The rapid evolution of drug resistance remains a major obstacle for HIV therapy. The capacity of the virus for recombination is widely believed to facilitate the evolution of drug resistance. Here, we challenge this intuitive view. We develop a population genetic model of HIV replication that incorporates the processes of mutation, cellular superinfection, and recombination. We show that cellular superinfection increases the abundance of low fitness viruses at the expense of the fittest strains due to the mixing of viral proteins (...) during virion assembly. Moreover, we argue that whether recombination facilitates the evolution of drug resistance depends critically on how resistance mutations interact to determine viral fitness. Contrary to the commonly held belief, we find that, under the most plausible biological assumptions, recombination is expected to slow down the rate of evolution of multi‐drug‐resistant virus during therapy. BioEssays 26:180–188, 2004. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

How can we be responsible for our attitudes if we cannot normally choose what we believe, desire, feel, and intend? This problem has received much attention during the last decades, both in epistemology and ethics. Yet its connections to discussions about reasons and rationality have been largely overlooked. This book develops the foundations of an ethics of mind by investigating the responsibility that is presupposed by the requirements of rationality that govern our attitudes. It has five main goals. First, it (...) reinterprets the problem of responsibility for attitudes as a problem about the normativity of rationality. Second, it connects substantive and structural rationality by drawing on debates about responsibility. Third, it supports recent accounts of the normativity of rationality by explicitly defending the view that epistemic reasons and other ‘right-kind’ reasons are genuine normative reasons. Fourth, it breaks the stalemate between rationalist and voluntarist accounts of mental responsibility by proposing a hybrid view. Finally, it argues that irrationality can warrant moral blame, thus revealing an unnoticed normative force of rational requirements. Length of manuscript: 85,000 words. (shrink)

Departing from the claim that AI needs to be trustworthy, we find that ethical advice from an AI-powered algorithm is trusted even when its users know nothing about its training data and when they learn information about it that warrants distrust. We conducted online experiments where the subjects took the role of decision-makers who received advice from an algorithm on how to deal with an ethical dilemma. We manipulated the information about the algorithm and studied its influence. Our findings suggest (...) that AI is overtrusted rather than distrusted. We suggest digital literacy as a potential remedy to ensure the responsible use of AI. (shrink)

In this paper we present a schema for describing dualities between physical theories, and illustrate it in detail with the example of bosonization: a boson-fermion duality in two-dimensional quantum field theory. The schema develops proposals in De Haro : these proposals include construals of notions related to duality, like representation, model, symmetry and interpretation. The aim of the schema is to give a more precise criterion for duality than has so far been considered. The bosonization example, or boson-fermion duality, has (...) the feature of being simple, yet rich enough, to illustrate the most relevant aspects of our schema, which also apply to more sophisticated dualities. The richness of the example consists, mainly, in its concern with two non-trivial quantum field theories: including massive Thirring-sine-Gordon duality, and non-abelian bosonization. This prompts two comparisons with the recent philosophical literature on dualities:--- Unlike the standard cases of duality in quantum field theory and string theory, where only specific simplifying limits of the theories are explicitly known, the boson-fermion duality is known to hold {\it exactly}. This exactness can be exhibited explicitly. The bosonization example illustrates both the cases of isomorphic and {\it non-isomorphic} models: which we believe the literature on dualities has not so far discussed. (shrink)

