This article explores the possibility of locating an ‘ethics of memory’ respecting commission of mass atrocities via the link between justice, truth and memory. First, it suggests a typology for memory in relation to justice in its retributive and restorative aspects. Second, it explores how so-called ‘memory-justice’ arises in the course of international proceedings—and particularly given its significance under the Rome Statute—by considering, critically, the international community's ability to repair or restitute injury by engaging in memory in ‘the (...) right way’. Lastly, it suggests limitations of memory-justice of which only some can be overcome. The challenges and arguments for a ‘categorical imperative’ for memory are left for a subsequent treatment, but arguments in law and practical ethics will be suggested in favour of properly approaching memory in pursuit of justice, with profound consequences for the nascent Court and sister tribunals, in their efforts to break the cycle of conflict in affected regions, and rid the world of the worst crimes known to humanity. (shrink)

Superior responsibility has been a widely recognised form of responsibility for omission in both treaty and customary international law. Superiors are held responsible for the acts of their subordinates when they fail in fulfilling their duties to prevent or punish crimes of subordinates. Duties to prevent and punish arise only after the superior knows about the subordinate’s crimes or has a reason to know about it. ‘Has a reason to know’ is a form of constructive knowledge and could be defined (...) as absence of actual knowledge about subordinates’ crimes where that knowledge should exist because of information available to the superior from the content of which it could be easily concluded that there is a possibility that subordinates intend to commit, are committing or have already committed crimes and the lack of that knowledge is a cause of willful disregard of his duties or at least disregard based on gross negligence. (shrink)

Enforced disappearance is not a new type of human rights violation. This phenomenon is taking place all over the world. Nevertheless, with the exception of the single provision in the Rome Statute, there is no universal legally binding document which would be applicable in all the cases of enforced disappearances. This article introduces the phenomenon of enforced disappearances, analyses its multiple nature, and overviews the latest developments in drafting legally binding documents within the UN framework.

Si les textes juridiques et les usages de la Rome républicaine et impériale établissent un classement entre les vêtements selon le statut (libre/non libre), le sexe et l’âge, certains vêtements apparaissent comme unisexes et, surtout, ce sont la façon de les porter (habitus), les gestes (gestus) et la démarche (incessus) qui leur donnent les connotations masculines ou féminines. Le sens du vêtement est construit par un système d’oppositions (toga pura VS toga praetexta ; toga VS stola, etc.) qui ne (...) fonctionnent qu’en contexte. Ainsi, le vêtement peut caractériser à la fois un statut, un rang (magistrat/non magistrat) et un état (citoyen en deuil, adolescent faisant son apprentissage oratoire, jeune mariée…), plus qu’il n’est l’apanage d’un sexe. En outre, les vêtements et la façon de les porter étant très codifiés, les transgressions ou variations par rapport à ce code sont toujours signifiantes et elles sont l’objet du regard et des commentaires des membres de la société. (shrink)

Le problème historique majeur posé par l’étude de la prostitution à Rome est celui de l’existence de prostitué(e)s libres dans une société esclavagiste. Puisque des corps serviles, ou affranchis, masculins et féminins étaient disponibles en grand nombre, aussi bien dans les demeures des hommes libres que dans les maisons de prostitution, comment se fait-il que des femmes nées libres aient renoncé à leurs privilèges et statut de matrones? Comment se fait-il aussi que la société ait institutionnalisé ce renoncement en (...) prévoyant d’enregistrer officiellement ces prostituées d’origine libre? L’explication proposée ici est que les prostitué(e)s libres assument une fonction symbolique qui est d’être l’autre du soldat comme l’acteur est l’autre de l’orateur. Ces « parias » de la société romaine, toujours « efféminés » servent à marquer les marges de l’humanité civilisée dans la continuité, à définir les hommes, libres et adultes et donc « masculins » par ce qu’ils ne sont pas mais ce qu’ils pourraient par malheur, devenir des « effeminés » ou leur équivalent, des prostituées libres. (shrink)

