Les dynamiques de classe du changement agraire en Afrique ont fait l’objet de débats importants. Dans son ouvrage de référence, Femmes, greniers et capitaux, Meillassoux prédisait en 1975 la cannibalisation de la paysannerie, avec la domination croissante des relations capitalistes dans les campagnes. Pourtant, près d’un demi-siècle plus tard, la paysannerie reste une construction sociale, économique et politique pertinente. En s’appuyant sur le cas du Mozambique, cet article explore les significations contradictoires de la paysannerie dans le capitalisme contemporain. La première (...) section retrace la création du paysan-prolétaire en Afrique australe, en s’appuyant sur les travaux de Meillassoux sur la « communauté domestique ». La deuxième partie explore les différentes manières dont les camponeses improvisent leur subsistance à travers trois cas. L’article conclut que la paysannerie incarne un ensemble contradictoire de significations qui reflètent les processus de production de marchandises plutôt qu’un passé précapitaliste. (shrink)

Nicolaus Steno (1638–1686) claimed that the Earth has a history that can be known by analyzing mountain strata with rules today known as Steno’s Principles of Stratigraphy. This essay argues that Steno’s research on the Earth was intrinsically related to his studies of the body. Most accounts associate Steno’s research on fossils with his dissection of a shark in the fall of 1666 in Medici Florence. Instead, the author suggests that Steno turned to the Earth after reading a manuscript about (...) fossils that contradicted his research methods. The essay shows how, exactly, Steno shifted his research and writing methods from anatomy to geology. In short, by reading Steno’s geology in light of his anatomical work, the essay presents anatomy as an influential discipline that contributed to other areas of knowledge and helped to spread the idea of laws of nature. It also problematizes the categories of seventeenth-century polymathy. (shrink)

This article deals with physico-mathematical approaches to anatomy in post-Harveyan physiology. But rather than looking at questions of iatromechanics and animal locomotion, which often attracted this approach, I look at the problem of how blood returned to the heart – a part of the circulation today known as venous return but poorly researched in the early modern period. I follow the venous return mechanisms proposed by lesser-known authors in the mechanization of anatomy, such as Jean Pecquet (1622–1674) and Nicolaus Steno (...) (1638–1686), alongside the more famous Giovanni Alfonso Borelli (1608–1679). Their mechanisms differed only in small details. Yet, these minor differences highlight significant aspects of the mechanization of the life sciences in the seventeenth century. First, they relied more on observations than hitherto acknowledged, even if only indirectly. Second, their mechanisms drew more from the physico-mathematical disciplines than from the trending corpuscularian philosophies of their time. Finally, these mechanisms led to a more accurate understanding of the circulation that remains valid today, thus revealing their cognitive benefits. In short, through the single problem of how blood returned to the heart, this article portrays the increasing complexity of anatomy in the early modern period. (shrink)

