Interpersonal sensitivity, particularly threat of potential exclusion, is a critical condition in borderline personality disorder (BPD) which impairs patients’ social adjustment. Current evidence-based treatments include group components, such as mentalization-based group therapy (MBT-G), in order to improve interpersonal functioning. These treatments additionally focus on the therapeutic alliance since it was discovered to be a robust predictor of treatment outcome. However, alliance is a multidimensional factor of group therapy, which includes the fellow patients, and may thus be negatively affected by the (...) exclusion-proneness of BPD patients. The aim of this pilot study was to examine the predictive value of threat of social exclusion for the therapeutic alliance in MBT-G. In the first part of the study, social exclusion was experimentally induced in 23 BPD inpatients and 28 healthy subjects using the Cyberball paradigm, a virtual ball tossing game. The evoked level of threat was measured with the Need-Threat Scale (NTS) which captures four dimensions of fundamental human needs, i. e. the need for belongingness, for self-esteem, for control, and for a meaningful existence. In the second part of the study, therapeutic alliance was measured on three dimensions, the therapists, the fellow patients and the group as a whole, using the Group-Questionnaire (GQ-D). BPD patients scored higher in their level of threat according to the NTS in both, the inclusion and the exclusion condition. The level of threat after exclusion predicted impairments of the therapeutic alliance in MBT-G. It was associated with more negative relationships, lower positive bonding and a lower positive working alliance with the fellow patients and lower positive bonding to the group as a whole whilst no negative prediction of the alliance to the therapists was found. Consequently, our translational study design has shown that Cyberball is an appropriate tool to use as an approach for clinical questions. We further conclude that exclusion-proneness in BPD is a critical feature with respect to alliance in group treatments. In order to neutralize BPD patients’ exclusion bias, therapists may be advised to provide an “inclusive stance”, especially in initial sessions. It is also recommendable to strengthen patient to patient relations. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the concept of a spirituality without religion. I argue that spirituality is best understood as a specific attitude that a subject has towards the totality of existence, characterized by a certain emotional, evaluative and noetic quality. The spiritual attitude typically involves a shift in the way a subject interprets their relation to themselves and to the whole of reality. Understood this way, religious and non-religious spiritualities are varieties of the same core phenomenon. Religious beliefs are compatible with, (...) but not necessary for spiritual attitudes. (shrink)

I defend the Received View on scientific theories as developed by Carnap, Hempel, and Feigl against a number of criticisms based on misconceptions. First, I dispute the claim that the Received View demands axiomatizations in first order logic, and the further claim that these axiomatizations must include axioms for the mathematics used in the scientific theories. Next, I contend that models are important according to the Received View. Finally, I argue against the claim that the Received View is intended to (...) make the concept of a theory more precise. Rather, it is meant as a generalizable framework for explicating specific theories. (shrink)

One worry about metaethical expressivism is that it reduces to some form of subjectivism. This worry is enforced by subjectivists who argue that subjectivism can explain certain phenomena thought to support expressivism equally well. Recently, authors have started to suggest that subjectivism can take away what has often been seen as expressivism's biggest explanatory advantage, namely expressivism's ability to explain the possibility of moral disagreement. In this paper, I will give a response to an argument recently given by Frank Jackson (...) to this conclusion that will show that it is false that subjectivism could explain disagreement as well as expressivism. (shrink)

In this article, I deal with the phenomenon, known to today’s philosophers, as the split between analytic and continental philosophy. I provide a historical-institutional explanation for this split and then a propose a type of doing philosophy beyond the divide, which I call “synthetic philosophy.” Synthetic philosophy should take and synthesize the best of both traditions into a new form of philosophy, which I recommend for the future.