Le statut juridique des femmes et de leurs biens introduit des différences par rapport à celui des hommes, différences qui sont tantôt défendues tantôt dénoncées par les femmes elles-mêmes, selon qu’elles visent à mettre leurs biens à l’abri des prétentions des créanciers ou, au contraire, qu’elles manifestent leur volonté de tester le plus librement possible. Mais, en préalable à la différence entre hommes et femmes, se trouve le problème de la définition du droit de propriété en tant que tel. De (...) nombreux témoignages montrent en effet que celui-ci est souvent déduit d’un état de fait, plutôt que de la production d’un titre légitime. Et, à la différence de la propriété, la possession ne se décline pas selon le genre. (shrink)

Déjà des questions d'actualité avaient conduit Eva Cantarella à mener des enquêtes sur l'histoire des femmes, sur le statut de l'homosexualité dans l'Antiquité gréco-romaine. La démarche est la même dans ce dernier ouvrage écrit au début des années 1990 et provoqué par l'énigme de la société nord-américaine qui, tenue pour un des pays les plus démocratiques de la planète, n'en pratique pas moins encore de nos jours la peine de mort. Non que le passé explique de manière univoque le prés...

On 25 May 1993 the United Nations Security Council took the extraordinary and unprecedented step of deciding to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia as a mechanism for the restoration and maintenance of international peace and security. This was an extremely significant innovation in the use of mandatory enforcement powers by the Security Council, and the manifestation of an explicit link between peace and justice - politics and law. The establishment of ad hoc tribunals for the former (...) Yugoslavia and Rwanda was followed by the adoption of the Rome Statute of the ICC in July 1998, the arrest of General Augusto Pinochet in London in October 1998, and the establishment of ad hoc tribunals in Cambodia, Sierra Leone, and East Timor, all of which pointed to an emerging norm of international criminal justice. The key to understanding this is the relationship between the political mandate and the judicial function. The Tribunal was established as a tool of politics, but it was a judicial, not a political tool.This book provides a systematic examination of the Tribunal, what it is, why it was established, how it functions, and where its significance lies. The central question is whether an international judicial institution, such as the Tribunal, can operate in a highly politicized context and fulfill an explicit political purpose, without the judicial process becoming politicized. Separate chapters chart the origins of the court, the process of establishment, jurisdiction, procedure, state co-operation, including obtaining custody of accused, and the role and function of the Chief Prosecutor. This last element is the key to the Tribunal's success in maintaining a delicate balancing act so that its external political function does not impinge on its impartial judicial status, and instead enhances its effectiveness. The book concludes with an assessment of the conduct of the Milosevic case to date. (shrink)

International criminal law (ICL) has traditionally overlooked sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and struggles to understand it. Prosecutions have been largely inefficient and not reflective of gender harms. The Rome Statute requires interpreting SGBV as a social construction (article 7(3)), in consistency with international human rights law (IHRL) and without discrimination (article 21(3)). There is, however, little guidance to implement these approaches. This article argues that intersectionality, an IHRL-based approach that reveals compounded discrimination, is an efficient tool to (...) interpret SGBV and, therefore, should be integrated in ICL. The article traces the origins of intersectionality in feminism and its recognition by IHRL dealing with violence against women. It establishes the applicability of intersectionality in ICL that it demonstrates with a comparative analysis of the Lubanga and Ntaganda cases. The findings show that intersectionality suits ICL’s specific needs which allows labelling and explaining some of those contributions throughout the judicial process. (shrink)

The recent proposal by the Independent Expert Panel of the Stop Ecocide initiative to include the crime of ecocide in the International Criminal Court's Rome Statute has raised expectations for preventing and remedying severe environmental harm through international prosecution. As alluring as this image is, we argue that ecocide prosecutions may be the most difficult, perhaps even impossible, in precisely the cases that the ICC would need to be concerned with; namely, the gravest global incidents of environmental harm, (...) including those associated with planetary climate change. We explore a series of questions about the panel's formulation of ecocide that resonate with longer debates around criminalizing environmental harm but take on new dimensions amid the Anthropocene and after twenty years of ICC trials. Ecocide must contend with the hard lessons learned concerning the ICC's limitations in realizing justice in a fraught international political context and also with fundamental challenges to knowledge and legitimacy arising from the uncertainty and dynamic socioenvironmental context of the Anthropocene. The proposed amendment, if adopted, risks ineffective prosecutions or even perverse outcomes for the environment itself. This risk, however, may characterize any effort to prosecute ecocide internationally in the Anthropocene unless the terms of international criminal law are fundamentally rethought. (shrink)

