Population genetics attempts to measure the influence of the causes of evolution, viz., mutation, migration, natural selection, and random genetic drift, by understanding the way those causes change the genetics of populations. But how does it accomplish this goal? After a short introduction, we begin in section (2) with a brief historical outline of the origins of population genetics. In section (3), we sketch the model theoretic structure of population genetics, providing the flavor of the ways in which population genetics (...) theory might be understood as incorporating causes. In sections (4) and (5) we discuss two specific problems concerning the relationship between population genetics and evolutionary causes, viz., the problem of conceptually distinguishing natural selection from random genetic drift, and the problem of interpreting fitness. In section (6), we briefly discuss the methodology and key epistemological problems faced by population geneticists in uncovering the causes of evolution. Section (7) of the essay contains concluding remarks. (shrink)

The late (1931-98) Kevelson (philosophy, College of William and Mary) drew from the unpublished manuscripts of American semiotician Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) to explore how he conceived of the evolution of thought from instinct and imagination as expressed in myth, to ideas that are exchangeable units of meaning. Her study characterizes his cosmology as open-ended, non-finite, and self-organizing.

In the recent philosophical literature, two questions have arisen concerning the status of natural selection: (1) Is it a population-level phenomenon, or is it an organism-level phenomenon? (2) Is it a causal process, or is it a purely statistical summary of lower-level processes? In an earlier work (Millstein, Br J Philos Sci, 57(4):627–653, 2006), I argue that natural selection should be understood as a population-level causal process, rather than a purely statistical population-level summation of lower-level processes or as an organism-level (...) causal process. In a 2009 essay entitled “Productivity, relevance, and natural selection,” Stuart Glennan argues in reply that natural selection is produced by causal pro- cesses operating at the level of individual organisms, but he maintains that there is no causal productivity at the population level. However, there are, he claims, many population-level properties that are causally relevant to the dynamics of evolution- ary processes. Glennan’s claims rely on a causal pluralism that holds that there are two types of causes: causal production and causal relevance. Without calling into question Glennan’s causal pluralism or his claims concerning the causal relevance of natural selection, I argue that natural selection does in fact exhibit causal production at the population level. It is true that natural selection does not fit with accounts of mechanisms that involve decomposition of wholes into parts, such as Glennan’s own. However, it does fit with causal production accounts that do not require decomposition, such as Salmon’s Mark Transmission account, given the extent to which populations act as interacting “objects” in the process of natural selection. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty. Une conception de l’empathie non centrée sur le sujet?Cet article étudie l’émergence du terme « empathie » dans les textes de Merleau-Ponty. Il souligne que le concept n’est pas avant tout présenté comme une catégorie épistémologique, remettant en question si et comment nous pouvons éventuellement connaître les autres. Au contraire, il est conçu comme une catégorie ontologique, pour dire notre appartenance à une nature commune. De ce point de vue, il propose une façon sensible pour comprendre les autres, basée (...) sur une proximité et un partage physiques.Mais, avec des références à l’actuel débat, le texte suggère que, dans les réflexions du phénoménologue français, il est possible de trouver un paradigme qui n’est pas centré sur une conception subjective de l’empathie – c’est a dire qu’il s’agit d’un paradigme qui ne suppose pas toujours une projection subjective de ma sensibilité sur celle des autres. Plutôt, il peut à la fois consister en un sentiment commun, prépersonnel, qui constitue l’arrière-plan de nos sensibilités conscientes, et aussi proceder de l’autre être humain à moi, alors que souvent je sens et comprendre moi-même par differentiation des autres personnes, qui s’imposent sur mes sentiments et sur mes mots.Merleau-Ponty. A Conception of Empathy not centered on the Subject?This paper investigates the emergence of the term “empathy” in Merleau-Ponty’s texts. It points out that the concept is not primarly introduced as an epistemological category, questioning if and how eventually we can know the others. On the contrary it is meant as an ontological category, in order to say our belonging to a common nature. From this point of view he proposes a sensible way to understanding the others, based on a bodily closeness and sharing.But, with references to the current debate, the text suggests that in the reflections of the French phenomenologist it is possible to find a not subjectively centered paradigm for understandig empathy – that is a paradigm which does not always presuppose a subjective projection of my sensibility on that of the other ones. It can rather both consist in a common, prepersonal feeling, costituting the background of our conscious sensitivities, and proceed from the other human being to me, so that I often feel and understand myself by differing from the other individuals, who impose themselves on my senses and on my words. (shrink)

