A fundamental problem in game theory is the possibility of reaching equilibrium outcomes with undesirable properties, e.g., inefficiency. The economics literature abounds with models that attempt to modify games in order to avoid such undesirable properties, for example through the use of subsidies and taxation, or by allowing players to undergo a bargaining phase before their decision. In this paper, we consider the effect of such transformations in Boolean games with costs, where players control propositional variables that they can set (...) to true or false, and are primarily motivated to seek the satisfaction of some goal formula, while secondarily motivated to minimise the costs of their actions. We adopt preparation sets as our basic solution concept. A preparation set is a set of outcomes that contains for every player at least one best response to every outcome in the set. Prep sets are well-suited to the analysis of Boolean games, because we can naturally represent prep sets as propositional formulas, which in turn allows us to refer to prep formulas. The preference structure of Boolean games with costs makes it possible to distinguish between hard and soft prep sets. The hard prep sets of a game are sets of valuations that would be prep sets in that game no matter what the cost function of the game was. The properties defined by hard prep sets typically relate to goal-seeking behaviour, and as such these properties cannot be eliminated from games by, for example, taxation or subsidies. In contrast, soft prep sets can be eliminated by an appropriate system of incentives. Besides considering what can happen in a game by unrestricted manipulation of players’ cost function, we also investigate several mechanisms that allow groups of players to form coalitions and eliminate undesirable outcomes from the game, even when taxes or subsidies are not a possibility. (shrink)

On the background of the widely known and controversially discussed concept of sustainable development and the ever increasing influence of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) on social, environmental and economic issues, this article focuses on how NGOs, specialised in environmental protection and conservation issues, reacted to the holistic societal concept of sustainable development which aims at finding solutions not only to environmental, but also to social and economic issues. For this purpose, the article investigates whether and to what extent the sustainability (...) concept has been adopted by three worldwide leading environmental conservation NGOs: Greenpeace International, WWF International and IUCN International. The research, conducted in early 2006, reveals that the three organisations integrated the sustainability concept to different degrees depending on the organisations' dominant value set. The more an organisation is bound to the idea of environmental protection, the less it is inclined to adopt strategies stemming from the sustainability concept whose implicit value system contradicts a strong bio- or eco-centric position. This finding adds evidence to the assumption that the holistic sustainability concept is most likely to be reduced and adapted when addressed by a specialised societal actor such as an NGO. Such insight into the influence of value systems on the actual actions of pressure groups might also be valuable in the light of the ever increasing number of strategic partnerships between NGOs and the private sector. To be familiar with each others' action-leading key assumptions can significantly contribute to establishing a sound basis for a fruitful and rewarding collaboration. (shrink)

The thesis deals with the concept of truth and the paradoxes of truth. Philosophical theories usually consider the concept of truth from a wider perspective. They are concerned with questions such as - Is there any connection between the truth and the world? And, if there is - What is the nature of the connection? Contrary to these theories, this analysis is of a logical nature. It deals with the internal semantic structure of language, the mutual semantic connection of sentences, (...) above all the connection of sentences that speak about the truth of other sentences and sentences whose truth they speak about. Truth paradoxes show that there is a problem in our basic understanding of the language meaning and they are a test for any proposed solution. It is important to make a distinction between the normative and analytical aspect of the solution. The former tries to ensure that paradoxes will not emerge. The latter tries to explain paradoxes. Of course, the practical aspect of the solution is also important. It tries to ensure a good framework for logical foundations of knowledge, for related problems in Artificial Intelligence and for the analysis of the natural language. Tarski’s analysis emphasized the T-scheme as the basic intuitive principle for the concept of truth, but it also showed its inconsistency with the classical logic. Tarski’s solution is to preserve the classical logic and to restrict the scheme: we can talk about the truth of sentences of a language only inside another essentially richer metalanguage. This solution is in harmony with the idea of reflexivity of thinking and it has become very fertile for mathematics and science in general. But it has normative nature | truth paradoxes are avoided in a way that in such frame we cannot even express paradoxical sentences. It is also too restrictive because, for the same reason we cannot express a situation in which there is a circular reference of some sentences to other sentences, no matter how common and harmless such a situation may be. Kripke showed that there is no natural restriction to the T-scheme and we have to accept it. But then we must also accept the riskiness of sentences | the possibility that under some circumstances a sentence does not have the classical truth value but it is undetermined. This leads to languages with three-valued semantics. Kripke did not give any definite model, but he gave a theoretical frame for investigations of various models | each fixed point in each three-valued semantics can be a model for the concept of truth. The solutions also have normative nature | we can express the paradoxical sentences, but we escape a contradiction by declaring them undetermined. Such a solution could become an analytical solution only if we provide the analysis that would show in a substantial way that it is the solution that models the concept of truth. Kripke took some steps in the direction of finding an analytical solution. He preferred the strong Kleene three-valued semantics for which he wrote it was "appropriate" but did not explain why it was appropriate. One reason for such a choice is probably that Kripke finds paradoxical sentences meaningful. This eliminates the weak Kleene three valued semantics which corresponds to the idea that paradoxical sentences are meaningless, and thus indeterminate. Another reason could be that the strong Kleene three valued semantics has the so-called investigative interpretation. According to this interpretation, this semantics corresponds to the classical determination of truth, whereby all sentences that do not have an already determined value are temporarily considered indeterminate. When we determine the truth value of these sentences, then we can also determine the truth value of the sentences that are composed of them. Kripke supplemented this investigative interpretation with an intuition about learning the concept of truth. That intuition deals with how we can teach someone who is a competent user of an initial language (without the predicate of truth T) to use sentences that contain the predicate T. That person knows which sentences of the initial language are true and which are not. We give her the rule to assign the T attribute to the former and deny that attribute to the latter. In that way, some new sentences that contain the predicate of truth, and which were indeterminate until then, become determinate. So the person gets a new set of true and false sentences with which he continues the procedure. This intuition leads directly to the smallest fixed point of strong Kleene semantics as an analytically acceptable model for the logical notion of truth. However, since this process is usually saturated only on some transfinite ordinal, this intuition, by climbing on ordinals, increasingly becomes a metaphor. This thesis is an attempt to give an analytical solution to truth paradoxes. It gives an analysis of why and how some sentences lack the classical truth value. The starting point is basic intuition according to which paradoxical sentences are meaningful (because we understand what they are talking about well, moreover we use it for determining their truth values), but they witness the failure of the classical procedure of determining their truth value in some "extreme" circumstances. Paradoxes emerge because the classical procedure of the truth value determination does not always give a classically supposed (and expected) answer. The analysis shows that such an assumption is an unjustified generalization from common situations to all situations. We can accept the classical procedure of the truth value determination and consequently the internal semantic structure of the language, but we must reject the universality of the exterior assumption of a successful ending of the procedure. The consciousness of this transforms paradoxes to normal situations inherent to the classical procedure. Some sentences, although meaningful, when we evaluate them according to the classical truth conditions, the classical conditions do not assign them a unique value. We can assign to them the third value, \undetermined", as a sign of definitive failure of the classical procedure. An analysis of the propagation of the failure in the structure of sentences gives exactly the strong Kleene three-valued semantics, not as an investigative procedure, as it occurs in Kripke, but as the classical truth determination procedure accompanied by the propagation of its own failure. An analysis of the circularities in the determination of the classical truth value gives the criterion of when the classical procedure succeeds and when it fails, when the sentences will have the classical truth value and when they will not. It turns out that the truth values of sentences thus obtained give exactly the largest intrinsic fixed point of the strong Kleene three-valued semantics. In that way, the argumentation is given for that choice among all fixed points of all monotone three-valued semantics for the model of the logical concept of truth. An immediate mathematical description of the fixed point is given, too. It has also been shown how this language can be semantically completed to the classical language which in many respects appears a natural completion of the process of thinking about the truth values of the sentences of a given language. Thus the final model is a language that has one interpretation and two systems of sentence truth evaluation, primary and final evaluation. The language through the symbol T speaks of its primary truth valuation, which is precisely the largest intrinsic fixed point of the strong Kleene three valued semantics. Its final truth valuation is the semantic completion of the first in such a way that all sentences that are not true in the primary valuation are false in the final valuation. (shrink)

The Shapley value is a well-known solution concept for TU games. The Maschler–Owen value and the NTU Shapley value are two well-known extensions of the Shapley value to NTU games. A hyperplane game is an NTU game in which the feasible set for each coalition is a hyperplane. On the domain of monotonic hyperplane games, the Maschler–Owen value is axiomatized. Although the domain of hyperplane game is a very interesting class of games to study, unfortunately, on this domain, the NTU (...) Shapley value is not well-defined, namely, it assigns an empty set to some hyperplane games. A prize game is an NTU game that can be obtained by “truncating” a hyperplane game. As such, a prize game describes essentially the same situation as the corresponding hyperplane game. It turns out that, on the domain of monotonic prize games, the NTU Shapley value is well-defined. Thus, one can define a value which is well-defined on the domain of monotonic hyperplane games as follows: given a monotonic hyperplane game, first, transform it into a prize game, and then apply the NTU Shapley value to it. We refer to the resulting value as the “generalized Shapley value” and compare the axiomatic properties of it with those of the Maschler–Owen value on the union of the class of monotonic hyperplane games and that of monotonic prize games. We also provide axiomatizations of the Maschler–Owen value and the generalized Shapley value on that domain. (shrink)