The sheer multitude of criteria of empirical significance has been taken as evidence that the pre-analytic notion being explicated is too vague to be useful. I show instead that a significant number of these criteria—by Ayer, Popper, Przełęcki, Suppes, and David Lewis, among others—not only form a coherent whole, but also connect directly to the theory of definition, the notion of empirical content as explicated by Ramsey sentences, and the theory of measurement; two criteria by Carnap and Sober are trivial, (...) but can be saved and connected to the other criteria by slight modifications. A corollary is that the ordinary language defense of Lewis, the conceptual arguments by Ayer and Popper, the theoretical considerations by Przełęcki, and the practical considerations by Suppes all apply to the same criterion or closely related criteria. Furthermore, the equivalence of some criteria allows for their individual justifications to be taken cumulatively and, together with the entailment relations between nonequivalent criteria, suggest criteria for general auxiliary assumptions, comparative criteria, and more liberal conceptions of observation. (shrink)

I provide an explicit formulation of empirical adequacy, the central concept of constructive empiricism, and point out a number of problems. Based on one of the inspirations for empirical adequacy, I generalize the notion of a theory to avoid implausible presumptions about the relation of theoretical concepts and observations, and generalize empirical adequacy with the help of approximation sets to allow for lack of knowledge, approximations, and successive gain of knowledge and precision. As a test case, I provide an application (...) of these generalizations to a simple interference phenomenon. (shrink)

I argue that believing at will – i.e. believing for practical reasons – is in some sense possible and in some sense impossible. It is impossible insofar as we think of belief formation as a re-sult of our exercise of certain capacities (perception, memory, agency). But insofar as we think of belief formation as an action that might lead to such a result (i.e. a deliberation or an in-quiry), believing at will is possible. First I present and clarify the problem (...) and its philosophical relevance (section 1). I then argue that a belief formation as an immediate reaction to practical reasons is not necessarily equivalent to believing at will because the causal mechanism that leads to the formation might be deviant (section 2). Finally, I explain the difference between the two above mentioned meanings of “belief formation” in order to clarify the possibility and impossibility of believing at will (section 3). (shrink)

According to the principle of indifference, when a set of possibilities is evidentially symmetric for you – when your evidence no more supports any one of the possibilities over any other – you're required to distribute your credences uniformly among them. Despite its intuitive appeal, the principle of indifference is often thought to be unsustainable due to the problem of multiple partitions: Depending on how a set of possibilities is divided, it seems that sometimes, applying indifference reasoning can require you (...) to assign incompatible credences to equivalent possibilities. This paper defends the principle of indifference from the problem of multiple partitions by offering two guides for how to respond. The first is for permissivists about rationality, and is modeled on permissivists' arguments for the claim that a body of evidence sometimes does not uniquely determine a fully rational credence function. The second is for impermissivists about rationality, and is modeled on impermissivists' arguments for the claim that a body of evidence does always uniquely determine a fully rational credence function. What appears to be a decisive objection against the principle of indifference is in fact an instance of a general challenge taking different forms familiar to both permissivists and impermissivists. (shrink)

This essay challenges Allegra de Laurentiis’s characterization of Hegel’s philosophy of nature as involving a polar, oppositional force-metaphysics. I begin by showing the centrality of such a force-metaphysics to de Laurentiis’s interpretation, and I go on to argue that Hegel thoroughly rejects force-metaphysics. I then consider some possible difficulties for my argument, including Hegel’s elaboration of attraction and repulsion, before turning to his distinction between “force [Kraft]” and “power [Macht].” I argue that the concept of power captures what Hegel endorses (...) in force-metaphysics, and that power is central to Hegel’s view of both spirit and nature. I conclude by suggesting that we best understand the Anthropology not as resolving a tension between natural polarity and ensouled unity, but as continuing a process of elaborating and extending a form of unity shared by both nature and spirit. (shrink)

