In Pakistan, as in many non‐Western cultures, decisions about a patient's health care are often made by the family or the doctor. For doctors educated in the West, the Pakistani approach requires striking a balance between preserving indigenous values and carving out room for patients to participate in their medical decisions.

In theory, a commercial market for kidneys could increase the scarce supply of transplantable organs and give impoverished people a new way to lift themselves out of poverty. In‐depth sociological work on those who opt to sell their kidneys reveals a different set of realities. Around the town of Sarghoda, Pakistan, the negative social and psychological ramifications of selling a kidney affect not only the vendors themselves, but also their families, communities, and even the country as a whole.

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan has a population of more than 145 million people, about 95% of whom are Muslims . Although it has a few large cities such as Karachi, almost 65% of the country is still rural, with a per capita income of $408 per year. The overall literacy rate is estimated to be 41.5% but is much lower for women in many of the provinces. Pakistan has a complex culture with many ethnic groups and socioeconomic strata, but (...) overall the society is characterized by hierarchical systems in both private and public domains. The population is religious and family centered with the “family” understood as extending beyond the nuclear; it is not uncommon to have three generations residing under one roof or within close proximity to each other and pooling their resources. (shrink)

The standard interpretation of Descartes's ethics maintains that virtue presupposes knowledge of metaphysics and the sciences. Lisa Shapiro, however, has argued that the meditator acquires the virtue of generosity in the Fourth Meditation, and that generosity contributes to her metaphysical achievements. Descartes's ethics and metaphsyics, then, must be intertwined. This view has been gaining traction in the recent literature. Omri Boehm, for example, has argued that generosity is foundational to the cogito. In this paper, I offer a close reading of (...) Cartesian generosity, arguing that the meditator cannot acquire generosity in the Second or Fourth Meditation. (shrink)

Ethics of Richard M. Hare is widely considered as a classical example of the strong internalistic theory of motivation: he is thought to believe that having a moral motive is a sufficient condition to act accordingly. However, strong internalism has difficulties with explaining the phenomenon of acrasia and amoralism. For this reason some critics charge him with developing a false theory of moral motivation. In the article I present Hare's answer to these questions by dividing the discussion about motivation into (...) three levels: semantical, epistemological, and ontological. I also explain his concept of internal motivation and argue that his theory, contrary to what his critics assume, may be called a weak motivational internalism. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Although a preference for sons is reportedly a universal phenomenon, in some Asian societies daughters are considered financial and cultural liabilities. Increasing availability of ultrasonography and amniocentesis has led to widespread gender screening and selective abortion of normal female foetuses in many countries, including India. Feminists have taken widely divergent positions on the morality of this practice. Feminists from India have strongly opposed it, considering it as a further disenfranchisement of females in their patriarchal society, and have agitated successfully (...) for legislative prohibitions. Libertarian feminists on the other hand, primarily from the United States, have argued that any prohibition of the use of this technology is a curtailment of a woman's reproductive choices and a violation of her right to make autonomous decisions regarding procreation. Using India as an illustrative case, this paper argues that in the context of what prevails in some societies, an ethical argument that hinges on the principle of autonomy as understood in the West can be problematic. Furthermore, a liberal theoretical assumption that it is always better to have more rather than fewer choices may not hold up well against the realities of life for such women. Although feminists have little disagreement concerning substantive matters, it is in the area of strategy that differences of opinion have arisen, their moral reasoning and responses shaped by the culture, ethnicity, class and race to which they belong. A view that a single ‘orthodox’ feminism of any variety can embody the aspiration of all women reverts to the problematic issues in the evolution of the rationalistic, individualistic, ‘male’ ethics against which women have consistently raised objections. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Al-Ghazālī’s engagement with scepticism in the Deliverance from Error has received much attention in recent literature, often in the context of comparing him with Descartes. However, there is one curious text that has gone largely unnoticed by commentators. In his account of how he overcame scepticism vis-à-vis a divine light cast unto his heart, al-Ghazālī makes a cryptic claim that suggests that primary truths are inherent to the mind, and that said cognitive status of primary truths is related to (...) his overcoming of scepticism. Although this one text does not straightforwardly prove that al-Ghazālī is a nativist, I argue that there are other texts that plausibly reveal his nativism. As such, I argue that al-Ghazālī can be read as a nativist, and I reconstruct a way in which his nativism helps explain how he overcomes scepticism. In doing so, I defend the (standard) strong divine interventionist reading of al-Ghazālī’s response to scepticism, against Hadisi’s recent weak divine interventionist reading. (shrink)