The model of incomplete cooperative games incorporates uncertainty into the classical model of cooperative games by considering a partial characteristic function. Thus the values for some of the coalitions are not known. The main focus of this paper is 1-convexity under this framework. We are interested in two heavily intertwined questions. First, given an incomplete game, how can we fill in the missing values to obtain a complete 1-convex game? Second, how to determine in a rational, fair, and efficient way (...) the payoffs of players based only on the known values of coalitions? We illustrate the analysis with two classes of incomplete games—minimal incomplete games and incomplete games with defined upper vector. To answer the first question, for both classes, we provide a description of the set of 1-convex extensions in terms of its extreme points and extreme rays. Based on the description of the set of 1-convex extensions, we introduce generalisations of three solution concepts for complete games, namely the τ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\tau $$\end{document}-value, the Shapley value and the nucleolus. For minimal incomplete games, we show that all of the generalised values coincide. We call it the average value and provide different axiomatisations. For incomplete games with defined upper vector, we show that the generalised values do not coincide in general. This highlights the importance and also the difficulty of considering more general classes of incomplete games. (shrink)

Violence in the world, explosive population growth, uneven and unfair distribution of wealth, destruction of the environment and/or the ineffectiveness of supranational political and economic tools and institutions and other problems are more and more achieving global character. The growth of number, frequency and intensity of global problems and threats is a reality. In the same time it represents a big challenge: How to find a generally acceptable, adequate global solution? The majority of political and intellectual leaders around the world (...) acknowledge concept of sustainable development/sustainable living as the most important tool for protecting the biosphere and for securing reasonable development for the future. The development and implementation of the sustainable living concept is driven by the effort to reach – as much as possible – the ideals of humanism and the harmony between man and nature, based on the respect of life. Values compatible with a sustainable way of living are a set of values, the implementation of which promote the shift towards sustainable future. These values are not completely new. Just the opposite. They create the core of the common heritage of humankind, since the oldest religious cultures. The submitted study tries to map the recent developments of values compatible with the sustainable way of living problematic from both Czech, Slovak and thinkers from abroad perspectives in the wider framework of relevant international activities. (shrink)

The academic and humanitarian conception of harmonious union has been proposed by Professor Zhang Liwen in the 1990s. It claims to explain the specifics of Chinese civilization and proposes solution of some global problems by its means. Despite the lack of direct references to the conception, it remains in demand both in the political and ideological discourse of the People's Republic of China. This presentations deals with the historical and philosophical facts available in Chinese written monuments and works of Antiquity (...) and the Middle Ages, which are put forward as a justification for the primordial idea of harmonious union in Chinese culture. An attempt is done to show that this concept does not offer any new set of philosophical categories, but appeals to the well-known concepts of two-, three- and five-item classifications. At the same time, the emphasis is laid on the form, the method of combining opposite or dissimilar elements. In general, on the basis of the limited historical and philosophical material, it can be concluded that the concept of harmonious unification is aimed not so much at revising the composition of the philosophical system of Confucianism, but at rethinking its value criteria for interaction and mutual dependence of objects and phenomena. (shrink)

This article examines the concept of creating shared value as articulated by Michael Porter and Mark Kramer, in non-Western and Western contexts. We define non-Western contexts as those in so-called “developing” countries and emerging economies, whereas Western ones pertain to dominant thinking in “developed” regions. We frame our research in postcolonial theory and offer an overview of existing critiques of CSV. We conduct a critical discourse analysis of 66 articles to identify how CSV is being cited by authors, and potential (...) underlying power dynamics that affect its relevance for non-Western contexts. Our review exposes increasingly critical views about the paradoxical positioning of CSV as an instrumental concept that can offer “win-win” solutions, particularly from those working in non-Western settings. Western perspectives generally tend to be more supportive of its instrumental nature, but also recognize the increasing complexity of the business-society nexus and stakeholder engagement. We argue that the CSV framework requires further development to maintain credibility and applicability, especially in non-Western domains. (shrink)

Carol Pateman has said that the public/private distinction is what feminism is all about. I tend to be sceptical about categorical pronouncements of this sort, but this book is a work of feminist political philosophy and the public/private distinction is what it is all about. It is motivated by the belief that we lack a philosophical conception of privacy suitable for a democracy; that feminism has exposed this lack; and that by combining feminist analysis with recent developments in political philosophy, (...) we can meet the philosophical and political need for a distinctively democratic conception of privacy. This book then, is an effort to sketch and defend such a conception of privacy. It aims to show that while some conceptions of privacy are inconsistent with democracy, others are not. Indeed, the book asserts, the belief that privacy can be valuable and that it can justify basic legal rights, is implicit in a democratic conception of persons as free and equal beings, and a democratic conception of politics as the self-governing, or regulating, activity of such individuals. Just as we can and should reject undemocratic conceptions of the suffrage in favour of democratic ones, so the book maintains, we can and must reject undemocratic conceptions of privacy in favour of ones that reflect the moral equality of men and women, and a commitment to democratic forms of government. Democracy is often described as government by and for the people. On such a view, democracy is a political regime which can be contrasted with monarchies or aristocracies on the one hand, or with theocracies and despotisms on the other. By contrast with the former, it is a form of government that views individuals as citizens and as equal members of the agency which authorizes the use of political power. By contrast with the latter, it is a form of government whose purposes and aims are established by the common interests of individuals, conceived as free and equal citizens. It is my contention that there is a plausible and attractive conception of privacy implicit in this view of democracy. Hence, I show that individuals have fundamental interests in privacy because privacy enables them to participate in politics freely and as the equal of others and, beyond that, to lead lives that they can each affirm to be reasonable, valuable and right. As I think that the ideal of democratic government is properly associated with this latter and broader goal, as well as with the former one, I call my account of privacy a democratic conception of privacy to signal its connection to a particular ideal of politics, and to the conception of persons that makes this ideal a convincing and inspiring one. As this is a work of political philosophy, however, no effort is made to address the legal merits of competing accounts of the right to privacy, or to resolve legal dispute about the content and justification of particular constitutional rights in the United States. Thus, while I use Supreme Court decisions and works of legal theory to illustrate and support my arguments, my use of these materials is governed by philosophical concerns and my conclusions, therefore, are strictly of a philosophical, not a legal, nature. The book is divided into four chapters, moving from feminist criticisms of privacy to an engagement with the philosophical literature on privacy and an account of the right to privacy in a democratic society. It proceeds as follows. In Chapter 1, I examine feminist concerns about privacy, through a close reading of the work of Catherine MacKinnon. I argue that MacKinnon persuasively shows that protection for privacy has frequently licensed the coercion and subjection of women, and that her arguments are supported both by feminist scholarship, key Supreme Court decisions, and by familiar conceptions of privacy and equality. However, I argue, these criticisms do not imply that privacy, like slavery, can never be democratic, because wholly inconsistent with the equality of individuals. Rather, feminist criticisms of privacy suggest that privacy, like the suffrage, can be necessary to the equality of women and can have a legitimate and important place in a democratic society. In Chapter 2, I examine the philosophical literature on privacy in light of the need to distinguish democratic from undemocratic accounts of its nature and value. This literature, I show, can help us to provide an account of privacy that is sensitive both to its inegalitarian aspects and to its importance for a democratic commitment to the freedom and equality of women. However, I argue, we cannot embrace current philosophical accounts of privacy uncritically, because to a striking extent they are, themselves, indifferent to the ways that privacy has licensed sexual inequality. Thus, in Chapter 2, I set about interpreting privacy as a moral and political value, in light of the strengths and weaknesses of the philosophical literature on privacy. Their strength is that they show that there are many reasons for caring about privacy, or many ways in which we might define it as a democratic value. Their weakness is that they tend to assume that we must choose amongst these different conceptions of privacy, in order to provide a philosophically cogent account of privacy. This, I show, is a mistake and one that can be remedied by remembering that a commitment to the equality of individuals requires us to acknowledge the reasonable differences in value and interest that may characterize their relations in a democracy. When we do so, I show, it is possible to define privacy in terms of its protection for self-definition, intimacy and confidentiality, without having to choose between the three of them. For individuals may legitimately disagree about the differences between privacy and other values, even while holding that privacy is a distinctive and important democratic good; and they may also disagree about the importance of privacy compared to other goods, such as equality, without denying that self-definition, intimacy and confidentiality can be morally and politically desirable in a democracy. In Chapter 2, therefore, I show that we can provide a philosophically adequate account of what privacy is and why it is valuable without supposing that privacy is always sexually egalitarian, or denying that it has a distinctive place in a democratic conception of value. Chapter 3 then extends this account of privacy, by considering the justification for a legal right to privacy. Just as we cannot provide a democratic conception of privacy without attending to the different, though equally valid, concerns that individuals may have so, I show, we cannot provide a democratic account of privacy rights if we forget that individuals can, quite reasonably, differ in the importance that they attach to privacy. The result, I argue, is that we can distinguish two main reasons for protecting privacy by right in a democracy, the one personal and the other political. Whereas the former emphasizes the importance of self-definition, intimacy and confidentiality to the personal freedom and equality of individuals, the latter emphasizes their importance to their prospects for voluntary and equal participation in the processes of collective choice and deliberation that define a democratic government. These two justifications of privacy rights reflect the fact that in a democracy the personal can be political, as feminists have insisted, but need not be in order to merit protection by right. Indeed, I argue, we can distinguish democratic from undemocratic accounts of the right to privacy in this way: for whilst the former acknowledge the variety of individuals’ interests in personal and collective choice, the latter either collapse the political into the personal, or assume that the legitimate claims of individuals are merely a function of collective needs, interests and values. Neither of these is consistent with familiar assumptions about the nature and justification of democratic institutions and rights, nor can they be reconciled with a commitment to sexual equality. Thus, I conclude, though the fact that there are different justifications for privacy rights in a democracy means that individuals may legitimately disagree over the content and justification of basic rights, it is wrong to confuse democratic debate with moral or conceptual confusion and so, arbitrarily, to truncate our accounts of privacy, equality and democracy. Finally, in Chapter 4, I test and develop these claims by examining the justification for abortion rights in a democracy. I argue that women have legitimate interests in abortion, as well as in bearing children, because they have fundamental, and legitimate, interests in privacy and equality. Although safe and legal abortion is necessary to sexual equality, as feminists claim, I show that we can provide a convincing and democratic account of women’s claims to abortion only if we recognize women’s interests in self-definition, intimacy and confidentiality. This is because women have both personal and political interests in abortion and we will be unable adequately to identify these if we overlook their interests in privacy. Indeed, I show, the difference between democratic and undemocratic solutions to conflict over abortion lies precisely in this: that whereas the former acknowledge the importance of privacy to the personal and political equality of women, the latter overlook or deny this. As a result, the latter license both mandated abortions, although women have legitimate interests in bearing and raising children, and prohibitions on abortion that cannot be reconciled with the freedom and equality of women. That is not to say that abortion is not a politically significant matter, or that we can resolve moral conflict over abortion simply by giving women a legal right to abortion. Neither is the case. However, the chapter shows, in a democracy individuals are entitled to make morally and politically controversial decisions for themselves not simply because this is expedient or useful, but because this is right. To overlook this feature of democracy, I argue, is to make moral and political conflict utterly intractable by democratic means. Thus, while controversy over abortion has been held to show that privacy is an incoherent and undemocratic right, this chapter argues that it shows the reverse: for controversy over abortion makes clear that privacy is essential to democracy, and why this should be so. This overview of the book, I hope, makes clear that its concerns are methodological as well as substantive, and moral as well as political. Thus, its central methodological claim is that we cannot reconcile privacy with the equality of individuals unless we make a deliberate effort to do so. Its central moral and political claims are that privacy is compatible with the equality of individuals, and sufficiently important to the latter that, in a democracy, the privacy of individuals merits legal protection by right. However, this summary of the book also exposes its limitations. Chief amongst these, I fear, is that it provides no sustained discussion of the place of property on a democratic conception of privacy, and that the latter, itself, is rather a broad preliminary sketch than a polished and detailed portrait. I regard these limits on the scope and arguments of the book as limitations, albeit ones that I hope to be able to remedy before too long.However, limited though the book clearly is, I believe that it lays out the essential components of a democratic conception of privacy and that, by analysing and synthesizing several diverse bodies of literature, it may help those who are interested in the relations between privacy, equality and democracy. (shrink)