El argumento cosmológico en su variante racionalista está compuesto por al menos dos premisas fundamentales: la premisa según la cual hay seres explicados por otros seres y el principio de razón suficiente. Ambas premisas son plausibles si se las toma individualmente. El problema es que tomadas conjuntamente conducen a un resultado irracional. Aquí propongo sacrificar uno de los aspectos del principio de razón suficiente, precisamente aquel aspecto que nos conduce a tal resultado irracional. Sin embargo, este sacrificio implica aceptar que (...) el argumento cosmológico fracasa en su propósito fundamental. (shrink)

Some of Catherine Malabou’s recent work has developed her conception of plasticity (originally deployed in a reading of Hegelian Aufhebung ) in relation to neuroscience. This development clarifies and advances her attempt to bring contemporary theory into dialogue with the natural sciences, while indirectly indicating her engagement with the French tradition in philosophy of science and philosophy of medicine, especially the work of Georges Canguilhem. I argue that we can see her development of plasticity as an answer to some specific (...) shortcomings in Canguilhem’s conception of organic or biological normativity as advanced in The Normal and the Pathological . Such a view of plasticity shows its potential to provide the basis for a powerful critical engagement with contemporary conceptions of selfhood, self-transformation, subjectivation, and the general theory of norms. (shrink)

What is religion? Is it rational to have religious beliefs? Do science and religion contradict each other? Is there a god? Are we immortal? Questions like these are discussed in the philosophy of religion. This book provides provides an accesible and comprehensive introduction to philosophy of religion. In 14 chapters, it describes and discusses classical and modern approaches to core issues in philosophy of religion. This book is primarily intended as a textbook for students of philosophy, theology and religious studies, (...) but will also appeal to general readers interested in philosophy and religion, and can be used as a textbook in an introductory course on philosophy of religion. (shrink)

The following discussion with philosopher and political scientist Wendy Brown seeks to apply her provocative and indispensable ideas to recent political events and problems, in particular focusing on her work in Undoing the Demos (2015) and returning briefly to consider Politics Out of History (2001) in today’s context. The questions were collectively authored and the interview itself was conducted by Sebastian Raza via Skype on 23 May 2017. We would like to thank Wendy Brown for the generous contribution of (...) her time and for answering the questions so directly and clearly. (shrink)

Most people think indexical thought has special content (_de se_ content). However, it has been acknowledged that classical examples, such as those offered by Perry and Lewis, are insufficient to establish this conclusion. Ongoing discussions typically focus on first-person beliefs and their relationship to the explanation of successful behavior and linguistic practices. Instead, I want to direct attention to the phenomenal content of our conscious experiences and the largely neglected contribution that its comprehension can make to the way in which (...) first-person representation is understood. This paper offers a novel argument for both the existence and a specific interpretation of the essential indexicality thesis based on widely accepted assumptions regarding the relation between phenomenology and representation. Specifically, I will argue that if (i) two different individuals can have token experiences with the same phenomenology and ii) two token experiences of ordinary subjects with the same phenomenology have the same phenomenal content, then phenomenal content is_ de se _content of a particular kind: _perspectival de se_ content. (shrink)

The Received View on scientific theories is a framework for formalizing and analyzing theories mainly developed by Rudolf Carnap and Carl Gustav Hempel within logical empiricism. Its central assumptions are that theories and observations can be formalized in predicate logic, that the language of formalization has a context-dependent observational sub-language or separate observation language, and that the interpretation of the language is restricted only by theories and the interpretation of the observational language. For the observational language as a sub-language, non-observational (...) terms were initially assumed to be explicitly definable in observational terms, and later assumed to have necessary or sufficient conditions in observational terms. In the final version of the Received View, no specific relations between observational terms and theoretical terms were assumed. The Received View also provided the framework for conceptualizations of explanation, confirmation, reduction, criteria of cognitive significance, the analytic-synthetic distinction, and concept formation. Many criticisms of the Received View in the philosophy of science rely on misrepresentations. (shrink)