Resumo: O presente artigo analisa a política de ensino integral no estado de Pernambuco, implementada por atores privados desde 2008, com enfoque privilegiado sobre as formas de contratação de docentes e sua incidência no território. A hipótese aqui considerada faz analogia ao pensamento de Lévi-Strauss, por ocasião de sua passagem pelo Brasil em 1930, quando remarcou o arrasamento da população indígena pela cultura do homem branco e seus interesses econômicos sustentados pelo discurso da modernidade. Problematiza-se, assim, em que medida (...) o avanço do segmento empresarial na educação pública assemelha-se à constatação tecida nos “Tristes trópicos” (1955) à medida que arrasa uma cultura educacional que passa da estabilidade e reflexividade para o pragmatismo e a racionalidade econômica. A concepção teórica que sustenta o debate sobre o tema apoia-se em Robert Castel (1998) e Cingolani (2005), os quais destacam que a precariedade nas relações de trabalho conduz a um processo de precarização das condições de vida, posto que trabalhadores sujeitados a trabalhos intermitentes, contratos por tempo determinado, tempo parcial, entre outros, resultam em vulnerabilidade social. Palavras-chave: Trabalho Docente; Privatização; Precariedade; Política Educacional. Sad tropics: the business culture of precarity applied to public education. Abstract: This article analyzes the policy of full-time education in the state of Pernambuco, implemented by private actors since 2008, with a privileged focus on the ways of hiring teachers and its impact on the territory. The hypothesis here considered makes analogy with the thought of Lévi-Strauss, on his passage in Brazil in 1930, when he remarked the destruction of the indigenous population by the white man's culture and his economic interests supported by the discourse of modernity. Is problematized how much the advance of the entrepreneurial segment in public education is similar to the observation made in "Sad tropics" (1955) as it devastates an educational culture that moves from stability and reflexivity to pragmatism and economic rationality. The theoretical conception that sustained the debate about the theme is based on Robert Castel (1998) and Cingolani (2005), who point out that the precarity in work relations leads to a process of precariousness in living conditions, since subjected to intermittent work, fixed-term contracts, part-time work, among others, result in social vulnerability. Keywords: Teaching Work; Privatization; Precarity; Educational Politics. Tropiques tristes : la culture entrepreneuriale de la précarité appliquée à l'éducation publique. Resumé: Cet article analyse la politique d'éducation à temps pleins dans l'État de Pernambuco, mise en œuvre par des acteurs privés depuis 2008, en se concentrant de manière privilégiée sur les formes d'embauche des enseignants et leur impact sur le territoire. L'hypothèse envisagée ici fait analogie à la pensée de Lévi-Strauss, à l'occasion de son passage au Brésil en 1930, lorsqu'il remarquait la destruction de la population indigène par la culture de l'homme blanc et ses intérêts économiques soutenus par le discours de la modernité. Le problème est donc de savoir dans quelle mesure l'avancée du segment entrepreneurial dans l'enseignement public est similaire à l'observation faite dans "Tristes trópicos" (1955) car elle dévaste une culture éducative qui passe de la stabilité et de la réflexivité au pragmatisme et à la rationalité économique. La conception théorique qui soutient le débat sur le sujet est basée sur Robert Castel (1998) et Cingolani (2005), qui soulignent que la précarité dans les relations de travail conduit à un processus de précarisation des conditions de vie, puisque soumis au travail intermittent, aux contrats à durée déterminée, au temps partiel, entre autres, entraînent une vulnérabilité sociale. Mots clés : Travail Enseignant ; Privatisation ; Précarité ; Politique Éducative. Data de registro: 29/05/2022Data de aceite: 28/06/2022. (shrink)

Preface by Daniel C. Dennett Beginning with a general theory of function applied to body organs, behaviors, customs, and both inner and outer representations, ...

This collection of essays serves both as an introduction to Ruth Millikan’s much-discussed volume Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories and as an extension and application of Millikan’s central themes, especially in the philosophy of psychology. The title essay discusses meaning rationalism and argues that rationality is not in the head, indeed, that there is no legitimate interpretation under which logical possibility and necessity are known a priori. In other essays, Millikan clarifies her views on the nature of mental (...) representation, explores whether human thought is a product of natural selection, examines the nature of behavior as studied by the behavioral sciences, and discusses the issues of individualism in psychology, psychological explanation, indexicality in thought, what knowledge is, and the realism/antirealism debate. Table of Contents Preface Acknowledgments Introduction 1 In Defense of Proper Functions 2 Propensities, Exaptations, and the Brain 3 Thoughts without Laws 4 Biosemantics 5 On Mentalese Orthography, Part 1 6 Compare and Contrast Dretske, Fodor, and Millikan on Teleosemantics 7 What Is Behavior? A Philosophical Essay on Ethology and Individualism in Psychology, Part 1 8 The Green Grass Growing All Around: A Philosophical Essay on Ethology and Individualism in Psychology, Part 2 9 Explanation in Biopsychology 10 Metaphysical Antirealism? 11 Truth Rules, Hoverflies, and the Kripke-Wittgenstein Paradox 12 Naturalist Reflections on Knowledge 13 The Myth of the Essential Indexical 14 White Queen Psychology; or, The Last Myth of the Given References Index. (shrink)

Ruth Garrett Millikan presents a strikingly original account of how we get to grips with the world in thought. Her question is Kant's 'How is knowledge possible?', answered from a contemporary naturalist standpoint. We begin with an understanding of what the world is like prior to cognition, then develop a theory of cognition within that world.

