CHAPTER ONE THE WORLD AS WILL TO POWER /. What there is for Nietzsche Any philosophical system which claims to be at all comprehensive must answer, ...

The existence of neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) is not enough for philosophical purposes. On the other hand, there's more to NCC than meets the sceptic's eye. (I) NCC are useful for a better understanding of conscious experience, for instance: (1) NCC are helpful to explain phenomenological features of consciousness – e.g., dreaming. (2) NCC can account for phenomenological opaque facts – e.g., the temporal structure of consciousness. (3) NCC reveal properties and functions of consciousness which cannot be elucidated either (...) by introspective phenomenology or by psychological experiments alone – e.g., vision. (II) There are crucial problems and shortcomings of NCC: (1) Correlation implies neither causation nor identity. (2) There are limitations of empirical access due to the problem of other minds and the problem of self-deception, and (3) due to the restrictions provided by inter- and intraindividual variations. (4) NCC cannot be catched by neuroscience alone because of the externalistic content of representations. Therefore, NCC are not sufficient for a naturalistic theory of mind, (5) nor are they necessary because of the possibility of multiple realization. (III) Nevertheless, NCC are relevant and important for the mind-body problem: (1) NCC reveal features that are necessary at least for behavioral manifestations of human consciousness. (2) But NCC are compatible with very different proposals for a solution of the mind-body problem. This seems to be both advantageous and detrimental. (3) NCC restrict nomological identity accounts. (4) The investigation of NCC can refute empirical arguments for interactionism as a case study of John Eccles' dualistic proposals will show. (5) The discoveries of NCC cannot establish a naturalistic theory of mind alone, for which, e.g., a principle of supervenience and a further condition – and therefore philosophical arguments – are required. (shrink)

Ethical theories have been largely focused on finding and clarifying certain amoral principles. However fruitful the communication of moral principles for providing orientation in modern society might be, a serious omission has been made in that the problem of implementation is not addressed. Two fundamental question have neither been raised nor answered: Why should self‐interested individuals follow the proposed moral principles in their daily conduct? Are societal institutions of such a design that is in the power of the individuals to (...) follow these moral principles? It is shown in this article that an economic theory of morals does systematically address these two questions and therefore provides a firm basis for discussing the possibilities and boundaries of following the moral principles inherent in the long history of moral philosophy. (shrink)

Schopenhauer’s concept of intuition (Anschauung) plays a fundamental roll in his philosophy: As pure intuition it addresses the forms of sensuality time and space. As empirical intuition it refers to the objects of the understanding (Verstand) and therefor to causal relations. But intuition is not only limited to Schopenhauer’s epistemology but is present in nearly every important aspect of his philosophical system. In his aesthetics Schopenhauer claims that every aesthetic cognition is necessarily intuitive, rendering every insight in the platonic ideas (...) through aesthetic contemplation as intuitive as well. Given that the understanding functions as the faculty of (empirical) intuition rather than reason, which is only the faculty of concepts, it seems at the first glance that Schopenhauer tries to exclude reason from any involvement in the aesthetic cognition of platonic ideas. But on closer examination Schopenhauer seems to argue for a rather fundamental involvement of reason in the fields of aesthetics as he insists on the importance of Besonnenheit (discernment, awareness, deliberateness). Aside from that only the participation of reason in the aesthetics could explain why animals, that share the same faculty of intuition as humans, are not capable of aesthetic judgement or producing art. In this article I argue that reason is a necessary condition for the possibility of aesthetic cognition but not as a theoretical faculty but in its practical function through Besonnenheit. While the platonic idea as well as every object of aesthetic contemplation must be given to our intuition, reason enables us to be besonnen and therefor gives us the possibility to suspend our actual willing for the sake of aesthetic contemplation. In this sense aesthetic cognition could be called besonnene Intuition. (shrink)

