Background Concepts of health have been widely discussed in the philosophy and ethics of medicine. Parallel to these theoretical debates, numerous empirical research projects have focused on subjective concepts of health and shown their significance for individuals and society at various levels. Only a few studies have so far investigated the concepts of health of non-professionals and professionals involved in long-term home care and discussed these empirical perspectives regarding moral responsibilities. Objectives To identify the subjective concepts of the health of (...) non-professionals (care recipients, informal caregivers) and professionals (registered nurses) involved in long-term home care and to discuss them against the background of existing normative guidelines addressing non-professionals and professionals’ responsibilities and rights concerning health. Research design A qualitative design was chosen to explore subjective concepts of health. Data were collected by semi-structured interviews; content analysis was applied according to Mayring. Participants and research context Twenty-eight interviews were conducted with non-professionals and professionals in long-term home care arrangements in Northern Germany. Ethical considerations Ethics approval was obtained from the Institutional Review Board at the University Medicine Greifswald (BB123/16). Findings Non-professionals and professionals consider health as a capability that enables them to participate in social activities and live their own lives according to their preferences. The former regard health particularly as a feeling and an attitude, the latter as the absence of disease with a focus on mental and emotional well-being. Both groups highlight the unsurpassable value of health and the personal responsibility for it. Discussion Normative guidelines applicable to practice in long-term home care discuss responsibilities and rights unevenly and raise several problems regarding non-professionals and professionals’ subjective concepts of health. Conclusion Individuals’ concepts of health are relevant for the subsequent interpretation of rights and responsibilities and should, thus, be reflected upon to address health-related needs effectively. (shrink)

The nature and functions of classifications are first discussed and the differences between natural and artificial classifications are explicated. It is shown that borderline-case type problems result not from classifications, but from extending them to wider domains. Some methods of solving such problems are considered. The differences between monothetic and polythetic classifications are also taken up. A new treatment of trees as relations and their levels is developed. Certain kinds of hierarchies such as the classificatory, the inclusional, and the structural (...) are then characterized by means of the tree concept. (shrink)

Additionally, the text shows how to develop computationally feasible methods to mesh with this framework.

The following article is a response to K. Mainzer's ‘Knowledge-Based Systems; Remarks on the Philosophy of Technology and Artificial Intelligence’. We show, that Mainzer does not reach any of his aimsto analyse the possibilities and limits of AI-technology.to reduce anxiousness and hostility against AI, which is motivated by phantastic speculations.to evaluate the factual impact of AI on our lives and on society.His article contributes on the contrary to phantastic speculations, which are not technologically justified in any way. There are two (...) main reasons for his misleading view: (a) the state of the art of knowledge-based systems is incorrectly described; (b) the roots, paradigms and alternatives to AI are not in the least sufficiently analysed. We examine issues (a) and (b) in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. In Chapter 3 we discuss, how the conclusions, which Mainzer draws, have to be modified. In analysing the lines of argumentation of Mainzer we try to clarify the methodological errors and the philosophical attitude of Mainzer, which is in many respects not adequate to the subject of the article. (shrink)

Considering that Husserl identifies passivity as the general principle of genetic dynamics and as given prior to any intentional activity, the original condition of possibility of such passivity must be clarified. Phenomenological analysis can successfully attest the presence of a drive-habituality operating prior to the level of the I, an instinct-character, thus, that raises the question about life as auto-affective capability. In the framework of a universal monadology the latter’s teleological orientation must be questioned in order to avoid that both (...) the limes constituted by the unconscious as well as affective being remain indeterminate and anonymous, which would not do justice to the transcendental rootedness of drive and instinct through the form of ipseity. (shrink)

The paper tries to illustrate the influence of Aristotle's thought upon Brentano by arguing that the view that all psychological phenomena have objects was proably derived from the Aristotelian conception that the mind can know itself only en parergo, and that this knowledge presupposes that some other thing be in the mind "objectively". Brentano's contribution to Aristotle scholarship is illustrated by reviewing some of his arguments against Zeller's claim that Aristotle's God, contemplating only himself, is ignorant of the world. The (...) paper concludes with an attempt to explain the relative neglect into which Brentano's exegetical efforts have fallen. (shrink)

Charles Taylor begins his essay “Kant's Theory of Freedom” by stating that in the last three centuries people have sought recognition, equality and justice as corollaries of “liberation”. The process, he says, “has been punctuated, and partly shaped, by paradigm statements by major thinkers …. Among these statements, Kant's has been very important. It marked a crucial step on the way.” Similar sentiments are expressed by Hayek, Rawls and others.