Written by one of today's most creative and innovative philosophers, Ruth Garrett Millikan, this book examines basic empirical concepts; how they are acquired, how they function, and how they have been misrepresented in the traditional philosophical literature. Millikan places cognitive psychology in an evolutionary context where human cognition is assumed to be an outgrowth of primitive forms of mentality, and assumed to have 'functions' in the biological sense. Of particular interest are her discussions of the nature of abilities as (...) different from dispositions, her detailed analysis of the psychological act of reidentifying substances, and her critique of the language of thought for mental representation. In a radical departure from current philosophical and psychological theories of concepts, this book provides the first in-depth discussion on the psychological act of reidentification. (shrink)

I defend the historical definition of "function" originally given in my Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories (1984a). The definition was not offered in the spirit of conceptual analysis but is more akin to a theoretical definition of "function". A major theme is that nonhistorical analyses of "function" fail to deal adequately with items that are not capable of performing their functions.

" Biosemantics " was the title of a paper on mental representation originally printed in The Journal of Philosophy in 1989. It contained a much abbreviated version of the work on mental representation in Language Thought and Other Biological Categories. There I had presented a naturalist theory of intentional signs generally, including linguistic representations, graphs, charts and diagrams, road sign symbols, animal communications, the "chemical signals" that regulate the function of glands, and so forth. But the term " biosemantics " (...) has usually been applied only to the theory of mental representation. Let me first characterize a more general class of theories called "teleological theories of mental content" of which biosemantics is an example. Then I will discuss the details that distinguish biosemantics from other naturalistic teleological theories. (shrink)

‘Normative powers’ are capacities to create normative reasons by our willing or say-so. They are significant, because if we have them and exercise them, then sometimes the reasons we have are ‘up to us’. But such powers seem mysterious. How can we, by willing, create reasons? In this paper, I examine whether normative powers can be adequately explained normatively, by appeal to norms of a practice, normative principles, human interests, or values. Can normative explanations of normative powers explain how an (...) exercise of the will can afford us special freedom in determining our reasons? I argue that normative approaches to answering this question prove to be inadequate. To vindicate the thought that normative powers can make our reasons ‘up to us’, we need an altogether different approach to understanding them, one that is located not in the normative but in the metaphysical. I end the paper by sketching a metaphysical explanation of normative powers. This metaphysical defence of normative powers provides a window into a different, more agent-centered way of thinking about rational agency. (shrink)

Robert Alexy develops his influential theory of legal reasoning exploring the nature of legal argumentation and its relation to practical reasoning. In doing so he sheds light on fundamental questions of law and rationality, which are as crucial to practising lawyers and law students as they are to scholars of legal theory.

Rather than the art of putting forward logically valid arguments leading to Truth, argumentation is here viewed as the use of verbal means ensuring an agreement on what can be considered reasonable by a given group, on a more or less controversial matter. What is acceptable and plausible is always coconstructed by subjects engaging in verbal interaction. It is the dynamism of this exchange, realized not only in natural language, but also in a specific cultural framework, that has to be (...) accounted for. From this perspective, it is not enough to reconstruct patterns of reasoning. As logos is by definition both Reason and Language, abstract schemata have to be examined in their verbal realization in a given situation of discourse. Such an approach to arguments allows for a “thick” description taking into account their discursive and communicational aspects, as well as argumentation’s constitutive dialogism and its inscription in a set of common representations, opinions and beliefs (a doxa). This approach, exemplified by the analysis of a short text on stock options borrowed from the French newspaper Libération, is an attempt at establishing a dialogue between disciplines like argumentation theories, rhetorical criticism and discourse analysis. (shrink)

