Asarja Polikarov ist die führende Gestalt in der Wissenschaftsmethodologie Bulgariens und einer der bedeutendsten Vertreter dieses Faches innerhalb des marxistischen Denkens. Der vorliegende Artikel ist der Analyse seiner Leitideen gewidmet: Dem Charakter des Verhältnisses zwischen Wissenschaft und Methodologie, der Konzeption des Multimethodologismus, der Untersuchung der Wertigkeit methodologischer Systeme, der Proliferation physikalischer Theorien usw. Das Ziel der Analyse besteht darin, die Stellung der Ansichten Polikarovs in Beziehung auf die weltweiten Tendenzen gegenwärtiger Wissenschaftsmethodologie aufzuweisen.

This book gives a systematic account of Martin Heidegger’s methodology. Contrary to the widespread conception that Heidegger’s (late) philosophy is lacking any kind of verifiable, provable insights, the author shows that a rejection of the scientific method does not imply a rejection of methodological, rigorous thinking. In fact, it can be shown that the method of Heidegger’s philosophy is more rigorous, more strict and more radical than the scientific method. But because the scientific method is conceived of as the (...) non-plus-ultra even within philosophy, in order to outline Heidegger’s methodology we have to give an account of his criticism of the scientific method. By showing the limitations of modern science, we can unfold the possibilities of philosophy. -/- The book consists of four parts: The first part is about Heidegger’s concept of subjectivity and his criticism of the Cartesian subject-object-dichotomy. The main argument of the first part is that the ‘subject’, inasmuch as it is understood ontologically, is essential for philosophy. We outline this – following Steven G. Crowell – as the philosophical significance of the first-person-perspective (Heidegger’s early philosophy between 1919 and 1927). -/- The second part is about what we call an ontological theory of constitution: A radicalization of the Kantian transcendental philosophy which does not orbit around transcendental subjectivity, but rather around concrete subjectivity (Dasein vs. the transcendental ego). We take a closer look on what Heidegger has written between 1927 and 1930. -/- The third part is about Heidegger’s late philosophy. The main topic of this third part is Heidegger’s “seynsgeschichtliche Besinnung auf das machenschaftliche Wesen der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft“ – which is in essence a closer look on what modern science is, on its relation to technology, and on its very own historicality. We discuss the most famous published texts and lectures between 1930 and 1976, but focus on Heidegger’s Nietzsche lectures and his second magnus opus: the Contributions to Philosophy. -/- This criticism of modern science is the stepping stone for the fourth and final part, in which we take all the pieces and put them together by giving a systematic account of Heidegger’s methodology. In this final part we take a step back from Heidegger’s texts (and from his language) and confront Heidegger with the most famous criticism by Carl Friedrich Gethmann and Jürgen Habermas. -/- This allows us to give an account of the central concepts of Heidegger’s methodology: truth, knowledge and validity. We also talk about the status of philosophical concepts and in general: philosophical language, about Heidegger’s theory of philosophical conceptualization, which is known as the method of formal indication and about the possibility of an ontological foundation of modern science and epistemology. -/- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- GERMAN------------------------------------------------- -/- Der methodische Status insbesondere der Spätphilosophie Heideggers ist ein Problem: Mit den Mitteln der traditionellen Methodenlehre können die Aussagen dieser Philosophie nicht ausgewiesen und auch nicht begründet werden. Mit der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft und ihrer Methode hat sie nichts mehr gemein. Aber muss dies heißen, dass diese Philosophie ihre Erkenntnisse überhaupt nicht mehr ausweisen kann? -/- Ich habe in dieser Arbeit versucht zu zeigen, dass auch die späte Philosophie Heideggers Methode hat. Auch wenn Heidegger in fast an den Mythos erinnernder Art und Weise über die Verbergung und das Sich-entziehen des Seyns spricht, handelt es sich um methodisch überprüfbare, ausweisbare Aussagen. Nur wird in Heideggers Methodologie Ernst gemacht mit dem Gedanken, dass die Philosophie eine eigene Methode braucht und sich nicht wie blind an der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft orientieren dürfe. Eine Methode, die sie zum Teil für sich erst entwickeln muss. -/- Die Grundbegriffe dieser ‚neuen Methodologie‘ zu klären, war das Hauptanliegen dieser Arbeit. Es ging um den Wahrheits-, Erkenntnis- und Geltungsanspruch dieser Philosophie. -/- Dafür habe ich einen Blick geworfen insb. auf die frühe Philosophie Heideggers (1. Teil: 1919-1927), auf die wichtigen Texte und Vorträge im Kontext von Sein und Zeit (2. Teil: 1927-1930) und auf die Texte zu Nietzsche, zu den Beiträgen und zu Wissenschaft und Technik (3. Teil: 1930-1976). In einem vierten Teil habe ich die Grundzüge dieser Methodologie skizziert. Ich habe mich dabei an der Kritik von Jürgen Habermas orientiert, der am bekanntesten und am stärksten die These vertreten hat, dass die Spätphilosophie Heideggers irrational sei. Auch hier kam ich zu dem Schluss, dass Heideggers Kritik an dem okzidentalen Rationalismus nicht in die Irrationalität führen muss, wie Habermas nahelegt, sondern dass dadurch ein kritisches Verständnis von Rationalität möglich wird. (shrink)