El estado del avance tecnológico actual permite pensar en formas en las que la humanidad podría tener una mejor vida, pero, por el contrario, las condiciones parecen ser peores cada día. Las propuestas de Nick Srnicek y Alex Williams, y de Franco Berardi, abordan el problema de superar la sujeción de la tecnología al neoliberalismo, para permitir un mejor vivir. Sin embargo, sus propuestas, contrahegemonía y liberación del conocimiento, se separan en la forma, entre un proyecto político y la morfogénesis (...) producto de la comunidad. (shrink)

The article generally aims to demonstrate that Kant’s endeavor with Swedenborg must be considered productive, meaning that “Dreams of a Spirit-Seer” is not merely a slanderous text. Specifically, we will deal with the explanation of “obscure representations”, which, according to Swedenborg, have their basis in the coexistence of the mundus spiritualis (not intelligibilis!) and mundus sensibilis. This theorem proves highly compatible with Kant, leading to an attempt to reconstruct Swedenborg’s considerations ‘within the bounds of bare reason’: Kant’s profane explanation of (...) obscure representations ultimately refers back to semiotics, namely in the sense that the representations are understood as caused by pure rational beings. Obscure representations thus point as signs to a pre-critical ‘realm of ends’. The influence of pure rational beings also manifests itself in a moral-practical sense; it evokes a feeling opposed to egoism, which can easily be traced to the ‘feeling of respect’ or the ‘voice of reason’ from the critical writings. The ‘actual’ spirit-seeing, which Kant explains as a dislocated foco imaginario and thus as a mental defect, is to be distinguished from all of this, as it only describes the special case of the illegitimate externalization of these obscure representations. As will be shown at the end of the article, the theorems taken up in “Dreams of a Spirit-Seer” can be traced further to Kant’s very last writings. (shrink)

This essay reconstructs the relationship between critique and theory constitutive for Critical Theory. Based on Max Horkheimer’s 1937 program, the first part shows that “critical behaviour” must, on the one hand, seek proximity to social practice. On the other hand, such behaviour is dependent on the distance from its object that all “theoretical work” entails. Since the inception of a genuinely critical theory in the early works of Karl Marx, the proximity to practice goes hand in hand with the demand (...) to work towards its change, implying a proximity to political movements. The second part shows that, for historical reasons, Horkheimer’s program distances itself from such movements. The third part interprets this dialectical attitude towards social practice as conditioning the peculiar – ideology-critical – capacity of Critical Theory. In conclusion, the fourth part problematises two current tendencies towards dissolving said dialectics: a return to what Horkheimer calls traditional theory on the one hand, and the abandonment of the demanding social-theoretical program in favour of political positioning on the other. (shrink)

Our main objective here is to show the methodological usefulness of philosophical ideas. Concretely, drawing on theoretical analyses related to the concept of social structuring processes (Elder-Vass) and becoming differently (Gilles Deleuze), we argue that the social struggles of Afro-Latin American women can be interrogated in their role of transforming normative identities and fostering innovative communitarian dynamics that enable adaptation and transformation. The central thesis is that embracing a social construction perspective characterised by fluidity, adaptability, and solidarity can offer an (...) alternative philosophically grounded methodological framework capable of addressing the complexities of race, gender, and social justice in Latin America. In the context of the recent necessity to rethink mobilisation and social movements, our findings highlight the significance of structuring processes over identity differentiation and the importance of networked activities in facing systemic challenges. Ultimately, this study contributes to the possibility of moving towards more complex accounts of the plurality communitarian arrangements becoming active in the middle of reality changes and mutual efforts to deal with them. (shrink)