Eva Schmidt argues that facts about incoherent beliefs can be non-evidential epistemic reasons to suspend judgment. In this commentary, I argue that incoherence-based reasons to suspend are epistemically superfluous: if the subjects in Schmidt’s cases ought to suspend judgment, then they should do so merely on the basis of their evidential reasons. This suggests a more general strategy to reduce the apparent normativity of coherence to the normativity of evidence. I conclude with some remarks on the independent interest that reasons-first (...) epistemology might have within an evidentialist framework. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Band bietet eine repräsentative Auswahl der wichtigsten Forschungsmanuskripte zur Methode der transzendental-phänomenologischen Reduktion aus Husserls Spätwerk. Werkgeschichtlich orientiert sich diese Edition an den Arbeitsphasen ab 1926, in denen Husserl wiederholt ein `System der Phänomenologie' bzw. ein phänomenologisches Grundwerk zu verfassen beabsichtigte. In den chronologisch angeordneten Texten, die Husserl im Rahmen seiner Manuskriptordnung vom Frühjahr 1935 einer eigenen Sektion (der `B-Gruppe' mit dem Titel 'Die Reduktion') zuwies, führt er aus Vorlesungen und Forschungsmanuskripten der zwanziger Jahre bekannte Themen fort. Neben (...) der Erörterung verschiedener Wege zur phänomenologischen Reduktion und Strategien der Einleitung in die transzendentale Phänomenologie behandelt Husserl das Problem der Phänomenologie als einer eigenständigen, zur intentionalen Psychologie parallelen, transzendentalen Bewußtseinswissenschaft. Hierzu gehören systematisch die Probleme der Unterscheidung von natürlichem und transzendentalem Ich, des Übergangs von natürlicher zu phänomenologischer Einstellung, des Status des unbeteiligten Zuschauers sowie das Problem der `Verweltlichung' des Transzendentalen und dessen `Einströmen' in die vorphilosophische Lebenswelt. In diesen hauptsächlich der Methodik gewidmeten Forschungsmanuskripten wird das Ganze einer phänomenologischen `Systematik' im Umriß erkennbar. (shrink)

Introduction to edited volume on vitalism and/in the life sciences, 1800-2010.

Porsdam Mann and colleagues provide an overview of opportunities and risks associated with the use of personalized large language models (LLMs) for text production in bio)ethics (Porsdam Mann et al...

Cognitive theories claim, whereas non-cognitive theories deny, that cognitive access is constitutive of phenomenology. Evidence in favor of non-cognitive theories has recently been collected by Block and is based on the high capacity of participants in partial-report experiments compared to the capacity of the working memory. In reply, defenders of cognitive theories have searched for alternative interpretations of such results that make visual awareness compatible with the capacity of the working memory; and so the conclusions of such experiments remain controversial. (...) Instead of entering the debate between alternative interpretations of partial-report experiments, this paper offers an alternative line of research that could settle the discussion between cognitive and non-cognitive theories of consciousness. Here I relate the neural correlates of cognitive access to empirical research into the neurophysiology of dreams; cognitive access seems to depend on the activity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. However, that area is strongly deactivated during sleep; a period when we entertain conscious experiences: dreams. This approach also avoids the classic objection that consciousness should be inextricably tied to reportability or it would fall outside the realm of science. (shrink)

Could you survive your bodily death by uploading your mind?

This article presents a characterization of higher-order risk preferences such as prudence or temperance in terms of statistical moments. Our results, which are generalizations of Roger :27–44, 2011) and Ekern, 329–333, 1980), give a better understanding of how higher-order risk preferences relate to skewness preference and kurtosis aversion. While they are not based on expected utility theory, an implication within that theory is that all commonly used utility functions exhibit skewness preference and kurtosis aversion.

The essay argues that there is no such thing as the epistemology of testimony as it is currently conceived: a subfield of epistemology that concerns itself with a special form of acquiring knowledge, a special kind of justification, a special sort of reason for belief. Rather, the concept of knowledge contains an account of the possibility of knowing from others. We cannot find ourselves in this predicament: we comprehend what knowledge is all right, and yet have difficulty seeing how one (...) may, from the words of another, come to acquire that: knowledge. And if we cannot find ourselves in this predicament, then there can be no need to introduce, in response to it, concepts that currently attract much interest—trust, authority, sincerity, etc. (shrink)

Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theories of consciousness maintain that the kind of awareness necessary for phenomenal consciousness depends on the cognitive accessibility that underlies reporting. -/- There is empirical evidence strongly suggesting that the cognitive accessibility that underlies the ability to report visual experiences depends on the activity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). This area, however, is highly deactivated during the conscious experiences we have during sleep: dreams. HOT theories are jeopardized, as I will argue. I will briefly present HOT (...) theories in the first section. Section 2 offers empirical evidence to the effect that the cognitive accessibility that underlies the ability to report depends on the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex: dlPFC is the neural correlate of HOTs. Section 3 shows the evidence we have of the deactivation of this brain area during dreams and, in section 4, I present my argument. Finally, I consider and rejoin two possible replies that my opponent can offer: the possibility of an alternative neural correlate of HOTs during dreams and the denial that we have phenomenally conscious experiences during sleep. (shrink)