How was the hypothetical character of theories of experience thought about throughout the history of science? The essays cover periods from the middle ages to the 19th and 20th centuries. It is fascinating to see how natural scientists and philosophers were increasingly forced to realize that a natural science without hypotheses is not possible.

Unter dem Begriff der „Verwissenschaftlichung der Methodologie der Wissenschaft“ verstehen wir den Einfluß wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis auf die eine oder andere Art und Weise auf die Methodologie der Wissenschaft, insbesondere den Gebrauch von wissenschaftlichen Ideen und Methoden für die Formulierung und Lösung von methodologischen Problemen der Wissenschaft und Problemen der Methodologie selbst. Es werden vier Haupttendenzen im Prozeß der Verwissenschaftlichung der Methodologie vorgestellt: (a) der Übergang vom „statement view“ zum mathematischen Holismus; (b) die Verwissenschaftlichung (...) auf system-theoretischer Basis; (c) der Einzug soziologischer Methoden in die methodologische Analyse der Wissenschaft und (d) die methodologischen Anwendungen von Forschungsresultaten im Bereich der Künstlichen Intelligenz. Darüberhinaus werden einige besondere Formen der Implementierung wissenschaftlicher Konstruktionen in der Methodologie ins Auge gefaßt. (shrink)

Max Weber’s reputation as one of the founding fathers of the modern social sciences relies in large measure on his methodological contributions such as value objectivity or freedom a...

In the growing Prussian university system of the early nineteenth century, "Wissenschaft" (science) was seen as an endeavor common to university faculties, characterized by a rigorous methodology. On this view, history and jurisprudence are sciences, as much as is physics. Nineteenth century trends challenged this view: the increasing influence of materialist and positivist philosophies, profound changes in the relationships between university faculties, and the defense of Kant's classification of the sciences by neo-Kantians. Wilhelm Dilthey's defense of the (...) independence of the methodology of the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) from those of the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften) is as much a return to the ideal of Wissenschaft as a cooperative endeavor as it is a defense of the autonomy of interpretive or hermeneutic methods. The debate between Dilthey and the neo-Kantian Wilhelm Windelband at the close of the century illuminates the development of this dialogue over the nineteenth century. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Wissenschaft und Methode" verfügbar.

Cet article se veut une présentation des méthodes principales que nécessitent les études en géolinguistique, un vaste domaine de recherche consacré à l’analyse de la variation, du changement et de la diffusion linguistiques. Je présenterai d’abord les outils méthodologiques d’enquêtes de terrain indispensables à la constitution d’un corpus de matériaux oraux (et visuels) qui permettent des analyses géolinguistiques, dont également celles de type comparatif. Plusieurs de ces concepts pourraient être appliqués à d’autres disciplines des sciences humaines en raison de leur (...) caractère général. Ensuite, je montrerai quelles sont les méthodes cartographiques les plus appropriées pour présenter et représenter la variation géolinguistique. Des données de l’Atlas linguistique des variétés berbères du Rif (Lafkioui 2007) seront utilisées pour illustrer les méthodes examinées. (shrink)