What is the most general common set of attributes that characterises something as intrinsically valuable and hence as subject to some moral respect, and without which something would rightly be considered intrinsically worthless or even positively unworthy and therefore rightly to be disrespected in itself? This paper develops and supports the thesis that the minimal condition of possibility of an entity's least intrinsic value is to be identified with its ontological status as an information object. All entities, even when interpreted (...) as only clusters of information, still have a minimal moral worth qua information objects and so may deserve to be respected. The paper is organised into four main sections. Section 1 models moral action as an information system using the object-oriented programming methodology (OOP). Section 2 addresses the question of what role the several components constituting the moral system can have in an ethical analysis. If they can play only an instrumental role, then Computer Ethics (CE) is probably bound to remain at most a practical, field-dependent, applied or professional ethics. However, Computer Ethics can give rise to a macroethical approach, namely Information Ethics (IE), if one can show that ethical concern should be extended to include not only human, animal or biological entities, but also information objects. The following two sections show how this minimalist level of analysis can be achieved. Section 3 provides an axiological analysis of information objects. It criticises the Kantian approach to the concept of intrinsic value and shows that it can be improved by using the methodology introduced in the first section. The solution of the Kantian problem prompts the reformulation of the key question concerning the moral worth of an entity: what is the intrinsic value of x qua an object constituted by its inherited attributes? In answering this question, it is argued that entities can share different observable properties depending on the level of abstraction adopted,and that it is still possible to speak of moral value even at the highest level of ontological abstraction represented by the informational analysis. Section 4 develops a minimalist axiology based on the concept of information object. It further supports IE's position by addressing five objections that may undermine its acceptability. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Fact Value Dichotomy in Demarcating DisorderPatricia A. Ross (bio)Keywordsdemarcation, values, ontology, epistemologyHaving read numerous articles on the concept of mental disorder, I find it useful to approach new articles on the topic by first sketching out the conceptual framework within which each author places the problem. The goal in doing this is not merely to be able to compare ideas within a remarkably diverse discussion, but also to (...) be able to uncover any presuppositions that underlie the account, as well as assumptions necessary for the argument, which may or may not be warranted. By approaching each new offering in this way, I often find that the solutions proposed depend a great deal on these undisclosed features, and that such presuppositions and assumptions are often questionable, at best, and are sometimes simply unwarranted. Brülde's discussion of mental disorder and values provides a useful example of this method.To determine how we should draw the line between disorder and nondisorder (henceforth, I refer to this as demarcation), Brülde claims that we need to address four questions. We need to determine (1) the extent to which demarcation depends on values and the extent to which it is descriptive, (2) the kinds of values we need to make use of (aesthetic, moral, pragmatic), (3) whether there is an implicit reference to some specific evaluative standard, and (4) whether the value judgments used to demarcate are ontological or epistemological. In putting forth these questions, Brülde identifies what he takes to be the generally agreed upon claim that there are two components necessary for demarcation: a factual component and an evaluative component. These components are distinct from each other and both are necessary—the demarcation cannot be made "by objective means alone," nor is it purely evaluative. Thus, demarcation necessarily involves a distinct value component, and the answers to Brülde's four questions are intended to shed light on how values are involved in determining the evaluative component of demarcation.Working under the assumption that they are distinct, Brülde sets aside discussion of the factual component to focus on the value component. He also tables the first of his four questions (the extent to which demarcation depends on values and the extent to which it is descriptive), citing an over-abundance of literature on the matter. Having thus framed the problem, Brülde turns his full attention to questions two through four, ultimately providing us with the answer that the values needed to demarcate disorders from nondisorders are of several types; mental disorder is both implicitly and explicitly an evaluative term, as well as value laden in both the ontological and epistemic senses. This [End Page 107] framing of the problem provides us with insight into the underlying presuppositions and assumptions that lead to Brülde's conclusion.The first aspect of this framework to consider is the division of demarcation into two distinct components, and the setting aside of the factual component as distinct from, and inconsequential to, the questions concerning values. By proceeding in this way, Brülde's argument rests on the presupposition that we can, and want, to consider the value component in isolation from the factual component. This presupposition raises a number of questions. Is there nothing about the factual component that may help us in our consideration of the value component, or vice versa? Does the factual component confine what we can say or know about the value component in any way. Overall, some justification is needed for accepting that there are two distinct and independent components, as well as for believing that the factual component can be disregarded in this way.Brülde also makes the (explicit) assumption that there is some internal state or process underlying all mental disorders about which we have or will gain factual knowledge that is objective. Implicit in this is the further assumption that this knowledge (regarding internal states or processes) will be all there is to say, scientifically, about the disorder—that is, knowledge concerning internal states and processes are what will comprise the "factual component." But if we can have sociological facts and psychological facts (and I think it is... (shrink)

The actual introduction of a non-reflexive and non-idempotent q -consequence gave birth to the concept of logical three-valuedness based on the idea of noncomplementary categories of rejection and acceptance. A q -consequence may not have bivalent description, the property claimed by Suszko’s Thesis on logical two-valuedness, ( ST ), of structural logics, i.e. structural consequence operations. Recall that ( ST ) shifts logical values over the set of matrix values and it refers to the division of matrix universe into two (...) subsets of designated and undesignated elements using their characteristic functions as logical valuations, cf. [4] The extension of the idea operates with three-valued function, with the third value ascribed to those elements of the matrix which are neither rejected nor accepted. Accordingly, the logical three-valuedness departs naturally from the division of the matrix universe into three subsets and the ( ST ) counterpart says that any inference based on a structural q -consequence may have a bivalent or a three-valued description. After a short presentation of the three-valued inferential framework, we discuss a solution for further exploration of the idea leading to logical n -valuedness for n > 3. Apparently, the first step in that direction is easy and it consists of a division of the matrix universe into more than three subsets. The next move, i.e. a definition of a matrix consequence-like relation being neither a consequence nor a q -consequence, seems extremely difficult. Therefore, here we consider only finite linear matrices with one-argument functions “labelling” respective matrix subsets. By means of these functions it is possible to represent a q-consequence as a “partial” Tarski’s consequence and, ultimately, to define a logically more-valued consequence-like relation. We believe, that the present partial proposal deserves an attention by itself but also that it may lead to a general approach to logically many-valued inference. (shrink)

