In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 22 (2002) 244-248 [Access article in PDF] Book Review The Social Self in Zen and American Pragmatism The Social Self in Zen and American Pragmatism. By Steve Odin. SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought. Albany: SUNY, 1996. xvi + 482 pp. Better late than never! As one of the few volumes—only two to date, actually—in the SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought to address a perennial philosophical (...) problem by drawing seriously upon both the Eastern (Zen Buddhism) and Western (American pragmatism) philosophical traditions, this book should have been reviewed in the pages of this journal a long time ago. Odin's thesis is that both traditions evidence a paradigm shift during the twentieth century from a monological and subjectivistic concept of an individualized self toward a dialogical and intersubjective concept of social self. He explores this hypothesis in the three parts of the book devoted to the social self in modern Japanese philosophy, the social self in Mead and American pragmatism, and a comparative analysis.Part 1 consists of three chapters focused on the philosophical thought of Watsuji Tetsuro (1885-1962) and Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945), and on the psychological investigations of Doi Takeo (dates not given, but whose primary works were published in the 1970s and 1980s). Watsuji's central idea is a Zen and Confucian ningenmodel of personhood whereby the self emerges in "the betweenness of person and person" as the individual (nin), understood primarily in temporal categories, and society (gen), understood primarily in the spatial categories of nature, community and family, mutually empty themselves into the other. (In a later chapter, Odin draws parallels between the yi-li—spontaneous, novel reaction-ritual action—dialectic of Confucianism and the I-me dialectic of George Herbert Mead.) This notion of self as ningen subsequently served, at least in part, the development of nihonjinron scholarship—"studies of Japanese identity"—as advanced by thinkers like Kimura Bin, Hamaguchi Eshun, and Kumon Shumpei. The goal has been to steer the middle way between individualistic (Western) and collectivistic (Confucian) conceptions of the self toward what Hamaguchi and Kumon call a contextualist (kanjin), and thereby truly Japanese, understanding.Odin's exposition of Nishida focuses on his idea of the true self—the perennial quest of the Zen tradition—as a "social self" (shakaiteki jiko) that emerges from the I-thou, self-other, and individual-environment dialectics that take "place" in the absolutely empty spatial "field" of basho.(Here, Odin suggests that rather than drawing from Martin Buber's philosophy, both Nishida and Buber drew common inspiration from Ludwig Feuerbach's Principles of the Philosophy of the Future [Grundsatze der Philosophie der Zukunft, 1843]). The true self is therefore the no-self in the locus of absolute Nothingness. As such, the true self is also the empty self. This leads Nishida to draw analogies in his last few essays between the Buddhist idea of sunyata, or "emptiness," with the Christian notion of kenosis, or "self-emptiness." In [End Page 244] keeping with the Zen insistence against reifying emptiness, however, the true self is that which overcomes nihilism but yet resists eternalism. Buddhist sunyatais now symbolized by the bodhisattva's self-negating vow of compassion for all sentient beings, even as Christian kenosis is symbolized by Christ's self-emptying love for the world. This leads to the true self conceptualized as the intersubjective self. Odin suggests that this insight of Nishida is latent in the Chan/Zen tradition as captured in the famous Ten Oxherding Pictures. He also briefly portrays how later Kyoto school thinkers like Ueda Shizuteru, Nishitani Keiji, Abe Masao, Tanabe Hajime, and MutoKazuo have extended Nishida's insights and contributed to the Buddhist-Christian dialogue.Meanwhile, Doi Takeo, a distinguished Japanese psychiatrist, has suggested that human intrapsychic drives are not limited to sexual and aggressive instincts as hypothesized by Freud. Rather, there is an amae or dependency drive that explains the human need for love, intimacy, warmth, protection, nurturing, and so forth. This other-reliance and relational aspect of the human being explains, at least from a psychoanalytical perspective, the... (shrink)

in a recent article entitled “Hume on the Passions,” Stephen Buckle opens with the claim that Hume’s theory of the passions has largely been neglected. “Apart from a couple of famous sections in the Treatise concerning the sources of action,” he writes, “the subject matter has rarely excited interest.”1 His analysis of why the subject of the passions in Hume has been uninspiring points to the fact that readers have largely misunderstood the point of Hume’s theory. They usually regard the (...) account as yet another mechanistic analysis of the passions in the vein of seventeenth-century science, alongside the offerings of Malebranche, Hobbes, and Spinoza. Buckle is right to point out that there is a.. (shrink)