Will man das Spiel auf seine moralische Beurteilbarkeit hin untersuchen, so muss zunächst geklärt werden, auf was sich diese moralischen Urteile beziehen können. Betrachtet man dabei primär das Spiel als Spiel, so rückt die Spiel-Spieler-Beziehung während des Spielvollzugs ins Zentrum der Betrachtung. Aus dieser Perspektive bietet sich allerdings lediglich die Spiel-Handlung als Objekt moralischer Urteile an, wie sie im Unterschied zum Gamer vom Player, während des Spielens vollzogen werden kann. Als konstitutive Bedingung der Spiel-Handlung darf daher die Haltung des Spielers (...) gegenüber des von ihm vollzogenen Spiels nicht vernachlässigt werden. Immersion und Intention des Spielers treten in eine Abhängigkeit, die überhaupt erst moralische Urteile zulassen kann. Da die Spielhaltung des Spielers graduell zwischen Gamer und Player variieren kann, wird eine objektive moralische Beurteilung von Spiel-Handlungen für unbeteiligte Außenstehende erschwert, wenn nicht sogar unmöglich. Die moralische Beurteilung kann folglich lediglich beim Spieler selbst liegen, sofern er als Spielender zugleich auch seine eigenen Spiel-Handlungen reflektiert. (shrink)

This chapter addresses the distinction between private and public and the difference between ‘public’ and ‘official’. Drawing on a comparative analysis of Asian cities, it looks at the ways in which the local, the national and the global levels, which serve different, sometimes contrasting, interests, are negotiated and reconciled in the city. The chapter suggests that different forms of reconciliation have brought about an alternative ‘insitutionalisation’ of the public space. Such an institutionalisation is reflected in the access to, and dissemination (...) of, information—e.g., access to the media—and, above all, in the control over the common goods. The public sphere is used to voice discontent, leading to a new definition of the ‘common good’; that is, the inclusion, or non-exclusion, of large sections of the population which, though initially marginal, can become significant in shaping urban politics. (shrink)

In his book from 1799 "Einleitung zu dem Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie" Schelling defines philosophy of nature (Naturphilosophie) as science of nature (Wissenschaft der Natur) a priori but emphasises nonetheless the importance of experience to develop such a science of nature. This raises the problematical question of how this science of nature as an science a priori that has concrete phenomena (Naturerscheinungen) as it's objects can be possible. In this text the author argues that it is Schelling's critical concept (...) of system respective systematicity of nature itself that allows him to develop a (philosophical) system of nature that for us might be known through experience but - as systematical knowledge - must be considered as necessary and therefor a priori. (shrink)

Die Nähe der Philosophie Schopenhauers zu derjenigen Schellings wurden oft beschworen und bereits zu Schopenhauers Lebzeiten häufig – bis hin zum Plagiatsvorwurf gegen Schopenhauer – thematisiert. Besonders auffällig werden die Ähnlichkeiten, wenn man sich den Naturkonzeptionen beider Denker zuwendet: Beide Philosophen versuchen auf je eigene Weise die Natur als selbsttätig zu denken. Ausgehend von diesen Überlegungen werden im vorliegenden Band die Naturphilosophie Schellings und Naturmetaphysik Schopenhauers ausführlich vor dem Hintergrund einer in ihrer Selbsttätigkeit als prozessual gedachten Natur gegenübergestellt und diskutiert. (...) Dabei versteht sich diese Arbeit als systematisch-komparatistischer Beitrag zur Schelling- und Schopenhauer-Forschung, indem sie erstmals einen detaillierten Vergleich der Naturkonzeptionen anstellt und zugleich für eine prozessphilosophische Interpretation – sowohl der Naturphilosophien, als auch der gesamtphilosophischen Systeme argumentiert. (shrink)

Barsalou's theory of perceptual symbol systems is considered from a metacognitive perspective. Two examples are discussed in terms of the proposed perceptual symbol theory. First, recent results in research on feeling-of-knowing judgement are used to argue for a representation of familiarity with input cues. This representation should support implicit memory. Second, the ability of maintaining a theory of other people's beliefs (theory of mind) is considered and it is suggested that a purely simulation-based view is insufficient to explain the available (...) evidence. Both examples characterize areas where Barsalou's theory would benefit from additional detail. (shrink)