In this paper, I want to try to put what has been termed the “care ethics” into a different perspective. While I will discuss primarily the use of that ethic or that term as it applies to the healthcare setting in general and to the deliberation of consultants or the function of committees more specifically, what I have to say is meant to be applicable to the problem of using a notion like “caring” as a fundamental precept in ethical decision (...) making. I will set out to examine the relationship between theoretical ethics, justice-based reasoning, and care-based reasoning and conclude by suggesting not only that all are part of a defensible solution when adjudicating individual cases, but that these three are linked and can, in fact, be mutually corrective. I will claim that using what has been called “the care ethic” alone is grossly insufficient for solving individual problems and that the term can be extremely dangerous. I will readily admit that while blindly using an approach based solely on theoretically derived principles is perhaps somewhat less dangerous, it is bound to be sterile, unsatisfying, and perhaps even cruel in individual situations. Care ethics, as I understand the concept, is basically a non- or truly an anti-intellectual kind of ethic in that it tries not only to value feeling over thought in deliberating problems of ethics, but indeed, would almost entirely substitute feeling for thought. Feeling when used to underwrite undisciplined and intuitive action without theory has no head and, therefore, no plan and no direction; theory eventuating in sterile rules and eventually resulting in action heedlessly based on such rules lacks humanity and heart. Neither one nor the other is complete in itself. There is no reason why we necessarily should be limited to choosing between these two extremes. (shrink)

Political science and economic science . . . make use of the same language, the same mode of abstraction, the same instruments of thought and the same method of reasoning. (Black 1998, 354) Proponents as well as opponents of economics imperialism agree that imperialism is a matter of unification; providing a unified framework for social scientific analysis. Uskali Mäki distinguishes between derivational and ontological unification and argues that the latter should serve as a constraint for the former. We explore whether, (...) in the case of rational-choice political science, self-interested behavior can be seen as a common causal element and solution concepts as the common derivational element, and whether the former constraints the use of the latter. We find that this is not the case. Instead, what is common to economics and rational-choice political science is a set of research heuristics and a focus on institutions with similar structures and forms of organization. (shrink)

The concept of value is often discredited for its ambivalence: value increases and decreases, and is valid for one person but not necessarily for the next. Philosophies of value are subjectivist or contaminated by economic rationality. I show, from Gilbert Simondon, that value can be conceived of as a variable quantity without falling into levelling or axiological relativism. This implies dismissing the neo-Kantian separation of ontology and axiology, rejecting the conception of culture as a set of values and the bipolarity (...) of value oppositions, and finally thinking of value from a physical-mathematical rather than an economic analogy. (shrink)

In organic farming animal welfare is one important aspect included in the internationally agreed organic principles of health, ecology, fairness and care (IFOAM 2006), reflecting expectation of consumers and farmers. The definition of organic animal welfare includes—besides traditional terms of animal welfare—‘regeneration’ and ‘naturalness’. Organic animal welfare assessment needs to reflect this and use complex parameters, include natural behaviour and a systemic view. Furthermore, various parties with seemingly conflicting interests are involved, causing ethical dilemmas, such as the use of nose (...) rings for outdoor sows (impaired animal welfare vs. destruction of humus). Solutions can only be found when foundational concepts are translated and applied to practical situations. On-farm animal welfare assessment and implementation of improvement strategies are increasingly relevant scientific areas. They combine on-farm welfare assessment, identification of key problem areas and connected risk factors. Constant communication between all parties is crucial for success. Animal health and welfare planning is one application of this approach, which was carried out on Austrian organic pig farms as well as organic dairy farms in seven European countries. The projects included welfare assessment, feedback and benchmarking as a tool for communication between farmers, advisors and scientists. Finally goals were set by the farmer and improvement strategies applicable to organic farming were implemented. This included prevention of disease by management strategies instead of routine treatment with pharmaceutical products. It appeared that next to problem structuring, multidisciplinary problem solving demands good communications skills to relate animal welfare science to value reflections. (shrink)

In this paper, we study solution concepts for cooperative games with stochastic payoffs. we define four kinds of solution concepts, namely the most coalitional (marginal) stable solution and the fairest coalitional (marginal) solution, by minimizing the total variance of excesses of coalitions (individual players). All these four concepts are optimal solutions of corresponding optimal problem under the least square criterion. It turns out that the fairest coalitional (marginal) solution belongs to the set of the most coalitional (...) (marginal) stable solutions. Inspired by the definition of nucleolus, we propose various extended nucleolus based on lexicographic criterion. Furthermore, axiomatizations of the proposed solutions are exhibited through the linkage between the stochastic and deterministic models. (shrink)

The recent development and growth oforganic livestock farming and the relateddevelopment of national and internationalregulations has fueled discussions amongscientists and philosophers concerning theproper conceptualization of animal welfare.These discussions on livestock welfare inorganic farming draw on the conventionaldiscussions and disputes on animal welfare thatinvolve issues such as different definitions ofwelfare (clinical health, absence of suffering,sum of positive and negative experiences,etc.), the possibility for objective measuresof animal welfare, and the acceptable level ofwelfare. It seems clear that livestock welfareis a value-laden concept and (...) that animalwelfare science cannot be made independent ofquestions of values and ethics. The questioninvestigated here is whether those values thatunderpin organic farming, in particular, alsoaffect the interpretation of livestock welfare,and, if so, how. While some of the issuesraised in connection with organic farming arerelatively uncontroversial, others are not. Theintroduction of organic farming values seems tointroduce new criteria for what counts as goodanimal welfare, as well as a different ethicalbasis for making moral decisions on welfare.Organic farming embodies distinctive systemicor communitarian ethical ideas and the organicvalues are connected to a systemic conceptionof nature, of agriculture, of the farm, and ofthe animal. The new criteria of welfare arerelated to concepts such as naturalness,harmony, integrity, and care. While the organicvalues overlap with those involved in theconventional discussion of animal welfare, someof them suggest a need to set new prioritiesand to re-conceptualize animal welfare – forexample, with respect to ``naturalness,'''' inrelation to the possibilities for expression ofnatural behavior and in relation to animalintegrity as a concept for organismic harmony.The organic perspective also seems to suggest awider range of solutions to welfare problemsthan changes in farm routines or operations onthe animals. The systemic solutions include thechoice and reproduction of suitable breeds,changes in the farm structure, and changes inthe larger production and consumption system – including consumer perceptions andpreferences. But the organic values may alsocall for sacrifices of individual welfare in aconventional sense in order to advance welfarefrom the perspective of organic farming.Whether this is good or bad cannot be decidedwithout entering into an inquiry and discussionof the values and ethics involved. (shrink)

This thesis is concerned with extending the underlying logical approach as well as the breadth of applications of the proof mining program to various (mostly previously untreated) areas of nonlinear analysis and optimization, with a particular focus being placed on topics which involve set-valued operators.For this, we extend the current logical methodology of proof mining by new systems and corresponding so-called logical metatheorems that cover these more involved areas of nonlinear analysis. Most of these systems crucially rely on the (...) use of intensional methods, treating sets with potentially high quantifier complexity in the defining matrix via characteristic functions and axioms that describe only their properties and do not completely characterize the elements of the sets.The applicability of all of these metatheorems is then substantiated by a range of case studies for the respective areas which in particular also highlight the naturalness of the use of intensional methods in the design of the corresponding systems.The first new area covered thereby is the theory of nonlinear semigroups induced by corresponding evolution equations for accretive operators. In that context, we present (besides an initial foray into the area from 2015) essentially the first applications of proof mining to the theory of partial differential equations. Concretely, we provide quantitative versions of four central results on the asymptotic behavior of solutions to such equations.The second new area unlocked in this thesis is that of the continuous dual of a Banach space and its norm (which are also approached via intensional methods). This in particular relies on a proof-theoretically tame treatment of suprema over (certain) bounded sets in this intensional context which is further exploited later on. These systems, which give access to this until now untreated fundamental notion from functional analysis, are then used to provide further substantial extensions to treat various notions from convex analysis like the Fréchet derivative of a convex function, Fenchel conjugates, Bregman distances, and monotone operators on Banach spaces in the sense of Browder.These systems are then utilized to provide applications in the context of Picard- and Halpern-style iterations of so-called Bregman strongly nonexpansive mappings where we provide both new quantitative and qualitative results.Lastly, we discuss the key notion of extensionality of a set-valued operator and its relation to set-theoretic maximality principles in more depth (which was already singled out—to some degree—in previous work). We thereby exhibit an issue arising with treating full extensionality in the context of these intensional approaches to set-valued operators and present useful fragments of the full extensionality statement where these issues are avoided.Corresponding to these fragments, we discuss a range of uniform continuity statements for set-valued operators beyond the usual notion involving the Hausdorff-metric. In particular, in that context, we utilize the previous tame treatment of suprema over bounded sets to also provide the first proof-theoretic treatment of that Hausdorff-metric in the context of systems for proof mining.The applicability of this treatment of the Hausdorff-metric is then in particular substantiated by a last case study where we provide quantitative information for a Mann-type iteration of set-valued mappings which are nonexpansive w.r.t. the Hausdorff-metric.The abstract was taken directly from the thesis.Abstract prepared by Nicholas Pischke, Technische Universität Darmstadt, Darmstadt, GermanyE-mail: [email protected]: https://doi.org/10.26083/tuprints-00026584. (shrink)

