Constitutivism is a family of theories of normativity, especially in metaethics, that rely on the concept of constitutive norms: norms that are grounded in constitutive features of the kind of thing to which they apply. In this paper, I present two conditions that any constitutivism must meet in its account of constitutive norms, if it is to remain true to its motivations: the constitutivity and broad normativity conditions. I argue that all extant accounts of constitutive norms fail to meet these (...) conditions due to making constitutive norms either inviolable or in need of some external ground of normativity. I then propose a new account of constitutive norms that is better fitted to meet these conditions. This account relies on an analysis of constitutive norms in terms of a specific kind of generic generalization, the “generic proposition”. I explain how norms of this form can be constitutive of a kind, while also allowing for violability. (shrink)

Preface Introduction Christopher J. Berry: Adam Smith: Outline of Life, Times, and Legacy Part One: Adam Smith: Heritage and Contemporaries 1: Nicholas Phillipson: Adam Smith: A Biographer's Reflections 2: Leonidas Montes: Newtonianism and Adam Smith 3: Dennis C. Rasmussen: Adam Smith and Rousseau: Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment 4: Christopher J. Berry: Adam Smith and Early Modern Thought Part Two: Adam Smith on Language, Art and Culture 5: Catherine Labio: Adam Smith's Aesthetics 6: James Chandler: Adam Smith as Critic 7: Michael C. (...) Amrozowicz: Adam Smith: History and Poetics 8: C. Jan Swearingen: Adam Smith on Language and Rhetoric: The Ethics of Style, Character, and Propriety Part Three: Adam Smith and Moral Philosophy 9: Christel Fricke: Adam Smith: The Sympathetic Process and the Origin and Function of Conscience 10: Duncan Kelly: Adam Smith and the Limits of Sympathy 11: Ryan Patrick Hanley: Adam Smith and Virtue 12: Eugene Heath: Adam Smith and Self-Interest Part Four: Adam Smith and Economics 13: Tony Aspromourgos: Adam Smith on Labour and Capital 14: Nerio Naldi: Adam Smith on Value and Prices 15: Hugh Rockoff: Adam Smith on Money, Banking, and the Price Level 16: Maria Pia Paganelli: Commercial Relations: from Adam Smith to Field Experiments Part Five: Adam Smith on History and Politics 17: Spiros Tegos: Adam Smith: Theorist of Corruption 18: David M. Levy & Sandra J. Peart: Adam Smith and the State: Language and Reform 19: Fabrizio Simon: Adam Smith and the Law 20: Edwin van de Haar: Adam Smith on Empire and International Relations Part Six: Adam Smith on Social Relations 21: Richard Boyd: Adam Smith, Civility, and Civil Society 22: Gavin Kennedy: Adam Smith on Religion 23: Samuel Fleischacker: Adam Smith and Equality 24: Maureen Harkin: Adam Smith and Women Part Seven; Adam Smith: Legacy and Influence 25: Spencer J. Pack: Adam Smith and Marx 26: Craig Smith: Adam Smith and the New Right 27: Tom Campbell: Adam Smith: Methods, Morals and Markets 28: Amartya Sen: The Contemporary Relevance of Adam Smith. (shrink)

There is an ongoing debate about the ethics of research on lifespan extension: roughly, using medical technologies to extend biological human lives beyond the current “natural” limit of about 120 years. At the same time, there is an exploding interest in the use of artificial intelligence (AI) to create “digital twins” of persons, for example by fine-tuning large language models on data specific to particular individuals. In this paper, we consider whether digital twins (or digital doppelgängers, as we refer to (...) them) could be a path toward a kind of life extension—or more precisely, a kind of person extension—that does not rely on biological continuity. We discuss relevant accounts of consciousness and personal identity and argue that digital doppelgängers may at least help us achieve some of the aims or ostensible goods of person-span extension, even if they may not count as literal extensions of our personhood on dominant philosophical accounts. We also consider relational accounts of personhood and discuss how digital doppelgängers may be able to extend personhood in a relational sense, or at least secure some of the goods associated with relevant relationships. We conclude by suggesting that a research program to investigate such issues is relevant to ongoing debates about the ethics of extending the human lifespan. (shrink)