In the Fifth Meditation Descartes considers the problem of knowledge preservation : the challenge of accounting for the diachronic certainty of perfect knowledge [scientia]. There are two general solutions to PKP in the literature: the regeneration solution and the infallible memory solution. While both readings pick up on features of Descartes’ considered view, I argue that they ultimately fall short. Salvaging pieces from both readings and drawing from Descartes’ virtue theory, I argue on textual and systematic grounds for a dispositionalist (...) solution. On this view, the diachronic certainty of scientia is achieved through virtuous habits of belief. (shrink)

Al-Ghazālī (c. 1056–1111) Al-Ghazālī did not regard himself as a philosopher, given that during his period in Islamic intellectual history, philosophy was associated with the Aristotelian tradition promulgated primarily by Avicenna (Ibn Sina), and, for al-Ghazālī, Avicenna was undoubtedly considered to be an unbeliever whose philosophical views (such as his commitment to the eternity of … Continue reading Al-Ghazālī →.

In this article, I will try to explain the meaning of the word zihâr, translated as oath of the back, trying only to situate it in its context and to bring an elucidation of the subject`s origin. The zihâr is a type of repudiation used by a husband against his wife in the times of gâhiliyya (the ante-Islamic period), by using a solemn divorce formula which consists in saying: "let (her) be from now on as the back of my mother". (...) Therefore, backing up on this formula, I want to try to clarify this concept. (shrink)

DESCARTES’S PASSIONS OF THE SOUL AND THE CONTEMPORARY DISPUTE ABOUT THE NATURE OF EMOTION In my article I discuss the connection between the Cartesian theory of passions of the soul and the contemporary dispute between the cognitive and non-cognitive theories of emotions. Defenders of the cognitive theory of emotions identify emotions with judgments. On the other hand, non-cognitivists claim that emotions are feelings caused by changes in physiological conditions relating to the autonomic and motor functions. Both cognitivists’ and non-cognitivists’ approaches (...) meet serious problems. In the paper, I want to show that the Cartesian theory of passions can be considered an anticipation of contemporary views and a compromise between the cognitive and non-cognitive theories of emotions. Keywords: DESCARTES, NATURE OF EMOTION, SOUL, COGNITIVE AND NON-COGNITIVE THEORIES OF EMOTIONS. (shrink)

Standardowy, podręcznikowy wykład etyki ujmuje kantyzm jako formę deontologii. Wpływ na to miał sam I. Kant, który krytykował konsekwencjalizm i bronił prawomocności deontycznych rygorów. Wielu jego kontynuatorów podziela jego opinie, uznając, że etyk-kantysta musi być deontologiem. Jednak kantowski konsekwencjalizm nie jest stanowiskiem wewnętrznie sprzecznym – twierdzą tak m.in. R.M. Hare, D. Cummiskey, S. Kagan czy D. Parfit. W niniejszym artykule przedstawiam sposób godzenia kantyzmu i konsekwencjalizmu, skupiając się na teoriach D. Cummiskeya i D. Parfita. Rozważam również najczęściej stawiany zarzut wobec (...) kantowskiego konsekwencjalizmu, iż nie jest on w stanie oddać kantowskiej idei autonomii i godności. Argumentuję, że nie można stwierdzić, iż konsekwencjalistyczny nakaz, aby w niektórych rzadkich sytuacjach poświęcić jedną niewinną osobę w celu ratowania kilku innych, automatycznie i z konieczności gwałcił kantowską ideę autonomii, jeśli autonomię tę rozumie się nie jako millowską autonomię osób, lecz jako kantowską autonomię zasad. (shrink)