»Somatische Narration« bezeichnet eine Arbeitsweise, die Strukturen des Körperselbst, die durch Traumatisierung desorganisiert sind und den Kontakt zum symbolischen Netzwerk verloren haben, ins Zentrum der Aufmerksamkeit des analytischen Paars stellt. Diese nicht-repräsentierten Zustände werden als »verkapselte Körperengramme« aufgefasst. Sie weisen eine leiblich organisierte Abwehrstruktur auf, zu der neben Desorganisation und Versteinerung auch Wahrnehmungsabwehr, d.h. die systematische Abwendung der Aufmerksamkeit vom eigenen Körper, gehört. Die »somatische Narration« kehrt die Wahrnehmungsabwehr um. Zentral hierfür ist eine spezifische therapeutische Haltung: Die sinnliche Präsenz und (...) das leibliche »Containment« werden ins Zentrum der analytischen Haltung gestellt. Vorschnelle Symbolisierungen werden auf Seiten des Analytikers (Deutung) wie des Analysanden als Abwehr der Wahrnehmung des beschädigten Körperselbst und als Widerstand gegen das Durcharbeiten »verkapselter Körperengramme« aufgefasst. Ein klinisches Beispiel erläutert die Arbeitsweise und zeigt die Veränderung der desorganisierten Körperlandschaft im Verlauf einer vierjährigen Analyse. (shrink)

The paper presents an interpretation of Brandom¿s analysis of de re specifying attitude-ascriptions. According to this interpretation, his analysis amounts to a deflationist conception of intentionality. In the first section I sketch the specific role deflationist theories of truth play within the philosophical debate on truth. Then I describe some analogies between the contemporary constellation of competing truth theories and the current confrontation of controversial theories of intentionality. The second section gives a short summary of Brandom¿s analysis of attitude-ascription, focusing (...) on his account of the grammar of de re ascriptions of belief. The third section discusses in detail those aspects of his account from which a deflationist conception of intentionality may be derived, or which at least permit such a conception. In the proposed interpretation of Brandom¿s analysis, the vocabulary expressing the representational directedness of thought and talk does not describe a genuine property of mental states, but has an alternative descriptive function and in addition contains a performative and a meta­descriptive element. (shrink)

Recent discussions about the microstructure of materials generally focus on the ontological aspects of the molecular structure. However, there are many types of substances that cannot be studied by means of the concept of molecule, for example, salts. For the quantum treatment of these substances, a new particle, called phonon, is introduced. Phonons are generally conceived as a pseudo-particle, that is, a mathematical device necessary to perform calculations but which does not have a “real” existence. In this context, the aim (...) of this paper will be to analyze the ontological status of phonons. For such purposes we will critically analyze the arguments that would account for the presumed nonexistence of phonons. Finally, having already demonstrated that there are not enough reasons to consider phonons as non-existing entities, we will explore some possibilities that allow us to elucidate their ontological status. (shrink)

. This paper argues that legal philosophy is a social practice undertaken by participants whose views have primacy over non‐participants. This social practice is dynamic, constructive and based on understanding and explanation, in order to meet normative expectations. Legal Philosophy should include Legal Ontology, Legal Epistemology and a Theory of Justice. It is usually claimed that legal philosophy is a branch of a genus called philosophy, but there is no one single definition of it. In this paper it is argued (...) that as a starting point there is a need to choose between three basic traditions in philosophy. (shrink)

A los cristales se los describe como a una red de átomos que puede vibrar alrededor de su posición de equilibrio. Sin embargo, el hecho de que la energía de estas ondas esté cuantificada sugiere una analogía con el campo electromagnético. En analogía con el fotón se define al fonón. Generalmente se concibe al fonón como a una cuasi-partícula, es decir, como a un instrumento matemático útil en los cálculos pero sin una existencia propia. En este trabajo estudiamos el estatuto (...) ontológico del fonón y argumentaremos en favor de la idea de considerarlo como una partícula real. (shrink)

