Despite the seemingly widespread agreement that racial and ethnic immigration criteria are always wrong, some cases seem potentially permissible and, in particular, do not seem to wrong either disfavored members or nonmembers. I demonstrate that an “antidiscrimination” approach to understanding when and why discrimination is wrong provides a compelling general explanation for this. The explanation’s key ingredient is the concept of global social status: many groups sharing a race or ethnicity have a social status beyond, and that can differ from, (...) their status in a particular state. (shrink)

Does a liberal state, dedicated to the principles of freedom and equality, have a moral right to exclude? In her book, Liberal Self-Determination in a World of Migration, Luara Ferracioli makes a c...

If states have the moral authority to decide their memberships by denying citizenship, I argue that they may also strip citizenship, from law-abiding members, for the same reasons. The only real difference is that when states revoke citizenship they may need to compensate people for their prior contributions, but that is not unlike what frequently occurs in divorce. Once just termination rules are established, stripping citizenship could become, like divorce, an everyday event. Partly because of this implication, we should reject (...) the membership authority of states. (shrink)

In certain ways, many disabilities seem to occupy a middle ground between illnesses like cancer and identity-traits like race: like illnesses, they can present a wide variety of obstacles in a range of social and natural environments and, insofar as they do, they are something we should prevent potential people from having for their own sake; at the same time, those same types of disabilities can be, like race, a valuable part of the identity of the persons who already have (...) them. I consider this seemingly dual nature of a significant class of disabilities to attempt to understand the proper relation of those disabilities to persons and how we should value or respect them. I argue for a distinction between embedded disabilities and general disabilities ; importantly not everyone with a disability will turn out to have an embedded disability. I then show that expressing negative value judgments about general disabilities does not typically express disrespect for people with disabilities — thereby addressing a long-standing charge made by many in the disabilities community. Finally, I show that unlike with disabilities, expressing negative judgments about the general form of identity-traits like race does typically express disrespect for people with those identity-traits. (shrink)

Most challenges to immigration restrictions have not shown that states lack a claim-right to exclude, or a moral right against outside interference to make membership decisions. And an important, unexamined aspect of the claim-right is that states have the right against interference to wrongfully exclude, or the right to do wrong when making admission decisions. A major implication of this right is that even political or economic measures to affect states’ immigration policies are off the table – significantly compromising the (...) prospect of meaningfully addressing the world’s growing refugee crisis. In the form of a reductio argument, I provide reason to reject this position. Specifically, I try to demonstrate that, in the relevant cases, a plausible moral defense for the right to wrongfully exclude can only be given for states with objectionable character – protecting the very states whose immigration policies we should be most concerned with, which is surely morally counterintuitive. (shrink)

My paper explores the question of when it is wrong for a state’s immigration criteria to discriminate against people with disabilities, focusing on the idea that discrimination is wrong when it demeans a group, rather than when it disadvantages them. I argue that selecting against people with disabilities often demeans them but might not always do so even when immigration criteria explicitly exclude people on the basis of having disabilities – that is, in cases of direct discrimination. Moreover, I demonstrate (...) that certain cases of less direct forms of discrimination that select against people with disabilities – in particular, when states apply health-cost limits on admissions – can function as proxies designed to exclude people with disabilities and thereby demean them. Finally, I explain why my analysis of discrimination’s wrong does not typically apply to health conditions in general, such as heart, liver, or lung disease or cancer, setting my view apart from a prominent view in the literature. (shrink)

Immigration and Discrimination explores what bases states are morally permitted to use for their admission decisions and policies, and why. Sahar Akhtar argues that the idea of wrongful discrimination can be applied to states' admission decisions, and explores what this means in terms of states' rights over the use of, say, racial, ethnic and religious criteria. Rather than rejecting any connection between immigration policies and such criteria, she argues that such criteria are not always morally wrong. Despite this finding, however, (...) a major implication of the book’s arguments and analysis is that states do not have the “right to exclude”, or the claim-right to make decisions about whom to admit into their borders. (shrink)

Communitarian writers argue that social identity is deeply important to individual autonomy and thus liberal societies have an obligation to recognize identity. Any liberal view that attempts to account for this charge must specify a procedure to recognize identity that also ensures that the liberal sense of autonomy is not weakened. In this article, I develop such an account. I argue that liberals must distinguish an identity that belongs to particular persons (particularized identity) from the collective form of that identity. (...) For instance, Naisha will have her own particularized way of being Indian in addition to the collective form of the culture that she shares with others. To determine which acts would be about recognizing the particularized form, I provide a counterfactual test. One major implication of the test is that special collective rights would not be endorsed. At the same time, the test is not equivalent to the liberal positions of insisting either that rights belong to individuals or that individuals are not harmed. Because identity is almost always viewed in terms of groups, valuing identity seems to be at odds with the principles of liberalism and democratic theory in which individual persons are the ultimate source of value. I show that there is a significant way to recognize identity that is harmonious with these principles. (shrink)

The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Immigration is an outstanding reference source to this vitally important topic and will be of great interest to those studying philosophy, politics and related subjects such as law, sociology and social policy.