Written by one of today's most creative and innovative philosophers, Ruth Garrett Millikan, this book examines basic empirical concepts; how they are acquired, how they function, and how they have been misrepresented in the traditional philosophical literature. Millikan places cognitive psychology in an evolutionary context where human cognition is assumed to be an outgrowth of primitive forms of mentality, and assumed to have 'functions' in the biological sense. Of particular interest are her discussions of the nature of abilities as (...) different from dispositions, her detailed analysis of the psychological act of reidentifying substances, and her critique of the language of thought for mental representation. In a radical departure from current philosophical and psychological theories of concepts, this book provides the first in-depth discussion on the psychological act of reidentification. (shrink)

This introductory article describes the phenomena of incommensurability and incomparability, how they are related, and why they are important. Since incomparability is the more significant phenomenon, the paper takes that as its focus. It gives a detailed account of what incomparability is, investigates the relation between the incomparability of values and the incomparability of alternatives for choice, distinguishes incomparability from the related phenomena of parity, indeterminacy, and noncomparability, and, finally, defends a view about practical justification that vindicates the importance of (...) incomparability — assuming it exists — for practical reason. (shrink)

The central aim of this book is to answer two questions: Are alternatives for choice ever incomparable? and, In what ways can items be compared? The arguments offered suggest that alternatives for choice no matter how different are never incomparable, and that the ways in which items can be compared are richer and more varied than commonly supposed. This work is the first book length treatment of the topics of incomparability, value, and practical reason.

Genetic database initiatives have given rise to considerable debate about their potential harms and benefits. The question arises as to whether existing ethical frameworks are sufficient to mediate between the competing interests at stake. One approach is to strengthen mechanisms for obtaining informed consent and for protecting confidentiality. However, there is increasing interest in other ethical frameworks, involving solidarity — participation in research for the common good — and the sharing of the benefits of research.

Robert Alexy develops his influential theory of legal reasoning exploring the nature of legal argumentation and its relation to practical reasoning. In doing so he sheds light on fundamental questions of law and rationality, which are as crucial to practising lawyers and law students as they are to scholars of legal theory.

Hume’s theory of personal identity is developed in response to Locke’s account of personal identity. Yet it is striking that Hume does not emphasize Locke’s distinction between persons and human beings. It seems even more striking that Hume’s account of the self in Books 2 and 3 of the Treatise has less scope for distinguishing persons from human beings than his account in Book 1. This is puzzling, because Locke originally introduced the distinction in order to answer questions of moral (...) accountability and Hume’s discussion of the self in Book 2 provides the foundation of his moral theory in Book 3. In response to the puzzle I show that Locke and Hume hold different moral and religious views and these differences are important to explain why their theories of personal identity differ. (shrink)

The privacy concerns discussed in the 1990s in relation to the New Genetics failed to anticipate the relevant issues for individuals, families, geneticists and society. Consumers, for example, can now buy their personal genetic information and share it online. The challenges facing genetic privacy have evolved as new biotechnologies have developed, and personal privacy is increasingly challenged by the irrepressible flow of electronic data between the personal and public spheres and by surveillance for terrorism and security risks. This book considers (...) the right to know and the right not to know about your own and others’ genomes. It discusses new privacy concerns and developments in ethical thinking, with the greater emphasis on solidarity and equity. The multidisciplinary approach covers current topics such as biobanks and forensic databases, DIY testing, group rights and accountability, the food we eat and the role of the press and the new digital media. (shrink)

What, normatively speaking, are the grounds of rational choice? This paper defends ‘comparativism’, the view that a comparative fact grounds rational choice. It examines three of the most serious challenges to comparativism: 1) that sometimes what grounds rational choice is an exclusionary-type relation among alternatives; 2) that an absolute fact such as that it’s your duty or conforms to the Categorial Imperative grounds rational choice; and 3) that rational choice between incomparables is possible, and in particular, all that is needed (...) for the possibility of rational choice is that one alternative is not worse than the others. Each challenge is questioned. If comparativism is correct, then no matter what normative theory you favor, your answer to the question, ‘What makes my choice rational?’ must be comparative in form. In this way, comparativism provides a framework for normative theorizing. (shrink)