The humanitarian sector continually faces organizational and operational challenges to respond to the needs of populations affected by war, disaster, displacement, and health emergencies. With the goal of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of response efforts, humanitarian innovation initiatives seek to develop, test, and scale a variety of novel and adapted practices, products, and systems. The innovation process raises important ethical considerations, such as appropriately engaging crisis-affected populations in defining problems and identifying potential solutions, mitigating risks, ensuring accountability, sharing (...) benefits fairly, and managing expectations. This paper aims to contribute to knowledge and practice regarding humanitarian innovation ethics and presents two components related to a value-sensitive approach to humanitarian innovation. First is a mapping of how ethical concepts are mobilized in values statements that have been produced by a diverse set of organizations involved in humanitarian innovation. Analyzing these documents, we identified six primary values (do-no-harm, autonomy, justice, accountability, sustainability, and inclusivity) around which we grouped 12 secondary values and 10 associated concepts. Second are two proposed activities that teams engaged in humanitarian innovation can employ to foreground values as they develop and refine their project’s design, and to anticipate and plan for challenges in enacting these values across the phases of their project. A deliberate and tangible approach to engaging with values within humanitarian innovation design can help to ground humanitarian innovation in ethical commitments by increasing shared understanding amongst team members, promoting attentiveness to values across the stages of innovation, and fostering capacities to anticipate and respond to ethically challenging situations. (shrink)

This paper offers the Boolean many-valued solution to the Sorites Paradox. According to the precisification-based Boolean many-valued theory, from which this solution arises, sentences have not only two truth values, truth (or 1) and falsity (or 0), but many Boolean values between 0 and 1. The Boolean value of a sentence is identified with the set of precisifications in which the sentence is true. Unlike degrees fuzzy logic assigns to sentences, Boolean many values are not linearly but only (...) partially ordered; so there are values that are incomparable. Despite this fact, the sentences in a sorites series can be taken as having values in a linear order, and losing (or gaining) value as we move from sentence to sentence in the series. So there is no sharp borderline between 0 and 1. Assigning Boolean many values instead of the two truth values to sentences for their vagueness values is analogous to assigning propositions instead of the truth values to sentences for their semantic values, as propositions are, from our viewpoint, also Boolean many values. (shrink)

Academic staff owe a duty of fidelity to uphold institutional standards of integrity. They also have their own values and conceptions of integrity as well as personal responsibilities and commitments. The question of how academic practitioners address or reconcile conflicting values and responsibilities has been underexplored in the literature. Before we can examine effectiveness of academic integrity strategies and develop best practices, we need to examine the breadth of integrity decisions. To this end we posited the academic integrity problem as (...) a set of seven dilemmas and presented them to post-secondary education staff (N = 80) located in Europe, North America, Oceania, and Asia. We asked the participants to recommend a solution to each dilemma. This yielded a modest sample of 498 themes across 30 categories. We expected the responses to fall on a binary scale where decisions either support the integrity or ignore it. However, the data suggests that academic integrity decisions are better suited to continuum where participants aim to reconcile personal and institutional obligations. We further argue that academic integrity decisions are predicated on personal experience and therefore pose a challenge for policy standardization and enforcement. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of the findings for practice. (shrink)

In this article, the main definitions and differentiation concepts of neutrosophic fuzzy environment will be reviewed. This article will introduce an analytical methodology for solving the second-order linear ordinary differential problem with neutrosophic fuzzy boundary values, this analysis will be under generalized Hukuhara differentiability to show the analytical solutions from a different point of view for the uncertain system, some of these solutions may be decreasing in uncertainty or maybe reflecting the behavior of some real-world systems better. (...) Some applications and numeral examples will be solved to show the behavior of the solution. (shrink)

The linear programming method is one of the important methods of operations research that has been used to address many practical issues and provided optimal solutions for many institutions and companies, which helped decision makers make ideal decisions through which companies and institutions achieved maximum profit, but these solutions remain ideal and appropriate in If the conditions surrounding the work environment are stable, because any change in the data provided will affect the optimal solution and to avoid losses (...) and achieve maximum profit, we have, in previous research, reformulated the linear models using the concepts of neutrosophic science, the science that takes into account the instability of conditions and fluctuations in the work environment and leaves nothing to chance. While taking data, neutrosophic values carry some indeterminacy, giving a margin of freedom to decision makers. In another research, we reformulated one of the most important methods used to solve linear models, which is the simplex method, using the concepts of this science, and as a continuation of what we did in the previous two researches, we will reformulate in this research. The graphical method for solving linear models using the concepts of neutrosophics. We will also shed light on a case that is rarely mentioned in most operations research references, which is that when the difference between the number of unknowns and the number of constraints is equal to one, two, or three, we can also find the optimal solution graphically for some linear models. This is done by taking advantage of the conditions of non-negativity that linear models have, and we will explain this through an example in which the difference is equal to two. Also, through examples, we will explain the difference between using classical values and neutrosophic values and the extent of this’s impact on the optimal solution. (shrink)

PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: HUMAN RIGHTS IN LIGHT OF THEIR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION Summary The book consists of two main parts: in the first, on the basis of an analysis of international law, elements of the contemporary conception of human rights and its positive legal protection are identified; in the second - in light of the first part -a philosophical theory of law based on the tradition leading from Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas Aquinas is constructed. The conclusion contains an application (...) of the results of the analysis conducted in the second part. The first part comprises four chapters. The first aims at revealing characteristics of human rights on the basis of an analysis of historical conditioning of the inter-national law of human rights and its development. The historical context displays the practical, vindicative, and critical character of the positive legal protection of human rights. Moreover, the process of change of positive human rights law is distinguished from the process of change of human rights as such. In the second chapter the content of human rights - a topic which is only auxiliary to the conducted analysis - is discussed. Basic typology and catalogues of rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and protected in the International Covenants of Human Rights are presented. The review of the content of rights aims at a more precise limitation of the field of research. The examination shows a diversity of rights which poses a serious challenge to the coherence of every philosophical theory of human rights. In the third chapter, central in the first part, international law is analyzed with regard to the characteristics of rights and the foundations of them. The analysis of documents shows a number of solutions referring to the anthropological foundations of rights. The inherent dignity of the human person is the source of all human rights. Each human being is recognized as free, and endowed with both reason and conscience. In the propounded conception of man individuals are not rivals but create a community which is a condition for their development. International law characterizes the rights as universal, inherent, inalienable and inviolable. The reconstructed conception also comprises the following basic elements: on the level of the structure of rights, a recognition of their equality, interdependence, and comprehensiveness; in the grounding of these rights, a recognition of the anthropological foundations of law; in the conception of positive law, a recognition of the secondariness of the positive law of human rights to human rights themselves, and a recognition of human rights and justice as the basis for legal order; in the conception of state, a recognition of the well-being of the individual as the fundamental aim of actions undertaken by political institutions, and recogni¬tion of rights which form an impassable boundary to the power of the state, includ¬ing its legislative actions. The characterization of the international legal paradigm serving for the under¬standing of human rights is supplemented by analyses of the structure of their posi¬tive legal protection. Various meanings of the terms "right" and "freedom" are distinguished. Subjective right, as basic structure of the positive legal protection of human rights, is understood as a complex relation formed by various legal situations of the subject of a right which create a functional whole in respect of the subordi-nation of human person to its good. Subordinating person to a good proper for it, expressed usually in a proclamatory norm, is the central element of particular rights around which further elements aiming at the realization of this good are built. In the second part of the book a philosophical theory is developed which allows for the location of a coherent foundation for the presented characterization of human rights and their positive legal protection. This part consists of two chapters. The first includes a review of some - not entirely satisfactory - means of founding of human rights; the second presents philosophical conceptions of law and man which may form a basis for the constructed theory. The review of arguments contained in the first chapter does not aim at a detailed analysis of various specific ways of argumentation encountered in works on this subject but rather at a concise presentation of the main possible lines of argumentation. These analyses also serve to emphasize the positive solutions which are pro¬posed later and to underscore the explanatory power of the elaborated theory. This theory, retaining accurate intuitions contained in the presented types of argumenta¬tion, helps in avoiding their consequences which are difficult to reconcile with the reconstructed paradigm of human rights. Efforts to base human rights on the norms of international law rightly take into account the necessity of determining the content of the rights and their positive legal protection as a means for the realization of man's good. These attempts, how¬ever, do not properly take into account the inherent character of human rights, which are independent of positive law and provide grounds for applying specific legislative measures and not others. Founding human rights on freedom accurately points at the freedom of an indi¬vidual as a constitutive element of some rights; however, absolutization of freedom leads, to a loss of an important element of the contemporary paradigm of under¬standing human rights. This foundation undermines recognition of the fact that human rights may set limits to both the freedom of others and the freedom of the subject of rights itself. Additionally, attempts at the so-called axiological justification of human rights are discussed. This type of justification has a few variants depending on the as¬sumed conception of value. Subjectivistic conceptions have similar advantages and disadvantages to the conceptions basing human rights on freedom; objectivistic conceptions while providing for the universality of human rights place, the fundamental aim of human rights protection beyond the individual human being - in the idealistically existing world of values; finally, conceptions rooting values and human rights in culture, while accurately noting that human rights are learned through the medium of culture, place the source of human rights beyond a concrete individual - in culture and processes which take place in it - which leads to difficulties in finding a basis for the universality of rights. Furthermore, attempts to ground human rights in specific characteristics of the human being are presented. This type of approach points to an important problem of dependence of the content of rights on what man is. However, recognition of specific characteristics of a human being as an ontic foundation of the existence of rights poses a danger to their universality since one has to accept that it is not enough to be a man to be a subject of rights, but a man possessing specific charac¬teristics. The second chapter aims at outlining solutions worked out by Saint Thomas Aquinas. For a fuller understanding of his propositions selected elements of Plato's and Aristotle's philosophy are presented. It was them who formulated the founda¬tions for reflection on law and justice in the ontological context. A qualification is made that Stoicism is not be analysed in depth. Although Thomas' concept of law was undoubtedly developed under the influence of the Stoic doctrine as well, it is not in this that one should look for the tools to understand the ontic foundations of human rights and law in general since the Stoic moral philosophy and philosophy of law were developed in the context of a theory of being which assumed monistic and pantheistic premises as foundations, leading to the recognition of a total subor¬dination of the human individual to a larger unity of which man is only a part. The analysis of Plato's and Aristotle's texts concentrates on problems of justice. Plato seems to be the first philosopher who reflected on the formula basic in the history of European thought: to render to each his due. It appears that justice as both a characteristic of man and his acts is understood in the perspective of that which is just, that which is a good for another man - the recipient of the act. The basis for determining what is just is the relation of correspondence between some¬one and something. While in the case of Plato this relation is based on something beyond its terms, namely on ideas, in the case of Aristotle the relation occurs on account of the elements of the relation itself. Something is just when it contributes to the develop¬ment of the recipient of an act realizing that which is just. At the same time, the realization of that which is just is a good for the agent. In the analysis of the just two types of relation are revealed: the relation of due-to-recipient occurring on account of the compatibility of that which is due, with the recipient of the act; and - a "superstructure" - a relation of obligation-of-subject occurring on account of the compatibility of the acting subject with the thing which should be done. The basis for being that which is due is formed by various potentialities of development of man - the recipient of agency; the basis of being that which is an obligation is the possibility of development of the subject of action. Aristotle distinguishes various types of freedom and points to the necessity of taking them into account in the discussion of justice. Among other things, as the core of man's freedom, he considers life for its own sake, which can be seen as his expression of the basic indices of the autotelic character of man - which is funda¬mental for later conceptions of dignity. The freedom which is described by him is not, however, inherent and inalienable; being free is conditioned by a factual possi¬bility of undertaking actions, which are not solely means to the realization of aims set by others. Thomas Aquinas takes over the Aristotelian research perspective both in his conception of man and of law. At the same time, however, he significantly enriches it. In anthropology he develops a conception of personal being. Drawing upon his distinction between existence ("that something is") and essence ("what something is"), he sees the basis for being a person in the dignity of personal being which is a certain way of existence of a rational being more perfect than that of non-personal beings. The person is a being which, by virtue of its act of existence, is individual¬ized in a specific way. It is an aim in itself. Expressing it in a negative way, one may say that it does not exist as a means for the realization of the aims of others and, in this sense, that it is free. As distinct from Aristotelian conclusions, being a person is not conditioned by the specific actions of a being. Dignity is inherent, based on that which is the foundation of the factual existence of every rational being. Although freedom requires that a being is rational, dignity still encompasses all being, all its properties and potentialities. Thus an act conforming with dignity has to take into account a whole human being. Among different types of that which is just, ius, the first place, from the point of view of understanding law, falls to "the just thing itself ("ipsa res justa"), which is right in the full meaning of the word. On the one hand, it is that which is due; on the other hand, it determines the way of acting in the utmost degree, since the course of every act is determined in the fullest extent by its aim. The content of ius may be determined both by elements independent of free decisions - ius naturale - and by free decisions taking into account the state of things - ius positivum. Recognition of the objective structure of being as the basis of law does not entail that it is possible or desirable to determine unequivocally "the only right" patterns of conduct. This concept is very well justified within the system proposed by Saint Thomas. Individualization of being is a significant element of the develop¬ment of a person as a person. It is attained by the realization of individual aims which are not unequivocally determined by circumstances and the nature common to all people. By virtue of free choices made in the sphere of that which is not by its nature unjust, the object of action becomes ius. Since in the realization of the person the individualization of human being is central, Aquinas clearly sees the need for the protection of the sphere of "dominion of will". This sphere itself constitutes ius naturale, something which is due to man independently of the acts of will. Therefore "law should forbid nothing which is not unjust" ("nihil debet lege prohiberi quod licite fieri potest", In 3 Sent., dist. 40, q. I, a. 1, 3). Besides the relation of due-to-recipient, ius also includes the relation of obligation-of-subject which is superimposed on the relation of due-to-recipient. As far as the ontic foundations of obligation are concerned, in explaining why man is subordinated to realization of the good of others, Aquinas generally follows Aristotle in accepting that this basis is the subordination to moral good - to actions conforming with the learned truth about reality. Aquinas' systemic solutions allow, however, to reach deeper and understand why moral development is also a development of the whole human being. This was difficult within Aristotle's system, since he was reluc¬tant to decide whether precedence should be given to intellectual or moral develop¬ment. The inclination to realise good of another appears to be a transcendental characteristic of being, based on its very existence. Morality understood as rational and free subordination to realize the good of another is a specifically personal way of the realization of this inclination. Thus just actions contribute to the actualization of being in the aspect of its existence and therefore to the actualization of being as a whole. Thomas' conception of natural law (lex naturalis) as participation in eternal law (lex aeterna), offers possibilities for grasping that which is just as something which is basically accessible cognition, independently of Revelation and independently of faith in God, and at the same time as something based in eternal law, understood as a design of God's wisdom. Eternal law, embracing all particular actions, is not, from the human perspective, accessible cognition directly. It is enacted in the struc-ture of the created being and - in case of human beings - in free choices taking this structure into account. In the concluding remarks, the results obtained earlier are applied directly to the contemporary conception of human rights. Human rights are understood in the first place as "just things" - concrete goods of man; as that which is due because of subordination, based on dignity, to the personal development of man. That which is just is understood as a relational - actual or potential - state of things, which exists by virtue of existing relations. Evaluations referring to that which is right are true when respective relations of due-to-recipient take place; norms of conduct are true when respective relations of obligation-of-subject take place. Examples of the application of the sketched theory outside the field of human rights are also presented. Procedural consequences of the developed theory are shown, such as the discrimination of two types of legislative procedures which differ significantly in the structure of argumentation: the first aims at recognition of that which is just independently of the will of the legislator, and the second, at making individual or collective "projects" of development compatible. Finally the possibilities of applying the theory to the increasingly important problems of the protection of the environment and the "rights" of animals are mentioned. The central issue is a philosophical conception of man and his freedom and a conception of law. It is also indispensable to turn to a general theory of being. The search for a comprehensive theory of human rights requires attention to the Abso¬lute Being - God - as well. This is important for at least two reasons. First, a conception of the Absolute Being is integral to philosophy of the systemic type -of which the present book is a piece. A conception of the Absolute Being is signifi¬cant for understanding all being, including, first of all, man as a personal being. Second, every theory of human rights which does not comprise the problem of the Absolute may be questioned as to whether solutions adopted in it do not lead, in consequence, to eliminating God from the perspective of the understanding of law. It is desirable that a philosophical theory should deal with this problem directly. A theory which eliminates God from the perspective of the understanding of rights will be unacceptable for all those who, for philosophical reasons or relying on faith, consider God as the author of inherent rights. Nevertheless, a theoretical approach to rights from the perspective of the Absolute Being should only be a possible extension of a philosophical approach which bases rights on something which is cognizable independently of the acceptance of the existence of God so that the theory is also acceptable for those who reject the existence of God or suspend their judgment on this subject. The pursued theory should therefore contain, on the one hand, reference to natural, faith-independent foundations of human rights, but on the other hand, point to a possible extension accounting for the Absolute Being. The analyses contained in this chapter have undoubtedly some historical value since they are based on source texts. Nevertheless, the use of these texts and not critical works was dictated, first of all, by a conviction that analyses embrace a given theory in the aspect selected by the interests of the researcher. Therefore to find out what past thinkers say on the subject characterized in the first part it is simpler to reach to the sources than to adopt the existing critical works. The pre¬sented reconstruction of Aquinas' views on philosophy of law incorporates proposi¬tions of supplementing and developing some of the ideas undertaken by him. Obligation to act in this and not an other way arises because human actions are subordinated to the conformity, on the one hand, of aims realized by these actions and, on the one hand, the order of being determining that which is favourable to man or destroys him. The content of the order of being is, on the one hand, determined by the structure of being independent from man's will and, on the other, by free decisions of man. (shrink)