The paper, written for a research handbook, critically surveys some fundamental philosophical, historical, and doctrinal issues in the crime of aggression. The two introductory sections set the theoretical issues in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and explain the origins of criminalizing aggression under the heading of “crimes against peace.” Section 3 explores an ambiguity between aggression as first use of force and aggression as unprovoked use of force, while section 4 discusses the doctrinal distinction between acts of aggression (...) and wars of aggression. Sections 5 and 6 turn to the theory of aggression. Section 5 examines modern versus early modern just war theorists’ views of just cause. Section 6 explores various theories of what exactly makes aggressive war so evil that it belongs in the pantheon of core crimes, side by side with genocide, crimes against humanity, and other war crimes. The basic question is whether aggression is fundamentally a crime against states, a crime against human rights, or a crime against peace itself. I reject the first, statist, version, and endorse the human rights version. I examine three versions of the view that aggressive war is fundamentally about its human costs: that aggressive wars lead to atrocities (Trainin); that aggressive wars lead more generally to unjustified killings (Dannenbaum); and that aggressive wars lead to both unjustified killings by the aggressor, and to unnecessary killings that include the justified killings of aggressors’ troops by defenders (Mégret). As for crimes against peace, I argue that this theory of aggression’s evils comes in two “flavors,” one of which has justly been criticized by postcolonial writers, and one of which I think is legitimate. The former originates in Judge Pal’s famous dissenting opinion in the IMTFE, and argues that criminalizing aggression is a move by colonial powers to freeze the oppressive status quo. The more legitimate version is that in an age of catastrophically destructive weapons, the risks of escalation in armed conflict –the threat that conflicts will spiral into world wars–are simply too great in human terms. Thus, the legitimate version of “crimes against peace” is part and parcel of the human rights analysis. The final sections break new ground. Section 7 considers whether aggression is solely a leadership crime. Everyone agrees that it would be wrong to punish ordinary soldiers for the crime of aggression launched by their leaders. The questions is why, and it is not easy to answer. Examining it brings us to a contemporary dispute over which leaders can be prosecuted: only those who control or direct the aggressive policies (as per the ICC’s Rome Statute), or others as well, who “shape or influence” the policy without necessarily directing it (as the customary rule used to be formulated). I argue against any narrowing of the leadership clause. Section 8 explores the “paradox of immunity”: Under the legal principle of sovereign immunity, apex leaders are immune from prosecution in the courts of another state. But under the narrow leadership clause, only apex leaders can be prosecuted. Here I argue for a surprising conclusion: that in fact there never was a customary rule of immunity for the crime of aggression. If so, the paradox of immunity disappears. This resolution also helps cut the Gordian knot of a current debate about whether a relatively small subset of states (the EU, perhaps) can form an aggression tribunal and call it “international.”. (shrink)