The human imagination remains one of the last uncharted terrains of the mind. People often imagine how events might have turned out something had been different. The of reality, those aspects more readily changed, indicate that counterfactual thoughts are guided by the same principles as rational thoughts. In the past, rationality and imagination have been viewed as opposites. But research has shown that rational thought is more imaginative than cognitive scientists had supposed. In The Rational Imagination, I argue that imaginative (...) thought is more rational than scientists have imagined. People exhibit remarkable similarities in the sorts of things they change in their mental representation of reality when they imagine how the facts could have turned out differently. For example, they tend to imagine alternatives to actions rather than inactions, events within their control rather than those beyond their control, and socially unacceptable events rather than acceptable ones. Their thoughts about how an event might have turned out differently lead them to judge that a strong causal relation exists between an antecedent event and the outcome, and their thoughts about how an event might have turned out the same lead them to judge that a weaker causal relation exists. In a simple temporal sequence, people tend to imagine alternatives to the most recent event. The central claim in the book is that counterfactual thoughts are organised along the same principles as rational thought. The idea that the counterfactual imagination is rational depends on three steps: (1) humans are capable of rational thought; (2) they make inferences by thinking about possibilities; and (3) their counterfactual thoughts rely on thinking about possibilities, just as rational thoughts do. The sorts of possibilities that people envisage explain the mutability of certain aspects of mental representations and the immutability of other aspects. (shrink)

This collection of Marcus's non-technical essays include her earlier ground-breaking axiomatizations of quantified modal logic, and explore such topics as the necessity of identity, the directly referential role of proper names as "tags", the interplay of possibility and existence, and others viewed as iconoclastic when Marcus first addressed them, but now long incorporated into current discussion.

If liberal theory is to move forward, it must take the political nature of family relations seriously. The beginnings of such a liberalism appear in Mary Wollstonecraft's work. Wollstonecraft's depiction of the family as a fundamentally political institution extends liberal values into the private sphere by promoting the ideal of marriage as friendship. However, while her model of marriage diminishes arbitrary power in family relations, she seems unable to incorporate enduring sexual relations between married partners.

Lifelong learning is something which one does for oneself that no one else can do for one: it is a public and personal human activity, rather than private or individualistic. One of the features of the education system is the paucity of a language for learning as process and participative experience. Personalised learning requires a sense of the worth-whileness of 'being a learner' - a virtue in the 21st century. A sense of one's own worth as a person is essential (...) to understanding one's identity as a learner. Research suggests the human capacity to learn can be understood as a form of consciousness which is characterised by particular values, attitudes and dispositions, with a lateral and a temporal connectivity. This 'consciousness' has several dimensions which are all related to becoming a person, with a learning identity. They also enable the learner to become aware of and appropriate what is of worth and map onto the sorts of core values that learning communities espouse. Awareness of self and of one's own worth as a person is a necessary condition for 'becoming a learner' and for identifying and engaging with 'what is of worth'. Furthermore, a sense of self as a learner is formed in relationship, and understood as one learns to tell one's own story, as a participant in the conversation of the learning community. Character is the way in which we refer to that quality of personhood in which there is rooted the capacity to change and learn over time. (shrink)

Public health ethics is emerging as a new field of inquiry, distinct not only from public health law, but also from traditional medical ethics and research ethics. Public health professional and scholarly attention is focusing on ways that ethical analysis and a new public health code of ethics can be a resource for health professionals working in the field. This article provides a preliminary exploration of the ethical issues faced by public health professionals in day-to-day practice and of the type (...) of ethics education and support they believe may be helpful. (shrink)

In the libertarian ``agent causation'' view of free will, free choices are attributable only to the choosing agent, as opposed to a specific cause or causes outside the agent. An often-repeated claim in the philosophical literature on free will is that agent causation necessarily implies lawlessness, and is therefore ``antiscientific." That claim is critiqued and it is argued, on the contrary, that the volitional powers of a free agent need not be viewed as anomic, specifically with regard to the quantum (...) statistical law. Assumptions about the role and nature of causation, taken as bearing on volitional agency, are examined and found inadequate to the task. Finally, it is suggested that quantum theory may constitute precisely the sort of theory required for a nomic grounding of libertarian free will. (shrink)

Through a collection of contributions from an international team of empirical researchers and philosophers, _New Philosophies of Learning_ signals the need for a sharper critical awareness of the possibilities and problems that the recent spate of innovative learning techniques presents. Explores some of the many contemporary innovations in approaches to learning, including neuroscience and the focus on learners’ well-being and happiness Debates the controversial approaches to categorising learners such as dyslexia Raises doubts about the preoccupation with quasi-mathematical scrutiny and the (...) neglect of ethical reflection about education Discusses the possible grounds for concern, without exaggerating their similarities or offering sweeping judgements Includes contributions from empirical researchers and philosophers, including Usha Goswami, Howard Gardner, Julian Elliott, David Bakhurst, John White and Christopher Winch. (shrink)