The issue of faith and reason arises from the claim that there are two kinds of truths: some truths are discoverable to human understanding and some are not. This paper argues that the epistemology of the prominent orthodox protestant theologian John Owen (1616–1683) does not fit the labels of evidentialism and fideism. According to evidentialism, every cognitive act (including faith) must depend on evidence available to reason. According to fideism, there is no relation between faith and reason so that nothing (...) of reason can be counted for or against faith. But Owen is a fideist in the sense that faith is not based on rational evidence, and an evidentialist in the sense that Christian faith ought to have some rational or cognitive support. Philosophical arguments count in favour of faith and are not the ground of faith. The paper suggests that this nuanced view is a viable alternative and option. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Continental Divide: Heidegger, Cassirer, DavosSebastian LuftPeter E. Gordon. Continental Divide: Heidegger, Cassirer, Davos. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010. Pp. 448. Cloth, $39.95.Much ink has been spilled on the dispute between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger that took place in the Swiss resort town Davos in 1929—famous since Thomas Mann staged his Magic Mountain there—and which has since been referred to as the “Davos Dispute.” While the debate (...) itself and accounts accompanying it have been widely known to historians [End Page 508] of philosophy, Harvard historian Peter E. Gordon shows in this marvelous new book how memory has shaped the event into something much larger than anyone could have foreseen. It is, Gordon claims, the silent work of memory that has made this debate, rather innocuous at the time, into what can be retrospectively be considered the truly earth-shattering philosophical event of the twentieth century.In hindsight, the symbolism of the debate between a German who became a leading Nazi philosopher in 1933 and a Jew who, in the same year, was dismissed from his professorship and forced to flee Germany, could not be greater. It only grows if one connects the historic events with their respective philosophies: on the one side the liberal modern Cassirer, whose philosophy allegedly glorified the Weimar stalemate, and on the other side the radical Heidegger, whose call for “authentic existence” took on a bone-chilling reality as he embraced Hitler in 1933 as the führer to lead Germany back to its authentic roots.Two volumes—the 1999 collection, 70 Jahre Davoser Disputation, edited by E. Rudolph and D. Kaegi, and, in 2000, A Parting of the Ways by Michael Friedman—were the first to delve into the debate’s symbolic meaning. It was Friedman’s thesis that the fateful “parting of the ways” between Continental and Analytic philosophy could be traced to this meeting, which was also attended by Rudolf Carnap. Despite these studies, there has until now not been a comprehensive treatment that pulls together all threads into one narrative, covering the entire intellectual, historical, cultural, and philosophical landscape of the time. Gordon’s book achieves just that and will be, for years to come, the landmark work on this encounter.The book begins from the background in post-World War I philosophy in Germany, which was perceived, along with culture, as being in crisis (ch. 1), to “set the stage” on the “Magic Mountain” (ch. 2). It proceeds to summarize the individual lectures by Cassirer and Heidegger, giving a detailed interpretation of the protocol prepared by students of the interlocutors (chs. 3–4). The author then takes a deep breath in chapter 5 to place the debate in the larger context of Cassirer’s and Heidegger’s philosophies. But the story does not end there, as chapter 6 examines the relation between both thinkers after the debate. Finally, in chapter 7, Gordon assesses the newer debates concerning this dispute up to the debate between Bourdieu and Habermas concerning Heidegger’s Nazi involvement, though it does not re-engage with Friedman’s thesis, as might have been desired.Regarding his interpretation, Gordon juxtaposes Cassirer’s and Heidegger’s philosophies along the Kantian distinction between spontaneity and receptivity, where both paradigms make different claims on the “normative image of humanity” (5 ff.). Whether humanity is interpreted as spontaneous and world-creating, in optimistic Enlightenment terms (Cassirer), or as receptive and open to the world, i.e. as the “shepherd” rather than the “lord of being” (Heidegger), both are answering the fourth of Kant’s questions, “What is man?” While this distinction is useful for understanding the basic relation between them, it is also—as the author would concede—somewhat too coarse to do justice to their mutual differences and commonalities. Were one to assert a systematic critique, Gordon does not really make up his mind as to the true significance of these paradigms: are they mutually exclusive oppositions or, as he implies elsewhere, two alternative versions of philosophical modernism with a common ground? There is evidence for both readings. This question, however, is for the philosopher to answer—the philosopher who wants to push... (shrink)

