In “History of the Lie: Prolegomena,” Derrida criticizes Arendt’s commitment to the “great resiliency” of factual truth against all lies in her essay “Truth and Politics,” claiming that she reintroduces a teleological account of history that clashes with her anti-totalitarian and anti-systematic thinking. By focussing on her understanding of truth-telling as action, this article shows that Arendt does not turn truth into a permanently stable ground for politics. Instead, Arendt’s theory of self-deception constitutes a lie capable of ending all truth. (...) Set in opposition to the nihilism of self-deception, Arendt understands truth-telling as an exemplary act that preserves the possibility of truthfulness and future actions. (shrink)

We argue that counterfactuals and indicative conditionals are not so different. Certain notorious differences previously observed between pairs of indicative and counterfactual sentences are actually due to the presence of an anti-abductive modal auxiliary (would) in the consequent of the counterfactual. But such auxiliaries, of which will is another example, span the counterfactual-indicative divide.

"Let him, therefore, who would arrive at a knowledge of nature, train his moral sense; let him act and conceive in accordance with the noble essence of his ...

This study examines the effects of corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance of Chinese firms on the formation of cross-border alliances with partners in developed countries. We use signaling theory and the co-evolutionary perspective as bases in proposing that the signaling effects of CSR performance on cross-border alliance formation are subject to the influences of subnational, national, and cross-national institutions. By using a longitudinal data set, we find that the signaling effects of CSR performance on cross-border alliance formation emerged only after (...) a national system of CSR-related institutions had been established. Once this framework was set up, the effectiveness of CSR as a signal was subject to subnational (intra-country) and cross-national (inter-countries) institutional differences. We conclude that combining signaling theory with the co-evolutionary perspective contributes to CSR research in emerging markets. (shrink)

The present article seeks to reconstruct the Christological meaning of the verbs “creating” and “begetting” in the Synodical letter of Ancyra (358). In order to assess the teaching of this document, the first part of the article provides an overview of the Christological use of “creating” and “begetting” from the beginning of the Arian crisis up to the eve of the synod of Ancyra. The second part studies the verbs “creating” and “begetting” in the Letter of Ancyra. The synodical document (...) makes an original and significant theological effort, purifying and complementing both the notion of “creation” (Prv 8:22) and “generation” (Prv 8:25), in order to grasp the perfect notion of the eternal birth of the Son. This understanding is confirmed by Hilary of Poitiers. (shrink)

This paper connects the following three apparently unrelated topics: an epistemic framework fighting logical omniscience, a class of generalized graphs without the arities of relations, and a family of non-normal modal logics rejecting the aggregative axiom. Through neighborhood frames as their meeting point, we show that, among many completeness results obtained in this paper, the limit of a family of weakly aggregative logics is both exactly the modal logic of hypergraphs and also the epistemic logic of local reasoning with veracity (...) and positive introspection. The logics studied are shown to be decidable based on a filtration construction. (shrink)

I am writing on moral knowledge in Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding. There are two basic parts. In the first part, I articulate and attack a predominant interpretation of the Essay . This interpretation attributes to Locke the view that he did not write in the Essay anything that would be inconsistent with his early views in the Questions Concerning the Laws of Nature that there exists a single, ultimate, moral standard, i.e., the Law of Nature. For example, John Colman, (...) in his book John Locke's Moral Philosophy , argues that even though Locke explains in the Essay that we arbitrarily create our moral notions, they are still objective since they are bound together with the Law of Nature. Colman explains that the features of human nature relevant to the derivation of the Law of Nature are universally shared needs and concerns . I argue that this presupposes a view of Locke which assumes that there are essences of species independent of our beliefs about them. However, I attempt to show from the text of the Essay that this view cannot be supported. ;In the second part, I argue that the text of the Essay supports two alternative theses. The first is that given the kind of metaphysical world-view presupposed by the corpuscular method of science employed within the Essay, coupled with Locke's commitment to the possibility of moral knowledge, he was left with only one option with reference to ethics, viz., to make moral goodness or evil a mind-dependent relation between a rule and an action, instead of a property of an action or person which exists independently of our moral beliefs. This view is logically inconsistent with the existence of the Law of Nature. The second is that Locke has a semantical view of moral claims which is consistent with his relational view of moral goodness, viz., the primary function of moral judgments is to recommend behavior for ourselves and others. I described. However, Locke explains in the Essay that the opposite takes place with respect to our moral notions: events and persons must conform to the moral notion. ;On the account that I offer, Locke's views on moral epistemology are much closer to David Hume's than many have supposed, and correspondingly, anticipate the more skeptical views of moral epistemology in the twentieth century. (shrink)