Background Paramedicine is a newly regulated profession in Australia and with the introduction of regulation in 2018 for this profession came increased responsibilities – including the introduction of a professional code of conduct. Several countries now have regulation of paramedicine and associated professional codes to guide ethical and professional behaviour. Despite this, there has been no published research into paramedic understanding and use of their professional codes. Objectives To explore Australian paramedics’ use and understanding of their professional code of conduct. (...) Research design: This study used a qualitative descriptive design, underpinned by hermeneutic theory. Reflexive thematic analysis was used to analyse the interview data and identify Australian paramedic perceptions surrounding the use of their code of conduct. Results 11 Registered Paramedics from several states and territories were interviewed. Participants were invited to interview by advertisement on social media and the Australasian College of Paramedicine Web site. Participants had varied professional backgrounds including clinical work, education providers and policymakers/managers. Four themes were identified as follows: Theme 1 – ‘You don’t know, what you can’t know’; Theme 2 – ‘I don’t need the code – the code is for others’; Theme 3 – ‘It’s about time’; Theme 4 – ‘Navigating the new profession’. Ethical considerations: Ethics approval was granted by the Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee (MUHREC) Project ID: 28921. All participants provided informed consent. Conclusions The results of this study suggest that paramedics’ knowledge and use of their code is limited, and participants appeared to mostly rely instead on ‘common sense’ morals. Participants did appear to want to understand the broad concepts of the code more and have this better integrated into the profession. The code was also interpreted as important to the paramedic profession and its new professional status, helping to legitimise it as a health profession in Australia. (shrink)

The type of research known as cluster randomized trials raises ethical questions not readily answered within the standard understanding of research ethics. What distinguishes a CRT is that it randomizes at the level of social groups rather than at the level of individual research participants: in a CRT, the regimen under study might be assigned to a village, hospital, or school. The organizational schemes of CRTs raise an assortment of fundamental ethical problems. In certain CRTs, the question of whether it (...) is possible to obtain individual informed consent is central. Also, if the intervention is offered at the level of a sizable social group, there is usually no realistic possibility for individuals to opt out of the trial. Other ethical questions raised by CRTs have to do with identifying the subjects of research, and indeed with whether “research” is occurring at all. (shrink)

Proposals for an ethical code for scientists raise questions about the usefulness of the framework of professional ethics for debating relevant issues surrounding ethics and science. Is science a profession and if so should its professional ethic be self-derived or subject to external input? What needs to be addressed is the nature of the 'good' that science promotes. Explanations of science as a public good in terms of knowledge and diversity are possibilities, but science's answer to the basic philosophical question (...) of hope in the human condition should not be overlooked. (shrink)

This is a synoptic and critical commentary on Joseph Raz’s From Normativity to Responsibility.

Issues in genetics and genomics have been centre stage in Bioethics for much of its history, and have given rise to both negative and positive imagined futures. Ten years after the completion of the Human Genome Project, it is a good time to assess developments. The promise of whole genome sequencing of individuals requires reflection on personalization, genetic determinism, and privacy.

The emotions have long been an interest for those studying ancient Greece and Rome. But while the last few decades have produced excellent studies of individual emotions and the different approaches to them by the major philosophical schools, the focus has been almost entirely on negative emotions. This might give the impression that the Greeks and Romans had little to say about positive emotion, something that would be misguided. As the chapters in this collection indicate, there are representations of positive (...) emotions extending from archaic Greek poetry to Augustine, and in both philosophical works and literary genres as wide-ranging as lyric poetry, forensic oratory, comedy, didactic poetry, and the novel. Nor is the evidence uniform: while many of the literary representations give expression to positive emotion but also describe its loss, the philosophers offer a more optimistic assessment of the possibilities of attaining joy or contentment in this life.The positive emotions show some of the same features that all emotions do. But unlike the negative emotions, which we are able to describe and analyze in great detail because of our preoccupation with them, positive emotions tend to be harder to articulate. Hence the interest of the present study, which considers how positive emotions are described, their relationship to other emotions, the ways in which they are provoked or upset by circumstances, how they complicate and enrich our relationships with other people, and which kinds of positive emotion we should seek to integrate. The ancient works have a great deal to say about all of these topics, and for that reason deserve more study, both for our understanding of antiquity and for our understanding of the positive emotions in general. (shrink)

Editorial of Approaching Religion, Vol. 11 Issue 1, based on a two-day seminar arranged in Helsinki in August 2020 by the Signe and Ane Gyllenberg Foundation under the title ‘Clear-sighted Art – Open Mind? Encounters between Art and Esotericism’.