A focus on the lawmaking process, I submit, permits us to explore a particular dimension of justice, namely the relationship between law and liberty. Laws that reflect the arbitrary whims of the lawmaker are presumptively unjust, because they constrain liberty for no good reason. A strategy for making arbitrary laws less likely involves recognizing checks on the lawmaker's powers and grounding those checks in processes that allow the governed to express their disapproval. The system of checks and balances employed in (...) the U.S. Constitution embodies this strategy, although reasonable people can debate its efficacy. As A.O. Hirschman observed, regimes that permit free movement of persons and property similarly restrict the force of arbitrary rules by allowing exit from unwanted restrictions. I want to inquire into the role of checks in international lawmaking. At first blush, it might appear that the fundamental principle of state consent provides all the checking that international lawmaking needs. This principle maintains that a state (and by extension, its subjects) can be bound by a rule of international law only if that state manifests its consent to the rule. As long as states have a real choice, itself subject to internal checks on official decisionmaking, the adoption of the rule should meet basic criteria of procedural justice. Indeed, the correlate of this principle—that each state has a veto over the adoption of international law, at least as applied to itself and its subjects—suggests that international lawmaking poses less of a threat to liberty than do conventional municipal lawmaking processes based on majority rule. One might think that, as a result of this principle, no rule will attain the status of international law unless its adoption makes some states better off and no state worse off. This first impression, however, is wrong. First, international lawyers argue for the existence of jus cogens norms that apply regardless of state consent. Second, the concept of state consent is artful, and opportunistic decisionmakers have some freedom to construe consent in ways that circumvent conventional checking processes. Third, political and economic coercion can reduce state consent to a meaningless formality. I discuss each of these points in turn. Once state consent ceases to constrain international lawmaking, the question role of alternative checks to protect liberty looms. Under what circumstances does the international lawmaking process as currently constituted present a threat of arbitrary force? What kinds of resistance to the results of international lawmaking can process values justify? I address these questions in three steps. First, I explore whether international law does carry a threat of coercion. If not, concerns about arbitrary restrictions of liberty are misplaced. Second, I discuss the problems arising from delegations of lawmaking authority to international institutions, with specific reference to the Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court. Third, I discuss the process-value issues associated with judicial lawmaking. None of these concerns justifies blanket opposition to international lawmaking. Rather, those interested in making and enforcing international rules need to grapple with these issues and provide another layer of justification for their efforts. a Footnotesa I am indebted to Ken Abbott, Jean Cohen, Larry Helfer, Robert Hockett, Sean Murphy, Phil Nichols, Ed Swaine, Joel Trachtman, the other contributors to this volume, and participants in a workshop at the University of Virginia School of Law for comments and criticism. Shortcomings are mine alone. (shrink)

Today, there are several problems in the field of criminal law caused both by the emergence of new types of legal relations and by the imperfection of legislation. Due to the emergence of new challenges in the field of criminal law, many of them require theoretical understanding. Some of these challenges, generated in the light of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, revealed several reasons for discussion in the Ukrainian and international legal community. The purpose of the (...) study involves consideration of certain aspects of modern challenges in the field of criminal-legal relations, which arose against the background of the military aggression of the Russian Federation in Ukraine. The first part of the study is devoted to the question of the qualification of war crimes committed by the Russian Federation in Ukraine as acts of genocide. The second part of the work is devoted to the issue of using existing international legal mechanisms to hold the Russian Federation accountable for war crimes. There are convincing reasons to say that the actions of the Russian Federation during the war in Ukraine have signs of the crime of genocide. Even though Ukraine is not a party to the Rome Statute, the Ukrainian government can use another tool to bring the subjects of war crimes to justice, by creating a certain mixed investigative mechanism or a criminal tribunal that could deal directly with the crime of aggression. (shrink)

The people of Gaza endure physical traumas, and psychological and social wounds directly linked to the combination of military occupations and the closing of its border, essentially forcing and trapping them in despair. The destruction of healthcare infrastructure in particular, has methodically added strain on an already hopeless situation, severely affecting the availability and accessibility of essential healthcare services for the population, which further perpetuates the cycle of peoples suffering. Such suffering has escalated to extreme proportions in 2023. As the (...) violence and attacks continue with flagrant disregard of the Geneva and Hague conventions, the Rome Statute, occupational law, and international and humanitarian law, amid outcries from the international community, we see hospitals, that are traditionally regarded as sanctuaries of humanity transform into corridors of horror. (shrink)

This paper discusses the creation and use of the new Macquarie Laws of War Corpus. The corpus consists of the 110 documents of international war law stored in the International Committee of the Red Cross treaties database, starting with the 1856 Declaration Respecting Maritime Law and ending with the most recent amendment to the Rome Statute. The new MQLWC is hosted at the Sydney Corpus Lab, via its CQWeb interface, which allows for searching of frequencies, concordance lines, and (...) collocations. The corpus can also be downloaded for offline processing in other popular concordance programs, such as #Lancsbox and AntConc. This paper introduces the corpus, describes the process of assembling the data, and explains its limitations. The paper then demonstrates some of the ways the data can be explored using the concept of 'military necessity'. The MQLWC contributes to the growing use of corpus linguistics in legal studies, and will be of particular relevance to scholars in the field of international war law. (shrink)