The main purpose of the paper is to present a new framework of meta-ethics which I call the Functional Model of Analysis. It presupposes that the most important meta-ethical question is not “What is the meaning of normative words, sentences and what is the ontological fabric of the moral world?” but “What should morality and ethics be for?”. It is a form of meta-ethics that focuses on finding theoretical resources that can be helpful in understanding ongoing ethical debates between disciples (...) of Aristotle, Epicurus, the Stoics, Augustine, Hobbes, utilitarians and Kant, and in building normative ethical theories that can help us to answer normative questions. As an example of such output I will present a formal sketch of Hybrid Function Consequentialism – a normative ethical theory based upon the meta-ethical framework proposed here. (shrink)

This essay provides a brief overview of the rise of organ trade in Pakistan towards the end of the last century and the concerted, collective struggle—of physicians and medical associations aided by the media, journalists, members of civil society, and senior judiciary—in pressuring the government to bring about and implement a national law criminalizing such practices opposed by an influential pro-organ trade lobby. It argues that among the most effective measures to prevent re-emergence of organ trafficking in the country is (...) increasing ethical live donations and above all, establishing sustainable, public supported deceased donor programs. To do this, the transplant community must recognize that organ transplantation is not merely a donor-recipient-physician transaction but a complex issue in which decisions to donate an organ are influenced by indigenous values and belief systems about human illness, life and death. (shrink)

Despite the majority opinion of Muslim jurists that organ donation is permitted in Sharia, surveys indicate continuing resistance by lay Muslims, especially to donating organs following death. Pakistan, a country with 165 million Muslims, currently reliant on live donors, is considering steps to establish deceased donor programs which will require public acceptance and support. This article analyzes the results of in‐depth interviews with 105 members of the public focusing on opinions and knowledge about juristic rulings regarding kidney donations, donor‐family dynamics (...) in deceased donation decisions, and attitudes towards buying kidneys. The objective was to determine the influence if any of cultural and religious values, and norms of traditional family structures and kinships, on decisions to donate. Study participants view donation of kidneys, particularly from the deceased, through a different lens from that used by jurists and physicians, one that also does not conform to familiar paradigms defining ethical organ donation. A socially modulated understanding of Islam passed down the generations, and longstanding family‐centric norms, shape the moral worldview of many rather than academic juristic rulings or non‐contextual concepts of autonomy and rights. The results of this study also highlight that medical science may be universal but its application occurs within particularities of cultural and religious values, social constructs of the self and its relationship with others, and different ways in which humans comprehend illness, suffering, and death. These findings are of relevance both to transplant related professionals and bioethicists involved with this field. (shrink)

Gabriel Rezende est à Jacques Derrida ce que Reiner Schürmann est à Martin Heidegger. Comme l’essai fondateur de Schürmann, Le principe d’anarchie. Heidegger et la question de l’agir, posait « la question du rapport entre théorie et pratique telle qu’elle résulte de la “déconstruction” » heideggérienne, celui de Rezende, Droit et normativité chez Jacques Derrida, pose celle des rapports entre éthique et morale telle qu’elle résulte de la déconstruction derridienne, c’est-à-dire d’une pensée «...

The aim of this article consists in presenting an interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason that begins with the notion of method in philosophy and it is way of exposition. This interpretation obeys the imperative of comprehending Kant’s philosophy as a whole and intends, doing do, point out the importance of the method in the study of kantian philosophy. After getting into the preliminary discussion about the possible interpretation of Kant’s method of philosophy and its importance, we present the (...) method, distinguishing it from the way of exposition. After that, we present the difference between the hole of definition in mathematics and philosophy. (shrink)

Resenha de: Blumenbach, J. F. Sobre o impulso de formação e a geração. Tradução, introdução e notas de Isabel Coelho Fragelli. Revisão técnica de Luciana Valéria Nogueira. Santo André: Editora UFABC, 2019.

A intenção deste texto é articular dois temas pouco trabalhados juntos nas interpretações de Kant, embora sejam, segundo nosso entendimento, de fundamental importância para uma plena compreensão da filosofia kantiana e do conhecimento filosófico em geral: a disciplina da razão pura e a filosofia teórica. Pretendemos nos utilizar de algumas outras noções, no entanto, para responder a seguinte pergunta: é possível a formação sem a disciplina filosófica? Isto é, seria possível uma formação teórica sem uma disciplina ou uma “contribuição negativa” (...) proveniente da filosofia? O conceito de formação está, segundo gostaríamos de defender, de um ponto de vista teórico, associado intrinsecamente à disciplina da razão. Assim, indicando como esta é, em geral, relacionada, nas interpretações de Kant, apenas com a pedagogia e com a filosofia prática, gostaríamos de, indo no sentido contrário, tratar do lugar da disciplina da razão em relação ao conceito de formação em seu sentido teórico, isto é, de fundamentação do conhecimento. A disciplina da razão pura revela-se, portanto, uma condição necessária para o filosofar e para a formação do conhecimento em geral. (shrink)

