Le commentaire que propose Merleau-Ponty de L’origine de la géométrie de Husserl en 1960 accorde une place privilégiée au langage, à l’écrit : l’étonnement peut être grand de voir Merleau-Ponty, dans la continuité de Husserl, penser la genèse de l’idéalité géométrique à partir d’une méditation sur la littérature. La réflexion de Merleau-Ponty sur la littérature a pris un tour ontologique décisif au début des années cinquante, dans le long commentaire de Proust notamment en 1953-1954. C’est dans cet esprit que le (...) cours de 1960 accorde à la littérature un sens ontologique : l’idéalité géométrique ne peut advenir comme idéalité que par passage à la parole et à l’écrit, mais le sens même de l’idéalité scientifique ne peut se comprendre que si on la replace sur fond d’idéalités plus fondamentales que la littérature précisément dévoile, idéalités qui se nouent à travers le temps, dans le lien entre le passé et le présent, moi et l’autre. La littérature éclaire l’histoire de la géométrie d’une autre manière encore : elle met au jour l’entrelacement homme-langage-monde, condition d’émergence d’un sens vrai, qui advient dans l’histoire de la géométrie, et que la littérature, assumant notre être de parole, porte plus fondamentalement encore.The commentary Merleau-Ponty offers in 1960 on Husserl’s The Origin of Geometry gives a privileged place to language, to writing: it is perhaps a great astonishment to see Merleau-Ponty, in continuity with Husserl, thinking about the genesis of geometrical ideality beginning from a meditation on literature. Merleau-Ponty’s reflection on literature took a decisive ontological turn at the beginning of the 1950s, notably in the long commentary on Proust in 1953-1954. It is in this spirit that the course of 1960 grants to literature an ontological sense: the ideality of geometry can occur as ideality by the passage to speech and to writing, but the meaning of even scientific ideality can be understood only if one places it on the basis of more fundamental idealities that literature precisely reveals, idealities that are linked across time, in the connection between past and present, self and other. Literature clarifies the history of geometry in yet another manner: it brings to light the intertwining of human-language-world, condition of the emergence of a true sense, which occurs in the history of geometry, and which literature, assuming our being in speech bears more fundamentally still.Il commento de L’origine della geometria di Husserl proposto da Merleau-Ponty nel 1960 accorda un posto privilegiato al linguaggio, alla scrittura. Ci si potrebbe stupire del fatto che Merleau-Ponty, nel solco di Husserl, pensi l’idealità geometrica a partire da una riflessione sulla letteratura. Il pensiero di Merleau-Ponty sulla letteratura ha assunto un’inflessione ontologica decisiva all’inizio degli anni Cinquanta, in particolare nel lungo commento a Proust del 1953-1954. È proprio prolungando questa linea che il corso del 1960 attribuisce alla letteratura un senso ontologico: l’idealità geometrica diviene idealità proprio nel passaggio dalla parola allo scritto, ma il senso stesso dell’idealità scientifica può essere compreso solo se ricollochiamo quest’ultima su quello sfondo di idealità più fondamentali che la letteratura ci rivela, idealità che si instaurano attraverso il tempo, nel legame tra il passato e il presente, l’io e l’altro. Infine, è in un altro modo ancora che la letteratura illumina la storia della geometria: essa ci consente di illuminare l’intreccio uomo-linguaggio-mondo, condizione di emergenza di un senso vero, che si attesta nella storia della geometria e che la letteratura, in quanto essa assume il nostro essere già da sempre implicati con la parola, reca con sé in modo ancora più fondamentale. (shrink)

Los intentos más recientes de repensar las normas democráticas están ejemplificados por dos pensadores franceses contemporáneos. Pierre Rosavallon critica los movimientos de protesta y trata de institucionalizar sus fuerzas. Jacques Rancière, por otra parte, ha definido notoriamente la política democrática de forma que se da sólo en momentos en los que se re-imagina caóticamente el orden existente. Su enfoque se revela de forma que reclama más atención hacia las normas razonables de ese orden de lo que el propio Rancière admite. (...) Tales normas constituyen un modelo de la democracia disidente, y puede inspirarse en los radicales populares de la era de la fundación americana. (shrink)

La crisis económica es lo que Illich llamaba “una crisis verdadera” porque admite dos soluciones opuestas: 1. aumentar las dependencias hacia los mercados; 2. renunciar selectivamente a ciertas mercancías y servicios. Este texto aboga por la segunda solución. Para volverla posible, la historia y la epistemología de la economía serán más importantes que todas las micro- y macroeconomías. De optarse por la primera solución, sólo se incrementará una característica de la economía moderna que es su capacidad de engendrar cumbres de (...) riqueza al lado de abismos de miseria. Vista como una invitación a la renuncia selectiva, la crisis puede ser un estímulo a las verdaderas opciones políticas, es decir las opciones que consideran seriamente el retorno de saberes de subsistencia que fueron avasallados por el sistema económico. (shrink)