This paper tries to show that one of the main objectives of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit is to give an epistemological argument for his monistic metaphysics. In its first part, it outlines a traditional, Kant-oriented approach to the question of how we can make sense of our ability to cognize objects. It focuses on the distinction between subjective and objective conditions of cognition and argues that this distinction, understood in the traditional (Kantian) way, is much too poor to do justice (...) to our very elaborated conception of kinds of objects. The second part deals with the Phenomenology. Here it is claimed that Hegel reacts in a sophisticated way to the shortcomings of the traditional epistemological view in presenting a theory which allows us to understand why we have to distinguish between different kinds of objects and how these kinds are related to conditions of cognition. This epistemological doctrine, however, is not developed by Hegel for its own sake. Rather, it has the function of a "transcendentalistic" (not "transcendental") argument for a monistic ontology. Thus, one can make sense of Hegel's claim that the Phenomenology is to be understood as an introduction into his (monistic) System. (shrink)

The repetition of life is being examined on the basis of Henry’s analysis of life as a performance beyond habitualization as sedimentation in Husserl’s approach, as well as a difference in immanent conceptualization on the premise of the coveting organless body according to Deleuze. In contrast to this “nomadic thinking,” which always remains non-subjective, the emphasis in the original reciprocity of life and body is put on the basic transcendentality of the effective repetition of life in the bodily memorial of (...) the radical phenomenological habitualization. (shrink)

Understanding in its widest sense is the aim of all rational knowledge. A distinction can be made between interpretation (leading to the understanding of meanings) and explanation (leading to the understanding of facts). The view that in the social sciences facts and meanings are the same is criticized. In respect of the specific understanding of human and social facts empathetic and rational understanding are distinguished and some of the difficulties pointed out inherent in both, in particular with regard to testability. (...) On the other hand, it is found that a purely behaviouristic approach, although possible, would not be completely satisfactory, so that in spite of all difficulties the social sciences (history included) cannot do without specific understanding, as a heuristic device as well as an aim. (shrink)

Foucaults Werk hat nicht nur die Kultur- und Sozialwissenschaften entscheidend beeinflusst. Das Handbuch gibt einen systematischen Überblick über Foucaults Leben und Werk. Es stellt die Kontexte dar, aus denen heraus seine Werke entstanden sind und erklärt Grundbegriffe des Foucault‘schen Denkens wie Archiv, Biopolitik, Diskurs, Dispositiv, Genealogie, Körper und Macht. Mit einem umfangreichen Kapitel zur Rezeption in den verschiedenen Disziplinen. Für die 2. Auflage wurde das Handbuch durchgesehen und aktualisiert sowie um neue Artikel zu Foucaults journalistischen und medizingeschichtlichen Arbeiten sowie zu (...) seinen Vorlesungen über das Wahrsprechen und zur Ödipus-Thematik erweitert. Außerdem setzt sich ein Beitrag ausführlich mit dem 2018 posthum erschienenen vierten Band der Geschichte der Sexualität auseinander. (shrink)

The cytoplasmic domain of the cell adhesion molecule uvomorulin associates with three independent proteins, named catenins, which are structurally related in different cell types of various species. This complex formation connects uvnomorulin and cytoskeletal structures and might, moreover, be involved in other adhesion‐dependent mechanisms.

Ohne Zweifel ergänzte Fichte das Denken Kants hinsichtlich des pathologischen und rein praktischen Willens mit dessen äußeren und inneren Motiven bzw. Triebfedern, denn ein guter Wille wäre nicht nur ein praktischer Wille ohne sinnliches Begehren, sondern ein Tun, welches niemals irgendein Ertragen im Sinne von Passivität darstellt, weil Selbstsetzung und »aktive« Selbstbestimmung zusammenfallen. Gut wäre dann nur jene Faktizität, wo das wissend wollende Subjekt jeweils vollständig präsent ist, denn dadurch wäre sein Tun auch gleichzeitig wahr im Sinne der höchsten Vernunft (...) der Wissenschaftslehre. In dieser Hinsicht muß daher das Nichthandeln bei Fichte als das Böse selbst auftreten, was dann zur Frage des gemeinsamen Handelns im intersubjektiven Sinne sowie zum rechtlich staatlichen Handeln überleitet. Das Nichtich, da es kein getrennter Bereich des Ich ist, sondern eine primordiale Bedingung desselben darstellt, ist die Natur im Menschen, welche für Fichte mit dem vielfach Sinnlichen zusammenfällt und vom Ich dem Wissen und Wollen angeglichen werden muß. Denn sinnliche Vielfalt bedeutet nicht nur Objektsein auf der Naturebene, sondern aus der Sicht des Menschen auch Verweigerung und Übertretung, wobei die materielle Trägheit der Naturgegenstände bei Fichte zur ethischen Trägheit als Quelle aller Laster wird, wie er unter anderem in den »Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten« von 1794 ausführt. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to present an attempt to reconcile the results of some of the main positions with respect to the I or self-consciousness put forward so far in the modern history of Western philosophy. They range from the conviction that self-consciousness is a systematically elusive phenomenon to the claim that the I is of supreme reality. Though these assertions seem to contradict each other in various ways, I hope to show that nevertheless one can learn from (...) these accounts quite a lot about the nature and the function of self- consciousness or the I which might help to determine its status and its significance within the wider framework of human attitudes and accomplishments. In particular, I want to point out that elusiveness and supreme reality of the I or self-consciousness are not that much opposed as one might believe at first, as can be learned especially well from Kant and some of his German idealistic followers and their insistence on propositional contexts as a necessary condition for a self-conscious I. (shrink)