We say that each social group is identical to its members. The group just is them; they just are the group. This view of groups as pluralities has tended to be swiftly rejected by social metaphysicians, if considered at all, mainly on the basis of two objections. First, it is argued that groups can change in membership, while pluralities cannot. Second, it is argued that different groups can have exactly the same members, while different pluralities cannot. We rebut these objections, (...) and argue that our plural view is superior to alternative reductive proposals which would identify social groups with the sets or fusions of their members. Finally we deal with some further potential challenges for the view of groups as pluralities. Thus we aim to establish it as a serious contender in the metaphysics of groups. (shrink)

In the recent literature on contextualism and relativism, one often finds disputes as to which kind of consideration would be relevant for positing a feature of a context as a parameter in the ‘‘circumstance of evaluation’: via the presence of an operator in the language which shifts that feature (Stanley) or by being a feature of a context with respect to which the truth of ‘‘propositions’’ expressed in the context is relative (McFarlane). This kind of dispute arises from two different (...) independent roles that elements in ‘‘circumstances of evaluation’’ are sometimes assumed to have. I distinguish indices from points of evaluation, and motivate its significance in the debate. (shrink)

In this essay we will argue for the following theses: 1- know-how is not a form of practical knowledge devoid of propositional sense; 2- the relationship between each perception and the body itself is metaphysically contingent (organisms and bodies can vary, as can even the spaces they occupy in the same experience vary), 3- it is up to the brain to configure or to shape a physical body (Körper) into a living body (Leib) and not the other way around; 4- (...) phenomenal externalism of enactivist nature, even in its mild form, is empirically implausible: the correlation between the conscious character of sensory experience with spatiotemporal neuronal patterns is much more systematic and regular than with anything outside the brain. But in its radical form is entirely implausible and contra-intuitive: phenomenal duplicates are not necessarily duplicates of agency; in short, 5-we are our own brain that has a body, avatars, and artifacts, properly configured, and molded by the brain, and not a body that has a brain among other essential organs. (shrink)

Resenha de: CHAMAYOU, Grégoire. Teoria do drone. Tradução de Célia Euvaldo. São Paulo: Cosac Naify, 2015.

Study about the death ond rebirth according to Hindu philosophy and sacred literature.

Um livro que reúne alguns dos mais representativos textos que moldaram o que podemos chamar pensamento feminista. Uma obra de referência capaz de oferecer um repertório fundamental para os estudos de gênero e também para o ativismo. "A missão deste livro é, portanto, a de mostrar o caminho no qual os conceitos centrais do pensamento feminista foram se desdobrando, sendo questionados e dando origem a novas formas de pensar e definir identidades, gênero, subjetividades e sexualidades. A sinalização desse longo processo (...) que constituiu o léxico feminista vai certamente facilitar o estudo das tendências teóricas e o avanço dos trabalhos acadêmicos e políticos no contexto atual", Heloisa Buarque de Hollanda. (shrink)

Abraham (Biblical patriarch); Muḥammad, Prophet, d. 632; Muslim scholars; Muslim leaders; biography; miscellaneous.

al-juzʼ 1. al-Mushkilāt al-falsafīyah -- al-juzʼ 2. Taṭawwur manāhij al-ʻulūm.

Teknikens skugga -- Ett sublimt mellan -- Tiden i formen -- Fenomenets blick -- Om bild -- Tolkningsfigurer -- Abstraktioner -- Anteckningar -- Det omåttligas måleri -- Att tänka i skisser.

Este artículo pretende ofrecer una visión alternativa tanto de la lectura conceptualista tradicional de Kant como de la nueva lectura no conceptualista. En contra de las lecturas conceptualistas tradicionales sostengo que confunden las condiciones para la representación sensible de los objetos con las condiciones para el reconocimiento de que representamos objetos mediante intuiciones sensibles. En contra de las lecturas no conceptualistas sostengo que no distinguen el no conceptualismo -propio de la filosofía contemporánea de la mente- de las tesis antiintelectualistas de (...) Kant. Tales lecturas fracasan porque se equivocan al atribuir un contenido representacional a las intuiciones sensibles de Kant. Las intuiciones sensibles, según Kant, no presentan el mundo según ciertas condiciones de satisfacción que podrían o no ser satisfechas por el mundo. Por lo tanto, no son ni verídicas ni non verídicas. Se limitan a presentar el mundo de una manera directa, independiente de los conceptos, lo que llamaré aquí la presentación de re de los objetos. En mi lectura, la oposición entre intuiciones y conceptos es la oposición entre la presentación de re de um objeto y el reconocimento proposicional de dicto de que representamos algo como um objeto. (shrink)

A commentary on al-Yazdī's gloss on al-Taftāzānī's Tahdhīb al-manṭiq wa-al-kalām; logic, Arabic logic; early works to 1800.