Au début de son livre sur la religion de Jésus, Geza Vermes exprimait son aversion pour la méthodologie. Selon lui, elle menace l'inventivité du chercheur, car « la recherche ne doit pas être liée par des règles trop strictes » et mieux vaut faire preuve de « pragmatisme ». La vigueur de la critique que John Meier adresse à son collègue illustre fort bien son refus de l'amateurisme. « Au bout du compte, dit-il dans l'introduction au troisième volume , en (...) écrivant ces trois tomes, j'ai été convaincu, à partir de ma propre expérience, que méthodologie et critères ont beau paraître ennuyeux, ils n'en sont pas moins indispensables pour empêcher le chercheur de trouver dans les données ce qu'il avait décidé d'y voir ». Dans les pages qui suivent J. Schlosser tente d'abord de donner une présentation générale de la méthode utilisée par Meier en la situant dans la discussion en cours, puis il analyse comment elle est appliquée concrètement dans la longue étude que l'auteur a consacrée au règne de Dieu.At the beginning of his book on the religion of Jesus, Geza Vermes expressed his own aversion to methodology. According to Vermes, it threatens the inventiveness of researchers because “research must not be bound by rules that are too strict” and it is better to rely on “pragmatism”. The vigorous critique that John Meier addresses to his colleague illustrates quite well his refusal of amateurism. Meier notes in his introduction to the third volume that he is convinced on the basis of his own experience that methodology and criteria may well appear boring, but that they are nonetheless indispensable in preventing the researcher from finding only what he had decided to look for in his data. In the article presented here, Jacques Schlosser endeavors to provide a general presentation of the method utilized by Meier by putting it into the context of present discussion, and then he analyzes how this method is applied concretely in the long study which Meier devotes to the reign of God. (shrink)

The Newtonian research program consists of the core axioms of the Principia Mathematica, a sequence of force laws and auxiliary hypotheses, and a set of methodological rules. The latter underwent several changes and so it is sometimes claimed that, historically seen, Newton and the Newtonians added methodological rules post constructione in order to further support their research agenda. An argument of Duhem, Feyerabend, and Lakatos aims to provide a theoretical reason why Newton could not have come up with his theory (...) of the Principia in accordance with his own methodology: Since Newton’s starting point, Kepler’s laws, contradict the law of universal gravitation, he could not have applied the so-called method of analysis and synthesis. In this paper, this argument is examined with reference to the Principia’s several editions. Newton’s method is characterized, and necessary general background assumptions of the argument are made explicit. Finally, the argument is criticized based on a contemporary philosophy of science point of view. (shrink)

Can Science do without a Theory? The main questions that are discussed are as follows: 1) Do we have - as a matter of fact - a general philosophy of science which is comprehensive and powerful enough to present a solution to all the relevant methodological and metatheoretical problems arising within the sciences? 2) Do scientists feel a need for such a general metatheoretical tool? 3) In the probable case of a negative answer to both questions posed above: (...) what, if any, is the legitimate status of the philosophy of science? It is argued in some detail that at least three types of models have failed, at least as far as their advisory function for scientific action in realistic situational settings is concerned: the ideal language model (Wittgenstein, Carnap), methodological falsificationism (Popper), and behavioral theories of scientific action. From the standpoint of the history of science it is plainly obvious that science has always been ahead of its purported metatheory and that important advances within the latter had been implicit in real scientific action at least for centuries. (shrink)

Philosophy of science and the sciences are related in an arbitrary and noncommital way. This has problematic consequences in terms of the disciplinary autonomy of the sciences, as shown in the example of the science of education. A new determination and definition of the relation between science and the philosophy of science demands, on the one hand, a greater willingness towards metatheoretical reflection and critique of the part of the individual sciences and, on the other hand, (...) a reorientation within the philosophy of science towards performing "service functions" with regard to the metatheoretical selfdefinitions of the sciences. This can be achieved by a constructivist, pragmatic and historical theory of knowledge and science. A central factor in a changed relationship between science and the philosophy of science is the scientific discipline's determination of its field of enquiry. This is seen to be an integral part of the process of establishing a discipline as a science. (shrink)