Was macht den Comic als Medium aus? Wer oder was macht ihn zu einem Medium? Für die Erforschung von Comics gibt es bislang keinen allgemein verbindlichen Medienbegriff: Zu divers scheinen sie, wenn sie aus Texten und Bildern arrangiert, in Zeitungen gedruckt, als Hefte gesammelt, als graphic novels besprochen oder auf Smartphones gelesen werden. Die Medien des Comics entwickelt ein Medialitätsmodell, mit dem sich der medialen Bestimmung von Comics gerade in ihrer Veränderbarkeit nachgehen lässt. Medialität wird dazu als ein Verbindungsprinzip verstanden, (...) nach dem die Einrichtung eines bestimmbaren Mediums Comic aus Materialien, Zeichen und Institutionen stetig neu vollzogen wird. Analysen zeigen auf, wie heterogene Akteure diese modernen Medienbestimmungen verändern - und wie dabei Kontroversen hinsichtlich der Mediengeschichte, Nostalgie, Selbstreflexivität und Materialität von Comics aufkommen. Dabei führen die Fallbeispiele von der Vergangenheit der comic strips und comic books zu aktuellen Entwicklungen im Zusammenhang mit Smartphones, Webcomics und Blogs. Der Band richtet sich an Comicforschende unterschiedlicher Disziplinen sowie an Medienwissenschaftler: innen, die sich mit Transformationsprozessen auseinandersetzen. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Thomism in John Owen by Christopher ClevelandSebastian RehnmanThomism in John Owen. By Christopher Cleveland. Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing, 2013. Pp. 173. $90.00 (cloth). ISBN: 978-1-4094-5579-0.Renaissance Scholasticism generally falls out of the contemporary philosophical and theological canon, and thus this form of argumentation is, and has for a long time, been a severely neglected area of study. However, a renewed interest in this field is increasingly exposing the philosophical (...) and theological stereotypes of the few earlier studies. Although institutional [End Page 160] philosophy and theology throughout Europe between the Reformation and the Enlightenment continued to identify itself as Scholastic, it is now clear that it was far from homogeneous. One of the diverse currents was the Scholasticism in Evangelical Protestantism. Within the reformed Church, academies aimed explicitly at continuing and contributing to the theological and philosophical tradition of the entire Church. Several studies have in particular suggested continuity between Thomas Aquinas and philosophers and theologians of good standing in the reformed Church. The most recent study is Christopher Cleveland’s Thomism in John Owen.The subject of this study is well chosen. John Owen (1616-83) was an influential pastor, scholar, vice-chancellor of the University of Oxford, and chaplain of Oliver Cromwell. He received a first-rate education at Oxford and maintained a wide-ranging scholarship throughout his life. His complete works comprise twenty-four volumes in the critical edition, and these are often thorough and systematic. From his tutor and friend Thomas Barlow, Owen seems to have gained a deep and lifelong appreciation of Aquinas, Alvarez, Bañez, and other Scholastics.Cleveland rightly aims at a focused investigation. His purpose is to “expand the inquiry into Reformed Thomism” (17) and “examine the role of Thomism in the theology of John Owen” (2). By “Thomism” he means “Aquinas” and sometimes “Diego Alvarez and Domingo Bañez.” In the first chapter Cleveland outlines the book and surveys some of the secondary literature. In the second chapter he contends that Owen was influenced by Aquinas’s concept of actus purus in arguing divine simplicity, divine immutability, and divine concurrence. In the third and fourth chapters he asserts that Aquinas’s understanding of infused “habits” strengthened Owen’s explanation of justification and sanctification. In the fifth chapter Cleveland proposes that Owen’s account of the hypostatic union is greatly indebted to Aquinas. Strangely the author concludes that Owen’s thought represents “a Western Trinitarian Theology” although he does not treat Owen’s doctrine of the Trinity.This book is a laudable and well-needed attempt to determine the particular influence of Aquinas on Owen. However, Cleveland’s work would benefit from a greater methodological rigor. Let us first consider Cleveland’s criteria for tracing Aquinas’s influence. He suggests that there are “four categories into which Thomistic influence falls.” These are: (1) quotations or paraphrases of “Thomas or a Thomist author,” (2) the development of a subject by means of similar theological concepts, (3) the “use of similar but not identical principles,” and (4) a coincidence of thought because of a common source. The second criterion is said to identify the most common type of influence, and the fourth the rarest (3). Now, that Owen was influenced by Aquinas is not in contest; the question is: how was Owen influenced? And there are limitations to what can be drawn from the application of these categories. The first category is not decisive, since any [End Page 161] author may be quoted or paraphrased for widely various reasons, and some influential authors may not be quoted or paraphrased. The fourth criterion is somewhat irrelevant, since the coincidental rarely reveals steady influence.Cleveland identifies “three major areas of Thomistic influence upon Owen’s theology” (4; similarly 154). These are God as actus purus, infused dispositions of grace, and the hypostatic union. Yet, the book contains no argument for that conclusion. Having formulated four criteria for the assessment of influence in the first chapter, Cleveland surprisingly does not return to them in the remainder of the book. The reader is thus left to wonder whether these three major areas of influence were determined by applying... (shrink)

