This paper addresses the issues related to designing and estimating the strength of solid-alloy elements in the deforming broaches of significant diameter (exceeding 150 mm) for the developed process of discrete broaching. The tool limit condition was assessed based on two strength criteria: the specific potential energy of shape change and the maximum tangent stresses. Numerical modeling using the finite element method has made it possible to derive the distribution of equivalent stresses in the tool elements and the contact stresses (...) at the surface of the contact between a solid-alloy insert and the body, which enabled the analysis of tool strength under loading. The simulation was performed under a single normal load, which ensured the versatility of the calculation for any contact pressure values. We have derived formulae to calculate the acceptable contact pressure depending on unit load. The effect of the insert protrusion height over the body on the strength of tool elements has been established. We have derived engineering dependences that determine the required magnitude of insert protrusion over the body depending on the ultimate load. An example of calculating the strength of a prefabricated deforming element in the machining of a sleeve made from gray modified cast iron of hardness HB230 has been considered. Our calculations have shown that the deforming element designed for the new technological process corresponds to the conditions of strength, provided the ratio h1/h=0.15 is maintained (where h1 is the insert height above the body, h is the insert height). The results obtained could be used in engineering calculations when designing the prefabricated tool for discrete deformation, as well as to assess the strength of prefabricated tools, such as cutters, core drills, reamers, when refining external loads. (shrink)

In 1931 the mathematical logician Kurt Godel published a revolutionary paper that challenged certain basic assumptions underpinning mathematics and logic. A colleague of Albert Einstein, his theorem proved that mathematics was partly based on propositions not provable within the mathematical system and had radical implications that have echoed throughout many fields. A gripping combination of science and accessibility, Godel’s Proof by Nagel and Newman is for both mathematicians and the idly curious, offering those with a taste for logic and philosophy (...) the chance to satisfy their intellectual curiosity. (shrink)

This paper analyzes Kent Bach’s representational theory of action, one of the causal theories of action. Bach’s theory sets requirements not only for the cause of an action, but also for how it unfolds in time and transitions into another action. These requirements suggest a sequential emergence of two components of the agent’s action awareness: the representation of the prepared movement and the perception of its sensory consequences. Bach introduces the concepts of “effective representation” (ER) and “receptive representation” (RR) to (...) denote these components of awareness. According to representational theory, action has a cyclic three-step causal structure, where ER is the cause of a movement, the movement is the cause of RR, and RR is the cause of ER of subsequent movement. In constructing his theory, Bach tries to take into account the problem of deviant causal chains and to introduce the so-called minimal actions into the purview of the philosophy of action. Relying on the behavioral data on blindfolded deafferentated patients, in this paper I argue that RRs are not a necessary element of action. I also analyze Bach’s distinction between ER and RR and compare it with J. Searle’s approach, placing Bach’s theory within the context of studies of the structure of intentional states. I show that Bach’s theory occupies a unique position among views on the structure of action awareness. At the same time, I conclude that the frameworks of Bach and Searle are insufficient for describing the metaphysical difference between the two kinds of intentional states, and I also point out the difficulties facing the notion of ER. Based on this reasoning and the data on deafferentated patients, I propose a modification of the causal structure of action proposed by Bach, making a remark about the inadequate definition of ER. In the proposed modification, RR and the agent’s prior intention serve as alternative components of action awareness. (shrink)

As these opening quotes acknowledge, the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) represents a core puzzle within the formal mathematics of game theory.3 Its rise in conspicuity is evident figure 2.1 above demonstrating a relatively steady rise in incidences of the phrase’s usage between 1960 to 1995, with a stable presence persisting into the twenty first century. This famous two-person “game,” with a stock narrative cast in terms of two prisoners who each independently must choose whether to remain silent or speak, each advancing (...) self-interest at the expense of the other and thereby achieving a mutually suboptimal outcome, mires any social interaction it is applied to into perplexity. The logic of this game proves the inverse of Adam Smith’s invisible hand: individuals acting on self interest will achieve a mutually suboptimal outcome. However, as this chapter illuminates, the assumptions underlying game theory drive this conclusion. (shrink)

The aim of the present study was to investigate the effect of the “Visual Awareness Education Programme” developed to support the visual literacy skills of preschool children. The study group comprised 40 children (20 children in the experimental group and 20 children in the control group) attending preschool in the 2014–2015 school year. The pre-test post-test experimental model was used in the study. The “Visual Literacy Inventory for Preschool Children” and the “Children’s Visual Literacy Rating Inventory for Parents” were used (...) to determine visual literacy level of children. Study results revealed significant differences in favour of the experimental group children in the sub-dimensions and the post-test scores of the “Visual Literacy Inventory for Preschool Children” and the post-test scores of the “Children’s Visual Literacy Rating Inventory for Parents”. (shrink)

