Previous studies have explored the impact of magic tricks on different basic cognitive processes yet there is a need of examining effectiveness of a cognitive training program through magic tricks for children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. The present study examines the effectiveness and feasibility of the MAGNITIVE program, a manualized intervention for cognitive training through the learning of magic tricks. A total of 11 children with ADHD participated in separated groups of two different community settings, and were assessed at (...) pre-treatment, post-treatment, and a 3-month later follow-up in different tasks involving processing speed, sustained attention, selective attention, and mental flexibility. Using non parametric statistical analyses and Reliable Change Index, the results showed that these children receiving MAGNITIVE particularly improved their performance in sustained attention, shifting attention, and mental flexibility, changes were also observed in processing speed performance yet further research is needed in terms of selective attention and inhibition, given the great individual differences within this sample. Changes were maintained when the program was finished. In terms of viability, the study proved a good treatment integrity in different contexts, adherence to the curriculum, and high levels of engagement satisfaction. In this second clinical trial, MAGNITIVE program appears to be a feasible training program for children with ADHD, as an alternative for medication when possible. (shrink)

Individuals can do a broad variety of things with their words and enjoy different degrees of this capacity. What moderates this capacity? And in cases in which this capacity is unjustly disrupted, what is a good explanation for it? These are the questions I address here. I propose that speech capacity, understood as the capacity to do things with your words, is a structural property importantly dependent on individuals' position in a social structure. My account facilitates a non-individualistic explanation of (...) cases in which speech capacity is undermined due to speaker's perceived social identity, e.g. episodes of silencing. Instead of appealing to interlocutors' implicit bias against speaker's identity, a structural approach refers to the positions interlocutors occupy in the social structure and the discursive conventions operating upon those positions. I articulate my proposal drawing on the notion of affordances. Each position within a social structure is associated with its own range of speech affordances. Thus, speech capacity is a function of the probability distribution of speech affordances across positions in the structure. (shrink)

This paper builds upon Mary Kate McGowan’s analysis of the mechanisms of harm in conversations (McGowan 2004; 2009). McGowan describes how a speaker’s intervention might constitute harm by enacting what is permissible to do in the conversation thereafter. We expand McGowan’s analysis in two ways: first, we use her account to argue for the potential of interlocutor’s silence, not only speaker’s intervention, to enact harm; second, we introduce a new party into the picture: observers of the conversation. We propose that (...) not only interlocutors who contribute to harm through action, but also those who do so by omission are morally responsible for that harm. We focus on one aspect of conversations: introduction of presuppositions. We argue that when the presupposition is morally problematic (e.g., sexist, ableist, racist, homo-, trans- or xeno-phobic), interlocutors have a moral responsibility to block it. This responsibility comes in degrees, and, importantly, depends on whether the interlocutor’s speech capacity is diminished by the harmful presupposition (i.e. whether the interlocutor is being silenced). Unlike common approaches to harm in speech, which take the unit of analysis to be the speaker-interlocutor relationship, we take as unit of analysis the relationship between the pair speaker-interlocutor and an observer. Problematic presuppositions introduced in conversations can harm observers overhearing these conversations (as well society as a whole), and prevention of such harm motivates our proposal for attribution of responsibility to interlocutors. We proceed as follows. First we review the dynamics of presupposition introduction. Second, we briefly introduce McGowan’s analysis of conversational pragmatics, subscribing to her account that some conversational moves constitute a special type of harm related to oppression, and outline a taxonomy of the pathways through which harm can be inflicted upon observers and the society as a whole. In the third part we articulate our argument that in the cases of presupposition introduction considered here, interlocutors are not merely allowing harm, but actively doing it, and put forward our proposal for responsibility attribution. Finally, we address potential objections, and situate our proposal within a broader project to fight oppressive speech. (shrink)

El trabajo explora críticamente la idea de una justificación débil o pen última de la moral enmarcándola en el conjunto de la filosofía de Tugendhat, reordenan do sus escritos éticos y discriminando los diversos aspectos que incluye dicha idea. Entre ellos, revisa el concepto formal de moral, ligado a los sentimientos, antes de centrarse en el punto crucial: la fundamentación de la ética moderna. Aquí se distingue, por un lado, la justificación comparativa de un contractualismo igualitario frente a otras alternativas (...) teóricas y, por otro, los motivos que pueden llevar (more heideggeriano, en realidad) a un individuo autónomo a entenderse en términos morales. (shrink)