Despite a “spatial imaginary” which constructs Europe as a location of sexual and gender freedom (Rao, 2014), presently, twenty countries in Europe require sterilisation in order to legally recognise transgender people’s gender identities, including four of the seven countries in the INFERCIT study: Greece, Italy, Turkey, and Cyprus (but not Spain, which since 2007 does not require sterilisation for gender identity recognition [see Platero, 2008]. In Bulgaria and Lebanon no gender identity recognition for trans people is provided by law; the (...) latter lies outside the “European” region) (TGEU, 2014). Compulsory sterilisation—classified as a crime against humanity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (UN General Assembly, 1998: art. 7.1)—is widely in force against transgender people, who constitute “the only known group in Europe subject to legally prescribed, state-enforced sterilisation” (Hammarberg, 2009: 19). However, forced sterilisation of trans people is not generally conceptualised as a eugenicist or genocidal policy, in part because sterilisation is conflated with gender reassignment surgical interventions which, widely considered as that which brings transgender bodies into being, are in turn conflated with embodied transgender subjectivities. On this view, transgender individuals could not exist except through a medicalised process that, by design, precludes their “natural” reproductive capacities and is generally not accompanied by fertility preservation or the provision of assisted reproduction technologies (Plemons, 2014: 38; De Sutter et al., 2002; De Sutter, 2001). Sterilisation laws are justified through a pathologising discourse on transgender lives which constructs gender reassignment interventions as medical “treatment” of gender identity disorder (Suess, Espineira & Crego Walters, 2014: 73-76). Adopting a depathologising perspective enables us to contextualise compulsory sterilisation (which naturalises the sexually dimorphic, cisgender, heterosexual body) as a form of “gendercide” which has historically been instrumental in the imposition of a Euro-colonial binary gender system (Miranda, 2010; Lugones, 2007). The state-imposition of medical interventions on trans people not only has deleterious effects on their reproductive rights, “effectively undermin[ing] their right to found a family” (Hammarberg, 2009: 21; see OHCHR et al., 2014)—as “family” is hegemonically defined by a heteronormative and bio/ logical kinship order (Butler, 2002; van Anders, 2014). I argue that state regulation of transgender reproduction constitutes a form of institutionalised gendered violence inasmuch as it impedes transgender people’s ability to exercise inherent first-person authority over the materiality and meanings of their gendered embodiments (Bettcher, 2009; Spade, 2013). Efforts to renaturalise gender and kinship inextricably intersect (Kantsa, 2006) in the biopolitical attempt to regulate transgender embodiments and reproduction, which conditions the emerging legal recognition of transgender subjects as a rights-bearing minority (Stryker, 2014). (shrink)

Beginning with a brief presentation of the historical data and conceptual issues that have led to the emergence of the doctrine of the notion of Transitional Justice, I will describe the orientation adopted in two paradigmatic historical contexts, the Nuremberg trial at the end of the Second World War and the post-apartheid reconciliation process in South Africa. Supported by documents from International Human Rights Law and other international legal sources (Rome Statute) I will then offer a provisional definition (...) of what I call a Critical Transitional Justice. The conclusion highlights how the relationship between retrospective and prospective responsibility today is not exclusionary: as central principles of Critical Transitional Justice, they contribute in conferring normative legitimacy to transformative processes of adapting the international system to compliance to general principles of human rights. (shrink)

The present work discusses the complex nature of the term ‘gender’ in legal discourse, in the wake of the recent pushbacks that the 2011 Istanbul Convention has received from anti-feminist movements and nations that have not signed/ratified the document or have withdrawn from it. Though its original aim was to protect women’s rights, the debate has eventually surfaced deeply-rooted problems linked to gender-related vocabulary. For this reason, the study will analyse the use of the terms ‘gender’ and ‘sex’ in the (...) 1995 UN Beijing Declaration, the 1998 Rome Statute, and the 2011 Istanbul Convention, from a synchronic and diachronic perspective. It aims to provide a critical comparison of the definitions, translations, and interpretations of the term ‘gender’, in an attempt to overcome some of the issues involved in the harmonisation of EU documentation, which could certainly help guarantee fundamental rights and convince more states to sign/ratify the Convention, or at least, not allow them to use issues not related to women’s rights to not accept the document. The interpretation of gender-related violence is still ‘in progress’, and the lack of harmonisation could eventually hinder fundamental human rights instead of helping the Istanbul Convention save lives. (shrink)