This essay represents a novel contribution to Nietzschean studies by combining an assessment of Friedrich Nietzsche’s challenging uses of “truth” and the “eternal return” with his insights drawn from Indian philosophies. Specifically, drawing on Martin Heidegger’s Nietzsche, I argue that Nietzsche’s critique of a static philosophy of being underpinning conceptual truth is best understood in line with the Theravada Buddhist critique of “self ” and “ego” as transitory. In conclusion, I find that Nietzsche’s “eternal return” can be understood as a (...) direct inversion of “nirvana”: Nietzsche celebrates profound attachment to each and every moment, independent from its pleasurable or distasteful registry. (shrink)

Contributed articles on self-realization.

The inconsistency between pro-environmental attitudes and behaviours, known as the “attitude-behaviour” gap, is exceptionally pronounced in scenarios associated with “green” choice. The current literature offers numerous explanations for the reasons behind the “attitude-behaviour” gap, however, the generalisability of these explanations is complex. In addition, the answer to the question of whether the gap occurs between attitudes and intentions, or intentions and behaviours is also unknown. In this study, we propose the moral dimension as a generalisable driver of the “attitude-behaviour” gap (...) and investigate its effectiveness in predicting attitudes, pro-environmental intentions and subsequent behaviours. We do so by using Hunt–Vitell’s moral philosophy-based framework of ethical decision-making, which conceptualises morality as the central decision-making parameter. The results from 557 US MTurk participants revealed that the manipulation of moral dimensions, specifically deontology and teleology, impacted ethical evaluation of presented dilemmas, however, failed to translate into subsequent intentions and behaviours. This finding suggests (i) that the moral dimension has an effect in shaping attitudes toward environmental issues, and (ii) that gap occurs between attitudes and intentions rather than intentions and behaviours. Further investigation of what strengthens and/or overrides the effects of the moral dimension would help understand the reasons why moral attitudes do not always translate into subsequent intentions and behaviours in the pro-environmental domain. (shrink)

In this essay, the author analyses Berkeley’s conformity and inference argument against Locke’s theory of percep tion. Both arguments are not as decisive as traditionally has been perceived and fail to engage in Locke’s actual position. The main reason for this is that Berkeley does not see that Locke’s position is compatible with the non-inferential nature of perceptual knowledge.

This is a challenging and original work on the concept of justification and its application to ethical statements. The book divides into two parts. The first part is devoted to a systematic treatment of the nature of justification. It begins with a critical rejection of the deductive model. Wellman presents plausible arguments for the existence of non-deductive evidences in ethics and shows how ethical theories can be tested by "thought-experiment" as analogous to the confirmation of scientific theories by laboratory trials. (...) An interesting kind of inference termed "conductive reasoning" is described. It is argued that this third form of reasoning can be validly used in justifying ethical conclusions. Distinctive of conductive reasoning is its non-formal and inconclusive feature. Its validity is alleged to lie in its dependence upon the content of the argument. But by and large there is no way to judge the validity of these basic ethical arguments but by thinking them through and feeling their logical force." Wellman goes on to develop a challenge-response model for understanding the nature of justification. Justification is "to be understood essentially as a process of responding to challenges made." However, Wellman makes no attempt to consider the role of moral concepts in determining the validity of conductive reasoning and its role in the justification of ethical statements. Part II considers the dimensions of ethical justification in terms of the model of challenge and response. Seven species of challenge are described: truth, truth-value, meaningfulness, validity, validity-value, competence, and knowability. On the whole the book contains challenging views and material for the epistemology of ethics.--A. S. C. (shrink)

Marx is generally taken to be important in the history of thought as a social philosopher, that is, a philosopher whose main categories are human individuals, their interactions, and the development and modification of institutions, values, and the like. Not so, according to Carol C. Gould, who contends, rather, that Marx is important in the history of thought as a metaphysician, that is, a philosopher whose main categories are particulars, classes, the relation of individuals to class concepts, change, causation, and (...) the like, and, having developed principles in that universal ontic domain, Marx proceeded to apply them to a special subdomain of reality, namely, society. In other words, Marx was important as an ontologist in general, and specifically as a social ontologist. Thus, the author states: "I present Marx for the first time as a great systematic philosopher in the tradition of Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel. Yet I show that Marx’s philosophical system is distinctive in that he develops it as a framework for his concrete social theory and his critique of political economy". (shrink)