We propose an externalist understanding of sex that builds upon extended and distributed approaches to cognition, and contributes to building a more just, diversity-sensitive society. Current sex categorization practices according to the female/male dichotomy are not only inaccurate and incoherent, but they also ground moral and political pressures that harm and oppress people. We argue that a new understanding of sex is due, an understanding that would acknowledge the variability and, most important, the flexibility of sex properties, as well as (...) the moral and political meaning of sex categorization. We propose an externalist account of sex, elaborating on extended and distributed approaches to cognition that capitalize on the natural capacity of organisms to couple with environmental resources. We introduce the notion of extended sex, and argue that properties relevant for sex categorization are neither exclusively internal to the individual skin, nor fixed. Finally, we spell out the potential of extended sex to support an active defense of diversity and an intervention against sex-based discrimination. (shrink)

Is there a choice in sexual orientation? [Wilkerson, William S. : “Is It a Choice? Sexual Orientation as Interpretation”. In: Journal of Social Philosophy 40. No. 1, p. 97–116] argues that sexual desires require interpretation in order to be fully constituted, and therefore sexual orientation is at least partially constituted by choice. [Díaz-León, Esa : “Sexual Orientation as Interpretation? Sexual Desires, Concepts, and Choice”; In: Journal of Social Ontology] critically assesses Wilkerson’s argument, concluding that we still lack a good argument (...) for the claim that choice plays a role in sexual orientation. Here I examine Díaz-León’s response to Wilkerson. I introduce what I call the conceptual act theory of sexual orientation, and argue that even if interpretation were not necessary to constitute sexual desires, it is a necessary element to constitute what we call sexual orientation. However, I conclude that even if we agree that interpretation is involved in sexual orientation, it does not follow that there is a choice involved. (shrink)

Tomando como marco de referencia algunos conceptos básicos de la teoría política de Gramsci, el objetivo principal de este artículo es criticar la función hegemónica e ideológica que la democracia representativa desempeña en el contexto social e histórico de la globalización neoliberal. Lejos de avanzar hacia el ideal emancipador que representa, en la época del neoliberalismo globalizado la democracia es un instrumento de dominación al servicio de una regulación social excluyente y desigual que origina nuevas formas de autoritarismo.

Spanish culture has recently shown interest about Neuroethics, a new line of research and reflection. It can be said that two general, and somewhat opposing, perspectives are currently being developed in Spain about neuroethics-related topics. One originates from the neuroscientific field and the other from the philosophical field. We will see, throughout this article, that the Spanish authors, who I am going to select here, deal with very diverse neuroethical topics and that they analyse them from different intellectual assumptions. However, (...) I consider that there is one constant concern, which emerges extensively or briefly in each one of the books that I am going to present. I am referring to the problem of freedom. Spanish neuroscientists, in general, stress and accept the new determinism that emanates from recent research about the brain, whilst those who engage in the study of philosophy usually point in their texts to the limitations of empirical research that purport to "demonstrate" the new neurological determinism. I will dedicate the last section, which is more extensive in length, to the work that I consider the most valuable, at least until the present day, and whose title is Neuroética y Neuropolítica (Tecnos, Madrid, 2011). Professor Adela Cortina (chair of Moral Philosophy at Valencia University and member of the Spanish Royal Academy of Moral and Political Science) is its author. But, firstly, I am going to refer to the works written by neuroscientists, and then to those written by philosophers. This will enable us to obtain a global view of the neuroethics models that are being constructed in Spain. (shrink)

This paper brings feminist public health ethics and feminist analytic tools to bear on mainstream medical research. Specifically, it uses these approaches to call attention to several problems associated with “The Placenta Harbors a Unique Microbiome,” a recent study published in Science Translational Medicine. We point out the potential negative consequences these problems have for both women’s health and their autonomy.Our paper has two parts. We begin by discussing the study, which examines the composition of the placental microbiome, that is (...) to say, the communities of microorganisms that live in the placenta. Among other things, this study considers two different relations: a correlation.. (shrink)

Tri filosofskikh "opravdanii︠a︡" (teodit︠s︡ei︠a︡, antropodit︠s︡ei︠a︡, kosmodit︠s︡ei︠a︡ Serebri︠a︡nogo veka) -- Russkai︠a︡ sofiologii︠a︡ i kabbala -- S. Bulgakov : nauka sofiologii︠a︡ (ili konet︠s︡ religii) -- Tretiĭ Zavet o. Sergii︠a︡ Bulgakova -- Tretʹezavetnai︠a︡ misterii︠a︡ ("malai︠a︡" trilogii︠a︡ Bulgakova).

