coherent and attractive account of justice in hiring. (shrink)

Derek Parfit held that in evaluating the future, we should ignore the difference between necessary persons and merely possible persons. In this article, I look at one of the most prominent alternatives to Parfit's view, namely Michael Otsuka and Larry Temkin ‘shortfall complaints’ view. In that view, we aggregate future persons’ well-being and deduct intrapersonal shortfall complaints, giving extra weight to the complaints of necessary persons. I offer here a third view. I reject Parfit's no difference view in that I (...) register a difference between necessary and possible persons. But I also reject the Shortfall View and replace its intra-personal complaints with an inter-personal complaints mechanism. I argue that the value of a population is its aggregate prioritarian value minus the egalitarian complaints that necessary persons hold. I show that the egalitarian view has all the explanatory power of the Shortfall view in easy cases, while significantly improving on it in three sorts of tough cases. (shrink)

Individuals come into the world with talents that differ greatly in their marketability. These talents command a wide variety of rents; from millions of dollars per film for a movie star, to just a few thousands of dollars per annum for a fast-food joint worker. How should we distribute income fairly given these disparities? That is the topic of Kristi Olson’s excellent new book, The Solidarity Solution: Principles for a Fair Income Distribution. 1 1 The question is not new, but (...) Olson’s treatment is among the most comprehensive and well-argued one can find. The manuscript is well researched, scholarly, thorough, packed full of arguments and low on fluff. It is well worth the time of anyone interested in fairness in the sphere of work and income. (shrink)

Luck egalitarians typically hold that it is bad for some to be worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own. In this paper I want to address two complaints against standard luck egalitarianism that do not question responsibility-sensitivity. The first objection says that equality itself lacks inherent non-instrumental value, and so the luckist component ought to be attached to a different pattern, say prioritarianism. The second objection also endorses luckism but worries that luck egalitarianism as conventionally (...) formulated is committed in fact to neutralizing not just brute luck but also option luck. And this would mean, among other things, compensating unsuccessful gamblers, which is something many egalitarians find counterintuitive. My aim is to show that there is a way for luck egalitarianism to meet both criticisms; that it can maintain its egalitarian credentials while avoiding the counterintuitive consequences of compensating unsuccessful gamblers. To do so, I propose, we ought to understand luck egalitarianism as resting on the disvalue of being arbitrarily worse off compared to others. In addition, I suggest, the badness of luck egalitarian inequality – that of arbitrary disadvantage – has both an inter-personal and an intra-personal dimension. (shrink)

This paper explores Socratic irony as reflected in the famous passages of Alcibiades’ speech in Plato’s Symposium, focusing on the relationship between ironic utterance and the philosophic guidance process. Reviewing the diverse meanings of the term eirôneia in Greek comedy and philosophy, it examines the way in which Plato employs irony in fashioning Socrates’ figure and depicting the ideal of philosophic guidance as the “art of midwifery.” It then analyzes Kierkegaard’s most positive perception of Socratic irony as a necessary methodical (...) element in the Socratic maieutic process of “deceiving into the truth.” Contrasting Kierkegaard with Alcibiades’ scathing critique, it reads the latter in a combined dramatic-philosophical perspective, as presenting irony as an anti-philosophic phenomenon, leading to cognitive puzzlement and Dionysian irrationality. Alcibiades’ negative stance will be manifested via analyzing his use of four literary rhetorical devices: comparing Socrates with the Silenoi, drawing an analogy between ironic speech and Marysas’ satyric flute playing, symbolizing philosophy as snake venom, and presenting the scene of Socrates’ seduction as dramatic irony. The discussion shows, then, that there are two distinct manifestations of Socratic irony drawn from Plato’s writings, destructive and constructive, derived from the character of his philosophical pupils. (shrink)

Telic sufficientarians hold that there is something special about a certain threshold level such that benefiting people below it, or raising them above it, makes an outcome better in at least one respect. The article investigates what fundamental value might ground that view. The aim is to demonstrate that sufficientarianism, at least on this telic version, is groundless and as such indefensible. The argument is advanced in three steps: first, it is shown that sufficientarianism cannot be grounded in a personal (...) value. Neither, secondly, is it committed to the person-affecting view, the view that says that nothing can be better if there is no one for whom it is better. This, in itself, is of interest because some sufficientarians reject egalitarianism precisely for its alleged incompatibility with the person-affecting view. Sufficientarians' disavowal of the person-affecting view implies that their view, similarly to egalitarianism, must be anchored in some impersonal value. But crucially, and this is the third step of the argument, there is no apparent value that can fit that role. We must conclude, then, that telic sufficientarianism is groundless. (shrink)

L’évolution de la terminologie relative au handicap intellectuel a été examinée pour comprendre les débats sur les préférences linguistiques. Les articles de journaux néerlandais publiés entre 1950 et 2020 et contenant des termes relatifs au handicap intellectuel ont été analysés à l’aide d’une analyse de contenu quantitative et qualitative. Les résultats ont montré que la terminologie liée au handicap intellectuel a changé dans la presse en faveur de celle adoptée par les organisations de personnes handicapées, les universitaires et le gouvernement. (...) L’utilisation de termes comme “faible d’esprit” ou “mongolien” est en recul. Cependant, les journaux ont continué d’utiliser certaines expressions dépassées et péjoratives. Dans des situations sans rapport avec la déficience, les termes liés au handicap intellectuel – en particulier les termes “idiot” et “retardé” – sont fréquemment utilisés pour renforcer une opinion négative. Les lecteurs de journaux néerlandais sont donc confrontés à une multitude déroutante de termes liés à des représentations disparates des personnes handicapées, qu’ils soient désuets et négatifs, ou positifs et inclusifs. (shrink)

