This article contains a case study of some innovative early fourteenth-century conceptions of the temporal structure of substantial change. An important tenet of thirteenth-century scholastic hylomorphism is that substantial change is an instantaneous process. In contrast, three early fourteenth-century Aristotelian commentators, first Walter Burley and then John Buridan and Albert of Saxony, progressively develop a view on which substantial change is linked to temporal duration. This process culminated, in Buridan and Albert of Saxony, with the explicit recognition of the temporally (...) extended nature of some (if not most) instances of substantial change. This article sheds light on this neglected episode in the history of late medieval hylomorphism taking as its point of departure these commentators’ discussions of the issue of minima naturalia, i.e., the issue of the lowest possible limit of any division of substantial forms coming about through the potentially infinite division of the matter they inform. In short: is there a piece of matter so small that no substantial form can possibly inhere in it? (shrink)

This paper compares the conception of substantial change put forth by Peter of Mantua (d. 1399) in his De primo et ultimo instanti with the one developed by Albert of Saxony (ca. 1320–1390). According to Albert, (i) each substantial form, save for the intellective soul, is a spatially-extended entity with actual quantitative parts that are co-located with the parts of matter they inform, and (ii) these quantitative parts are generated and corrupted one after another over an extended interval of time. (...) From (i) and (ii), Albert deduces that (iii) the substantial change of material substances as individuals (save for human beings) is a temporally extended process. This is what I call the ‘piecemeal’ conception of substantial change. I show that Peter of Mantua is significantly indebted to this conception. Indeed, he endorses both (i) and (ii). Moreover, he even extends this approach to the process by which the intellective soul informs matter and is separated from it. Nevertheless, I argue that, thanks to his peculiar doctrine of numerical sameness over time, Peter rejects (iii) and maintains, instead, that the substantial change of any material substance as an individual is an instantaneous event. (shrink)

This article tries to point out a source of potential conflict in Charles Taylor’s theoretical perspective. There is an unsolved tension between the historical reconstruction of the genealogy of the modern identity and the theoretical claim that our moral reactions are the basis of an objective assessment of practices. My intention is to analyse this tension at three different levels of discourse: first, Taylor’s position as a liberal non-atomist thinker hinges upon his idea that our moral identity depends on our (...) free determination of our relation to good, which can be pursued only within the experience of a community. Second, this Hegelian trait of his perspective is also present in his meta-ethical theory, in which our moral reactions are said to be both instinctive and culturally mediate. In this case, it is not clear how an individual or a group can transcend this limited perspective, if any appeal to reason is inextricably tied to historical delimitations. Third, the principle that any culture in itself is to be considered equally valuable appears to be disputable in front of the objection that some cultures do violate what seem to be fundamental rights and therefore do not deserve equal consideration and are not to be preserved. (shrink)

L’articolo si concentra sull’analisi dell’estesa comparazione tra filosofia e amicizia proposta da Dante in Convivio III, xi, interpretandola come una consapevole analogia. A partire da un’attenta esegesi del capitolo, letto come un peculiare accessus ad philosophiam dantesco, l’articolo ripercorre le tappe dell’analogia evidenziandone i principali contenuti teorici. In questo modo, diventa possibile mostrare la rilevanza del tema dell’amicizia (in particolare di quella tra maestro e allievo) per una corretta comprensione di uno degli aspetti fondamentali (e anche più dibattuti) della pratica (...) filosofica così come concepita da Dante, ovvero il suo carattere intrinsecamente collettivo. Inoltre, l’articolo sottolinea come l’amicizia costituisca per Dante uno degli strumenti essenziali per l’allargamento del sapere filosofico al di fuori dei circoli universitari, obiettivo a cui il Convivio dichiaratamente mira. The article focuses on the analysis of the extended comparison between philosophy and friendship advanced by Dante in Convivio III, xi, interpreting it as a conscious analogy. Starting from a careful exegesis of the chapter, read as Dante’s peculiar accessus ad philosophiam, the article goes through the stages of the analogy, and it highlights its main theoretical contents. In this way, it becomes possible to show the relevance of the topic of friendship (especially that between master and student) for a correct understanding of one of the fundamental (and most debated) aspects of philosophical practice as conceived by Dante, i.e., its intrinsically collective character. Moreover, the article underlines that friendship constitutes for Dante one of the essential instruments in order to broaden philosophical knowledge outside of university circles, something that the Convivio explicitly purports to do. (shrink)