Entrepreneurship has been highlighted as one of the major forces in addressing significant economic, social, and environmental challenges. These challenges have raised new ethical questions, leading to an explosive growth of research at the intersection of ethics and entrepreneurship. This study provides an overview of the evolution of the scientific literature on the interplay between ethics and entrepreneurship to propose a research proposition with standardized protocols and a broad time limit. Specifically, in a hybrid literature review, 516 articles from peer-reviewed (...) journals indexed in Scopus were analyzed. The review revealed that the field mainly comprises six themes. Through the analysis of each theme, gaps are identified and structured and used to build theoretical proposals for future research agendas applied to current societal challenges. Understanding the link between entrepreneurship and ethics guides practices improves decisions, addresses challenges, promotes sustainability, enhances academia, and builds trust, fostering a responsible, beneficial entrepreneurial environment for society and the economy. (shrink)

In this essay, I will attempt a systematic reconstruction of the general shape of Husserl's late philosophy, insofar as it centers on the concept of personhood. The systematic concatenation of this and other themes in Husserl's late work - the method of epoché and reduction, ethics, personhood, and teleology - has only recently begun to be explored in Husserl scholarship, and this article is a modest contribution to the further e1ucidation of their mutual relationship. One of the most striking results (...) of this reconstructive analysis is Husserl's final concept of "person", which goes beyond the traditional distinctions, such as "heart" and "mind" or "reason" and "emotion". For Husserl to conceive of the subject as moral person implies, then, the demand to not only conduct oneself morally, but also to have an ethical view of the world as a world that bears meaning and harbors values despite its apparent absurdities. (shrink)

Situational crime prevention (SCP) measures attempt to prevent crime by reducing the opportunities for crime to occur. One of the ways in which some SCP measures reduce such opportunities is by providing victims with advice about how to avoid being victimised, for instance through public awareness campaigns or safety apps. Some scholars claim that this approach to preventing crime often or always promotes victim-blaming and that it is therefore morally wrong to pursue such strategies. Others have made sweeping rejections of (...) this claim. However, in this paper, I suggest that neither view is correct. Specifically, I demonstrate that there are at least three distinct ways of interpreting what I term the victim-blaming argument against advice-giving SCP measures – i.e. as an argument based on a concern for direct victim-blaming, indirect victim-blaming, or self-blame – and that both SCP opponents and supporters have legitimate grounds for their position, depending on how the argument is spelled out. (shrink)