This paper compares ethics in countries with different cultural dimensions based on empirical data from 12 countries. The results indicate that dimensions of national culture could serve as predictors of the ethical standards desired in a specific society. The author divided societal cultural practices into desired and undesired practices. According to this study, ethics could be seen as the means for achieving a desired state in a society: for reducing some societal characteristics and increasing others. Finally, a model of the (...) impact of cultural dimensions on desired ethical standards is proposed. (shrink)

At the start of Convention (1969) Lewis says that it is "a platitude that language is ruled by convention" and that he proposes to give us "an analysis of convention in its full generality, including tacit convention not created by agreement." Almost no clause, however, of Lewis's analysis has withstood the barrage of counter examples over the years,1 and a glance at the big dictionary suggests why, for there are a dozen different senses listed there. Left unfettered, convention wanders freely (...) from conventional wisdom through conventional medicine, conventions of art and "conventions of morality" to conventions of bidding in bridge.2 Surely it is unwise to try to fell these all with a single stone. Lewis's original goal, however, pursued further in (Lewis 1975), was to describe the conventionality of language, and this may be a more reasonable target. (shrink)

I give an analysis of how empirical terms do their work in communication and the gathering of knowledge that is fully externalist and that covers the full range of empirical terms. It rests on claims about ontology. A result is that armchair analysis fails as a tool for examining meanings of ‘basic’ empirical terms because their meanings are not determined by common methods or criteria of application passed from old to new users, by conventionally determined ‘intensions’. Nor do methods of (...) application used by individual speakers constitute definitive reference-determining intensions for their idiolect terms or associated concepts. Conventional intensions of non-basic empirical terms ultimately rest on basic empirical concepts, so no empirical meaning is found merely ‘in the head’. I discuss the nature of lexical definition, why empirical meanings cannot ultimately be modelled as functions from possible worlds to extensions, and traps into which armchair analysis of meaning can lead us. A coda explains how ‘Swampman’ examples, as used against teleosemantic theories of content, illustrate such traps. (shrink)

Suppose lightning strikes a dead tree in a swamp; I am standing nearby. My body is reduced to its elements, while entirely by coincidence (and out of different molecules) the tree is turned into my physical replica. My replica, The Swampman.....moves into my house and seems to write articles on radical interpretation. No one can tell the difference.

The positions of Brandom and Millikan are compared with respect to their common origins in the works of Wilfrid Sellars and Wittgenstein. Millikan takes more seriously the “picturing” themes from Sellars and Wittgenstein. Brandom follows Sellars more closely in deriving the normativity of language from social practice, although there are also hints of a possible derivation from evolutionary theory in Sellars. An important claim common to Brandom and Millikan is that there are no representations without function or “attitude”.

We discuss the important, but greatly under-researched, topic of the social aspects of human wayfinding during navigation. Wayfinding represents the planning and decision-making component of navigation and is arguably among the most common, real-world domains of both individual and group-level decision making. We highlight the myriad ways that wayfinding by people is not a solitary psychological process but is influenced by the actions of other people, even by their mere presence. We also present a novel and comprehensive framework for classifying (...) wayfinding in complex environments that incorporates the influence of other people. This classification builds upon the premises of previous wayfinding taxonomies and is further structured into four parts based upon (1) the nature of the interaction between the actors and (2) the time frame in which the interaction takes place. We highlight gaps in our current understanding of social wayfinding and outline future research opportunities. (shrink)

In this 60th anniversary of Business & Society essay, we seek to make three main contributions at the intersection of governance and artificial intelligence. First, we aim to illuminate some of the deeper social, legal, organizational, and democratic challenges of rising AI adoption and resulting algorithmic power by reviewing AI research through a governance lens. Second, we propose an AI governance framework that aims to better assess AI challenges as well as how different governance modalities can support AI. At the (...) heart of our framework lies the governance forces that apply to institutions, organizations, and individuals, who ultimately provide, regulate, and use AI decision-making. We discuss how businesses may harness AI’s economic power through governance solutions without creating or amplifying societal biases and inequalities. Third, as part of our section on future research, we identify a set of governance trade-offs in AI adoption, suggest future research avenues to conceptually strengthen research on the governance of AI, and lay out key policy recommendations. (shrink)