In this paper I consider three widespread assumptions: (1) the assumption that we are accountable for our intentional actions only if they are in some special sense ours; (2) the assumption that it is possible for us to be more or less “true to” ourselves, and that we are flawed human beings to the extent that we lack “integrity”; and (3) the assumption that we can sometimes give ourselves reasons by giving ourselves commands. I acknowledge that, as Ruediger Bittner has (...) argued, each of these assumptions is problematic, and that the failure to appreciate the problems has led many philosophers astray. I try to show, however, that it is possible to make sense of each assumption in a way that addresses Bittner’s concerns. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AQUINAS ON THE IMMATERIALITY OF THE INTELLECT DAVID RUEL FOSTER Seton Hall University South Orange, New Jersey I. A Controversial Question? HE QUESTION of the immateriailiity of the intelloot s,an important part of the wider question about the nau11e of the soul. The axgiumen'ts for the immaiteriality of rthe intellect a11e particularly important to Thomas's thought because they undergil1d his argument for the incorruptibility of the soul; the incorruptibiility (...) of the soul, in turn, leads towards the dootrine of the immortaility of the soruJ, a tenet of faith which Thoma.s wants to explain and deifend.1 This article will present Thomas's two most prominent arguments for the immateriality of the intieliteot and critique the first iin light of rthe seoond.2 Whether,the principle of int~Uectual ilife must, by the very 1.Arguments for the immateriality of the intellect do not necessarily appear in articles on the incorruptibility of the soul but are always presupposed by them in Thomas. For example, in Summa theologiae I, q. 75, a. 6, "Whether the human soul is incorruptible?" (" Utrum anima humana sit corruptibilis "), Thomas supports the crucial premise in his argument by referring to the,arguments for the immateriality of the intellect in articles 2 and 5 (" Utrum anima humana sit aliquid subsistens? "; "Utrum anima sit composita ex materia et forma?" Summa theologiae I, q. 75, aa. 2 and 5). 2 Five important instances of the arguments are as follows: In Sententias II, d. 19, q. 1, a. l; Summa contra gentiles II, chapters 49-50; Summa theologiae I, q. 75, aa. 2 and 5; Quaestiones Dis-putatae De anima a. 14; Oompendium theologiae, De fide, chapters 79 and 84. This chronological ordering is based on Weisheipl's catalogue in Friar Thomas D'A.quino, pp. 355-406; and Eschmann's, A Catalogue of St. Thomas's Work, in Gilson's, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, pp. 381-439. The dating of the Compendium theologiae is the most problematic. 415 416 DAVID RUEL FOSTER natUJ.1e of its.act, be immaterial is a particularly controrverted question today. Many corutempo~ary thinkers helie¥e that human understanding can be ex:pfained in strictly physical terms. ':Chis was not the case in Thomas's day, and it is important to takie notre of this. Thomas W1as noit foroed by any opponent to sharpen his arguments for the imma.teriality of the inteHect. The major Islamic philosophers, ailithough they disagreed among themselves about aspects of the inbe1iJiect's nature (e.g., the plaice and ro[e of the agent intellect)' md agree thait the intellectual soul was immaterial. Plato and Aristotle, according.to Thomas, agreed on this f.undamental point. In fact, although there were post-Socratic materialists,3 Thoma;s usuru1Jy goes ha;ek to the Pre-Socratics in order rto give an example of someone who taJUght that the inte!IJiectual :act. depends entirely on physicrul principles. Perhaps it is better to s1ay that, because the doctrine of runiversal hylomorphism was so widely accepted in his time, Thomas was not challenged regarding the incorporeality of the intellect. Many of Thoma:s's contemporaries, foililowing the tewching of Awoobroin, held that the intellectuaJ. souil was composed of spiritua.l matter.and the appropriate form,4 hut this was not in opposition to Thomas's arguments for the immateriality of the intellect. II. The Two Most Prominent Arguments A. Type I The first argument (hereaf·ter caUed Type 1) proceeds from the intellect's potential to know all corporeal things. It is justifiably described as Thomas's preferred argument,5 for s For example, the Epicureans. 4 J. Weisheipl, "Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism: Avicebron," in Albert the priam rationem formalem, which is :to grasp the essence of the obj,oot. Then Thom!lis draws his conclusion " therefore,... the inte!llecrbuaJ soul itse[f is an absolute form." The conclusion that the irntellect's mode of being is immaterial, a " form without matter," follows from the premises: majorr premise, the objeclt is,in the knower in an ahso1uite way, i.e., without matter; minor premise, the object is received in the knower.ruooording to rthe mode of he... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Christian Structure of Politics: On the De Regno of Thomas Aquinas by William McCormickD. C. SchindlerMcCORMICK, William. The Christian Structure of Politics: On the De Regno of Thomas Aquinas. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2022. xiii + 272 pp. Cloth, $75.00Challenging general assumptions that, because of its genre as a letter to a king in the speculum principis tradition, Aquinas's De Regno is a (...) minor source for Aquinas's political theory in comparison to the political passages from the Summa and Sentence Commentary, William McCormick, S.J. presents a new interpretation of this somewhat neglected text. Though there exist a few classic articles comparing Aquinas's thought in this letter and elsewhere, and substantial introductions to the De Regno in editions by Eschmann (1949) and Dondaine (1979), The Christian Structure of Politics is the first book-length study of Aquinas's letter to the king of Cyprus. In this respect, the volume makes a very welcome contribution to our understanding of Aquinas's understanding of political order, bringing out a dimension of his thought—its awareness of history and its pedagogical sensitivity—not so apparent in Aquinas's other writings.The book is very much what it presents itself as being, namely, a "close reading" of the text, following the letter's two parts (the second of which [End Page 150] Aquinas left unfinished) paragraph by paragraph, considering various interpretative possibilities and suspending judgment—the words "might" and "perhaps" are no doubt two of the most frequent in the book—until more evidence comes into view, and working up to general principles only at the end. McCormick thus eschews substantial engagement with theoretical issues that would form the backdrop to the discussion (for example, the relation between nature and grace, and between practical and theoretical reason), opting instead to focus on a more immediate engagement with what is presented in the text itself. He also does not make more than passing comments on Aquinas's better-known formulations on political matters from the Summa or Sentences Commentary. On the other hand, the "close reading" does not keep McCormick from discerning a general order in Aquinas's letter, which he divides up thematically according to a proposed schema. His approach shows a sensitivity to the historical context in which Aquinas was writing, even if particular details about Aquinas's addressee and the occasion of composition remain uncertain, but his aim is not simply to produce a historical study. Instead, as the book's title itself already indicates, he investigates the De Regno in order to show that the text offers fundamental principles for a distinctively Christian approach to politics, and thus can shed light even on our contemporary situation.The book is divided into five basic chapters, in addition to a substantial introduction and brief conclusion. The first four chapters follow the order of the De Regno, though the basic lines of division are McCormick's own interpretative proposal. Chapter 1 treats the letter's prooemium and the first two chapters of part one (I.1-2) under the title "The Aristotelian State of Nature," showing that, contrary to ideas found in a certain current of Christian thought, political order is fully natural to man and not simply a practical response to violence. Chapter 2, "The Augustinian Earthly City," treating I.3-6, complements the natural character of politics with the realistic acknowledgment of man's fallen nature. While some commentators have worried that the discussion of tyranny in these and subsequent chapters of the De Regno eclipses the positive account of politics given rather schematically at the start, and so diminishes the interest the text might hold for the political philosopher, McCormick argues that the engagement with the tyrant, and the disorder he generates, represents an essential dimension of Aquinas's political vision. Indeed, one of the principal theses of The Christian Structure of Politics is that Aquinas manages to integrate Aristotelian and Augustinian perspectives in an unusually illuminating way: Christian revelation, which introduces the eschatological horizon and foregrounds the historical narrative of sin and redemption, does not supplant but instead grounds and deepens the integrity of politics and... (shrink)