During the 1980s, empirical social sciences and normative theory seemingly converged within ethical debates. This tendency kindled new debates about the limits and possibilities of empirical-normative collaboration. The article asks for adequate ways of collaboration by taking a closer look at the philosophy of science of empirical social sciences as well as normative theory development and its logical groundings. As a result, three possible modes of cooperation are characterized: first, the empirical assessment of conditions that actually necessitate the translation of (...) normatively derived basic principles into practice rules; second, the empirical assessment of conditions for application of a moral norm which are formulated by bridging principles; third, the empirical assessment of social practice which allows to measure whether adopted norms actually are implemented in practice or not and to encounter new moral problems which are in need of ethical guidance. Finally, the article defends a symbiotic position in Weaver ’s and Trevino's triad of possible approaches to empirical-normative collaboration in ethics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:CRUCIFIXION: ACCIDENT OR DESIGN? Sebastian Moore, O.S.B. Downside Abbey Lastyear I was visited by an old friend from my Liverpool days. Mike and I had worked together with the young of the parish, and one summer the two of us took a couple of boys camping in France, a trial of patience which made us known to each other at some depth. He was in fact a passionately (...) convinced Catholic, and very pastoral with it. We had many and long theological discussions. On his recent visit to Downside, I was showing him and some friends round our church, when, à propos ofquite what I don't remember, he made a remark about the Catholic cult of suffering, and said, "and it's all because ofthe crucifixion, isn't it? Why don't we recognize that the crucifixion was an accident?" I didn't react, because I was dumbfounded at what seemed to be the denial ofthe mystery ofthe cross by a friend who I had no reason to believe had stopped being a Catholic. And I'm sure he hasn't. He would certainly have told me ifhe had. It has taken me over a year to figure out what is going on here, and this would not have been possible without intensive study of the work of René Girard. The only alternative to saying that the crucifixion was an accident is to say that it was "ordained by God." It is only as ordained by God that this horrible event could be presented to people as a divine affirmation that suffering is to be sought and espoused. Also, it is only as ordained by God that the crucifixion can be thought of as "appeasing God" in some way. Both the moral and the dogmatic implication ofthe crucifixion—that suffering is a good thing, and that God required a victim—are grounded in the notion that God required the crucifixion ofhis Son. And it is because this idea is quite unacceptable, unworthy of God and ofthe human mind made in God's image, that my friend concludes that the crucifixion was not required by God, not written into the eternal scheme ofthings, but an accident. 156Sebastian Moore Once the problem is clarified in these terms, more and more instances come to mind, of rejection, by Christians and others, of the whole divine ordination ofthe cross. Gore Vidal refers to Christianity as "that lugubrious religion." Mary Hunt, a prominent American Catholic feminist, introduced a workshop with the statement, "we are not about naked guys nailed to crosses, blood all over the place!" Where divine ordering is accepted the special painfulness and darkness ofthe idea is noted. Anselm refers to the doctrine as the Narnia Chronicles, to commend the notion, by referring to a dark law written into the nature ofthings beyond our comprehension. The children's suggestion that Asian should simply not comply with the Snow Queen's requirement is rejected by Asian with a mysterious impatience—the children justhaven't grown up, like the romantics who, according to Matthew Arnold, "did not know enough." Again, during a day on "the roots of violence" that I led here yesterday there was much questioning about the role ofGod die Father in the crucifixion. The problem is crystallized in the famous cry from the cross, "Why have you forsaken me?" To my confessedly lame suggestion that Jesus was "only quoting a psalm," someone remarked, "to quote that psalm at thatjuncture and not mean it, is somewhatmisleading!" Again it's the same problem. How can God be understood as ordaining the crucifixion, compatibly with the notion of God as all-loving which Christianity of course affirms? Hans Urs Von Balthasar, who is 90% pro-Girard, in the other 10% wants to hold on to something he calls "the wrath of God." Thus the seeming necessity of having God require and ordain the crucifixion is the main crisis of Christian belief. The six-year-old Willie, in Thomas Klise's amazing novel, The Last Western, puts the problem with childlike directness. He keeps interrupting catechism class with, "Why did God kill Jesus?" and is shushed by Sister. I recall that Illtyd Trethowan said to... (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft und Ethik Jahrgang: 16 Heft: 1 Seiten: 5-40.