Cuidados paliativos: solución ética acorde con la dignidad humana al final de la vida Cuidados paliativos: solução ética de acordo com a dignidade humana no final da vida It is said that passing laws to legalize euthanasia is absolutely necessary but, in my opinion, it is more pressing to enact a law for the patient to access a universal palliative care service at the end of their life than a law on euthanasia. This article discusses the difference between euthanasia and (...) palliative care. It is affirmed that being in favor of the latter does not mean wanting the patient to be in pain and to suffer, nor extending their life unreasonably. However, opting for palliative care is, on the one hand, what the physician can ethically do as a health worker and, on the other, the only morally acceptable alternative to the natural end of human beings that is appropriate to their dignity. Therefore, palliative care immerses us in an anthropological reflection about our own limitation and fragility, since respect for human life and palliative care dignify the process of dying. Para citar este artículo / To reference this article / Para citar este artigo Zurriaráin RG. Cuidados paliativos: solución ética acorde con la dignidad humana al final de la vida. Pers Bioet. 2019; 23: 180-193. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5294/pebi.2019.23.2.2 Recibido: 08/04/2019 Aceptado: 24/07/2019. (shrink)

The first Italian edition (Vita e Pensiero, Milan 1996) has been thoroughly revised, corrected and updated, and is complemented by an index of the most ...

RESUMEN: La biología evolucionista no ha logrado definir un concepto de especie que satisfaga a todos sus colaboradores. El presente panorama crítico de las principales propuestas y sus respectivas dificultades apunta, por un lado, a ilustrar los procesos de formación de conceptos en las ciencias empíricas y, por otro, a socavar la visión parateológica del conocimiento y la verdad que inspiró inicialmente a la ciencia moderna y prevalece aún entre muchas personas educadas. El artículo se divide en dos partes. La (...) primera atiende al concepto biológico (o genético) de especie adoptado por Theodosius Dobzhansky y Ernst Mayr alrededor de 1940, así como a las alternativas introducidas para superar sus limitaciones. La segunda parte estudia la tradición “cladista” fundada por Willi Hennig (1950) y sus ramificaciones. Varios conceptos de especie que no era fácil integrar en estos dos grupos se omitieron en aras de la coherencia y la brevedad de la exposición.ABSTRACT: Evolutionary biology has not suceeded in defining a concept of species that will satisfy all researchers. This critical survey of the main proposals and their respective difficulties tends, on the one hand, to throw light on the processes of concept formation in the empirical sciences, and, on the other, to undermine the paratheological vision of knowledge and truth that initially inspired modern science and still prevails among many educated persons. The article is divided into two parts. The first part concerns the biological (or genetical) concept of species which was adopted by Theodosius Dobzhansky and Ernst Mayr ca. 1940 and some alternatives which were subsequently introduced to overcome its limitations. The second part deals with several branches of the cladist tradition founded by Willi Hennig (1950). Various concepts of species that could not be easily integrated in either group were omitted for the sake of coherence and brevity. (shrink)

Frankenstein é um dos personagens mais populares da ficção. Nascido no romance de Mary Shelley, ele está completando 180 anos, mas já transcendeu as fronteiras da literatura. Há 65 anos, é encontrado nas telas cinematográficas, somando 117 aparições, perdendo apenas para o Conde Drácula, com 161, no gênero de filmes de terror. Este ensaio, atravessado por suas precariedades e limitações históricas, procurará respostas sobre o mito de Frankenstein. É importante investigar as significações desta experiência de alma, que lhe asseguram atualidade (...) e permanência às vésperas do terceiro milênio. Para tanto, serão usados os pressupostos da Psicanálise, compatibilizados com os do filósofo Louis Althusser. (shrink)

En este artículo presentamos una descripción de la crítica de Iván Illich a la sociedad industrial, específicamente en relación al problema de la energía y de la equidad. Especial atención es dada al concepto de convivencialidad y a sus posibles repercusiones para enfrentar los problemas energéticos. Una discusión en torno a la manera de Illich de criticar a la sociedad es presentada, en relación a lo que ha sido llamado un “humanismo crítico” y al problema de las necesidades individuales.

The aim of this paper is to reconsider the relationship between living body and artefacts in the perspective of Helmuth Plessner’s aesthesiology. According to the outcomes of Plessner’s aesthesiology, I present two main theses: 1) artefacts are not created, but rather discovered and expressed by human agency, and 2) the bodily dimension of the human being is the condition of the “discovery” of material and symbolic artefacts. To argue these theses I highlight a) the process of “somatisation” that engages the (...) Kantian transcendental model of subject in Plessner’s philosophical anthropology, b) Plessner’s rejection of the Kantian profile of Uexküll’s theory of Umwelt as an application of this transcendental model of subjectivity in the biological field, and c) the development in Plessner of a type of transcendental aesthetics, which can be linked with S. Crowell’s recent theory of perception. (shrink)