This paper takes a new look at Francis Hutcheson's moral sense theory and examines it in light of the views of his rationalist critics and opponents who claim that there has to be an antecedent moral standard prior to any sense or affections. I examine how Gilbert Burnet, Samuel Clarke, and Catharine Trotter Cockburn each argue for the priority of reason over a moral sense and how Hutcheson responds or could respond to their views. Furthermore, I consider the proposal that (...) rather than regarding Hutcheson's moral sense theory as fundamentally opposed to moral rationalism, Hutcheson and Clarke endorse a shared moral metaphysics, as argued by Patricia Sheridan. Although I consider this proposal as too broad and believe it overlooks relevant metaphysical differences between Clarke and Hutcheson, I argue that the dispute between Hutcheson and his critics and opponents will not be settled without taking their underlying moral metaphysics into consideration. (shrink)

Since the last issue of Feminist Legal Studies, we editorial board members have had lots of conversations about comfort, displacement and alienation. As we developed the programme for #FLaK2016 we thought about it as a kind of pulling ourselves out of our comfort zone, if academic events and journals ever have a comfort zone. Drawing on a mix of feminist live performance methods and a science and technology studies-type curiosity for objects of experimentation, we tried out a kitchen table method (...) of hosting a live research conversation with activists, artists and academics over two days. But we had not fully anticipated the way that the Brexit result would contribute to and complicate discomfort. A fuller analysis of FLaK awaits a later moment, but here we pick out this one aspect of our gathering—feelings of discomfort – as they animate the contributions to this issue in interesting ways. (shrink)

One of the virtues of the biosemantic view of language is the clarity and simplicity of its description of the general nature of nonrepresentational linguistic constructions. It doesn't follow, however, that it is obvious on this view how these functions should be described individually. After an explanation of the biosemantic approach, initial suggestions are made for analyses of a variety of nonrepresentational constructions that have traditionally been considered problematic. Included are “not”, “is” (of identity), “exists”, “means”, “but”, “if … then”, (...) “possibly” and “true.”. (shrink)

One of the major purposes of this article is to show that friendship was one of Nietzsche's central concerns and that he shared Aristotle's belief that it takes higher and lower forms. Yet Nietzsche's interest in friendship is overlooked in much of the secondary literature. An important reason for this is that this interest is most evident in the works of his middle period, and these tend to be neglected in commentaries on Nietzsche. In the works of the middle period, (...) Nietzsche suggests that there is a close connection between friendship and selfhood, contending that an individual's friendships reflect something about his or her identity. Following Aristotle, he believes that friendship can make a significant contribution to self-knowledge and self-improvement, which are both closely associated with his notion of self-overcoming. Nietzsche encourages individuals to adopt an aesthetic approach to the self: they should refashion themselves by consolidating their strengths, minimising their weaknesses and developing themselves in new directions. The works of the middle period suggest, however, that not only can friendship foster self-overcoming, but that the talent for friendship is one of the marks of a higher human being. Recognising this requires some reconsideration of Nietzsche's putative individualism and the belief that he holds great individuals to be utterly independent and indifferent to the judgements of others. It also requires a revision of the common interpretation that he is unremittingly sceptical about pity and other forms of fellow-feeling. Yet while Nietzsche generalises about friendship in the works of the middle period and contrasts its superior and inferior forms, he remains sensitive to its particularity. He never adopts a wholly formulaic approach to this relationship, but recognises that difference and responsiveness to particularity are among its central characteristics. (shrink)