The arrival of the Covid‐19 pandemic in Pakistan necessitated that the Centre of Biomedical Ethics and Culture in Karachi realign its activities to changing realities in the country. As Pakistan's only bioethics center, and with no guidelines available for allocation of scarce medical resources, CBEC developed “Guidelines for Ethical Healthcare Decision‐Making in Pakistan” with input from medical and civil society stakeholders. The CBEC blog connected to the center's bioethics programs for students from Pakistan and Kenya shifted to Covid‐related issues specific (...) to the context of existing social and political realities within these countries. As part of its outreach activities, CBEC initiated a popular Facebook series, #HumansofCovid, as an experience‐sharing platform for health care professionals and members of the public. Narratives received vary from those by frustrated physicians under quarantine to those concerning street vendors left jobless and a transsexual person in whose opinion “social distancing” is not a new phenomenon for their communities. (shrink)

In recent literature commentators have challenged the standard interpretation that the Cartesian Self is a res cogitans. Various modifications have been proposed: the will should be regarded as an essential feature of thought as well (not just the intellect), and even the body – in some sense – belongs to the Cartesian Self. While these modifications are important, commentators have neglected Descartes’ wholly different conception of the Self in the Passions of the Soul. In his definition of generosity, Descartes claims (...) that the Cartesian Self is a res volans: the only thing that truly belongs to the generous person is her free will. I aim to unpack what Descartes means in the “truly belongs” locution (TBL), ultimately arguing for what I call the weak essentialist reading. Descartes’ grounds for claiming that free will truly belongs to the Cartesian Self is that free will constitutes the activity – not passivity – of the mind. And that is the most important property in the essence of a mental substance. (shrink)

In this thesis I argue that foundational to attaining Cartesian generosity, both as a passion and as a virtue are the clear and distinct perceptions of mind, God, and body. I challenge Lisa Shapiro’s account of generosity, and her suggestion that generosity regulates the passions expressed in the Meditations. Unlike Shapiro I attend closely to the distinction between the passion of generosity and the virtue of generosity, and how to acquire these different states of the soul. I propose that the (...) passion of generosity cannot be aroused in the soul until after the meditations have been completed and the full inventory of clear and distinct perceptions attained. I interpret the meditations as orienting the meditator towards attaining virtue; by putting her in a position to attend frequently to the nature of free will after the six meditations have been completed. I interpret this frequent attendance to the will as a “Seventh Meditation,” which arouses the passion of generosity. After the passion has been attained, the virtue of generosity can then be acquired through self-cultivation, which instills generosity as a habit of the soul. The virtue of generosity is what allows one to gain mastery of the passions, and I provide an account of how this can be done through a process of reconditioning the passions. (shrink)

In recent years, with the appearance of a new wave of realism and non-descriptivism, the old dispute in meta-ethics between cognitivism and non-cognitivism has resurfaced. At present one of the most intensely discussed arguments among meta-ethicists is the so-called Moral Twin Earth argument of Terrence Horgan and Mark Timmons. It was presented in a series of articles published at the beginning of the nineties. However, a similar argument was put forth much earlier by Richard Hare, though the participants of the (...) discussion that has arisen in connection with the Moral Twin Earth have passed over it in silence. It appeared for the first time at the beginning of the fifties in The Language of Morals as the Missionary and the Cannibal Islands argument. Hare later renamed it the Reductio ad Absurdum of Descriptivism in an article published in 1986 under the same name. Since then he has made it as his basic instrument against descriptivism. In the present article the author outlines the argument of Moral Twin Earth, presents its prototype, and offers a concise criticism of it. (shrink)