Universal jurisdiction and the existence of an International Criminal Court (ICC) under the Rome Statute provide a framework through which true reconciliation can be achieved simultaneously with truth and justice. The ICC and universal jurisdiction can be viewed as laying out objective limits on the power of domestic and international actors to seek peace at any cost.This paper argues that those objective limits are not necessarily inimical to a just peace, nor are an undue burden on peacemakers. On (...) the contrary, they can set parameters whereby a just and lasting peace can be differentiated from impunity achieved through blackmail.The first step is to take a hard look at whether international standards of accountability for gross abuses have been met. At the same time, the examination of any specific scheme of domestic accountability cannot be done on a blanket basis. It will require a close look at conditions prevailing in the country, both at the time the scheme was adopted and later; at the policies adopted and how they were meant to advance the process of national reconciliation; at who adopted those measures and how; and at concrete applications of the scheme to individual cases.Even applying this exacting standard, there will be cases in which the best course of action for the ICC and for third country courts will be to defer to the greater wisdom of local actors operating in good faith, and to decline to prosecute. (shrink)

The war in the DRC has resulted in one of the world’s worst humanitarian crisis with over 3.4 million displaced persons scattered throughout the country. An estimated 4 million people have died as a result of the war. The most pressing need to be addressed is the question of justice and accountability for these human rights atrocities in order to achieve a durable peace in the country and also in the Great Lakes region. It is particularly true in post-conflict situations (...) where justice systems have been either partially or completely destroyed, that national courts are not capable of arriving at a uniform stance, or willing to provide justice for atrocities in the immediate future. As a result, international justice seems to be a crucial and last resort that must continue to be fortified against efforts to undermine it. However, even if the ICC achieves its full potential, it faces a number of challenges. Firstly, it is realistically not able to address all situations in which national courts are unwilling or unable to prosecute perpetrators. Secondly, there are temporal and other jurisdictional limitations on what cases the ICC can hear. Accordingly, the ICC will only have the power to try people accused of the gravest human rights violations committed after 1 July 2002; the date the Rome Statute which established the ICC took effect. As a result, only a small number of individuals responsible for the atrocities committed will be tried by this Court. Thirdly, is the establishment, of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), one of the civilian institutions that emerged from the peace talks, meant to end impunity or to cover up gross violations of human rights committed in the DRC? It remains to be seen how it will function and interact with the courts. (shrink)

Rapid advancements in human neuroscience and neurotechnology open unprecedented possibilities for accessing, collecting, sharing and manipulating information from the human brain. Such applications raise important challenges to human rights principles that need to be addressed to prevent unintended consequences. This paper assesses the implications of emerging neurotechnology applications in the context of the human rights framework and suggests that existing human rights may not be sufficient to respond to these emerging issues. After analysing the relationship between neuroscience and human rights, (...) we identify four new rights that may become of great relevance in the coming decades: the right to cognitive liberty, the right to mental privacy, the right to mental integrity, and the right to psychological continuity. (shrink)

The entry into force of the Rome Statute on 1 July 2002 establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) has signified a shift in the goals pursued by international criminal law. Due to new types of warfare dynamics, international protection is in need of new orientations, particularly with regard to conflict deterrence aims. This urgency is widely documented by the normative action framework of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) and, more recently, by the UN Secretary-General 2012–2013 Reports for the (...) RtoP’s implementation. The scope of this study is twofold. On the one hand, it aims to explore theoretical overlapping between the jus post bellum and the RtoP with regard to deterrence effects of the ICC; on the other hand, it proposes to illustrate such dynamics by reference to Kenya’s post-electoral violence during the period 2007–2013. Kenya represents an instance of a post-conflict society whereby transitional justice actions have taken place under a de facto adoption of a RtoP framework. As a result, I defend a qualified correlation between ICC’s retribution and deterrence effects. I claim that the hypothesis of the ICC’s deterring effects accounts in Kenya is constructed upon a general condition of direct compliance by self-interested rational actors (such as high-ranking political candidates and their secretariat) as well as on unintended effects of ethnic stabilization. I further consider that this possibility is reinforced by systemic interdependencies with other national and international initiatives such as the Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) mediation initiative, the Grand Coalition Government, the Panel of African Eminent Personalities led by Kofi Annan, and the findings of the Commission of Enquiry of Post-Election Violence (CIPEV). (shrink)