Stuart White and others claim that providing welfare benefits to citizens who do not, and are not willing to, work breaches the principle of reciprocity. This, they argue, justifies placing a minimum work requirement on welfare recipients. This article seeks to rebut their claim. It begins by rejecting the attempt to ground the work requirement on a civic obligation to work. The article then explores the principle of reciprocity, and argues that the practice of reciprocity depends on the particular conception (...) of distributive justice adopted. An examination of different interpretations of egalitarian justice and their corresponding patterns of reciprocity demonstrates that unconditional welfare benefits are compatible with, and sometimes even warranted by, the principle of reciprocity. Thus, imposing a work requirement on welfare recipients is by no means a mandate of reciprocity. Key Words: contractualism • unconditional basic income • reciprocity • welfare state • work. (shrink)

Utilitarians are said to be indifferent between interpersonal and intrapersonal transfers. In doing so, they fail to register the separateness of persons. This ‘separateness of persons’ objection has been traditionally used against utilitarianism, but more recently against prioritarianism. In this paper, I examine how yet another distributive view, namely sufficientarianism, fares in this respect. Sufficientarians famously believe that while inequality as such does not matter, what does matter is that all individuals meet some adequate threshold. It is often taken for (...) granted that sufficientarianism does not violate the separateness of persons. In this paper, I seek to show that that is not the case. The main challenge, however, proves to be formulating an accurate understanding of what the separateness of persons precisely means. I offer several interpretations and argue that sufficientarianism, surprisingly, violates them all. Sufficientarianism, just like utilitarianism does not respect the separateness of persons. (shrink)

The present study extends the meaningful work and ethics literature by comparing three ethics-related antecedents. The second contribution of this paper is that in using a multi-dimensional MFW construct we offer a more fine-tuned understanding of the impact of ethical antecedents on different dimensions of MFW, such as expressing full potential and integrity with self. Using an international data set from 879 employees and structural equation modelling, we confirmed an updated seven-dimension Comprehensive Meaningful Work Scale. The structural model found that (...) fairness, responsible leadership and worthy work are all significant and positively related to the majority of meaningfulness dimensions. However, different antecedents are related to different dimensions of MFW, showing that a complex and multi-level combination of ethics-related practices are required to cultivate MFW. All relationships were in the expected positive direction except responsible leadership, which was negatively related to the MFW dimension of integrity with self. Across the seven dimensions of MFW, only the dimension ‘Service to Others’ was uniformly not predicted by any antecedent. However, all three antecedents significantly related to important dimensions of MFW not usually measured in the ethics literature, such as ‘Unity with Others’ and ‘Expressing Full Potential’. In addition, we conducted dominance analysis to test the relative importance of the three antecedent across the MFW dimensions, and found that worthy work is the most dominant antecedent, although all three antecedents are the most dominant for at least one MFW dimension—further highlighting the importance of exploring MFW as a multi-dimensional construct. We discuss the implications for MFW theory and practice. (shrink)

In the literature on responsibility and health care, many associate responsibility-sensitive health policies with a form of luck egalitarianism. On this view, if some health inequality is due to the choices, or responsible agency, of one of the patients involved, then it is not unjust, and we have no responsibility to compensate for it. If the inequality’s origins cannot be traced back to the patients’ choices, then it is not their responsibility, and thus it becomes society’s responsibility to compensate for (...) it. This division of responsibilities between the individual and society applies not only to the past, but also to our responsibilities concerning the future. For instance, some luck egalitarians think that inequalities in life expectancy between men and women are unjust (Segall 2010) and should be compensated. Alex Voorhoeve has recently raised a new frontier in this debate concerning ‘prospective’ lives: the lives of those who will be born in the future. Against Voorhoeve, I argue that prospective inequalities are not a concern for egalitarians. This qualifies the claim that all inequalities not traceable to personal responsibility are unjust and suggests that there is no responsibility to structure society or our social institutions to avoid such prospective inequalities. (shrink)

Philosophical Psychology, Volume 25, Issue 1, Page 143-147, February 2012.

Longtemps l'homme a été certain de son essence. Métaphysiquement, avant toute anthropologie, il s'est reconnu comme le vivant doué de la parole. Il a été sûr aussi d'être l'animal raisonnable, la créature faite à l'image de Dieu, le sujet pensant, le maître de la planète. Aujourd'hui, où l'humanisme est si bien partagé, ces définitions nous suffisent-elles? Heidegger, dans le prolongement de la phénoménologie, a eu le génie de retrouver et de décrire l'unité de l'être-au-monde, en revenant en-deçà de la dualité (...) de l'animalité et de la raison. Il a défini le Dasein à partir de sa transcendance, de sa temporalité ekstatique, de son ouverture à l'être, en somme à partir de la pensée-parole. Dans sa critique de l'anthropocentrisme occidental, il a transféré à l'être toutes les facultés humaines, allant ainsi aussi loin que possible (peut-être trop?) vers une inquiétante dépossession de la subjectivité. Qui niera que c'est dans son monde et dans son époque que l'homme puise ses possibilités et trouve son identité? Mais qu'est devenu, dans cette définition, le lien à la nature, à la vie, que reconnaissait à l'homme une tradition de plus de vingt-cinq siècles - ce lien aujourd'hui si menacé? Cet essai tente de situer la vérité de l'homme dans un entrelacement entre une dimension mondiale, institutionnelle et langagière, et une dimension terrestre, charnelle et silencieuse. (shrink)