The author reviews the collective work Military Sciences versus the Science of War in Austria and in Russia. The reviewed book considers methodological and ideological problems of modern war and its aspects. The author draws attention to several topics, which are important for understanding modern war. The reviewed work is analyzed from the point of view of its contribution to the development of the philosophy of war. The author focuses on the peculiarities of classical researches on war, pays attention (...) to the conceptual and categorical apparatus, conducts a comparative analysis of thoughts and judgments of Russian and Austrian scholars, shows their conceptual vision of everything related to the war. The article considers the approach to the modern science of war. The possibility of its exclusion from the historical process is analyzed. The main factor preventing the elimination of war is a strong social inertia. Analyzing concepts and categories of the philosophy of war, the collective work discussing the art of war, strategy, and the meaning of war. Strategy, even being divided into military and political one, is a part of the art of war. The review’s author considers the views on philosophical foundations of war of Russian and Austrian scholars, who are in search for moral basis for countering this social and political phenomenon. It is noted that analyzing the views on the nature of war of scientists in Austria and Russia, the political ambitions of their nations should be taken into account. The monograph emphasizes that an effective opposition to militarism should be based on an analysis of its nature and the real historical situation. (shrink)

Der Band rekonstruiert und kritisiert die verstreuten Vorschläge, die Karl R. Popper zur Philosophie der Sozialwissenschaften gemacht hat. Dabei stehen drei Themenbereiche im Vordergrund: Zum einen wird der von Popper verteidigte Methodologische Individualismus in der Absicht untersucht, dessen begrenzte heuristische Fruchtbarkeit sichtbar zu machen; zum weiteren wird die von Popper favorisierte Logik von Handlungserklärungen einer nachhaltigen Revision unterzogen, was eine umfassendere handlungstheoretische Erklärungspraxis erlaubt, als sie Popper im Auge hatte; und zum dritten diskutiert der Autor die Frage, inwieweit Poppers Theorie (...) des Wissensfortschritts für die sozialwissenschaftliche Theoriebildung verbindlich ist; auch in diesem Falle werden Mängel diagnostiziert und Wege zu deren Beseitigung erkundet. Relevanz und Reichweite der Popperschen Gedanken zur Philosophie der Handlungswissenschaften lassen sich damit deutlicher abstecken, als dies der bisherigen Popper-Rezeption möglich war. Es stellt sich heraus, daß Poppers sozialwissenschaftliche Methodenvorschläge in revidierter Form durchaus Beachtung verdienen und manchem neueren Versuch, der sozialwissenschaftlichen Theoriebildung Halt und Richtung zu verleihen, vorzuziehen sind. (shrink)

Advancements in computing, instrumentation, robotics, digital imaging, and simulation modeling have changed science into a technology-driven institution. Government, industry, and society increasingly exert their influence over science, raising questions of values and objectivity. These and other profound changes have led many to speculate that we are in the midst of an epochal break in scientific history. -/- This edited volume presents an in-depth examination of these issues from philosophical, historical, social, and cultural perspectives. It offers arguments both for (...) and against the epochal break thesis in light of historical antecedents. Contributors discuss topics such as: science as a continuing epistemological enterprise; the decline of the individual scientist and the rise of communities; the intertwining of scientific and technological needs; links to prior practices and ways of thinking; the alleged divide between mode-1 and mode-2 research methods; the commodification of university science; and the shift from the scientific to a technological enterprise. Additionally, they examine the epochal break thesis using specific examples, including the transition from laboratory to real world experiments; the increased reliance on computer imaging; how analog and digital technologies condition behaviors that shape the object and beholder; the cultural significance of humanoid robots; the erosion of scientific quality in experimentation; and the effect of computers on prediction at the expense of explanation. -/- Whether these events represent a historic break in scientific theory, practice, and methodology is disputed. What they do offer is an important occasion for philosophical analysis of the epistemic, institutional and moral questions affecting current and future scientific pursuits. (shrink)

La recherche entreprise par John P. Meier sur le Jésus historique accorde une large place à la question des miracles. La présente contribution s’attachera à rendre compte du travail de Meier sur ce dossier particulier, en trois étapes : un premier temps sera consacré à l’examen de son projet et de sa méthodologie ; un deuxième moment sera dédié à l’évaluation des principaux résultats auxquels il parvient. Il s’agira enfin, au terme du parcours, de répondre à la question : « (...) Y a-t-il une théologie du miracle chez Meier ? ». Il faudra alors se situer différemment dans la lecture de l’ouvrage de Meier, dont le projet, selon ses propres mots, « peut être pris en compte par des théologiens qui pratiquent la christologie dans un contexte contemporain ». Il est clair, en effet, que cette recherche historique peut être d’un grand profit aux théologiens contemporains, encore faut-il préciser en quoi et selon quelles limites.The research undertaken by John P. Meier on the historical Jesus deals amply with the issue of the miracles. The present contribution gives an account on Meier’s work in this particular matter and proceeds in three steps. We first examine his objectives and his methodology, and secondly try to evaluate the results he achieves. Finally, we attempt to answer the following question: “Is there a theology of the miracle in Meier’s work?” If so, we would then have to position ourselves differently in our reading of this work whose objective, as Meier declares himself, “can be taken into account by theologians who practice Christology in a contemporary context”. Actually, it is quite clear that this historical research can provide much benefit for contemporary theologians, but we will have to specify by which means and within which limits. (shrink)

