Participative pricing demonstrates the basic idea of allowing customer participation in price-setting process. Nottingham Playhouse, IBIS Singapore, Metropolitan Museum of Art, Wiener Deewan, Girl Talk, 8k, Zest consulting, Radiohead band and many more have successfully implemented pay-what-you-want, the most innovative form of participative pricing. Based on the degree of participation, PWYW is the highest form that allows buyers to select any price they want to pay for a product/service, including zero. The present study examines how customers lower their motivation to (...) pay more for products offered under PWYW by morally disengaging themselves from reciprocity concerns. It focuses on one mechanism of moral disengagement—displacement of responsibility and tests the proposed hypotheses in PWYW context. 284 responses were gathered using structured questionnaires at a reputed public university. Data were analysed using partial least-squares structural equation modelling. Findings indicate that customers’ moral disengagement via displacement of responsibility towards reciprocity concerns is negatively associated with willingness-to-pay more. Results corroborate the attenuating role of perceived control on the negative association between displacement of responsibility towards reciprocity concerns and WTPM. However, relaxation from monetary commitments does not have a significant moderating effect on the negative relationship between moral disengagement and WTPM. This study is possibly the first to empirically investigate the interplay among individuals’ cognitive mechanisms, moral disengagement from reciprocity concerns and socio-demographic variables under participative pricing. Findings empirically substantiate the theory of moral disengagement, moral self-regulation and social cognitive theory. Practitioners should actively engage customers’ moral self-regulation process and provide more sense of perceived control while designing participative pricing offerings. (shrink)

Boundary extension is a memory phenomenon in which an individual reports seeing more of a scene than they actually did. We provide the first examination of boundary extension in individuals diagnosed with depression, hypothesising that an overemphasis on pre-existing schema may enhance boundary extension effects on emotional photographs. The relationship between boundary extension and overgeneralisation in autobiographical memory was also explored. Individuals with (n = 42) and without (n = 41) Major Depressive Disorder completed a camera paradigm task utilising positive, (...) negative, and neutral stimuli. Across all participants, positive (d = 0.37) and negative (d = 0.66) stimuli were extended more than neutral stimuli. This effect did not differ between depressed and never-depressed participants. Across all participants, images containing objects were extended more than images containing faces. An association was also evident between extension effects in memory for perceptual space and extensions of autobiographical memory across time. (shrink)

Stanford argues that cooperators achieve and maintain correlated interaction through the objectification of moral norms. We first challenge the moral/non-moral distinction that frames Stanford's discussion. We then argue that to the extent that norms are objectified (and we hold that they are at most objectified in a very thin sense), it is not for the sake of achieving correlated interaction.

There are a number of conflicting accounts of thought insertion, the delusion that the thoughts of another are inserted into one’s own mind. These accounts share the common assumption of realism: that the subject of thought insertion has a thought corresponding to the description of her thought insertion episode. I challenge the assumption by arguing for an anti-realist treatment of first-person reports of thought insertion. I then offer an alternative account, simulationism, according to which sufferers merely simulate having a thought (...) inserted into their heads. By rejecting realism, the paper undermines a widespread explanatory framework that unites otherwise competing cognitive models of thought insertion. (shrink)

The claim that perfect hallucination is introspectively indistinguishable from perception has been a centrepiece of philosophical theorizing about sense experience. The most common interpretation of the indistinguishability claim is modal: that it is impossible to distinguish perfect hallucination from perception through introspection alone. I run through various models of introspection and show that none of them can accommodate the modal interpretation. Rejecting the modal interpretation opens up two alternative interpretations of the indistinguishability claim. According to the generic interpretation, hallucination is (...) indistinguishable from perception despite the existence of possible exceptions, while according to the actuality interpretation, the indistinguishability of hallucination from perception consists in the actual failure to distinguish hallucination from perception. These alternative understandings of the indistinguishability claim have a number of significant implications for the problem of perception, including the rejection of perfect hallucination and illusion in favour of our ordinary, non-philosophical concepts of these states. (shrink)

Theorists have found it difficult to reconcile the unity of inner speech as a mental state kind with the diversity of its manifestations. I argue that existing views concerning the content of inner speech fail to accommodate both of these features because they mistakenly assume that its content is to be found in the ‘speech processing hierarchy’, which includes semantic, syntactic, phonemic, phonetic, and articulatory levels. Upon rejecting this assumption, I offer a position on which the content of inner speech (...) is determined by voice processing, of which speech processing is but one component. The resulting view does justice to the idea that inner speech is a motley assortment of episodes that nevertheless form a kind. (shrink)