What will be the consequences of the criminalization of aggression? In 2010, the International Criminal Court made aggression a crime for which individuals can be prosecuted. But questions around what constitutes aggression, who decides, and, most important, how effective this legal change will be in reducing the incidence of war remain. This essay considers these questions in light of two recent books on the criminalization of aggression: Noah Weisbord'sThe Crime of Aggression: The Quest for Justice in an Age of Drones, (...) Cyberattacks, Insurgents, and Autocratsand Tom Dannenbaum'sThe Crime of Aggression, Humanity, and the Soldier. While the authors argue in favor of the efficacy of the criminalization of aggression as a means to reduce future war, it is also likely that the criminalization of aggression will reshape war in potentially profound ways. (shrink)

English summary: Within the span of a single century (from the mid-15th to the mid-16th centuries), the Greek language, which was well on its way to oblivion, became the focus of one of the most heated debates of the Renaissance period. Greek was accused by what was then a Catholic and Latin Europe of being a vehicle for ancient paganism, Byzantine schism, and even Lutheran heresy. The Council of Trent, which deemed that Roman authority was being undermined by the Vulgate's (...) philological criticism, went so far as to confirm the obvious collusion that existed between Greek and heresy. In fact, behind such accusations can be discerned the power struggles that were taking place between ecclesiastical, academic and political factions. Analysis of such confrontations and of the difficulties that Humanists had in circumventing them, infers that, despite its ultimate success, Greek literature remained suspect in Europe throughout the Counter-Reformation. In this very meticulous study, based on previously unpublished texts, of what was at stake in this anti-Greek movement (a resistance actually based on free, progressive and critical thought), the author combines the thoroughness of an historian with a mine of true anecdotes about the moral standards of that era : the censure practices, legal disputes, self-serving denouncements, etc. That, indeed, were the most evident driving forces behind the intellectual and power struggles. French description: Le grec, disparu d'Europe depuis les Grandes Invasions, fit un retour spectaculaire au XVe siecle. Mais l'enthousiasme des humanistes pour la langue d'Homere a fait oublier la violence des resistances que lui opposerent les maitres scolastiques. Lorsque Erasme osa contester la Vulgate latine au nom de la verite grecque (1516), le scandale eclata publiquement et Luther en prit argument pour contester l'autorite de Rome, si bien que les hellenistes furent accuses de faire le jeu de la Reforme. Le statut du grec se vit etroitement lie a celui de l'hebreu, l'autre langue sacree rivale du latin (l'Affaire Reuchlin). Pour extirper le mal a sa racine, le concile de Trente decida finalement d'imposer la legitimite du latin biblique (1545) et d'interdire l'acces aux sources grecques et hebraiques, puis de mettre a l'index les principaux hellenistes et leurs imprimeurs. Les etudes grecques allaient en rester durablement affaiblies dans l'Europe de la Contre-Reforme. En faisant revivre les oeuvres et les hommes qui en furent les acteurs, et en devoilant ses veritables enjeux, ce livre retrace les deux siecles de cette bataille du grec, restee un point aveugle dans l'histoire de la culture occidentale. Jean-Christophe Saladin est docteur en Histoire. (shrink)