Die Kontroversen um Imre Lakatos' "Methodologie wissenschaftlicher Forschungsprogramme" haben zu der Frage geführt, ob auf Basis der von Lakatos entwickelten Standards für die Bewertung von konkurrierenden Theorien und Forschungsprogrammen auch heuristische Empfehlungen begründet werden können, die die von Wissenschaftlern auszuführenden Handlungen im Interesse der Maximierung von Erkenntnisfortschritt normieren. Eine solche Frage steht im Zusammenhang mit einem zentralen Anliegen der Popperschen Wissenschaftstheorie: "Wir wollen die Regeln, oder, wenn man will, die Normen aufstellen, nach denen sich der Forscher richtet, wenn er (...) Wissenschaft treibt, wie wir es uns denken". Ob die Methodologie wissenschaftlicher Forschungsprogramme, die Lakatos als Weiterentwicklung des kritisch-rationalistischen Falsifikationismus verstanden wissen will, diesen Ansprüchen genügt, wurde zuerst von Paul K. Feyerabend und Thomas S. Kuhn bezweifelt. Im folgenden werden zunächst deren Kritiken, die Antworten von Lakatos sowie Analysen von J. J. C. Smart, Wolfgang Stegmüller und Philip Quinn diskutiert. Anschließend wird ein neuer Versuch Alan Musgraves kritisch überprüft, unter Rückgriff auf die Bewertungskriterien der Methodologie wissenschaftlicher Forschungsprogramme heuristische Empfehlungen zu begründen. (shrink)

In this book Mark Bevir and Jason Blakely set out to make the most comprehensive case yet for an 'interpretive' or hermeneutic approach to the social sciences. Interpretive approaches are a major growth area in the social sciences today. This is because they offer a full-blown alternative to the behavioralism, institutionalism, rational choice, and other quasi-scientific approaches that dominate the study of human behavior. In addition to presenting a systematic case for interpretivism and a critique of scientism, Bevir and Blakely (...) also propose their own uniquely 'anti-naturalist 'notion of an interpretive approach. This anti-naturalist framework encompasses the insights of philosophers ranging from Michel Foucault and Hans-Georg Gadamer to Charles Taylor and Ludwig Wittgenstein, while also resolving dilemmas that have plagued rival philosophical defenses of interpretivism. In addition, working social scientists are given detailed discussions of a distinctly interpretive approach to methods and empirical research. The book draws on the latest social science to cover everything from concept formation and empirical inquiry to ethics, democratic theory, and public policy. An anti-naturalist approach to interpretive social science offers nothing short of a sweeping paradigm shift in the study of human beings and society. This book will be of interest to all who seek a humanistic alternative to the scientism that overwhelms the study of human beings today. (shrink)

Asceticism and science are connected in Weber’s thought insofar as “asceticism” includes an attitude of job-related professionalization and this attitude in turn signifies capitalistic as well as scientific activity. In this way, asceticism has also an “innerworldly” nature, in contrast to the way it is depicted in Christianity or in other religions. In this (religious) sense, asceticism serves as a means to otherworldly completion, while its “innerworldly” meaning is entirely interior to itself. Insofar as for Weber, asceticism, independent from (...) any religious sense, signifies scientific as well as economic activity, it is a “practical-rational” conduct of life in the sense of competence, enhancement, and perfection. This is the methodological basis for a reconsideration of Thomas Aquinas’ ideas on asceticism. Thomas, like Weber, uncouples the relation of otherworldly completion and asceticism and links this decoupling to the priority of perfection of asceticism. However Thomas, contrary to Weber, associates asceticism with the conditions innate to a particular way of life; in this sense, asceticism can determine human existence itself, insofar as it is realized both “outside the world in monastic communities” and also “within this world and for it”. With reference to the relation of science and asceticism, for Thomas as well as for Weber scientific activity is “ascetic” in the sense that it strives for perfection. However, in contrast to Weber, Thomas maintains that it is impossible for a subject to bring his scientific activity to a complete conclusion. (shrink)