A los cristales se los describe como a una red de átomos que puede vibrar alrededor de su posición de equilibrio. Sin embargo, el hecho de que la energía de estas ondas esté cuantificada sugiere una analogía con el campo electromagnético. En analogía con el fotón se define al fonón. Generalmente se concibe al fonón como a una cuasi-partícula, es decir, como a un instrumento matemático útil en los cálculos pero sin una existencia propia. En este trabajo estudiamos el estatuto (...) ontológico del fonón y argumentaremos en favor de la idea de considerarlo como una partícula real. (shrink)

Videoüberwachung ist heute allgegenwärtig. Sie dient dazu, Delikte im Nachhinein aufzuklären, zur Echtzeit-Überwachung oder zur Abschreckung. Darüber hinaus gibt es aber auch wirtschaftliche Interessen für eine Videoüberwachung und automatische Erfassung von Personen – z.B. zur Erstellung von Kundenprofilen und somit zur Analyse von Kaufverhalten. Dem gegenüber stehen Rechtsanspruche sowie ethische und gesellschaftliche Grundnormen, etwa dass Menschen nicht unter Generalverdacht gestellt oder ohne Zustimmung aufgezeichnet werden dürfen. In dieser Arbeit wird ein technischer Lösungsansatz behandelt, der eine flexible Handhabung der Videoüberwachung erlaubt. (...) Es werden in diesem Zusammenhang neben der technischen Umsetzung auch ökonomische, ethische und juristische Fragen betrachtet. Der Lösungsansatz besteht darin, Personen auf Videoaufnahmen durch ein kryptographisches Verfahren unkenntlich zu machen, noch bevor die Aufnahmen die Kamera-Elektronik verlassen. Nur mittels eines geheimen kryptographischen Schlüssels können einzelne Zeit- und Bildbereiche einer Aufnahme wieder deanonymisiert werden, wodurch rechtlichen wie ethischen Bedenken Rechnung getragen werden kann. In kommerziellen Szenarien erlaubt es diese digitale Tarnkappe, dass Kunden z.B. im Rahmen eines Prämien-Programms freiwillig auf Anonymisierung verzichten. Während in der Literatur der Informatik bereits seit längerem Technologien für solche System beschrieben werden, werden in dieser Arbeit Wege gezeigt, wie dessen Einbettung in die Gesellschaft wirklich realisiert werden könnte. (shrink)

The so-called Brundtland-Report defines Sustainable Development as a conception of intra- and intergenerational justice, which is to be realized by a globally just distribution of possibilities for satisfying human basic needs as well as assuring such possibilities for future generations. Hence, any political and/or societal decision is addressed by the ethical demands of Sustainable Development insofar it affects possibilities for satisfying human basic needs. In particular, this concerns – contrary to the widespread opinion that Sustainable Development only has to deal (...) with problems of environmental ethics – the legitimization of biomedical applications. After all, especially such decisions often face the problem of measuring and trading-off potential advantages and disadvantages regarding possibilities for satisfying human basic needs. Based on the example of decisions about establishing biobanks, my talk firstly will show that Sustainable Development actually demands much more from political and societal decisions than just being concerned about environmental ethics. Secondly, it will clarify these demands in detail. Thirdly, it will address the issues of how these demands can be implemented adequately. My talk therefore will show which conditions political and/or societal decision processes have to meet in order to comply with Sustainable Development. (shrink)

While largely studied because of their harmful effects on human health, there is growing appreciation that bacteria are important partners for invertebrates and vertebrates, including man. Epithelia in metazoans do not only select their microbiota; a coevolved consortium of microbes enables both invertebrates and vertebrates to expand the range of diet supply, to shape the complex immune system and to control pathogenic bacteria. Microbes in zebrafish and mice regulate gut epithelial homeostasis. In a squid, microbes control the development of the (...) symbiotic light organ. These discoveries point to a key role for bacteria in any metazoan existence, and imply that beneficial bacteria‐host interactions should be considered an integral part of development and evolution. (shrink)

