To vindicate morality against skeptical doubts, Kant must show that agents can be moved to act independently of their sensible desires. Kant must therefore answer a motivational question: how does an agent get from the cognition that she ought to act morally to acting morally? Affectivist interpretations of Kant hold that agents are moved to act by feelings, while intellectualists appeal to cognition alone. To overcome the significant shortcomings of each view, I develop a hybrid theory of motivation. My central (...) interpretive claim is that Kant is a special kind of motivational internalist: on his view, agents are moved to act by a feeling of intellectual pleasure at the prospect of accomplishing a task they have set for themselves, a feeling that originates in free choice. The resulting theory is immune to the challenges facing intellectualism and affectivism, thus strengthening the prospects of Kant’s justification of morality. (shrink)

In the A-preface of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant kindly warns his readers to pay special attention to the chapter on the “Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding.” Looking to mitigate the reader's effort, Kant goes on to explain the chapter's methodology, suggesting that the inquiry will have “two sides.” One side deals with the “objective validity” of the pure categories of the understanding; he calls this the “objective deduction.” The other deals with the powers of cognition (...) on which the understanding rests; he calls this the “subjective deduction.” Having gone to such great lengths to outline his method ahead of time, it comes as no small surprise that the actual chapter offers no clear indication of where the two deductions are located. In this essay, I attempt to solve this puzzle. On the way, I engage with both traditional and recent interpretations of the subjective deduction, arguing that they fail—in one way or another—to satisfy the criteria that Kant develops in the preface. (shrink)

Richard Rorty draws a distinction between an activity of using old words in new senses for self liberation or private autonomy and an activity of searching ‘‘for theories which will get at real essence.’’ He calls those who engage in the former activity ‘‘ironists,’’ people like Proust, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Hegel and Derrida, and calls those who engage in the latter activity ‘‘metaphysicians,’’ people like Plato, Descartes and Kant. The ironists, he says, have radical and continuing doubts about their final vocabularies, (...) because they have been impressed by other vocabularies. Unlike metaphysicians who search for words closer to reality, ironists engage only in playing off new words against old ones. When Rorty realized that this distinction is implausible, that both groups shared a certain unavoidable metaphysical link, he then called for replacement of theory with novel in ironism, which implies replacement of philosophy with literature. Theory, he says, is about general ideas, while the novel is about people. This paper is aimed at averting this implication, by arguing that interpretation of the novel implicates metaphysics and is theory-laden, and that ironism should not be seen in the Rortyan way as that opposed to metaphysics, but as a new way of doing metaphysics. Integrativism, an African method of philosophy, is employed to dissolve Rorty’s distinction between ironism and metaphysics, and to redescribe ironism as ‘‘innovativism.’’ The method of this work is argumentative, conversational, critical and redescriptive. Keywords: Ironism, metaphysics, integrativism, innovativism, redescription. (shrink)

Hua-yen Buddhism, the pre-eminent philosophical form of Buddhism in early T'ang dynasty the China, was instrumental in laying the conceptual foundations for virtually all subsequent East Asian Buddhism. This Hua-yen legacy includes Ch' an/Zen and Pure Land, the non-philosophical forms of Buddhism that came to dominance in the centuries to follow. In this sense, Fa-tsang (643-712), the third patriarch and foremost philosopher of Hua-yen, can be considered one of the forefathers of East Asian Buddhism today. By focusing on one element (...) in Fa-tsang's thought, this essay attempts to articulate the overall character of Hua-yen thought and, in the process, to shed light on its connection to other dimensions of the Buddhist tradition. -/- In Fa-tsang's monumental Wu-chiao chang (Treatise on the Five Teachings ), the mental image of a house is taken to model the dharmakãya universe as a whole. On Fa-tsang's account, since any one part of the house - his example is a rafter - is a condition for the house as a whole, that one part through its complex relations encompasses the whole house and is therefore able to reveal it comprehensively. What he calls the "one flavor" of the dharmakãya can be fully tasted in any one part. Adopting Fa-tsang's sytematic principle and taking the concept of bodhicitta as the focal point study, this essay attempts to show the "one flavor" of Fa-tsang's Buddhist thought through the treatment he gives to the traditional idea of the "thought of enlightenment.". (shrink)