El objetivo de este trabajo es estudiar los modos en los que la documentación árabe emitida por las notarías mozárabes de Toledo es incluida en dos cartularios elaborados en el scriptorium catedralicio: Toledo, Biblioteca Capitular, 42-20 (1190) y Madrid, Archivo Histórico Nacional, 987B (1257 p. q.). Estos volúmenes tienen en común que no copian las cartas árabes de forma literal, sino que las traducen y resumen. No obstante, también presentan diferencias importantes: mientras que Toledo, Biblioteca Capitular, 42-20 copia algunas firmas (...) árabes, en Madrid, Archivo Histórico Nacional, 987B el árabe está completamente ausente. Además, los volúmenes también se diferencian en la colocación de los resúmenes del árabe en el conjunto de documentos copiados y, sobre todo, en la lengua meta de las traducciones: latín en el primer caso, romance en el segundo. De este modo, el análisis de los mecanismos de recepción del árabe en estos dos cartularios nos proporciona información sobre la convivencia de lenguas en la Toledo medieval y documenta los cambios en el panorama lingüístico en el periodo que medió entre la elaboración de los dos cartularios. (shrink)

Cognitive and social sciences such as psychology and sociology are often described as immature sciences. But what is immaturity? According to the received view, immaturity is disunity, where disunity can usefully be cashed out in terms of having a plurality of disunified frameworks in play, where these frameworks consist of concepts, theories, goals, practices, methods, criteria for what counts as a good explanation, etc. However, there are some reasons to think that the cognitive and social sciences should be disunified in (...) this sense. If that is right, either these sciences should remain immature, or we need a new account of immaturity. The former option is unappealing. I therefore provide an alternative account of immaturity, based on Dudley Shapere’s work on the internal/external distinction. I then go on to use this account to argue against the imposition of unification on the cognitive and social sciences. Acceptance of disunity may be the route to maturity, rather than a sign of immaturity. (shrink)

Looks at ethical procedure in the choices and decisions made by nurses with regard to such questions as obeying doctors, covering up of a colleague's mistakes, recent developments in foetal surgery and whether the nurse's advocate role is tenable in practice. These questions are taken from the personal case studies recounted by 450 nurses in Britain and North America. The issues are to be found in many hospital situations and are faced in day-to-day practice by student and qualified nurses. A (...) commentary is provided on the ethical principles involved. (shrink)

Issues arising in connection with genes and nutrition policy include both nutrigenomics and nutrigenetics. Nutrigenomics considers the relationship between specifc nutrients or diet and gene expression and, it is envisaged, will facilitate prevention of diet-related common diseases. Nutrigenetics is concerned with the effects of individual genetic variation on response to diet, and in the longer term may lead to personalised dietary recommendations. It is important also to consider the surrounding context of other issues such as novel and functional foods in (...) so far as they are related to genetic modification. Ethical issues fall into a number of categories: why nutrigenomics? Will it have important public health benefits? questions about research, e.g. concerning the acquisition of information about individual genetic variation; questions about who has access to this information, and its possible misuse; the applications of this information in terms of public health policy, and the negotiation of the potential tension between the interests of the individual in relation to, for example, prevention of conditions such as obesity and allergy; the appropriate ethical approach to the issues, e.g. the moral difference, if any, between therapy and enhancement in relation to individualised diets; whether the 'technological fix' is always appropriate, especially in the wider context of the purported lack of public confidence in science, which has special resonance in the sphere of nutrition. (shrink)

In this response I discuss some of the key issues raised by the commentators on The Rational Imagination. I consider whether the imaginative creation of alternatives to reality is rational or irrational, and what happens in childhood cognition to enable a rational imagination to develop. I outline how thoughts about causality, counterfactuality, and controllability are intertwined and why some sorts of possibilities are more readily imagined than others. I conclude with a consideration of what the counterfactual imagination is for.

From our deep interest in the neuroconstructivist framework, we would like to comment on two fundamental aspects of Mareschal et al.'s work: the role of neuroconstructivism for clinical work with people suffering from developmental disorders; and the relation between the process of progressive specialization and the increasing abstraction of representations in development.