This is a response to Christie, Brusse, et al., ‘Are biological traits explained by their “selected effect” functions?’ The interest of their paper is that it draws our attention to those cases in which changes in a population that are brought about by natural selection in turn bring about changes in the environment that alter the selectionist pressures that were responsible for the original changes. Much of the paper, however, is an argument that the notion of a ‘proper function’ introduced (...) in my Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories (LTOBC), exhibits deep misunderstandings about the actual workings of natural selection. Very little that they say about ‘proper functions’ and related notions from LTOBC is correct, however. I will not list the errors but I will try to make my uses of ‘proper function’ and certain related terms clearer. (shrink)

This paper presents a formal characterization of a two stage decision rule. This characterization involves three conditions which, together, are satisfied by any choice function that can be represented as a two-tier choice function. And any choice function satisfying these three conditions can be represented as a two-tier choice function. The first condition identifies particular features of two-tier choice functions when they violate Property α. The other two conditions are essentially existence claims, required to ensure that the two tiers of (...) a choice function can be represented as (pseudo-) rationalizable choice functions. My aim is to offer a formal result that provides insight into the nature of two-tier decisions. The more we understand how a particular decision procedure operates, the more we should expect to predict its results accurately, and the more we should be able to understand the circumstances under which its use is (and is not) appropriate. (shrink)

Picking up the question of what FLaK might be, this editorial considers the relationship between openness and closure in feminist legal studies. How do we draw on feminist struggles for openness in common resources, from security to knowledge, as we inhabit a compromised space in commercial publishing? We think about this first in relation to the content of this issue: on image-based abuse continuums, asylum struggles, trials of protestors, customary justice, and not-so-timely reparations. Our thoughts take us through the different (...) ways that openness and closure work in struggles against violence, cruel welcomes, and re-arrangements of code and custom. Secondly, we share some reflections on methodological openness and closure as the roundtable conversation on asylum, and the interview with Riles, remind us of #FLaK2016 and its method of scattering sources as we think about how best to mix knowledges. Thirdly, prompted by the FLaK kitchen table conversations on openness, publishing and ‘getting the word out’, we respond to Kember’s call to ‘open up open access’. We explain the different current arrangements for opening up FLS content and how green open access, the sharedit initiative, author request and publisher discretion present alternatives to gold open access. Finally drawing on Franklin and Spade, we show how there are a range of ‘wench tactics’—adapting gifts, stalling and resting—which we deploy as academic editors who are trying to have an impact on the access, use and circulation of our journal, even though we do not own the journal we edit. These wench tactics are alternatives to the more obvious or reported tactic of resignation, or withdrawing academic labour from editing and reviewing altogether. They help us think about brewing editorial time, what ambivalence over our 25th birthday might mean, and how to inhabit painful places. In this, we respond in our own impure, compromised way to da Silva’s call not to forget the native and slave as we do FLaK, and repurpose shrapnel, in our common commitments. (shrink)

“Teleosemantics and Pushmi-Pullyu Representations” (call it “TP-PR,” this journal 2014 79.3, 545–566) argues that core teleosemantics, particularly as defined in Millikan (Language, thought and other biological categories, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1984, J Philos 86(6):281–297, 1989, White queen psychology and other essays for Alice, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1993, Philosophical perspectives, Ridgeview Publishing, Alascadero, 1996, Varieties of meaning, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2004–2008), seems to imply that all descriptive representations are at the same time directive and that directives are at the same time (...) descriptive, hence that all representations are pushmi-pullyu representations. A pushmi-pullyu representation is at once indicative and imperative, telling both what the case is and what to do about it. The usefulness at all of the notion of a pushmi-pullyu representation is then questioned. I have recently found several new papers, dissertations, discussions, in which TP-PR is treated as definitive. However, the conclusions of TP-PR rest on misunderstandings of my position, so although the date is late, clarification seems still to be in order. I will indicate a few significant corrections that need to be made to TP-PR’s description of my position (originally called “biosemantics”) and explain central features of biosemantics that are omitted in TP-PR’s description of basic teleosemantics and which are incompatible with the main argument and conclusions of TP-PR. I will try to clarify and explain the value of the notion of a pushmi-pullyu representation. (shrink)