Can world peace come about through a world federation of governments? Is growing agreement and appreciation for, throughout the world, the doctrine of equal human rights inevitable? Such questions are raised by Mortimer Adler in How to Think about War and Peace. Adler argues in this book that both are possible, and in doing so he argues that the insights of liberal contract thinkers, particularly Immanuel Kant, are essentially true. Kant argues that each person has the capacity to discover within (...) himself the foundation for human rights because they are self-evident. It follows that over time inequalities and prejudices will disappear, and people will gain the freedom to advance the cause of peace. About this account of the possibility of world peace I ask the question: is it indeed reasonable? For if it is reasonable, it is not reasonable for the reasons that would have been advanced by Aristotle or Plato or their medieval followers. In older political philosophy it is agreement about the unchanging truth of things that can bring peace. To seek the unchanging truth of things, philosophical speculation about God and things divine, is the highest human activity. It is that end to which life in this world is directed, and upon which human flourishing depends. Freedom depends upon our openness to unchanging eternal truth, even more than self-evident rights; the exercise of speculative reasoning allows for political discourse and an open society. (shrink)

This essay attempts at elucidating the relationships between cosmopolitanism and nationalism and between State and Nation in Fichte’s thought on the basis of the new evidence provided by the critical edition of his works. The analysis of the Reden an die deutsche Nation highlights the ambiguity of the concept of Nation, strictly connected to the thesis of the primacy of Germans. This position is discussed in the light of the reflections devoted to this matter by Fichte in his last months (...) of life, as recorded in his diary. (shrink)

The first work to offer a comprehensive pragmatist anthropology focusing on sensibility, habits, and human experience as contingently yet irreversibly enlanguaged.

Recently, philosophers of biology have debated the status of the evolutionary process: is it deterministic or indeterministic? I argue that there is insufficient reason to favor one side of the debate over the other, and that a more philosophically defensible position argues neither for the determinacy nor for the indeterminacy of the evolutionary process. In other words, I maintain that the appropriate stand to take towards the question of the determinism of the evolutionary process is agnosticism. I then suggest that (...) an examination of the phenomenon of developmental noise might yield a solution to the problem. (shrink)

Is gender determined by biology, society or experience? How have notions of gender and sexuality differed in past societies? Addressing such questions, Gender and Archaeology is the first critical introduction to the field of gender archaeology as it has evolved over the last two decades. It examines the impact of feminist perspectives on archaeology and shows the unique insights that gender archaeology offers on topics like the sexual division of labor, issues of sexuality, and the embodiment of gender identity. A (...) substantial case study of gender and space in the medieval English castle lucidly draws together and illustrates these issues. Comprehensive and accessible, Gender and Archaeology is sure to further debate in the field. (shrink)

This volume collects the papers presented at the 9th edition of the Formal Ontology in Information Systems conference, FOIS 2016, held July 6–9, 2016, in Annecy, France. As in the previous editions, FOIS 2016 included keynote addresses, full paper presentations, an Ontology Competition, an Early Career Symposium in its scientific program and was preceded by the Interdisciplinary Summer School on Ontological Analysis, now at its third edition and held June 27–July 1 in Bolzano-Bozen, Italy.

A myth exists that Jews can embrace the cultural components of Judaism without appreciating the legal aspects of the Jewish tradition. This myth suggests that law and culture are independent of one another. In reality, however, much of Jewish culture has a basis in Jewish law. Similarly, Jewish law produces Jewish culture. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall develops and applies a cultural analysis paradigm to the Jewish tradition that departs from the understanding of Jewish law solely as the embodiment of Divine (...) command. (shrink)

Given the role of values in the deployment of GMOs, given the lack of mandatory and long-term testing of GMOs with outside oversight, and given the demonstrated environmental harms, it is not anti-science to want to GMOs labelled as GMOs. People who would like to avoid GMOs, whether out of concerns for potential health harms or concerns over actual environmental harms, are not being allowed to judge the risks and make choices for themselves and their families. For these reasons—so that (...) people can follow their reasonably held values—we ought to label GMOs as GMOs. (shrink)

In all disciplines there are specifiable basic concepts, our universes of discourse, which define special areas of inquiry. Semiotics is that 'science of sciences' which inquires into all processes of inquiry, and which seeks to discover methods of inquiry. Peirce held that semiotics was to be the method of methods. An account of semiotic method should distinguish between the way the term 'sign' is used in semiotics and the various ways this term was meant in nearly all the traditional disciplines. (...) In this monograph Roberta Kevelson minutely explores Charles S. Peirce's method of methods. (shrink)

Biologists studying ecology and evolution use the term “population” in many different ways. Yet little philosophical analysis of the concept has been done, either by biologists or philosophers, in contrast to the voluminous literature on the concept of “species.” This is in spite of the fact that “population” is arguably a far more central concept in ecological and evolutionary studies than “species” is. The fact that such a central concept has been employed in so many different ways is potentially problematic (...) for the reason that inconsistent usages (especially when the usage has not been made explicit) might lead to false controversies in which disputants are simply talking past one another. However, the inconsistent usages are not the only, or even the most important reason to examine the concept. If any set of organisms is legitimately called a “population,” selection and drift processes become purely arbitrary, too. Moreover, key ecological variables, such as abundance and distribution, depend on a nonarbitrary way of identifying populations. I sketch the beginnings of a population concept, drawing inspiration from the Ghiselin-Hull individuality thesis, and show why some alternative approaches are nonstarters. (shrink)