The Umayyads (41-132/661-750) were the first Muslim dynastic state established in Damascus after the Rasheedun Caliphs. The Umayyads' transformation of the caliphate into a sultanate, their tribalist and discriminatory approaches, as well as the exaggerated palace life and entertainment of some caliphs have been the subject of criticism. Among the Umayyad caliphs, Yazīd II (101-105/720-724) was remembered for his drinking parties and love affairs with his concubines, and his fondness for entertainment to the degree of debauchery was described. The night (...) life of the caliph in question with his concubines named Sallāma and Habābah and his inclusion of them in the administration did not escape attention.It is known that the Umayyads had some problems in their relations with the new non-Arab Muslims (mawālī). Yazīd II’s elder brother, al-Maslama İbn ʽAbd al-Malik, was prevented on the grounds that his mother was a mawāli, although he was known to be the most worthy candidate for the caliphate among his brothers. Yazīd II, on the other hand, was appointed as the heir apparent with the advantage of being a member of the dynasty on his mother's side and then he was brought to the caliphate.After ‘Umar ibn ʽAbd al-ʽAziz, who was recognised as the ‘Fifth Rasheedun Caliph’ thanks to his piety and effective administrative skills, Yazīd II, who had a completely opposite character and administrative understanding, was brought to the caliphate. Although he imitated ‘Umar ibn ʽAbd al-ʽAziz in the first days of his caliphate, this situation did not last long. Soon after, he came under the influence of his favourites named Sallāma and Habāba and started to govern the state under the influence of these two names. It has also been stated that he jeopardised the future of the state and the dynasty with his arbitrary practices and debauched life. The sources give limited information about the lives of Sallāma and Habābah. Sallāma was born in Mecca as the child of a family whose parents were slaves (muwellada). It is narrated that she memorised almost all poetry and song lyrics from the Jahiliyyah period until the time she lived, and that she was extremely knowledgeable in the al-Qur’ân al-Karîm, hadiths and religious sciences. But with her mesmerising voice and physical beauty, she became famous as a singing courtesan. She gained her real fame when she met Yazid ibn ʽAbd al-Malik and became a part of the palace life. After Yazid II became the caliph, she rose in the palace and started to have a say in the state administration. It has been stated that Habābah was not inferior to Sallāma with her physical beauty, superior performance in singing, knowledge and manners, and even more advanced. As a matter of fact, Yazīd II was enamoured of her at first sight and wanted her very much, but his brother Caliph Sulaymān prevented him. Henceforth Yazīd II seated these two combines on his right and left in his palace and did not leave them until his death.Sallāma was an extremely intelligent, knowledgeable and beautiful woman who could be called Yazīd II’s first love. She almost ruled the state by using the affection and trust that the caliph cherished for her. So much so that the highest bureaucrats of the state could only be appointed with her approval. With her beauty, voice, and sharp intelligence, Habābah also enchanted the caliph, and her intervention in the state administration cost the caliph his life. Yazīd II was very saddened by the sudden death of Habābah during an entertainment party. His body was kept waiting for days and could only be buried after the warning of the caliph’s elder brother al-Maslama. The caliph, who knew the cause of her death from himself, never left her grave day or night. Weeks after the burial, he had her grave opened, embraced and kissed her decomposed corpse, lamented, and it was recorded that he died of grief. This situation, which cost the caliph his life, was expressed as ‘lovesickness’.This information and details are mentioned in Islamic historical sources. In this study, by using classical (Arabic) sources, two of the women who we think were influential on politics are introduced. Thus, we have contributed to the discussions on the presence and role of women in state administration in an early period of Islamic history. In this study, the portraits of two women, Habāba and Sallāma, who we think were involved in politics during the Umayyad period, albeit limited to the reign of Yazīd II, are given. While their short biographies are discussed, the status of women in the Umayyads, palace life and entertainments are touched upon. Again, the concepts of concubine and qayna (singing concubine) and umm al-walad, which express their art and social status in the person of these two concubines are explained. (shrink)