Introduction: This paper has two, interrelated aims. The first is to clarify Sartre's theory of intersubjectivity. Sartre's discussion of the Other has a puzzling way of going in and out of focus, seeming at one moment to provide a remarkably original solution to the problem of other minds and at the next to wholly miss the point of the skeptical challenge. The nature of his argument is equally uncertain: at some points it looks like an attempt to mount a transcendental (...) argument, a kind of Refutation of Idealism regarding the existence of others, at others, to be a defence of direct realism; yet again, it can seem to propose a dissolution of the problem closely analogous to Wittgenstein. I will argue (Section 1) that none of these provides quite the right model for understanding Sartre, which requires one to take seriously his method of resolving epistemological issues into matters of ontology. I argue further (Section 2) that Sartre's theory becomes fully coherent only if we make explicit its implicit presupposition of a conception of intersubjectivity articulated by Fichte. My second aim is to pursue the connection opened up of Sartre with German idealism. To the extent that commentators attempt to relate Sartre systematically to German idealism, it is almost always Hegel who provides the other term of comparison.1 What I try to show (Section 3) is that the usual comparison of Sartre with Hegel, which is largely negative, is distracting, and that Sartre's closer philosophical [End Page 325] relations are to Fichte and Schelling.2 This supplies, I argue, an important correction to the tendency of anglophone discussion of Sartre to isolate his claims from historical considerations, or to restrict Sartre's historical frame of reference to Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger: Sartre's philosophy, I suggest, is viewed fruitfully in the context of philosophical debates pursued in early German idealism. Sartre's ethics, I argue (Section 4), provide supporting evidence for this view. I propose tentatively in conclusion (Section 5) a corresponding view of existential phenomenology as a whole. (shrink)

This paper issues a highly controversial point: is there possible that a concept of ‘revolution’ can legitimize the historical revolutionary action and, if yes, how could this be possible? This debate on revolution is a subsequent part of a larger puzzle: the hermeneutics of the historical fact. Roughly explained, the concept of ‘revolution’ is the major piece of a ’revolutionary rhetoric,’ which generates the interpretation of the historical fact. Samples are offered by means of the concept of ‘revolution’ issued by (...) modern historiography. The case focuses on three main parts: a brief debate on the concept of ‘revolution’ viewed by the apologists of the French Revolution and their adversaries; a critique of Marx’s and Lenin’s ideology of revolution; finally, an illustration of a rhetorical dismantle of ‘revolution’ at hand in Kenneth Burke’s comments on Marxist ‘revolution.’. (shrink)

The issue, which is at stake here, consists in analysing the modern view of ethics in the context of the social and cultural transformation of the status of the individual. The role of ethics in the history of the modern mind is strictly related to the struggle between liberal individualism and the ge- neric idea of “man,” presented as a social actor in a large political and ideological arena. As a matter of fact, beginning with Illuminism, the radical as- sumption (...) concerning the “human rights” has sev- ered two different directions of thought: 1) The theory of human rights, which are immediately and unconditionally related to the preservation of both negative and positive rights of the individual; 2) the Hegelian and Post-Hegelian view (especially Marxism) – the social and political liberty of the indi- vidual is protected only by the direct intervention of the State. Thus, introducing the traditional concept of “virtue” – following Alasdair MacIntyre’s theory on traditional virtues – into the arena of the modern ethics debate is seen at first as an adven- turous task, but finally, as a possible solution – the neo-Aristotelian view of virtues could be considered as a positive response to the more increasing crisis of traditional values in our society. (shrink)

Adrian Moore argues that Kant’s transcendental idealism is incoherent, and that its incoherence gives us an invaluable insight into the fundamental nature of metaphysics, motivating the reconception of metaphysical inquiry with which Moore concludes his story of the development of modern philosophy. My discussion has three parts. First, I focus on the treatment of Kant’s transcendental idealism in Moore’s earlier book, Points of View, and highlight ways in which Moore is, I argue, open to challenge. Second, I suggest that the (...) historical record does not bear out Moore’s criticism of Kant’s transcendental idealism. Third, I compare Moore’s response to the alleged incoherence of transcendental idealism with that of the German Romantics. (shrink)