Kraut and other neo-Aristotelians have argued that there is no such thing as absolute goodness. They admit only good in a kind, e.g. a good sculptor, and good for something, e.g. good for fish. What is the view of Aristotle? Mostly limiting myself to the Nicomachean Ethics, I argue that Aristotle is committed to things being absolutely good and also to a metaphysics of absolute goodness where there is a maximally best good that is the cause of the goodness of (...) all other things in virtue of being their end. I begin by suggesting that the notion of good as an end, which is present in the first lines of the NE, is not obviously accounted for by good in a kind or good for something. I then give evidence that good in a kind and good for something can explain neither certain distinctions drawn between virtues nor the determinacy ascribed to what is good “in itself.” I argue contra Gotthelf that because several important arguments in the Nicomachean Ethics rely on comparative judgments of absolute value—e.g. “Man is the best of all animals”—Aristotle is committed to the existence of both absolute goodness and an absolutely best being. I focus on one passage, Aristotle’s division of goods in NE I 12, which presupposes this metaphysical picture. (shrink)

For medical schools, the COVID-19 pandemic necessitated examination and curricular restructuring as well as significant changes to clinical attachments. With the available evidence suggesting that medical students’ mental health status is already poorer than that of the general population, with academic stress being a chief predictor, such changes are likely to have a significant effect on these students. This online, cross-sectional study aimed to determine the impact of COVID-19 on perceived stress levels of medical students, investigate possible contributing and alleviating (...) factors, and produce recommendations for medical schools to implement during future healthcare emergencies. The majority (54.5%) of respondents reported levels of stress ranging from moderate to extreme. Higher levels of stress were significantly associated with female gender (p=0.039) and international status (p=0.031). A significant association was also noted between reported stress and the transition to online learning (p<0.0001) and online assessment formatting (p<0.0001), concerns for personal health (p<0.0001) and for the health of family members (p<0.0001). Students who reported higher stress levels were less confident in their government’s management of the crisis (p=0.041). Additionally, students who reported lower stress agreed highly that their medical school had an appropriate response to the crisis (p<0.0001), had provided sufficient information regarding the crisis (p=0.015), that they trust their school in handling the continuing of their education (p=0.020) and that their school had appropriate plans in place to support the continuing of education (p=0.017). (shrink)

I argue that Spinoza endorses "conceptual dependence monism," the thesis that all forms of metaphysical dependence (such as causation, inherence, and existential dependence) are conceptual in kind. In the course of explaining the view, I further argue that it is actually presupposed in the proof for his more famed substance monism. Conceptual dependence monism also illuminates several of Spinoza’s most striking metaphysical views, including the intensionality of causal contexts, parallelism, metaphysical perfection, and explanatory rationalism. I also argue that this priority (...) of the conceptual does not commit Spinoza to forms of idealism or mentalism. The question of how to understand different kinds of metaphysical dependence is quite controversial in Spinoza studies; I address major alternative readings in the notes. But there I also try to draw connections to the growing debate in contemporary discussions about metaphysical dependence, as this topic is a happy point of shared interest between Spinoza and contemporary metaphysicians alike. (shrink)

This paper examines the relationship between the university and fair trade coffee campaigns in North America. In recent years, fair trade coffee sales internationally have increased substantially but have still not grown large enough to meet the needs of fair trade producers in the South. In consequence, fair trade activists have sought to expand the market by pressuring public institutions to adopt fair trade purchasing policies. In North America, the university has emerged as a central focus of fair trade coffee (...) campaigns. Thus far, university administrators have been reluctant to support fair trade. This paper explores this reluctance and asserts that the university has a moral responsibility to support fair trade. However, it also argues that the potential exists for administrators to employ fair trade as an ethical fig leaf to mask the growing corporatization of the university under the weight of neoliberal reforms. This has become a common strategy of many neoliberal institutions in the North. Contrary to the assumptions of much of the emerging literature, it cannot be assumed that the impact of fair trade will necessarily be beneficial in the North unless activists work to ensure fair trade does not become employed as an ethical fig leaf. (shrink)