This comprehensive Handbook is aimed at both academic researchers and practitioners in the field of complexity science. The book's 26 chapters, specially written by leading experts, provide in-depth coverage of research methods based on the sciences of complexity. The research methods presented are illustratively applied to practical cases and are readily accessible to researchers and decision makers alike.The Handbook's wide range of research methods are clearly illustrated with case studies that demonstrate their practical application. They range from the regeneration (...) of communities to musical performance; from complex governance networks to psychotherapy; from gender dynamics to agent-based modelling; and the appropriate response to pandemics. Some unusual research methods - based on art, psychology and multi-level networks - are also included. Furthermore, the book incorporates discussions on the philosophical aspect of research methods and explores important theoretical concepts, such as exaptation, emergence, self-organisation and co-evolution.This is an ideal resource for academics and researchers in the field seeking and exploring new research methods. For decision makers and researchers trying to address complex challenges it will be an essential source of inspiration that will arm them with effective state-of-the-art research methods for the future. (shrink)

Giovanni Sartori (1924-2017) was a founder and icon of contemporary political science. A number of his books and articles have become part of the theoretical and conceptual basis of the field, and of social science in general. This volume brings together selected essays that examine Sartori as a scholar, university professor and intellectual. It is unique in covering all three aspects of Sartori's academic work: comparative politics, social science methodology and political theory. General overviews of Sartori's (...) contribution to political science are complemented by chapters that focus on specific areas of his interest; and Sartori's theoretical and methodological contributions are examined alongside his extensive public appearances, which remain little known outside Italy. (shrink)

Cet article présente mes réflexions en leur état au début de l’année 2020 quant à la situation de la méthodologie économique et de la philosophie de l’économie (ou philosophie économique), après quinze années passées à la co-direction (avec Wade Hands) du Journal of Economic Methodology. J’y constate les changements des méta-champs de recherche que sont la méthodologie et la philosophie de l’économie, depuis leur surgissement comme sous-domaines au sein des sciences économiques durant les années 1980. En usant d’une analyse (...) qui prend en considération l’évolution technologique, j’y distingue deux scenarii envisageables pour l’avenir du champ, en rapport aux facteurs de l’environnement l’impactant, et quant à l’influence de la spécialisation croissante de la recherche, à la fois sur ce champ même et sur les sciences économiques ; j’élabore enfin une argumentation transdisciplinaire touchant son évolution future vers la diversité et la pluralité dans la recherche académique. (shrink)

À la fin des années 1990, plusieurs tendances convergentes en économie, psychologie et neuroscience ont préparé le terrain pour la naissance d’un nouveau champ scientifique qualifié de « neuroéconomie ». Comme pour toute discipline émergente – pensons par exemple à l’économie mathématique, l’économétrie ou l’économie expérimentale en d’autres temps – la neuroéconomie est plutôt controversée en économie. Elle soulève un grand nombre de questions d’ordre empirique, méthodologique et philosophiques donnant lieu à des débats et controverses que l’article identifie et discute (...) à travers trois questions majeures relatives aux connaissances produites : Sont-elles fiables? Sont-elles scientifiquement légitimes? Sont-elles utiles pour les économistes? Sans prétendre à l’exhaustivité, ce cadre analytique permet de comprendre l’essence des principales critiques adressées à la neuroéconomie. Dans le même temps, l’article éclaire la nature des réponses susceptibles d’être apportées à ces critiques au vu des progrès conceptuels et empiriques qu’a connus ce champ de recherche depuis son émergence et à la lumière du tournant apparu dans l’agenda de la neuroéconomie au cours de la dernière décennie. JEL Codes : A12, B41, C51, C81, C9, D03, D87. (shrink)