In this note, my aim is to point out a phenomenon that has not received much attention; a phenomenon that, in my opinion, should not be overlooked in the professional practice of philosophy, especially within feminist efforts for social justice. I am referring to the way in which being a non-native speaker of English interacts with the practice of philosophy.1 There is evidence that non-native speakers are often perceived in prejudiced ways. Such prejudiced perception causes harm and, more importantly, constitutes (...) wrongdoing. As in other cases of prejudiced perception and biased behavior, it would be pretentious and misguided to expect philosophers and the philosophy profession to be free from this vice. There are good reasons to think that this prejudiced perception is bad not only for the persons who are perceived in such a way, but also for the profession, for it might make us miss important things that could improve philosophy in general. I claim we should be more sensitive to this phenomenon, both out of concern for justice, and for the sake of doing better philosophy. (shrink)

En este trabajo sobre las reflexiones del escritor vasco en torno a la muerte me ceñiré a aquellas obras de carácter filosófico en las que el tema es tratado con cierto detenimiento. Si bien es verdad que en los primeros escritos hace alguna mención breve a esta cuestión, donde propiamente la desarrolla con mayor esmero y originalidad es en cinco obras, de las que ofreceré una síntesis de las ideas más relevantes, con alguna que otra concisa crítica, a fin de (...) no superar la extensión concedida. He aquí las obras principales en las que se pronuncia sobre la muerte: Política para Amador (PA), Diccionario filosófico (DF), Despierta y lee (DL), Las preguntas de la vida (PV) y La vida eterna (VE). Leídas globalmente se pueden extraer diversos temas entremezclados, algunos tratados por clásicos filósofos, otros no. Por una mayor claridad serán aquí diferenciados y ordenados con el propósito de que resulte la presentación de esta dimensión de la ética savateriana más coherente y didáctica. (shrink)

We consider a modification of the pigeonhole principle, M P H P, introduced by Goerdt in [7]. M P H P is defined over n pigeons and log n holes, and more than one pigeon can go into a hole (according to some rules). Using a technique of Razborov [9] and simplified by Impagliazzo, Pudlák and Sgall [8], we prove that any Polynomial Calculus refutation of a set of polynomials encoding the M P H P, requires degree Ω(log n). We (...) also prove a simple Lemma giving a simulation of Resolution by Polynomial Calculus. Using this lemma, and a Resolution upper bound by Goerdt [7], we obtain that the degree lower bound is tight. Our lower bound establishes the optimality of the tree-like Resolution simulation by the Polynomial Calculus given in [6]. (shrink)

La construcción del Canal de Isabel II, inaugurado en 1858, vino a solucionar la sed secular de Madrid en la época del estío y ala vez hacer posible el ensanche de la ciudad. La presa del Pontón y la traída de agua del río Lozoya, obras del ingeniero Lucio del Valle, supusieron un avance en la modernización de la capital de España. La creciente necesidad de agua según fue aumentando el índice demográfico de Madrid hizo necesario que se aumentasen las (...) obras del canal con nuevas presas. En 1865 se construyó un Segundo Depósito y en 1915 un Tercer Depósito. También importante tanto desde el punto de vista ingenieril como arquitectónico es el Depósito elevado de la calle de Santa Engracia. A lo largo del siglo XX el canal no ha cesado de ampliar su red y de aplicar nuevas tecnologías para suministrar agua a Madrid. (shrink)

In contrast to individualistic explanations of social injustice that appeal to implicit attitudes, structural explanations are unintuitive: they appeal to entities that lack clear ontological status, and the explanatory mechanism is similarly unclear. This makes structural explanations unappealing. The present work proposes a structural explanation of one type of injustice that happens in conversations, discursive injustice. This proposal meets two goals. First, it satisfactorily accounts for the specific features of this particular kind of injustice; and second, it articulates a structural (...) explanation that overcomes their unattractiveness. The main idea is that discursive injustice is not the result of biased interlocutors, but of problematic discursive norms. (shrink)

When proponents of cognitive externalism (CE) turn to empirical studies in cognitive science to put the framework to use and to assess its explanatory success, they typically refer to perception, memory, or motor coordination. In contrast, not much has been said about reasoning. One promising avenue to explore in this respect is the theory of bounded rationality (BR). To clarify the relationship between CE and BR, we criticize Andy Clark's understanding of BR, as well as his claim that BR does (...) not fit his version of CE. We then propose and defend a version of CE—“scaffolded cognition”—that is not committed to constitutive claims about the mind, but still differs from mainstream internalism. Finally, we analyze BR from our own CE perspective, thereby clarifying its vague appeals to the environment, and argue that cognitive internalism cannot explain important aspects of the BR program. (shrink)