RESUMEN: El presente trabajo examina dos de los principales modelos de exposición del pensamiento político de Tomás de Aquino vigentes en el siglo XX. Uno, en cuya representación se ha escogido la obra de Eschmann, mira a la relación de la obra del Aquinate con sus predecesores; el otro, adecuadamente representado por Ullmann, mira a la relación de dicha obra con el pensamiento que se proyecta a partir de él hacia la Modernidad. Al determinar tanto las virtudes cuanto limitaciones (...) propias de estos modelos hermenéuticos, se hace posible advertir las virtualidades presentes en los mismos, abriendo nuevos caminos de investigación que superen la tensión concebida entre el poder eclesiástico y el civil, así como el temor por reanimar un concepto que, si bien embrionario en la obra del autor medieval, es imprescindible para comprender cabalmente su reactivación del republicanismo aristotélico. Tal es el concepto de nación. ABSTRACT: The present paper deals with two of the main 20th Century hermeneutic models that explain the political thought of Thomas Aquinas. One, well represented by the work of I. Th. Eschmann, regards the relation between Aquinas and his predecessors. The other, well represented by W. Ullmann, looks at the relation between Aquinas and modern thought. In demarcating the virtues as well the limitations of these two hermeneutic models, it is possible to understand the potentialities present in them and to discover new ways for overcoming, on the one hand, the imagined strain between the power of ecclesiastical and the civil authorities, and, on the other hand, fears regarding the concept of nation. This last concept, although embryonic in Aquinas' works, is essential to not misunderstanding his Aristotelian republicanism. (shrink)