The commitment to evidence-based practice in clinical psychology requires scientific investigation of the effects of treatment and mechanisms of change. Empirical evidence suggests that mindfulness-based treatments provide clinically meaningful improvement for people suffering from many important problems, including depression, anxiety, pain, and stress. However, the processes of change that produce these beneficial outcomes are not entirely clear. Central questions include whether mindfulness training leads to increases in the general tendency to respond mindfully to the experiences of daily life, and if (...) so, whether these changes are responsible for the improvements in mental health that are often observed. Answering these questions requires methods for assessing mindfulness. Several tools for this purpose are now available and early evidence suggests that they are useful and informative, despite shortcomings that require additional work. This paper summarizes the rationale for mindfulness questionnaires, the methods used to construct them, and research findings on their utility. Challenges related to maintaining consistency with Buddhist conceptions of mindfulness while applying psychological research methods to the study of its assessment are discussed. (shrink)

If stem cell-based therapies are developed, we will likely confront a difficult problem of justice: for biological reasons alone, the new therapies might benefit only a limited range of patients. In fact, they might benefit primarily white Americans, thereby exacerbating long-standing differences in health and health care.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature on age and the digital divide by examining the uses of and attitudes toward information and communication technologies by 26 politically senior citizens.Design/methodology/approachThe approach taken involved in‐depth face‐to‐face interviews.FindingsThe majority of the respondents are informed and balanced cyber‐enthusiasts who have embraced the opportunities afforded by ICTs to enhance their lives in general, including their political activities.Originality/valueThese findings destabilize the dominant image of older people and their attitudes to and experiences (...) of ICTs that appears in most of the literature on age and the digital divide. Those aged 65 and over represent the last cohort, in Western societies at least, for whom age as such is likely to be a decisive factor in their relationship to ICTs. It is therefore vital to get some insight into their views. (shrink)

The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reasonis an outstanding reference source to this exciting and distinctive subject area. Comprising over thirty chapters by a team of international contributors the handbook provides a comprehensive overview of the field covering questions such as: What is the nature of the reasons for which we act and what is the nature of the faculty of practical reason? What are normative reasons for action? What is practical irrationality and what are the requirements, permissions, and powers that (...) explain what it is to be practically rational and irrational? What is the relationship between ethics and the philosophy of practical reason? This handbook will be essential reading for philosophy students and researchers in metaethics, philosophy of action, action theory, ethics and history of philosophy. (shrink)

How does it feel to be in a crisis? Is the idea of the crisis itself bound to our affectivity in the sense that without the occurrence of specific emotions or a change in our affective lives at large we cannot even talk about a crisis properly speaking? In this paper, I explore these questions by analyzing the exemplary case of the corona crisis. In order to do so, I first explore the affective phenomenology of crises in general and the (...) corona crisis in particular, thereby paying attention to both individual (personal) and collective (socio-political) crises and crisis experiences. Then, I turn to the limits of the analogy between individual and collective crises. I reflect on how socio-political crises are not simply there but performed and procedurally constructed and show how, in the context of the corona pandemic, fears and hopes, feelings of solidarity and antagonistic emotions mirror political interests and values. While the phenomenological reflections in the first part help us to account for the fact that crises are not just objective facts but also subjective forms of experience, the political reflections in the second part help us to do justice to the inherently political nature of the language and experiences of (collective) crises. I conclude by pointing out a twofold relationship between (socio-political) crisis and critique. Thanks to their characteristic affective phenomenology, crises are tools of criticism; but due to their inherently political character, they also themselves have to be subjected to critique. (shrink)

Corporate success is understood as stakeholder value, which is based on three licenses: the licenses to innovate, to compete, and to operate. Stakeholders contribute to these three licenses through their benefit and risk potentials. Based on four cases, a stakeholder value management system is developed which provides managers with a tool to systematically use the benefit potentials that lie in stakeholder relations. The links between corporate value creation and stakeholders are identified.