This book is about values education in early years settings and discusses theory and concepts, as well as methodological and empirical perspectives. It explores issues such as the kinds of values that are communicated between educators and children and the kind of future citizens we foster in early childhood settings. It illustrates by way of cases involving many participants, including children, educators, and researchers, who have their roots in diverse contexts, and reside in different parts of the world, including (...) Australia, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Slovenia, and Sweden. The book carefully considers the contextualized character of the cases presented, yet argues that the questions, theories, and methodologies emphasized do inform the international debate in manifold ways. Communication of values in a broad and diverse sense is central in any pedagogy, especially for the youngest children in the educational system. Still, values education has been neglected as a research field, in education in general and particularly in the early years. This book addresses this lack of knowledge by scrutinizing various questions about values education in ECEC settings. (shrink)

The paper focuses on the issue of intermedial references, the matters of conditions, necessity and relevance of their interpretation. It discusses the question of semantic value of an intermedial reference rather than of its aesthetic, pragmatic, modal or other aspects. It considers the lack of coherence between the theoretical propositions of intermedial studies, grounded in the studies of intertextuality, and the practice of analysis. In theory, every intermedial reference configures semantic dialogue between qualified media (configurations), thus requires conceptualisation. Yet, the (...) practice of analysis reveals that some of them perform exclusively aesthetic function and invite to keep reception within the limits of perception. Therefore I make an attempt to define the criteria of textual request for conceptualisation/interpretation set up in a text as such. I propose to revise the relevant insights of different intertextual and semiotic approaches, to perform their revision, modification and extension, to articulate possible solution and exemplify it by filmic references to painting. (shrink)

When collective decisions should be made democratically, which people form the relevant demos? Many theorists think this question is an embarrassment to democratic theory: because any decision about who forms the demos must be made democratically by the right demos, which itself must be democratically constituted and so on ad infinitum; and because neither the concept of democracy, nor our reasons for caring about democracy, determine who should form the demos. Having distinguished between these three versions of the demos problem, (...) we argue that each of them can be solved. (shrink)

In the complex environment, the suddenly changing structural parameters and abrupt actuator failures are often encountered, and the negligence or unproper handling method may induce undesired or unacceptable results. In this paper, taking the suddenly changing structural parameters and abrupt actuator failures into consideration, we focus on the robust adaptive control design for a class of heterogeneous Takagi–Sugeno fuzzy nonlinear systems subjected to discontinuous multiple uncertainties. The key point is that the switch modes not only vary with the system time (...) but also vary with the system states, and the intrinsic heterogeneous characteristics make it difficult to design stable controllers. Firstly, the concepts of differential inclusion are introduced to describe the heterogeneous fuzzy systems. Meanwhile, a fundamental lemma is provided to demonstrate the criteria of the boundness for a Filippov solution. Then, by using the set-valued Lie derivative of the Lyapunov function and introducing a vector of specific continuous functions, the closed-loop T-S fuzzy differential inclusion systems are proved to be ultimately bounded. The sufficient conditions for system stability are derived in term of linear matrix inequalities, which can be solved directly. Finally, a numerical example is provided to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed control algorithm. (shrink)

This paper introduces a new solution concept for games with incomplete preferences. The concept is based on rationalizability and it is more general than the existing ones based on Nash equilibrium. In rationalizable strategies, we assume that the players choose nondominated strategies given their beliefs of what strategies the other players may choose. Our solution concept can also be used, e.g., in ordinal games where the standard notion of rationalizability cannot be applied. We show that the sets of rationalizable strategies (...) are the maximal mutually nondominated sets. We also show that no new rationalizable strategies appear when the preferences are refined, i.e., when the information gets more precise. Moreover, noncooperative multicriteria games are suitable applications of incomplete preferences. We apply our framework to such games, where the outcomes are evaluated according to several criteria and the payoffs are vector valued. We use the sets of feasible weights to represent the relative importance of the criteria. We demonstrate the applicability of the new solution concept with an ordinal game and a bicriteria Cournot game. (shrink)

A satisfying theory of knowledge has to explain why knowledge seems to be better than mere true belief. In this paper, I try to show that the best reliabilist explanation (ERA+) is still not able to solve this problem. According to an already elaborated answer (ERA), it is better to possess knowledge that p because this makes likely that one’s future belief of a similar kind will also be true. I begin with a metaphysical comment which gives birth to ERA (...) +, a better formulation of ERA. Then, I raise two objections against ERA+. The first objection shows that the truth of the reliabilist answer requires the conception of a specific theory of instrumental value. In the second objection, I present an example in order to show that ERA+ actually fails to explain why it is better to possess knowledge than a mere true belief. (shrink)

Matthew Caswell - The Value of Humanity and Kant's Conception of Evil - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.4 635-663 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents The Value of Humanity and Kant's Conception of Evil Matthew Caswell Recent years have seen the development of a powerful reinterpretation of Kant's basic approach in ethical thought. Kant, it is argued, should not be read as defending the stark, metaphysics-laden formalism for which his theory is (...) so famous. Rather, the reinterpreters claim that the heart of Kantian practical philosophy is the absolute value of humanity, or human rational nature. Kant's ethics can thus be understood as a "theory of value," in which the singular value of our own end-setting capacity as rational agents is taken as supreme, or even as the source of all value. On this reading, morality is just acting in such a way that respects or promotes the value of humanity. Moreover, this value may be deduced through an immanent, regressive argument about the conditions of practical agency as such, according to which any adequate conception of ourselves as agents commits us, finally, to moral norms. The consequences of this approach to Kantian ethics for such central issues as the doctrine of transcendental freedom, ethical formalism, the meaning of Kantian deontology, and indeed the very picture of human moral life for which Kant's theory is meant to account are profound... (shrink)

The aim of this analysis was to examine the concept of time to rejuvenate and extend existing narratives of time within the nursing literature. In particular, we hope to promote a new trajectory in nursing research and practice which focuses on time and person‐centred care, specifically of older people with cognitive impairment hospitalized in the acute care setting. We consider the explanatory power of concepts such as clock time, process time, fast care, slow care and time debt for elucidating (...) the relationship between ‘good care’ and ‘time use’. We conclude by offering two additional concepts of time, plurotemporality and person‐centred time (PCT) which we propose will help advance of nursing knowledge and practice. Nurse clinicians and researchers can use these alternative concepts of time to explore and describe different temporal structures that honour the patient's values and preferences using experiential, observation‐based nursing research approaches. (shrink)

In 1908 the German mathematician Ernst Zermelo gave an axiomatization of the concept of set. His axioms remain at the core of what became to be known as Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. There were two axioms that received diverse criticisms at the time: the axiom of choice and the axiom of separation. This paper centers around one question this latter axiom raised. The main purpose is to show how this question might be solved with the aid of another, more recent mathematical (...) theory of sets which, like Zermelo’s, has numerous philosophical underpinnings. Keywords: properties of sets, foundations of mathematics, axiom of separation, subobject classifier, truth values. (shrink)

In decisions about inclusion (or exclusion) of health care services in the benefit package, different interpretations of notions like health, health risk, disease, quality of life or necessary care often remain implicit. Yet they can lead to different benefit package decisions. After a brief discussion of these concepts in definitions of the goals of medicine, the various value-judgements implicit in interpretations of key notions in health care are analysed and conclusions are drawn with regard to the composition of decision (...) making bodies at various levels. It is further argued that such a body needs to discuss the various interpretations of key-notions explicitly in the various phases of a priority-setting procedure so that more consistent choices can be made in health care priority setting. (shrink)

Defending a non-value-based and therefore purely empirical conception of overall freedom must involve showing how available actions can, at least in theory, be individuated and counted. The problems encountered here include the fact that actions can have an indefinite number of descriptions, that they can be subjected to indefinite spatio-temporal division, and that they give rise to indefinitely long causal chains of events. Solutions to these problems can be found through an application of Donald Davidson’s notion of actions as (...) particulars, and by thinking of act-tokens as located in particular units within a space-time grid. Once possible actions have been adequately individuated, a formula for the measurement of freedom can be constructed, adapting a formula originally proposed by Hillel Steiner and taking into account the compossibility of particular actions and the probability of their being unconstrained. Careful attention to the structure of sets of available actions helps to mitigate some of the supposed counterintuitive implications of this analysis. Furthermore, subscribing to this empirical approach to the measurement of overall freedom does not necessarily imply subscribing to an empiricist or physicalist conception of action. (shrink)

This work introduces the framework for selecting architecture in 5G networks, considering various technological, performance, economic, and operational factors. With the emergence of 5G technology, the architecture selection process has become pivotal in meeting diverse requirements for ultra-high-speed connectivity, low latency, scalability, and diverse service demands. The evaluation comprehensively analyses different architecture options, including centralized, distributed, cloud-based, and virtualized architectures. Factors such as network performance, scalability, cost-effectiveness, security, and compatibility are considered within a multi-criteria decision-making framework. Findings reveal each architecture (...) option's diverse strengths and limitations, emphasizing the importance of aligning architectural choices with specific use cases, deployment scenarios, and business objectives. We used the concept of multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) methodology to control the various criteria. We used the single-valued neutrosophic set (SVNS) to deal with vague and inconsistent data. The SVNS is integrated with the hyperSoft set. The proposed methodology uses a single-valued neutrosophic hyperSoft set (SVNHSS) to select the best 5G architecture. We used the VIKOR method as an MCDM method to rank the alternatives. The proposed framework provides stakeholders with a structured methodology to evaluate and prioritize architecture options, facilitating informed decision-making in the complex landscape of 5G network deployments. (shrink)