Operational and financial sustainability have, over time, remained as issues in the microfinance industry. The microfinance industry is struggling to gain self-sufficiency in Pakistan due to non-performing loans and operating costs. Simultaneously, deliberation on corporate social responsibility is also considered in academic literature and organizational practices. However, studies on CSR and financial performance in the microfinance sector are scarce, especially in Pakistan. CSR will develop customer attraction and loyalty, employee attraction, motivation and commitment, MFIs' reputation and access to capital, and (...) eventually build financial performance. Interviews were conducted with branch managers of microfinance institutions to test previous questionnaires. A self-administered survey was conducted to collect data from the managers of the microfinance banks operating in Punjab. Descriptive and inferential statistics were performed to answer research questions using Smart PLS. Most of the microfinance institutions believe in social responsibilities but lacks fund allocation and approval from higher management, and results are in line with prior studies. These empirical findings lead to the perception that CSR is not a barrier performance in microfinance banks as they have access to capital. The results indicated a strong positive correlation between CSR and the financial performance of the MFIs. CSR also positively correlates with customer retention, employees' motivation and attraction, and business reputation. CSR was associated with access to capital but was found to be weak. The research also narrated the limitation and practical implications of the study. The study also discusses further research directions. (shrink)

Philosophers and psychologists assume that mental imagery is a cognitive state, that it represents things as being a certain way. However, I argue that imagery is a conative state: it represents things as to be made a certain way. I challenge the traditional assumption by targeting an increasingly popular cognitive account that identifies mental imagery, such as inner speech, with predictions of sensory input. This predictive account faces both empirical and theoretical problems. The account not only fails to capture the (...) salience effects exhibited by mental imagery, it also cannot explain why subjects should not spend their lives minimizing prediction error by engaging in fantasy. These shortcomings highlight what I call the conative profile of imagery, which includes its salience, motivational, and performance effects. I argue that an alternative, conative view of imagery, according to which mental images are goal states, is best able to account for its conative profile. (shrink)

Healthcare reforms in India have been a much-debated issue in the recent past. While the debate has focused mainly on the right to healthcare, another by-product that has evolved out of the debate was the current problem of medical malpractice and the healthcare law. The last decade has seen an increase in the healthcare facilities in the country. This, however, has come with a bulk of medical error cases which the courts have entertained. According to reports, there has been an (...) increase in medical litigation cases by 400% in the last decade. There are about 5.2 million cases of medical error in the country every year. While there exists a standard legal system in the country which entertains such complaints of medical malpractice, the attempt by regulators and medical practitioners should be to reduce these cases. This paper seeks to analyze the extent to which medical malpractice cases affect consumers. It analyzes the existing medical liability system which has mainly evolved through the jurisprudence laid down by the English courts and critiques it. It also looks into the major reasons for such medical mishaps. Authors argue that a “No-Fault” system may give better outcomes. They analyze this by looking at the no-fault liability model implemented in New Zealand. Narratives of no-fault liability being implemented in India have also been used. These are showcased from instances of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and Clinical Trial regulations. It is also argued that a by-product of a no-fault liability system is stringent regulations which are used to reduce the possibility of medical mishaps altogether. Lastly, the possible problems of the no-fault liability system are discussed in the paper. (shrink)

A common but overlooked form of explanation in psychiatry is what I label ‘empathetic explanation’. Empathetic explanations invoke empathetic variables, which, in addition to providing an explanation of the target phenomenon, also afford an empathetic understanding of it. Focusing on the case of auditory verbal hallucination (AVH), I argue that empathetic explanation fails to provide an adequate account of the phenomenon, perniciously shapes empirical research, and confuses empathetic understanding with scientific understanding. I close by providing a general condition on the (...) legitimate application of empathetic explanation. (shrink)

We created paired moral dilemmas with minimal contrasts in wording, a research strategy that has been advocated as a way to empirically establish principles operative in a domain‐specific moral psychology. However, the candidate “principles” we tested were not derived from work in moral philosophy, but rather from work in the areas of consumer choice and risk perception. Participants were paradoxically less likely to choose an action that sacrifices one life to save others when they were asked to provide more reasons (...) for doing so (Experiment 1), and their willingness to sacrifice lives depended not only on how many lives would be saved, but on the number of lives at risk (Experiment 2). The latter effect was also found in a within‐subjects design (Experiment 3). These findings suggest caution in the use of artificial dilemmas as a key testbed for revealing principled bases for moral judgment. (shrink)

This book discusses a variety of world views that we can find to describe human relationships with the environment, and the underlying values in them. It reviews existing international legal instruments discussing some of the ethical values that have been agreed among member states of the United Nations.