Cicero's praise of Caesar in thePro Marcelloof September 46b.c.e.has been much discussed for its sincerity or otherwise. Here I would like to point out some unobserved literary colour which may make some contribution to the argument, namely Cicero's subtle evocation of Hercules in describing the achievements of the victorious Caesar. Such an analogy is not unlikely in the context of Roman military image-making: Sulla in 78b.c.e.and Crassus and Pompey in 70b.c.e.had earlier encouraged connections with Hercules in analogous victorious contexts, and (...) similar comparisons are later made between the foreign conquests of Augustus and those of Hercules in both Virgil and Horace. (shrink)

The period from Kant to Hegel is one of the most intense and rigorous in modern philosophy. The central problem at the heart of it was the development of a new standard of theoretical reflection and of the principle of rationality itself. The essays in this volume, published in 2000, consider both the development of Kant's system of transcendental idealism in the three Critiques, the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, and the Opus Postumum, as well as the reception and transformation (...) of that idealism in the work of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. (shrink)

Hegel’s basic position so far on the various meanings of evil as necessary and thereby intelligible directly in the development of spirit might be summed up as follows. Evil is always a necessary moment of instability which gives impetus in the movement from various meanings of particularity to various meanings of universality; from the more abstract expression of potential unity and truth to the more actualized notion and unity.

Health professionals do not always have the luxury of making “right” choices. This article introduces the “devil's choice” as a metaphor to describe medical choices that arise in circumstances where all the available options are both unwanted and perverse. Using the devil's choice, the paper criticizes the principle of double effect and provides a re-interpretation of the conventional legal and ethical account of symptom relief in palliative care.

The article proposes that the hypothetical framework of Kierkegaard's "Philosophical Fragments" is determined by the question 'How is it possible for one to become a disciple?' An account of this framework is provided by employing an original interpretation of the concept 'the Moment'. This enables an understanding of 'the condition' by means of a contrast between 'Universalist' and 'Particularist' perspectives. Moreover, it is only when the insights offered by both perspectives are combined that the answer to the determining question of (...) the Fragments becomes apparent. (shrink)

We discuss the one–many problem as it appears in the Philebus and find that it is not restricted to the usually understood problem about the identity of universals across particulars that instantiate them (the Hylomorphic Dispersal Problem). In fact some of the most interesting aspects of the problem occur purely with respect to the relationship between Forms. We argue that contemporary metaphysicians may draw from the Philebus at least three different one–many relationships between universals themselves: instantiation, subkind and part, and (...) thereby construct three new ‘problems of the one and the many’ (an Eidetic Dispersal Problem, a Genus–Species Problem, and an Eidetic Combination Problem), which are as problematic as the version generally discussed. We then argue that this taxonomy sheds new and interesting light on certain discussions of higher-order universals in recent Australian analytic philosophy. (shrink)

A breathtaking detective story, this book charts the adventure of Whitehead's ideas in a remarkably detailed and careful reconstruction of his metaphysical views.

The beginnings of Hegel’s interest in “logic” as a branch of philosophy are somewhat obscure. In a lecture of 1830 Schelling claimed that Hegel first began to attend to the subject only because “his friends at the University” suggested that it was a good topic for his lectures because it was being neglected. Schelling’s object by then was evidently to suggest that Hegel’s “logic” had always been a superficial pretense. But Hegel was alive to contradict him. So I think his (...) statement of the facts must be right as far as it goes. I do not therefore believe that Hegel came to Jena with any “logical” manuscripts. In my view, it was Schelling himself—especially in his System of Transcendental Idealism —who sparked Hegel’s interest in the subject. (shrink)