Gregory Currie is one of the world’s preeminent philosophers of art and a highly-respected philosopher of mind. Imagining and Knowing: the Shape of Fiction is his seventh book, with his conspicuous contributions to the analytic tradition of philosophy including the first systematic philosophical aesthetics in no less than two fields, film (Image and Mind: Film, Philosophy and Cognitive Science, 1995) and narrative (Narratives and Narrators: A Philosophy of Stories, 2010). Currie’s trademark approach is the seamless integration of art criticism and (...) aesthetic theory on the one hand with empirical psychology and evolutionary biology on the other and Imagining and Knowing follows suit. His stated aim is twofold: to make a convincing case for the significance of the imagination to the understanding of and engagement with fiction and to make an equally convincing case against the significance of fiction as a source of knowledge. The monograph consists of an introduction, eleven chapters divided into three parts, and a coda. Part I is concerned with making a case for imagining fiction, defending fiction as an utterance over fiction as a genre (Chapter 1) and the role of the imagination in the engagement with fiction (Chapter 2). This role is fleshed out by means of Currie’s conceptions of ‘desires in imagination, or i-desires’ (Chapter 3) and i-emotions (Chapter 4), which also provide neat solutions to both the paradox of fiction and the imaginative resistance debates (56). Part II sets the scene for the case against fictional knowledge, establishing an epistemic taxonomy (Chapter 5), arguing that claims about the cognitive value of fiction should cohere with the findings of experimental psychology (Chapter 6), and debunking evolutionary claims for the significance of fiction (Chapter 7). Part III presents Currie’s deflationary account, tackling each of what he considers to be the four most convincing arguments for learning from fiction in turn: fictional thought experiments (Chapter 8), truth in literature (Chapter 9), the psychology of authors (Chapter 10), and the relationship between fiction and empathy (Chapter 11). (shrink)

Although Habermas's sophisticated conception of constitutional patriotism successfully avoids the charge of trying to ground patriotism in a set of principles that is too thin and abstract to sustain a real sense of solidarity and belonging, his optimism regarding the prospect in modern pluralist societies of building a genuinely shared political culture is misplaced. The march of modernization as rationalization is neither as relentless nor as inevitable as Habermas assumes. Hence the rational consensus on liberal constitutional principles that is to (...) provide the basis for a shared political culture remains elusive. However, while Habermas's solution to the `solidarity gap' that confronts many contemporary liberal democracies remains problematic, he is right to point to the importance of a shared identity that is strong enough to turn strangers into fellow citizens. The challenges that cultural diversity and value pluralism pose for contemporary states cannot be resolved via a procedural approach that focuses solely on political legitimacy. Yet the difficulties that surround Habermas's conception of `constitutional patriotism' suggest modern states will struggle to build a collective political identity that can generate a genuine sense of solidarity. If this is so, modern pluralist states face a more profound challenge than writers such as Habermas assume. (shrink)

In this paper I propose a new argument for moderate autonomism. I call this the ‘critical argument’ to distinguish it from the empirical argument of James C. Anderson and Jeffrey T. Dean, and the no-error argument of James Harold. My strategy is to first employ the criticism of Matthew Arnold and F.R. Leavis to demonstrate the moralist failure to account for the complexity of the relationship between literature and morality, and then offer a more promising alternative. I set out the (...) autonomist, moralist, and immoralist positions in the value interaction debate in §1, and identify problems with classifying the two critics in contemporary terms. In §2 I discuss Arnold’s cultural criticism as both a part of – and a reaction to – the public moralist tradition that dominated Britain in the nineteenth century, drawing attention to his criterion of ‘seriousness’. §3 examines Leavis’ literary criticism, focusing on his conception of the relationship between composition and life, and his criterion of ‘maturity’. Drawing on the similarities between Arnold and Leavis, I demonstrate that their concern with morality differs from that of the contemporary moralists in §4. In §5 I employ John Gibson’s distinction between normative and informative values to complete the argument for moderate autonomism. I test my argument against an extreme case, a hypothetical literary equivalent to The Birth of a Nation, in §6, and conclude that moderate autonomism provides the most compelling solution to the value interaction debate. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the way different axiom systems for set theory can be justified by appeal to such intuitions as limitation of size, predicativity, stratification, etc. While none of the different conceptions historically resulting from the impetus to provide a solution to the paradoxes turns out to rest on an intuition providing an unshakeable foundation,'each supplies a picture of the set-theoretic universe that is both useful and internally well motivated. The same is true of more recently proposed axiom (...) systems for non-well-founded universes, and an attempt is made to motivate such axiom systems on the basis of an old and respected ‘algebraic’ intuition. (shrink)

: The concept of the person has come to be intimately connected with questions about the value of life. It is applied to those sorts of beings who have some special value or moral importance and where we need to prioritize the needs or claims of different sorts of individuals. "Person" is a concept designating individuals like us in some important respects, but possibly including individuals who are very unlike us in other respects. What are these respects and why are (...) they important? This paper sets out to answer these questions and to develop a coherent and useful concept of the person. (shrink)

The problem of values has given rise to a bewildering variety of theories. Louis Lavelle set himself the task of expounding and systematizing these diverse doctrines, of making “une sorte de tableau de toutes les directions dans lesquelles s’est engagée la reflection humaine au cours de son histoire, lorsqu’il s’est agi de definir pour elle la valeur absolue et les valeurs particulières”. He tried to bring order into the work of ages, situating it in a vaster order according to his (...) own views of man’s privileged place in the universe. Of course the study of values made by this great psychologist–metaphysician was far more than a lifeless gathering together of dry concepts: it involved a representation, from a new angle, of his entire philosophy of being. “Le problème essentiel de la métaphysique, le seul dont la solution puisse éclairer notre vie et guider notre conduite, c’est le problème du rapport entre l’être et la valeur”. M. Wesley Piersol now presents a fine compendium of Lavelle’s thought on value. He divides his study into four parts, aiming at thus keeping close to the line of development of the philosopher’s views. In the first part is found Lavelle’s analysis of the faculties of the moi, sentiment, will, preference, judgment of value. From this analysis is derived his understanding of the characters of value. Next comes a section on the incarnation of value by liberty in time: thus a psychology of value develops into a metaphysics of value. Finally, there is a section on the relation between axiology and ontology. The book is well planned and the matter clearly presented but, as anybody who is acquainted with Lavell’s writings must know, clarity and charm in presentation do not eliminate difficulty. (shrink)

In this paper I set out the problem of feminist social science as the need to explain and justify its method of theory choice in relation to both its own theories and those of androcentric social science. In doing this, it needs to avoid both a positivism which denies the impact of values on scientific theory-choice and a radical relativism which undercuts the emancipatory potential of feminist research. From the relevant literature I offer two possible solutions: the Holistic and (...) the Constructivist models of theory-choice. I then rate these models according to what extent they solve the problem of feminist social science. I argue that the principal distinction between these models is in their contrasting conceptions of truth. Solving the problem of feminist social science will require understanding that what is at stake in the debate is our conception of truth. This understanding will serve to clarify, though not resolve, the various approaches to and disagreements over methodologies and explanations in feminist social science. (shrink)

Many philosophers are aware of the paradoxes of set theory (e.g. Russell's paradox). For many people, these were solved by the iterative conception of set which holds that sets are formed in stages by collecting sets available at previous stages. This Element will examine possibilities for articulating this solution. In particular, the author argues that there are different kinds of iterative conception, and it's open which of them (if any) is the best. Along the way, the author hopes to make (...) some of the underlying mathematical and philosophical ideas behind tricky bits of the philosophy of set theory clear for philosophers more widely and make their relationships to some other questions in philosophy perspicuous. (shrink)

Carnap wrote a continuation of his reply to Kaplan, which would, however, have made that reply, already by far the longest in the book, too long. So he set aside his projected notes for a continuation to serve as the basis for a separate paper, which he never got around to writing. It is transcribed here from his shorthand and translated into English, with some introductory notes to provide a little context.

The philosophy of science that grew out of logical positivism construed scientific knowledge in terms of set of interconnected beliefs about the world, such as theories and observation statements. Nowadays science is also conceived of as a dynamic process based on the various practices of individual scientists and the institutional settings of science. Two features particularly influence the dynamics of scientific knowledge: epistemic standards and aims (e.g., assumptions about what issues are currently in need of scientific study and explanation). While (...) scientific beliefs are representations of the world, scientific standards and aims are epistemic values. The relevance of epistemic aims and values for belief change has been previously recognized. My paper makes a similar point for scientific concepts, both by studying how an individual concept changes (in its semantic properties) and by viewing epistemic aims and values tied to individual concepts. (shrink)

Policies are set by governments in an attempt to bring about desired ends within a society. These ends are often vaguely put and phrased in terms of values. Agrarianism, as a value, has been used to justify current farm policy. Yet, that policy has also been used as a mechanism to solve a variety of problems for the United States: those of the rural sector, farmers themselves, and even the land upon which they farm. This paper tries to separate the (...) problems that are part of the farm crisis and to show how policies designed to solve one of the problems for one set of actors, and frequently defended in the name of agrarianism, may actually exacerbate the problems for other actors. An overarching value, however, that may further inhibit problem solution and lead us further into an expensive and ineffectual farm program is the basic value that planning is somehow bad. Agrarianism and the value of spontaneity underlie some of the current decision-making or lack thereof in the farm program. (shrink)