The latter half of the twentieth century has been marked by debates in evolutionary biology over the relative significance of natural selection and random drift: the so-called “neutralist/selectionist” debates. Yet John Beatty has argued that it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the concept of random drift from the concept of natural selection, a claim that has been accepted by many philosophers of biology. If this claim is correct, then the neutralist/selectionist debates seem at best futile, and at worst, (...) meaningless. I reexamine the issues that Beatty raises, and argue that random drift and natural selection, conceived as processes, can be distinguished from one another. (shrink)

Even if Peirce were well understood and there existed· general agreement among Peirce scholars on what he meant by his semiotics, or philosophy of signs, the undertaking of this book-wliich intends to establish a theoretical foundation for a new approach to understanding the interrelations of law, economics, and politics against referent systems of value-would be a risky venture. But since such general agreement on Peirce's work is lacking, one's sense of adventure in ideas requires further qualification. Indeed, the proverbial nerve (...) for failure must in any case be attendant. If one succeeds, one has introduced for further inquiry the strong possibility that should our social systems of law, economics, and politics---our means of interpersonal transaction as a whole-be understood against the theoretical back ground of a dynamic, "motion-picture" universe that is continually becoming, that is infinitely developing and changing in response to genuinely novel elements that emerge as existents, then the basic concepts of rights, resources, and reality take on new dimensions of meaning in correspondence with n-dimensional, infinite value judgments or truth-like beliefs which one holds. If such a view, as Peirce maintained, were possible and tenable not only for philosophy but as the basis for action and interaction in the world of human experience and practical affairs, one would readily say that risk taking is a small price for the realization of such possibility. (shrink)

The Law uses the terms, Action and Agency in several, significant ways which connect them with modern semiotic theory. In Law one of the main contexts for the idea of Acts is in Speech Acts which have become a major aspect of the philosophy of Language in the twentieth century; to Peirce, as the «father» of modern Semiotics, all thought is action, and thought has meaning to the extent that it has consequences in the world. Agency in law is inseparable (...) from the idea of a Legal Actor, and refers to powers which are conferred by a Principal upon a representator to a Third Party. Legal Agents are mediators in law as signs are mediators of interpreted meaning in semiotic theory and semiotic processes. This collection of papers is a transcultural and transdisciplinary project in law and semiotics by distinguished scholars. (shrink)

This book explores from selected semioticians' international and cross-cultural viewpoints, the changing concepts of custom and community. The idea of the 'primitive' as a complex social system is explored in the context of recent studies of comparative law. The range of focus is from Lockean majority-rule to aboriginal self-determination, and includes a new look at waning ideologies such as the «old» feminism, Critical Legal Studies, and postmodernisms. Pragmatism is reinterpreted and reviewed with fresh eyes.

This book examines Space, as Time and Motion, as a complex, evolving topic, from the special perspective of modern semiotics. The distinguished community of scholars explore concepts of locus, boundary, grounding, borders, sites, and cultural surrounds as aspects of the idea of semiotic space. This collection is international and transdisciplinary in range and insight. A common theme which binds these viewpoints into a cohesive text is Law with respect to that Space called human affairs.

This essay explores – by drawing on published and unpublished sources – a singular and until now neglected aspect of Ricoeur’s confrontation with Hegel’s legacy: i.e. his interpretation and productive appropriation of the well-known dialectic of evil and its forgiveness, developed by Hegel at the end of Chapter VI of the Phenomenology of Spirit. The investigation identifies the constant reason, which feeds Ricoeur’s interest for this figure of Hegel’s Phenomenology, from the Symbolic of evil to Oneself as another: i.e. the (...) will to overcome the limits of Kantian moral vision of world and evil. At the same time, it highlights the shifts, which mark Ricoeur’s initially very critical interpretation of the dialectic of evil and its forgiveness, concurrently with the transition to the second phase of his hermeneutics, centered on the notions of “text” and “action”. On this basis, the article examines the productive appropriation that this new and rehabilitative interpretation feeds, by inspiring Ricoeur’s reflection both on “difficult forgiveness” and on the “tragic wellspring of action”, i.e. on the unavoidable tension between universal moral norms, ethical particular contexts and individual’s conviction. At the same time, the article highlights the limits of this appropriative mouvement, by focusing on the irreducible and persistent divergences between Hegel’s and Ricoeur’s concept of evil and forgiveness. (shrink)