Od początku rozwoju stuletniej historii metaetyki rozważania językowe grały kluczową rolę przy wyborze dobrej teorii metaetycznej. Celem artykułu jest ukazanie i wyjaśnienie tego faktu poprzez wskazanie na najistotniejsze motywy rozwoju dociekań metaetycznych. Postawiona została również teza, że główny problem metaetyki ująć należy szerzej, niż uczynił to w ostatnich latach we wpływowy sposób M. Smith. W tym celu zaprezentowane zostały dwa kryteria dobrej teorii metaetycznej postulowane przez M. Timmonsa i T. Horgana: kryterium koherencji i doświadczenia oraz cechy języka moralności, jak również (...) inne istotne, psychologiczne, epistemologiczne i ontologiczne fenomeny, które w kluczowy sposób determinują kształt współczesnej debaty metaetycznej. Następnie ich wpływ zobrazowany został na przykładach kilku najgłośniejszych polemik metaetycznych. (shrink)

SummaryThis paper examines the official abortion statistics for South Australia since the legalization of abortion in January 1970. The incidence of abortion is shown to be increasing steadily—in 1976 more than half of the extramarital pregnancies were terminated and the overall ratio of abortions to live births was nearly 1:6. Most abortion patients were single, young women. Comparison of fertility levels in South Australia with the rest of Australia shows that the fertility decline has been much more rapid in South (...) Australia, suggesting that unless the South Australian women are more efficient users of contraception than other Australian women, a significant proportion of the fertility decline in South Australia has to be attributed to legalized abortion. (shrink)

Al-Ghazālı̄ famously claims in the Incoherence of the Philosophers that al-Fārābī and Avicenna are unbelievers because they hold philosophical positions that conflict with Islam. What is less well-known, however, is that Averroës claims in the Decisive Treatise that al-Fārābī and Avicenna are not unbelievers; rather, al-Ghazālı̄ is the true unbeliever for writing the Incoherence of the Philosophers. In this paper, my aim is to present a sustained reconstruction of Averroës’ legal and philosophical argument for why al-Ghazālı̄ is an unbeliever. The (...) crux of Averroës’ argument is that al-Ghazālı̄ has expressed false allegorical interpretations of scripture to unqualified persons, which has led them into unbelief. By being causally responsible for other people’s unbelief, al-Ghazālı̄ is an unbeliever as well. (shrink)

My paper is a reaction to polemic of Tomasz Sieczkowski "Discrimination nonetheless. A reply to Krzysztof Saja” [ICF "Diametros" (36) 2013] that he wrote against my paper "Discrimination against same-sex couples" [ICF “Diametros" (34) 2012]. The purpose of the paper is to refute Sieczkowski’s objections that rely on wrong interpretation of the structure of my main argument. I will describe the proper course of the reasoning that I have expressed in the first article and undermine the Sieczkowski’s proposal to (...) justify gay marriages by referring to values such as dignity, freedom and equality. (shrink)

Most ethical discussions about diet are focused on the justification of specific kinds of products rather than an individual assessment of the moral footprint of eating products of certain animal species. This way of thinking is represented in the typical division of four dietary attitudes. There are vegans, vegetarians, welfarists and ordinary meat -eaters. However, the common “all or nothing” discussions between meat -eaters, vegans and vegetarians bypass very important factors in assessing dietary habits. I argue that if we want (...) to discover a properly assessed moral footprint of animal products, we should take into consideration not only life quality of animals during farming or violation of their rights—as is typically done—but, most of all, their body weight, life time in farms and time efficiency in animal products acquisition. Without these factors, an assessment of animal products is much too simplified. If we assume some easily accepted premises, we can justify a thesis that, regardless of the treatment of animals during farming and slaughtering, for example, eating chicken can be 163 times morally worse than eating beef, drinking milk can be 58 times morally better than eating eggs, and eating some types of fish can be even 501 times worse than eating beef. In order to justify such a thesis there is no need to reform common morality by, for example, criticizing its speciesism. The thesis that some animal products are much worse than others can be justified on common moral grounds. (shrink)