People tend to grossly overestimate the size of their mirror-reflected face. Although this overestimation bias is robust, not much is known about its relationships to self-face perception. In two experiments, we investigated the overestimation bias as a function of the presentation of the own face , the identity of the seen face, and prior exposure to a real mirror. For this we developed a computerized task requiring size estimations of displayed faces. We replicated the observation that people overestimate the size (...) of their mirror-reflected face and showed that the overestimation can be reduced following a brief mirror exposure. We also found that left–right reversal modulates the overestimation bias, depending on the perceived face’s identity. These data underline the enhanced familiarity of left–right reversed self-faces and the importance of size perception for understanding mirror reflection processing. (shrink)

The essay develops a disjunctive account of perception, showing that it needs to be renamed 'self-conscious power account'. For it is by reference to a self-conscious power of sensory knowledge that, on the one hand, the unity of perception and illusion and, on the other hand, the priority of perception over illusion, specifically, its priority in knowledge, is understood. The concept of a self-conscious power thus transpires as lying at the basis of a sound epistemology and response to sceptical arguments (...) such as the argument from illusion. (shrink)

Since Sidney Winter published his paper on “Knowledge and competence as Strategic assets”, the number of publications on the role of knowledge in economics has immensely grown. l-Iere we shall analyze that role from an evolutionary point of view, and try to show that the discussion about concepts like “evolution” is not closed, and that the Darwinian framework of evolutionary economics is in debate.

It is well known that Sartre describes his form of existentialism as atheistic, and much of the rhetoric of Sartrean existentialism draws off the image of God's absence from the world. There are nevertheless, I argue, deep grounds for thinking that the coherence and well-groundedness of Sartre's thought requires that his phenomenological ontology take finally the form of an onto-theology: Sartre's ontology runs into difficulties concerning the origin of the for-itself and the unity of being; an onto-theology like Schelling's, which (...) avoids the ‘ontological optimism’ that Sartre objects to in Hegel, both releases Sartre's ontology from its difficulties and furthers Sartre's central philosophical purposes. (Published Online July 10 2006). (shrink)

This article is a contribution to the history of the Geiger-Müller counter, based on the replication method. Along with a historical analysis of the Geiger-Müller counter I present and discuss my experience with replicas of early counters from 1928. The explicit and tacit knowledge that was gained during my construction und the experimentation process allows a different view of the development process in 1928. Against this background, I discuss Walter Müller’s role in the development and the significance of experimental work (...) in Geiger’s laboratory by illustrating the status of data gained from indirect electrical measurements in the field of early radioactivity research. All things considered it was not the instrument itself, but Geiger’s influence and status that affected its establishment in the scientific community in an authoritative way. (shrink)

Georg Liebster was a lutheran pastor in Leipzig and a leader of the Evangelical Social Movement in the red kingdom of Saxony. Liebster's speach about working class and bourgeosie from 1900 offers insight into his national-social political thinking. Six simple sermons show the inventive liberal theologian.

Zusammenfassung: Aktuelle Debatten zu gesellschaftspolitischen Folgen der Corona-Pandemie zeigen, dass Intellektuelle wie Giorgio Agamben und Roberto Esposito den Begriff „Biopolitik“ ins Treffen führen, um Regierungsmaßnahmen zur Eindämmung des Virus zu analysieren. Seit Michel Foucaults Überlegungen zur Funktionsweise und Genealogie der Biopolitik birgt der Begriff jedoch eine gewisse Problematik: Aufgrund strukturell bedingter Mechanismen der Inklusion und Exklusion menschlichen Lebens gelingt es den biopolitischen Modellen nach Agamben und Esposito nicht – so die These –, ein zentrales Element des Politischen zu beschreiben. Unberücksichtigt (...) bleibt die Möglichkeit des Widerstands und der Kritik an Regierungsmaßnahmen; eine Möglichkeit, die gerade die Heterogenität politischer Ordnungsstrukturen anzeigt. Im Zuge der Analytik moderner Machttechniken verschiebt Foucault anders als Agamben und Esposito den Fokus von der Biopolitik hin zu einem umfassenderen Paradigma des „Regierens“, der Gouvernementalität. Infolgedessen lässt sich die Biopolitik als Regierungsweise thematisieren, mit der immer schon Formen widerständigen Handelns einhergehen. Um dieser Perspektive Rechnung zu tragen, argumentiert mein Beitrag mit Foucault gegen die primär strukturale Auffassung politischer Ordnungen nach Agamben und Esposito. (shrink)