Among the main assumptions of the well-known principle-based method in bioethics, the ideal of consensus assumes central importance. Indeed, by proposing this method, Beauchamp and Childress offer a base for a practical agreement that can be reached starting from different moral perspectives: they defend the universality of the principles shared by the common-morality theories. The ideal of consensus based on the universal acceptability of the principles is criticized by a large number of authors, communitarians and feminists. They attack the notion (...) of universality in different ways: universal principles cannot yield any practical solution to ethical problems. The feminists in particular emphasize the relational, emotional involvement, and also the particular context ofeach situation, as central elements of any practical decision, rather than the cold detachment of the conformity to principles and norms. The case of abortion provides a good example of this position. (shrink)

Current corporate systems risk generating inequality among workers, insofar as they concentrate only on economic results by favoring, through the incentive and award system, only what can be seen, produced, and measured. As such, these systems are unable to recognize workers’ agapic behaviors – similar to the ones considered in organizational citizenship behavior literature – that cannot be quantified, i.e. workers’ generosity, humanity, kindness, compassion, help for others and mercy. Although these types of behaviors may appear unproductive or irrational, they (...) create symbols of belonging to the company and social cohesion. This article claims that beyond focusing on reward systems, companies should recognize agapic behaviors to increase workers’ intrinsic motivation. These behavioral attitudes allow fraternal relationships -as conceived in the Civil Economy tradition- to arise within organizations; moreover, they contribute to advancing new managerial practical implications in the humanistic management field. (shrink)

Recent research has shown that, although still on a limited scale, the teaching of business ethics in UK higher education has been increasing in recent years. This paper reports on a postal questionnaire survey conducted to investigate the extent to which ethical issues are covered in the teaching of management accounting in higher education. The principal findings are that the majority of management accounting lecturers in the British Isles do not incorporate ethics. About a third of the respondents to the (...) survey do address ethical issues, although about half of those say they do so only implicitly. Various factors underlying the findings and prospects for the future are discussed. (shrink)

Body as Sanctuary for Soul reminds us about "that primordial seed of memory" planted within, which once retrieved and nurtured becomes the inner intelligence of the soul. As Plato affirmed, we all move through "the river of forgetfulness" upon being born, and for some it can take a lifetime to retrieve what we have forgotten. Roberta Pughe teaches an embodied methodology to move this process along more quickly; to help call the soul home to live integrated within the container (...) of the body. There is a specific skill set required to understand conceptually exactly what is going on and to learn how to nurture this in daily life. Pughe draws from gestalt theory, shamanism, Platonic philosophy, and elemental breath work in a practical and easily accessible manner. Her audio tracks complement the text, providing a daily opportunity for experiential spiritual practice. Once you have applied the book's information, you begin to experience your soul's intelligence informing the daily activities of your life. Each enlightened soul seeks embodiment - simultaneously traversing both earth and sky realms - so that it can unveil its mythical knowledge in practical ways to create a life of greater purpose and fulfillment of destiny. (shrink)

Biologists and philosophers have offered differing concepts of biological race. That is, they have offered different candidates for what a biological correlate of race might be; for example, races might be subspecies, clades, lineages, ecotypes, or genetic clusters. One thing that is striking about each of these proposals is that they all depend on a concept of population. Indeed, some authors have explicitly characterized races in terms of populations. However, including the concept of population into concepts of race raises three (...) puzzles, all having to do with time. In this paper, I extend the causal interactionist population concept (CIPC) by introducing some simple assumptions about how to understand populations through time. These assumptions help to shed light on the three puzzles, and in the process show that if we want to understand races in terms of populations, we will need to revise our concept(s) of race. (shrink)

I examine recent debates in the philosophy of biology over the determinism or indeterminism of the evolutionary process, focusing on two papers in particular: Glymour 2001 and Stamos 2001. I argue that neither of these papers succeeds in making the case for the indeterminism of the evolutionary process, and suggest that what is needed is a detailed analysis of the causal processes at every level from the quantum mechanical to the evolutionary.

I argue that the propensity interpretation of fitness, properly understood, not only solves the explanatory circularity problem and the mismatch problem, but can also withstand the Pandora’s box full of problems that have been thrown at it. Fitness is the propensity (i.e., probabilistic ability, based on heritable physical traits) for organisms or types of organisms to survive and reproduce in particular environments and in particular populations for a specified number of generations; if greater than one generation, “reproduction” includes descendants of (...) descendants. Fitness values can be described in terms of distributions of propensities to produce varying number of offspring and can be modeled for any number of generations using computer simulations, thus providing both predictive power and a means for comparing the fitness of different phenotypes. Fitness is a causal concept, most notably at the population level, where fitness differences are causally responsible for differences in reproductive success. Relative fitness is ultimately what matters for natural selection. (shrink)