This article describes the main topics of Descartes’ ethics through discussion of key primary texts and corresponding interpretations in the secondary literature. Although Descartes never wrote a treatise dedicated solely to ethics, commentators have uncovered an array of texts that demonstrate a rich analysis of virtue, the good, happiness, moral judgment, the passions, and the systematic relationship between ethics and the rest of philosophy. The following ethical claims are often attributed to Descartes: the supreme good consists in virtue, which is (...) a firm and constant resolution to use the will well; virtue presupposes knowledge of metaphysics and natural philosophy; happiness is the supreme contentment of mind which results from exercising virtue; the virtue of generosity is the key to all the virtues and a general remedy for regulating the passions; and virtue can be secured even though our first-order moral judgments never amount to knowledge. -/- Descartes’ ethics was a neglected aspect of his philosophical system until the late 20th century. Since then, standard interpretations of Descartes’ ethics have emerged, debates have ensued, and commentators have carved out key interpretive questions that anyone must answer in trying to understand Descartes’ ethics. For example: what kind of normative ethics does Descartes espouse? Are the passions representational or merely motivational states? At what point in the progress of knowledge can the moral agent acquire and exercise virtue? Is Descartes’ ethics as systematic as he sometimes seems to envision? (shrink)

It has been a little over three months since I returned. My day begins with an altercation with a new security guard who stops me as I drive up to the gate of the brand-new university hospital. He tells me that I am to use the other entrance, as only the chairman’s car is allowed through this gate. I inform him that I am the chairman. He peers at me suspiciously. The chairman sahib is a man not a woman, he (...) says. I put on a stern face and tell him that I am the chairman and he will get into trouble for not letting me through. He looks uncertain but eventually lets me drive in through the gate. I pick up my white coat and stethoscope from my... (shrink)