Many states prohibit patients from appointing their physicians as health care proxies, fearing paternalism and conflict of interest. But the potential for conflict is not unique to physicians, and patients may have compelling reasons to prefer that their doctor make decisions on their behalf. Managing potential conflicts serves patients better than denying them the right to choose who will make health care decisions for them when they are no longer competent.

Most psychological research consists of experiments that put people in artificial situations that elicit unnatural behavior whose ecological validity is unknown. Without knowing the psychocultural meaning of experimental situations, we cannot interpret the responses of WEIRD people, let alone people in other cultures. Psychology, like other sciences, needs to be solidly rooted in naturalistic observation and description of people around the world. Theory should be inductively developed and tested against real-world behavior.

A traditional assumption in the literature on inner speech is that inner speech allows us to have knowledge of our thoughts. I argue that inner speech cannot even be part of an explanation of how we know our propositional states. My argument turns on the existence of unsymbolized thought, and makes the case that whatever explains self-knowledge in the absence of inner speech also explains self-knowledge when inner speech is present. Inner speech is thus ‘screened off’ from explaining the knowledge (...) we have of our propositional states. Nevertheless, inner speech seems to have a reflexive character: in inner speech we seem to represent aspects of ourselves. I argue that inner speech does not allow us to represent our own propositional states, as the tradition holds, but rather our own voices. In representing my own voice in inner speech, I bear a distinctively second-personal relation to myself, addressing myself as a ‘you’. The paper suggests a broader reorientation in theorizing about inner speech: away from questions about how inner speech maps onto mental states and toward questions about its second-personal nature. (shrink)

A traditional assumption in the literature on inner speech is that inner speech allows us to have knowledge of our thoughts. I argue that inner speech cannot even be part of an explanation of how we know our propositional states. My argument turns on the existence of unsymbolized thought, and makes the case that whatever explains self-knowledge in the absence of inner speech also explains self-knowledge when inner speech is present. Inner speech is thus ‘screened off’ from explaining the knowledge (...) we have of our propositional states. Nevertheless, inner speech seems to have a reflexive character: in inner speech we seem to represent aspects of ourselves. I argue that inner speech does not allow us to represent our own propositional states, as the tradition holds, but rather our own voices. In representing my own voice in inner speech, I bear a distinctively second-personal relation to myself, addressing myself as a ‘you’. The paper suggests a broader reorientation in theorizing about inner speech: away from questions about how inner speech maps onto mental states and toward questions about its second-personal nature. (shrink)

On the fundamentals of Yoga according to Hinduism.

Moral hypocrisy is typically viewed as an ethical accusation: Someone is applying different moral standards to essentially identical cases, dishonestly claiming that one action is acceptable while otherwise equivalent actions are not. We suggest that in some instances the apparent logical inconsistency stems from different evaluations of a weak argument, rather than dishonesty per se. Extending Corner, Hahn, and Oaksford's (2006) analysis of slippery slope arguments, we develop a Bayesian framework in which accusations of hypocrisy depend on inferences of shared (...) category membership between proposed actions and previous standards, based on prior probabilities that inform the strength of competing hypotheses. Across three experiments, we demonstrate that inferences of hypocrisy increase as perceptions of the likelihood of shared category membership between precedent cases and current cases increase, that these inferences follow established principles of category induction, and that the presence of self-serving motives increases inferences of hypocrisy independent of changes in the actions themselves. Taken together, these results demonstrate that Bayesian analyses of weak arguments may have implications for assessing moral reasoning. (shrink)

By examining evidence from India, where quotas for women in local government were introduced in 1993, this article argues that institutional reform can disturb hegemonic discourses sufficiently to open a window of opportunity where deliberative democratic norms take root and where, in addition to the politics of recognition, the politics of redistribution also operates.