Volume 2 of __The Writings of Charles De Koninck_ _is part of the three-volume series presenting the first English edition of the collected works of the Catholic Thomist philosopher Charles De Koninck. Ralph McInerny is the project editor and has prepared the excellent translations. The second volume begins with two works published in 1943: _Ego Sapientia: The Wisdom That Is Mary_, De Koninck's first study in Mariology, and _The Primacy of the Common Good Against the Personalists_, which generated a strong (...) critical reaction. Included in this volume are two reviews of _The Primacy of the Common Good_, by Yves R. Simon and I. Thomas Eschmann, O.P., and De Koninck's substantial response to Eschmann in his lengthy “In Defense of St. Thomas.” The volume concludes with a group of short essays: “The Dialectic of Limits as Critique of Reason,” “Notes on Marxism,” “This Is a Hard Saying,” “[Review of] _Between Heaven and Earth_,” and “Concept, Process, and Reality.” “Volume Two of __The Writings of Charles De Koninck_ _reveals a Thomist at home not merely in the deepest questions of natural science and natural philosophy, but also in the highest reaches of ethical and political philosophy, and in the most wonderful realm of revealed theology. De Koninck combines a justified confidence in his wisdom about the highest things with humility and gratitude for the gift of that wisdom. The series edited by Dr. McInerny is taking shape as a recovered treasure of a philosopher who labored to receive, and to pass on, the gift of wisdom.“ —_David Quackenbush, Thomas Aquinas College_. (shrink)

The present work is substantially a dissertation presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Toronto. While aware of the numerous imperfections of the work I have decided, on the urging of many colleagues, to publish it at this time because of the current relevance of the subject-matter and especially of the collection of texts. I am happy to acknowledge my indebtedness to the faculty of the Pontifical Mediaeval Institute of Toronto and especially to the Reverend (...) Ignatius Eschmann, O.P., who first suggested the idea of this study and whose encouragement and assistance brought it to completion. My thanks are due also to the Reverend George Klubertanz, S.J., and Mr. Paul Mathews, both of the Department of Philosophy of Saint Louis University, and" for invaluable secretarial assistance, to Mrs. Savina Tonella and Miss Agnes Kutz. R. J. HENLE, S.j. Saint Louis December, 1954 TABLE OF CONTENTS GENERAL INTRODUCTION... (shrink)