Scientization of the Social – Politization of Knowledge? On a Narrative of the History of the Twentieth Century. The spread of scientific methods and expert cultures in the social, political and economic fields represents a key aspect of twentieth century history. In German-speaking historiography, the “scientization of the social” has advanced to an influential concept for research into the role of social and human sciences within this development. Exploring this analytical framework against the background of methodological debates, this paper raises (...) the question of how the relationship between the academic and the political spheres in modern societies can be theoretically conceived. (shrink)

Commonly overlooked in the commentaries on Husserl’s conception of the lifeworld is the fact that Husserl conceived his science of the lifeworld as a two-stage science with an empirical as well as a non-empirical (eidetic) stage. At the lower stage, it deals with our factical lifeworld and aims at general propositions about the very world we live in. At the higher stage, i.e., the primary stage for Husserl, it aims at general propositions about the lifeworld as such but (...) not about our factical lifeworld, which now serves only as one possible lifeworld among others. This higher-level science of the lifeworld is a descriptive eidetics made up of pure descriptive concepts and pure descriptive laws (descriptive eidetic laws), in which no factical entity is posited explicitly or implicitly. The present paper analyzes these relationships. In an excursus, it also traces out the elements, principles and methodology of a descriptive eidetics in general to see how they are applied to Husserl’s descriptive eidetics of the lifeworld as it is subsequently developed in his lectures on Phenomenological Psychology from 1925, a text in which Husserl explicitly outlines his science of the lifeworld as a two-stage science. (shrink)

The notion of life-world is to be understood as a methodological concept which demands the grounding of scientific statements in the first order constructs of everyday experiences and actions. Whereas the methodological principles proposed by Schütz conceive of these experiences mainly from a subjectivistic point of view, the ’communicative turn' asksfor a reconceptualization of these principles. Taken together; the hermeneutics of the everyday life world, ethnomethodology and grounded theory methodology can account for the methodical and communicative production of scientific (...) statements about everyday constructs and the respective degree of "derivatedness. (shrink)

En matière de méthodologie, les juristes ont le plus souvent eu pour réflexe de se réapproprier des modèles provenant d'autres champs de savoir. Cette attitude présente plusieurs difficultés. Elles reposent tout d'abord sur une part de fiction. Les juristes ne sont ni des mathématiciens, ni des physiciens, ni des biologistes, ni des historiens, ni encore des sociologues. Tout au mieux font-ils comme s'ils Tétaient. Par ailleurs, bien que les réappropriations méthodologiques opérées visent fréquemment à ériger le savoir juridique au rang (...) de science, cette prétention n'est pas exempte d'ambiguïtés, ni de malentendus. Cela tient essentiellement au fait que, dans le domaine juridique, il existe deux niveaux de langage, à savoir le langage du droit lui-même et le langage du savant qui l'appréhende. Du point de vue d'une méthodologie analytique, ces deux niveaux devraient être rigoureusement distingués. Toutefois leur confusion est régulièrement entretenue. Pour certains, en effet, les juristes feraient d'autant plus preuve de science qu'ils se révèleraient capables de reproduire, parfois en vue de les prédire, les méthodes, les raisonnements et les solutions retenus par les autorités normatives qu'ils observent. Pour d'autres également, le métier de juriste est avant tout celui d'un bon connaisseur de la technique du droit positif. Cette proximité gardée à l'égard de l'objet analysé est mal comprise par les autres sciences humaines et sociales qui situent les efforts de distanciation et d'objectivation au rang des premiers réquisits méthodologiques du savoir scientifique. Dès lors, les réflexions méthodologiques dépassent les enjeux internes au champ juridique. Elles sont cruciales pour qui veut comprendre les déplacements épistémologiques dont sont porteuses l'évolution des techniques de connaissance et l'affirmation d'objets transverses qui défient les découpages disciplinaires hérités du siècle dernier. Cette troisième édition a été enrichie de nouveaux développements sur le pragmatisme et les méthodes de l'interdisciplinarité. (shrink)

This book looks at how science investigates the natural world around us. It is an examination of the scientific method, the foundation of science and basis on which our scientific knowledge is built.... [It] addresses all concepts pertaining to the scientific method. It includes discussions on objective reality, hypotheses and theory, and the fundamental and unalienable role of experimental evidence in scientific knowledge.... Di Ventra also examines the limits of science and the errors we make when abusing (...) its method in nonscientific contexts. By reflecting on the general method, the reader can critically sort through other types of scientific claims, and judge their ability to apply it in study and in practice. (shrink)