In our increasingly interactive and interdependent world, we are confronted almost daily with issues in international law: think, for instance, of the recent Pinochet and Öcalan cases, the crises in Iraq, Kosovo and East Timor, or the banana and hormone disputes in the WTO. Add to this continual reports about the activities of international organizations, from the UN to the European Union, and it becomes clear that international law is the order of the day. Whoever follows these international developments, as (...) I do, and whoever is committed to the construction of a solid legal order for the international community, finds himself constantly torn between hope and despair. Signs of hope in recent years include the approval of a statute for the International Criminal Court in Rome on July 17, 1998; the Pinochet decisions of the House of Lords of November 1998 and March 1999; and the coming into force of the Ottawa agreement on anti-personnel mines in March of 1999. Yet who could witness the course of events during the NATO bombing campaign in Yugoslavia, and the long period of UN inaction against the violence that broke out in East Timor following the referendum, without feeling some sense of desperation? The mood of the present day, however, should not prevent us from taking a long-term perspective. What kind of international legal order are we moving towards on the threshold of the twenty-first century? Building up a solid international legal order is probably one of the greatest challenges facing humanity at present. Our national legal systems are strongly developed and during the last fifty years, Western Europe has succeeded in constructing an EU legal order which has made possible a peaceful society, welfare and the integration of peoples in Europe. But where do we stand on the world level? Is international law not all too slowly limping behind globalization? And yet, the century we are looking back on has been the century in which international law and the law of international organizations flourished: in the framework of the League of Nations, and then the UN, we have succeeded in codifying, consolidating and developing international law in numerous multilateral treaties ranging from human rights and maritime law to international labour, trade and environmental norms. Never before had the world witnessed such an extensive network of international organizations . Never before did states make such intensive use of treaties for arranging their mutual concerns: more than 30,000 are registered at the UN. (shrink)

For Theory aims to open a discussion on the weakening of the production of theory in left-wing thought since the 1970s, based on Louis Althusser's ideas of overdetermination, plural temporality, conjuncture, and theoretical practice.

A manual for Mindful Focusing—a new integration of Western psychology and Buddhist mindfulness techniques for accessing your inherent wisdom and solving life’s problems Ever come up against one of those moments when life requires a response—and you feel clueless? We all have. But there’s good news: you have all the wisdom you need to respond to any situation, even the “impossible” ones. It’s a matter of tuning in to your felt sense: that subtle physical sensation that lives somewhere between your (...) conscious and subconscious mind and that can be accessed through Focusing—the well-known method developed by the psychologist Eugene Gendlin. David Rome’s technique of Mindful Focusing unites Gendlin’s method with Buddhist mindfulness practices to provide a wonderfully effective method for accessing your felt sense—so you can problem solve, deal with challenges, and respond honestly and creatively to the world around you. (shrink)

Recently, Congress has focused on reforms to address pharmacy benefit managers’ (PBMs) role in high drug prices for patients. Congress must not excessively restrict PBMs’ ability to negotiate with manufacturers; alternatively, reforms could be paired with other policies that address the high prices of brand-name drugs.

El artículo recorre el tratamiento que Louis Althusser ofrece acerca de la noción de Darstellung, en el marco de su proyecto de dar forma al concepto de causalidad estructural en la teoría marxista. Retomando investigaciones anteriores de Étienne Balibar, Vittorio Morfino, George Hartley, Warren Montag y Aurelio Sainz Pezonaga, se reconstruyen algunos de los problemas hilvanados en la serie que articula, en la escritura althusseriana, las categorías marxistas de Darstellung, Verbindung y Gliederung con la metáfora del teatro sin autor. El (...) artículo tiene como objetivo exponer la condición cismática de la noción althusseriana de representación, escindida por una singular idea de performatividad que va de lo escénico a lo inconsciente. Con este recorrido me propongo aportar ayuda a la formulación de la pregunta por las posibilidades de la crítica en la coyuntura del pensamiento algorítmico. (shrink)

A partir del tratamiento que Slavoj Žižek realiza del concepto lacaniano de jouissance para problematizar la ética kantiana, se exploran los alcances y las posibilidades del vínculo entre ética y política en el presente. Con ese fin se retoma la gravitación althusseriana en el pensamiento de Žižek y se propone un contrapunto con los aportes de Michel Pêcheux en torno a los vínculos entre goce y fantasma. Finalmente, se despliega una conjetura respecto a la politicidad inherente a la dimensión poética (...) del discurso como posibilidad de apertura política. (shrink)

This paper addresses one of the ways in which transgender individuals identify with respect to personal history, living “stealth,” whereby transgender individuals do not disclose their transgender status (that is, they present themselves as cisgender), oftentimes no longer considering themselves transgender. Individuals who live stealth are often criticized for inauthenticity; thus, this paper analyses Sartrean notions of authenticity and personal history, thereby arguing that the person who lives stealth is not living inauthentically but rather is constituting their conception of self (...) through their past, present, and future projects. (shrink)