We consider small-weight Cutting Planes (CP * ) proofs; that is, Cutting Planes (CP) proofs with coefficients up to $\operatorname{Poly}(n)$ . We use the well known lower bounds for monotone complexity to prove an exponential lower bound for the length of CP * proofs, for a family of tautologies based on the clique function. Because Resolution is a special case of small-weight CP, our method also gives a new and simpler exponential lower bound for Resolution. We also prove the following (...) two theorems: (1) Tree-like CP * proofs cannot polynomially simulate non-tree-like CP * proofs. (2) Tree-like (CP * proofs and Bounded-depth-Frege proofs cannot polynomially simulate each other. Our proofs also work for some generalizations of the CP * proof system. In particular, they work for CP * with a deduction rule, and also for any proof system that allows any formula with small communication complexity, and any set of sound rules of inference. (shrink)

I’m at the playground with my baby, and a smiling adult inquires, “Is it a boy or a girl?” Scientific studies show that if I say X, they will see my baby as doing A, being A, feeling A—versus if I say Y.1 They’ll likely make different assumptions about whether my baby is able to climb up the playground structures and sit without support, and they’ll encourage my baby to engage in different activities.2 And of course, they’ll respond to them (...) differently depending on whether they think the baby is a boy or a girl. What do I do if I don’t want that to happen? One way to respond to the question is not to reveal the gender, or rather, to reject the assumption that my baby already has a gender, which is arguably a weird move, breaking out of a smoothly functioning, well-oiled social exchange. Here I want to talk about this weird move: How weird it is? What are some of the reasons to make the move anyway, and what are some of the concerns? (shrink)

We introduce new proof systems for propositional logic, simple deduction Frege systems, general deduction Frege systems, and nested deduction Frege systems, which augment Frege systems with variants of the deduction rule. We give upper bounds on the lengths of proofs in Frege proof systems compared to lengths in these new systems. As applications we give near-linear simulations of the propositional Gentzen sequent calculus and the natural deduction calculus by Frege proofs. The length of a proof is the number of lines (...) in the proof. A general deduction Frege proof system provides at most quadratic speedup over Frege proof systems. A nested deduction Frege proof system provides at most a nearly linear speedup over Frege system where by "nearly linear" is meant the ratio of proof lengths is O) where α is the inverse Ackermann function. A nested deduction Frege system can linearly simulate the propositional sequent calculus, the tree-like general deduction Frege calculus, and the natural deduction calculus. Hence a Frege proof system can simulate all those proof systems with proof lengths bounded by O). Also we show that a Frege proof of n lines can be transformed into a tree-like Frege proof of O lines and of height O. As a corollary of this fact we can prove that natural deduction and sequent calculus tree-like systems simulate Frege systems with proof lengths bounded by O. (shrink)

We extend results of Bonet, Buss and Pitassi on Bondy’s Theorem and of Nozaki, Arai and Arai on Bollobás’ Theorem by proving that Frankl’s Theorem on the trace of sets has quasipolynomial size Frege proofs. For constant values of the parametert, we prove that Frankl’s Theorem has polynomial size AC0-Frege proofs from instances of the pigeonhole principle.

Why does social injustice exist? What role, if any, do implicit biases play in the perpetuation of social inequalities? Individualistic approaches to these questions explain social injustice as the result of individuals’ preferences, beliefs, and choices. For example, they explain racial injustice as the result of individuals acting on racial stereotypes and prejudices. In contrast, structural approaches explain social injustice in terms of beyond-the-individual features, including laws, institutions, city layouts, and social norms. Often these two approaches are seen as competitors. (...) Framing them as competitors suggests that only one approach can win and that the loser offers worse explanations of injustice. In this essay, we explore each approach and compare them. Using implicit bias as an example, we argue that the relationship between individualistic and structural approaches is more complicated than it may first seem. Moreover, we contend that each approach has its place in analyses of injustice and raise the possibility that they can work together—synergistically—to produce deeper explanations of social injustice. If so, the approaches may be complementary, rather than competing. (shrink)

A partir de la definición de la globalización neoliberal como un localismo occidental globalizado, expresión de un nuevo tipo de imperialismo cultural, el objetivo principal de este artículo es el de llevar a cabo una exposición analítica de la propuesta de traducción intercultural e interpolítica d..

En Enero de 2002, los Servicios Sanitarios gestionados por el INSALUD fueron transferidos a las diez Comunidades Autónomas que todavía no los habían recibido. Se completó así el mapa territorial de Servicios de Salud Autonómicos, si exceptuamos Ceuta y Melilla que siguen gestionados por la Administración Central. Habiendo transcurrido más de tres años desde aquella fecha se puede ver con cierta perspectiva aquel proceso, algunos de sus componentes y aportar así algo al momento que vive nuestro sistema, siempre con ánimo (...) de enriquecer el debate.…. (shrink)