There is an ongoing debate about the ethics of research on lifespan extension: roughly, using medical technologies to extend biological human lives beyond the current “natural” limit of about 120 years. At the same time, there is an exploding interest in the use of artificial intelligence (AI) to create “digital twins” of persons, for example by fine-tuning large language models on data specific to particular individuals. In this paper, we consider whether digital twins (or digital doppelgängers, as we refer to (...) them) could be a path toward a kind of life extension—or more precisely, a kind of person extension—that does not rely on biological continuity. We discuss relevant accounts of consciousness and personal identity and argue that digital doppelgängers may at least help us achieve some of the aims or ostensible goods of person-span extension, even if they may not count as literal extensions of our personhood on dominant philosophical accounts. We also consider relational accounts of personhood and discuss how digital doppelgängers may be able to extend personhood in a relational sense, or at least secure some of the goods associated with relevant relationships. We conclude by suggesting that a research program to investigate such issues is relevant to ongoing debates about the ethics of extending the human lifespan. (shrink)

Fifty years after the Holocaust, anti-Jewish myths and sentiments are gaining momentum in Europe, the Islamic world, the Americas, and even in Japan. Why? Does hate spring eternal? Seeking an answer to this question, I develop a seven part argument. My aim is to advance what can reasonably be called a "social constructionist" perspective on the kind of antisemitic demonology that is now gaining worldwide currency. My method is to seek clarity by evaluating varying kinds of constructionist claims. Both the (...) strengths and weaknesses of these claims are illuminating for my purposes, as I try to show in connection with writers including Philippe Lacoue- Labarthe, Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, Daniel Goldhagen, and Pierre-Andre Taguieff. My conclusion is that we can best understand antisemitism as an instance of what historian Gavin Langmuir calls "chimeria." Interpreted in the spirit of certain classic texts (by Sartre, Adorno, and Samuel), this notion offers a powerful starting point for further inquiry. To illustrate the promise of this approach, I close with an interpretation of the current, global antisemitic revival as an expression of anti-Jewish chimeria. (shrink)

Work is on one side a central arena of self-making, self-understanding, and self-development, and on the other a deep threat to our flourishing. My question is: what kind of work is good for human beings, and what kind bad? I first characterise work as necessary productive activity. My answer to my question then develops a perfectionist account of the human good: the good is the full development and expression of human potentials and capacities; this development and expression happens over a (...) lifetime through appropriate practice. Work is thus a problem of human development, and I address that problem by considering three central human capacities: that we are passionate choosers, skilled makers, and social negotiators. For each, I ask: what does this capacity need from our work if it is to develop towards full and flourishing expression? Answering that question leads to a three-part account of good work as requiring: a distinctive kind of pleasure, involving both unselfconscious flow and supervisory self-attention; skill, which I describe via the ideal of craft; and democracy, which I define as a form of life in which each is able to develop and use both expressive and receptive capacities. (shrink)

Serena Olsaretti brings together new essays by leading moral and political philosophers on the nature of desert and justice, their relations with each other and with other values.

This essay engages with two large themes in order to address the social and intellectual practices of nyāya scholars in early colonial Bengal. First, I examine networks that connected scholars with each other and, to a lesser extent, students and households. Exemplified in historical documents of the period, these networks demonstrate that nyāya scholars were part of larger scholar communities in Bengal and across India during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. I map these networks and examine their relevance for how (...) nyāya scholars were organized in early colonial Bengal. Second, I examine circulation patterns of manuscripts of nyāya texts composed in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Bengal. I argue that a contraction in the distribution of nyāya manuscripts of works written in Bengal during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries took place, especially into southern India. The essay concludes by situating nyāya scholars within the context of colonialism and drawing larger conclusions about nyāya intellectual practices in Bengal during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. (shrink)

Poststructuralism has long been acknowledged to offer a radical critique of the foundational subject as a precursor to affirming a constituted subject. Its detractors have however held that the resultant position cannot offer a coherent account of agency (strong version) or, alternatively, that while it may be able to account for non-subjective agency it is unable to develop a coherent explanation for subjective agency (weak version). Somewhat strangely, this issue has been largely ignored by commentators predisposed to poststructuralist thought. In (...) contrast, this volume focuses on the works of Judith Butler, Cornelius Castoriadis, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Luce Irigaray, Jacques Lacan, and Catherine Malabou, to show that the question of the subject is a key one for many poststructuralist thinkers, that they are aware of the problematic status of agency that arises from their decentering of the foundational subject, and that they offer heterogeneous responses to it. Subjective Agency and Poststructuralism will therefore be an invaluable resource for researchers and advanced students interested in philosophy, political theory, psychoanalysis, critical theory, history of ideas, feminist theory, and cultural studies. (shrink)

The private self, however, cannot stand alone. "We cannot think of the self except in contrast to that which is other than the self". Royce finds the source of physical nature in this need of the self for a not-self. The whole difference between inner and outer is social in origin, for only social confirmation can sustain our belief that a fact is an outer fact rather than an inner fact which no one else can observe.