The primary goal of this monograph is to justify the possibility of building a hybrid theory of normative ethics which can combine ethical consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics. The aim of the book is to demonstrate the possibility of constructing a synthetic theory from ethical traditions that are generally considered to be contradictory. In addition, I propose an outline of an original theory which tries to carry out such a synthesis. I call it Institutional Function Consequentialism. The justification for a (...) hybrid theory of normative ethics requires the resolution of certain meta-ethical issues. I discuss them in part 1.1. After a brief overview of my research aims I consider the answer to the following questions: “What kind of meta-ethical beliefs must we assume for normative ethics?” and "Why should we build ethical theories?". I also discuss the various forms of ethical scepticism, which should be rejected if we develop a hybrid theory of normative ethics. I also describe possible methods of justifying any ethical theory. At the end of part 1.1 I explain that the best method for justifying any ethical theory is the method of wide reflective equilibrium. In parts 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 I analyse three main types of normative ethics which are considered to be competitive: consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. Part 1.2 is about consequentialism and its difference between utilitarianism and teleological theories. I also present the main reasons for the popularity of consequentialism. In part 1.3 I define deontology, present its variations and show important benefits that motivate its continuous growth. In part 1.4 I discuss virtue ethics, which is often referred as the viable alternative to consequentialism and deontology. If we want to build any new ethical theory, first we should describe the problems of the old ones. For this reason, in chapter 2 I describe the most important arguments against ethical consequentialism, and in chapter 3 I explain the difficulties of deontology. Critical remarks on virtue ethics are considered in part 1.4. The last two chapters directly concern the main aim of the monograph. Because in chapter 3 I show that deontology suffers from a number of problems such as the paradox of deontology, in chapters 4 and 5 I present only consequentialist versions of hybrid theories. These versions try to avoid the common pleas of utilitarianism and combine the advantages of opponents to utilitarianism. I answer the question (4.1) "What is hybrid consequentialism?" and briefly describe (4.2) the most important examples of hybrid theories by others. I discuss the prerogatives without restrictions idea by Samuel Scheffler, rule consequentialism by Brad Hooker, Kantian consequentialism by Richard M. Hare, David Cummiskey and Derek Parfit and consequentializing procedure proposed by Douglas W. Portmore. In the last chapter I present a new hybrid version of consequentialism that I call Institutional Function Consequentialism. I start from the thesis (5.1) that traditional meta-ethics of analytic philosophy incorrectly defines the main field of its research. Rather than focusing on the philosophy of language and metaphysics it should try to answer one question: “What should morality and ethics be for?”. Therefore I introduce an original methodology for meta-ethics that I call the Functional Model of Analysis (FMA). It is a meta-ethical framework in which the fundamental questions concern the practical functions of normative domains such as morality and ethics and the most rational way of achieving them. FMA is meta-ethical project that (a) explains the persistence of fundamental ethical disagreement among experts, (b) sets the background for explaining or justifying the correct structure of the ethical theory, (c) gives the possibility to create a hybrid theory of normative ethics. In part 5.2 I formulate a generalized argument against various popular theories of normative ethics which states that most of the popular theories are too narrow and one-sided, causing permanent dispute between them. There are many distinct practical functions of morality that are usually based on different types of normative theories such as Aristotelian ethics, utilitarianism, contractarianism and contractualism. In order to remove these conflicts, the correct ethical theory should try to take into account all of these relevant features of moral life. Unfortunately, most ethical theories are mono-functional. This means that their supporters consciously or unconsciously (1) recognize or accept only one genuine practical function, (2) think that this one practical function overrides all other practical functions or (3) try to reduce all practical functions to the one that is chosen. In part 5.2 I present a description and justification of a new normative account that I call Hybrid Function Consequentialism. The formal scheme of this consequentialism can be summarized in the following way: we should act according to some important focal points P1…Pn with contents C1…Cn that are selected on the basis of considerations about which kind of P with C will bring the best realization of the best mix of normative functions F1...Fn. In the next part (5.2.2) I present the new way of “consequentializing” particular theories of normative ethics by applying the scheme of Hybrid Function Consequentialism. As an example of the use of this procedure, I formulate perfectionist virtue consequentialism, contractarian institution consequentialism, contractualist rule consequentialism and consequentialism of salvation. In part 5.3 I formulate an original theoretical concept that I call Institutional Function Consequentialism (IFC). It is a hybrid theory that is based on the previously described Functional Model of Analysis and a reflection on the role of institutions in modern developed societies. IFC claims that we should always act according to some rules, virtues, motives and intentions that constitute the homeostasis of normative institutions whose internalization by the overwhelming majority of each new generation has maximum expected value in terms of the best realization of the equilibrium of the most important practical functions of normative domains. Responsibility and sanctions related to wrongful actions should be dependent on the particular institution whose standards have been violated. IFC has several unique features which are described and justified in part 5.3. It is a form of hybrid consequentialism – it mixes features of consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics. It does this on three different levels: justification, structure and content. The main focal point of the theory is not rules or virtues, but normative institutions. Values to be optimized in the framework of consequentialism are not "happiness", "well-being" or "preferences", but the fulfilment of normative functions. IFC is not limited to the field of ethics only, but it is a meta-normative account of justification for an entire social order which is comprised of a number of different institutions. It also assumes a specific, circular relationship between practical ethics (e.g. research on such important issues as civil disobedience, fair distribution of wealth, philosophy of punishment or autonomy of conscience), and the content of the general rules that may constitute the optimal homeostasis of institutions. It rejects the simplistic belief that moral thinking is based solely on deductive implications from general ethical principles or meta-ethical beliefs. (shrink)

Commentators have noticed the striking similarities between the skep­tical arguments of al-Ghazālī’s Deliverance from Error and Descartes’ Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy. However, commentators agree that their solutions to skepticism are radically different. Al-Ghazālī does not use rational proofs to defeat skepticism; rather, he relies on a supernatural light [nūr] sent by God to rescue him from skepticism. Descartes, on the other hand, relies on the natural light of reason [lumen naturale] to prove the existence of God, (...) mind, and body. In this paper, I argue that Descartes’ solution is closer to al-Ghazālī’s than commentators have allowed. A close reading of the cosmological argument of the Third Meditation reveals that there is also a type of divine intervention em­ployed in the Meditations, which helps Descartes defeat skepticism. This reading may buttress the case made by some that al-Ghazālī influenced Descartes; but more importantly, it requires us to rethink key features of Descartes’ epistemology. (shrink)

In my paper I discuss the argument that the absence of the legal possibility to contract same-sex marriages is discriminatory. I argue that there is no analogy between the legal situation of same-sex couples and African-Americans, women or disabled persons in the nineteenth century. There are important natural differences between same-sex and different-sex couples that are good reasons for the legal disparities between them. The probability of having and raising children is one of them. Therefore, demanding that same-sex couples have (...) rights similar to those that married couples currently have in Poland and justifying that claim by alleged discrimination is neither correct nor fair. (shrink)