Sylvain Luquet | : On tente ici de retracer aussi fidèlement que possible les tenants et les aboutissants du célèbre débat autour du bien commun et de la personne suscité par l’attaque du Père Eschmann contre le livre de Charles De Koninck, De la primauté du bien commun contre les personnalistes . On y verra vite à quel point il s’agissait d’un débat d’idées et nullement de conflits personnels. | : We attempt here to retrace as faithfully as possible (...) the whys and wherefores of the famous debate about the common good and the person that resulted from the attack by Father Eschmann against Charles De Koninck’s book, On the Primacy of the Common Good against the Personalists . It will soon be obvious how much the core of this debate were ideas, and not at all personal conflicts. (shrink)

The purpose of this text is to draw attention to eight forgotten heroes: William C. Bagley, Charles DeGarmo, David Felmley, William Torrey Harris, Isaac L. Kandel, Charles McMurry, William C. Ruediger, and Edward Austin Sheldon. They have been marginalized from our profession, and drawing upon their legacy is the best hope for restoring the profession of teaching today. This work also includes a chapter at the end of the book entitled "John Dewey's Forgotten Essays." The audience for this book includes: (...) 1) classroom teachers, 2) school administrators, 3) teacher educators, 4) deans and other university administrators, 5) college and university presidents, 6) legislators, 7) historians of education, 8) curriculum specialists, 9) specialists in teacher training, and 10) the general public. (shrink)

Baruch Spinoza, Friedrich Nietzsche and, more recently, Ruediger Bittner argued that regret is unreasonable. My article criticises this view and describes what I consider to be the common-sense understanding of regret: In some – but not all – cases of flawed actions it is unreasonable to regret what one did. The article characterises the common-sense understanding by eight principles and offers an explication of core concepts.

La réflexion de Thomas d’Aquin sur les régimes de la cité présente l’inconvénient que ses oeuvres politiques sont restées inachevées. Significative pour pouvoir décider de l’appartenance de Thomas d’Aquin au côté de la doctrine gélasienne ou à celle du pape Grégoire VII, la comparaison du Super Sententiisavec le traité De regno, telle qu’elle a été faite par I.T. Eschmann, n’est pas bien riche en conclusions pour la question du consentement politique. Selon la position que nous avons assumée dans notre (...) investigation au sein des deux oeuvres de Thomas, il est possible d’affirmer que la notion de consentement n’introduit pas de fausses discontinuités entre des textes écrits à des périodes distinctes. En fin de compte, ce qui unit le Super Sententiis au De regno c’est, à notre avis, une sorte de prudence politique, issue de la lecture que Thomas d’Aquin fait des livres sapientiels de l’Ancien Testament. Sans avoir l’intention de nier les différences qui existent entre les deux textes thomasiens, il nous semble évident qu’ils dégagent plutôt la perspective d’une science politique attentive aux pratiques du temps, mais encore réservée quant aux concepts liés au consentement exprimé par le principe quod omnes tangit, principe que la prudence politique n’a pas encore assimilé. (shrink)

The 1957 Presidential address of Fr. Klubertanz pleads for greater study of Thomist ethics, especially in view of its recent criticism by Leclerc and Niebuhr, which is expounded and tentatively evaluated. Père Eschmann portrays St. Thomas’s approach to moral philosophy as balancing human autonomy with objective order. Fr. Doyle analyses the current problem of subalternating ethics to theology. Miss Salmon investigates the relationship of moral truth to modern epistemology, while Dr. Riedl further analyses ethics as a practical science in (...) the historical light of Aristotle and St. Thomas. (shrink)