The Impassioned Life argues that theology's task today is to rethink the nature of the emotions and their relation to human reason. Such rethinking is necessary because the Christian tradition feels ambivalently about the emotions. Armed with a commitment to body-soul dualism, many writers have equated the image of God with rationality and wondered whether emotion is an essential feature of human nature; however, the tradition has also affirmed the value of emotions such as love and compassion and has sometimes (...) asserted the value of so-called negative emotions such as anger. The question, then, is whether the tradition's pastoral insight into the importance of moderation and control of the emotions requires us to think dualistically about soul (identified with reason) and body (the seat of emotions). To answer this question, The Impassioned Life explores the vital resources of the Christian theological tradition and also of contemporary scientific and psychological research in order to achieve a more adequate theological understanding of the emotions and reason. At heart, it offers a holistic, integrated vision of the Christian life lived passionately in its full range of human feeling as life in the Spirit. (shrink)

According to the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis, the legalization of abor- tion in the United States in the 1970s explains some of the decrease in crime in the 1990s. In this paper, I challenge this hypothesis. First, I argue against the intermediate mechanisms whereby abortion in the 1970s is supposed to cause a decrease in crime in the 1990s. Second, I argue against the correlations that sup- port this causal relationship.

When Thomas Jefferson placed 'the pursuit of happiness' along with life and liberty in The Declaration of Independence he was most likely referring to Aristotle's concept of happiness, or eudaimonia. Eudaimonia is not about good feelings but rather the fulfilment of human potentials. Fulfilment is made possible by virtue; the moderation of desire and emotion by reason. The Psychology of Happiness was the first book to bring together psychological, philosophical, and physiological theory and research in support of Aristotle's view. It (...) examines the similarity between Aristotle's concept of virtue and modern cognitive theories of emotion. It discusses the discovery of human potentials, the development of virtue and its neurological basis, the mistaken idea that fulfilment is selfish, and several other issues related to the pursuit of a good human life. (shrink)

Aristotle’s fundamental rationale for the ‘teleios life’ requirement (Nicomachean Ethics i 7.1098a18) is that a virtuous activity is better when it is more continuous and more enduring. Consequently, the Aristotelian wish (boulēsis) for happiness properly inclines the virtuous person to wish for immortality. This is not an incoherent wish because mortality is coincidental to the human being as such.

This is the Editorial Introduction to “S.I.: Strong and Weak Kleene Logics”.

This essay argues that §49 of Kant’s third Critique pursues the question of the nature of genius through an analysis of the spectator’s response to beautiful art. It presents and defends a spectator-centered interpretation of §49’s opening paragraphs, which clarifies Kant’s notion of aesthetic ideas and reveals that beautiful art provokes a productive imaginative activity in its spectators. This interpretation is significant because it elucidates the character of Kant’s account of genius and his understanding of art criticism. Moreover, it suggests (...) that the imagination’s productive activity may provide a certain satisfaction to theoretical reason’s natural but unrequited desire for knowledge of the transcendent. (shrink)

Certains physiciens modernes ont cru pouvoir tirer, de leurs recherches sur la structure de l’atome, la négation du déterminisme universel. Mais ils confondent, dans leurs déductions, l'indétermination avec le hasard ; et ils acceptent l’existence réelle du hasard. D’ailleurs Max Planck, qui a découvert les quanta, n’accepte pas l'indéterminisme, non plus que le professeur Einstein.

They say of morality, as St. Augustine said of Time, I know what it is when you do not ask me If this theory wexetrue, 9 PRACTICAL ETHICS mankind would be ...

Pseudo-Archytas.--Iamblichus.--Proclus.--Damascius.--Simplicius.--Plutarch.--Tatian.