The notion of semantic descent made familiar by Quine is extended to a movement from the first-floor level of language use to the level of objects that language typically describes; descent here is to a basement level. The idea of such a descent is combined with the idea of qualification to produce what is called the ‘Semantic Descent’ account of metaphor. According to this account, metaphor first requires semantic descent to a level of non-linguistic objects, and these objects then fulfill (...) the predicative function described as qualification. The account is presented in a relatively minimalist way, to show how it copes with the features of metaphor discussed in Chapter 1, as well as provide a clear view of the obvious objections that might be raised against it. The latter centrally includes the fear that the use of objects as qualifiers might be too indeterminate. This is countered with a discussion of a notion called ‘attunement’. (shrink)

'Que devrions-nous croire?' est la question centrale des débats philosophiques en éthique de la croyance, un champ complexe de philosophie contemporaine où se mêlent la normativité, les théories de la connaissance et la psychologie. Spécifiquement, ce livre aborde la question de si nous devrions croire certaines choses parce qu'elles sont vraies ou parce qu'elles sont utiles. Que croire lorsque les preuves s'opposent aux avantages pratiques d'entretenir une certaine croyance? Sous quelle condition devrions-nous croire quelque chose d'avantageux, bien que faux? Ces (...) questions ne peuvent faire l'économie d'autres débats portant sur notre autonomie et notre responsabilité quant à nos croyances. De par ces chemins sinueux vers les horizons normatifs de la croyance se dévoilent des questions sur les limites de l'activité philosophique."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

The original work has been a favorite of both scholars and laypeople for its straightforward style, in contrast to other medieval writings on ethics that are largely theoretical and reflective.

In his "Lectures on the History of Philosophy," Hegel once commented that the characteristic of Eastern philosophy lies in that it only recognizes as real the singular ding-an-sich . If an individuality, or a singular entity, stands in opposition to the ontological entity that exists in itself and spontaneously acts in itself , then it cannot have any value in itself, and cannot attain any value at all. However, at the same time that the individual entity unites with the (...) ding-an-sich, this individual entity ceases to be an entity, as a subject, and disappears into nonconsciousness. This viewpoint appears to be an understanding of the Chinese cultural traditional mode of thought that was almost universally held by all Western thinkers of the time. A similar point of view seems to be held by the British writer Samuel Taylor Coleridge in an essay that he wrote on the linguistic styles of various genre of literature. In Coleridge's case, however, he was attempting to make a comparison of Eastern and Western political systems. He believed that the characteristic of Eastern polity was that it embodied a tendency toward autocracy, or, in other words, toward unity, whereas the characteristic of Western polity, coming from the source of the Greek political system, conversely embodied a tendency toward diversity and plurality. It is not my belief that all the ways in which Western scholars understood Chinese culture, since the period of the Enlightenment, were accurate and valid. Indeed, many such Western thinkers, owing either to a paucity of information on their part or to their ignorance, or partial ignorance, of the sources of Chinese civilization, have made many incorrect evaluations and judgments about Chinese culture. However, I do believe that this particular view held by Western scholars, that Eastern philosophy emphasized identity and unity while deemphasizing or even ignoring diversity and plurality, is a viewpoint that deserves some attention. This, in my opinion, is indeed a characteristic of China's cultural tradition. The problem that it raises is essentially the question of the relationship between the group and the individual, between commonality and individuality, and, one may even go so far as to say, the relationship between "public" and "private.". (shrink)