In this article I seek to explain Hegel’s significance to contemporary meta-ethics, in particular to Kantian constructivism. I argue that in the master–slave dialectic in the Phenomenology of Spirit , Hegel shows that self-consciousness and intersubjectivity arise at the same time. This point, I argue, shows that there is no problem with taking other people’s reasons to motivate us since reflection on our aims is necessarily also reflection on the needs of those around us. I further explore Hegel’s contribution to (...) the debate about internal and external reasons. I end by arguing that we should understand reasons as historically constructed in the sense that who counts as an intrinsic bearer of value changes over time. I thus argue that the struggle for recognition is in fact the beginning of the long march toward the idea of recognition and the Kantian kingdom of ends. This march, however, is driven by the need to overcome injustice as it is instantiated at the beginning of history by the master’s absolute domination of the slave. (shrink)

200 years ago, on August 5, 1802, Niels Henrik Abel was born on Finnøy near Stavanger on the Norwegian west coast. During a short life span, Abel contributed to a deep transition in mathematics in which concepts replaced formulae as the basic objects of mathematics. The transformation of mathematics in the 1820s and its manifestation in Abel’s works are the themes of the author’s PhD thesis. After sketching the formative instances in Abel’s well-known biography, this article illustrates two aspects of (...) the transformation which concern the introduction of concept based mathematics and the related shift in standards of mathematical rigor. Furthermore, the article outlines some of the many bicentennial celebrations in Norway and gives a short, thematic introduction to the literature on Abel and his work. (shrink)

Swedenborg's Principles of Usefulness presents a possibly unsuspected historical undercurrent that further evidences Emanuel Swedenborg's pervasive influence on a whole host of historical figures-from poets and artists to philosophers and statesmen-whose contributions to the evolution of self and society have resonated throughout time and into the present. Besides having an impact on individual thinkers, Swedenborg's ideas worked their way into the various social reform traditions that vitalized the American landscape during the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. His concept of usefulness, best (...) demonstrated in the competing worldviews of the nation's liberal and conservative traditions, involved a commitment made by Swedenborgians, New Church members, and others to energize the nation and its people by envisaging the possibility of a much-desired Universal Human. (shrink)

In this essay, the author analyses Berkeley’s conformity and inference argument against Locke’s theory of percep tion. Both arguments are not as decisive as traditionally has been perceived and fail to engage in Locke’s actual position. The main reason for this is that Berkeley does not see that Locke’s position is compatible with the non-inferential nature of perceptual knowledge.

The Irish poet W. B. Yeats once wrote, with great sapience and perception: Nor dread, nor hope attend A dying animal; A man awaits his end Dreading and hoping all. That death has ever been a problem to man is attested as far back as we can trace our species in the archaeological record—indeed, it seems to have been a problem even for that immediate precursor of homo sapiens, the so-called Neanderthal Man; for he buried his dead.

In this lecture Justice Breyer examines three classical criticisms of constitutional judicial review. Those criticisms say that a grant to unelected judges of the power to set aside legislation as contrary to a written constitution leads to judicial decision-making that is (a) undemocratic, (b) subjective, and impractical. Justice Breyer describes features of the constitutional decision-making that do not dictate results in individual cases, but none the less hold the judges' 'subjective' will in check. He also describes necessary judicial efforts to (...) focus upon considerations of administrative practicality. The description seeks, not to refute the criticisms in their entirety, but to help evaluate the extent to which those criticisms militate against the adoption of a system of constitutional judicial review. (shrink)

Pricing Life is an extremely timely and stimulating book. The debate about health care rationing has now been running for several decades but there are still people who publicly deny that rationing of health care has to take place, or that health care rationing could be ethically justifiable. In many countries we have also had politicians who have refused to allow the “R” word to pass their lips. In this well written, and very direct book Peter Ubel decisively shows that (...) rationing is an inevitable feature of modern medicine and that it is not something that health care administrators and economists force doctors to perform against …. (shrink)

Leclerc's systematic introduction is predicated upon the thesis that "Whitehead's basic problems belong to the great tradition of philosophical inquiry first opened up by the Greeks." A lucid discussion of the traditional problems surrounding "being" leads simply and logically to a consideration of the categories in terms of which Whitehead reformulates the traditional approach to "that which is." The great merit of this progression is that it dispels the illusion, so overwhelming on an initial glance at Whitehead himself, that his (...) terminology is arbitrary and completely disassociated from traditional usage.--D. W. S. (shrink)