Comparison of surviving texts of eighteenth-century composers, Bach and Mozart in particular, show that considerable latitude was granted to performers for extempore embellishment and cadenzas, not only in arias and concertos but in solo works as well. Amateurs required prepared elaborations, whereas professional performers did not. The aesthetic of improvisation in performance is shot through with risk—an element sadly lacking in the training and the performance of classical music at the present time. This article finds distinct parallels among what (...) it calls the “ghetto language” of 1730s Leipzig, 1780s Vienna, and 1930s New York. Duke Ellington is said to be Bach's and Mozart's true successor. (shrink)

El proyecto mexicano de educación profesional antropológica tuvo un proceso formativo crucial a finales del gobierno posrevolucionario presidido por Lázaro Cárdenas del Río (1934-1940), pues estaba enmarcado por el programa político denominado Educación Socialista. Dicho programa dio cobijo a la fundación del Instituto Politécnico Nacional que tuvo en sus inicios un Departamento de Antropología, el cual fue transferido al Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia (INAH) en 1942, recibiendo el nombre de Escuela Nacional de Antropología (ENA). Aunque estos movimientos institucionales (...) parecieran solo reacomodos administrativos, dentro de ellos se modelaron interesantes perspectivas de trabajo antropológico e histórico, las cuales posicionaron a sus estudiantes en puestos clave de instituciones científicas, artísticas y gubernamentales que resultan elementales para la comprensión de las inquietudes y debates de la academia americana en las disciplinas antropo-históricas para las décadas venideras. Bajo tal contexto, este artículo identifica la potencialidad del proceso de formación académica y científica en la ENA a través de indicios contenidos en la documentación docente de Robert H. Barlow, profesor viajero estadounidense que, después de ser estudiante temporal, laboró en esta escuela entre 1945 y 1951. Consideramos sus registros como parte de un archivo vital, disperso en varias instituciones, que nos permiten rastrear algunos detalles sobre las personas que se encontraron en sus aulas durante este proceso de formación institucional de la ENA, contextualizándoles dentro del proyecto estatal de la profesionalización disciplinar, pero también en los inquietantes silencios que rodean las dispersas memorias andantes de este profesor migrante. (shrink)

La obra de Robert Musil Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften no sólo se considera una de las cumbres de la novela del siglo XX, sino que constituye también un ensayo de profundo calado teórico político sobre la nación y los nacionalismos en la Europa de entreguerras. La crisis del Imperio austrohúngaro sirve de motivo al autor para desarrollar una crítica profunda de algunos de los fundamentos teóricos fundamentales del pensamiento político moderno. Este artículo muestra cómo la crítica sistemática a la (...) que el nacionalismo esencialista y racista se somete en la obra se basa en una revisión de dos de los presupuestos filosóficos que la hacen posible: la concepción lineal del tiempo y la historia, y la metafísica del sujeto. El análisis explora las profunda relación que existe en la obra entre la identidad individual y la identidad colectiva, entre la crisis del sujeto unitario moderno como individuo autónomo y las dificultades de la construcción de un concepto pluralista, democrático e inclusivo de Nación. Palabras-clave: Nacionalismo, nacionalidades, Imperio Austro-Húngaro, Robert Musil, identidad colectiva. (shrink)

A partir de los postulados de una concepción semántica de norma y su clasificación en reglas y principios, Robert Alexy ha enunciado una tesis fuerte de la separación, al concebir que entre ambos tipos de normas no solo existe una diferencia gradual, sino también cualitativa. En este contexto, los principios son descritos como mandatos de optimización, caracterizados por un cumplimiento gradual en atención a las posibilidades reales y jurídicas, y a través de la denominada técnica de la ponderación. (...) A pesar de las objeciones recibidas, la vigencia de esta tesis resulta incuestionable, sirviendo todavía de inspiración a las nuevas generaciones de juristas interesados en la Teoría del Derecho. En el presente capítulo se pretende exponer de manera sucinta pero precisa los postulados del principialismo alexyano, las críticas más recurrentes y sus posibles respuestas, para terminar con algunas notas interpretativas que persiguen contribuir a la continuación del camino trazado por el insigne profesor alemán. (shrink)

Resumen: Spinoza afirma que las decisiones, elecciones y acciones de un agente son necesarias porque están determinadas causalmente. ¿Acaso los seres humanos no son agentes morales? ¿son sólo eslabones de una cadena de causas cuyo curso no pueden controlar y que los exime de las consecuencias de sus actos, así como de premios y castigos? ¿ser un individuo libre significa aceptar pasivamente lo que ocurre y abandonar la pretensión de modificarlo? Este artículo responde a estas preguntas mediante la distinción en (...) la obra spinoziana de dos conceptos de libertad, la verdadera libertad y el libre albedrío, así como con la distinción entre la responsabilidad civil fundada en el concepto de potestas humana -y no en la verdadera libertad, aunque la posibilita-.: Spinoza sustains that the agents' decisions are necessary because they are causally determined. But then, are humans really moral agents? Is it possible that they are only passengers in a train of causes, whose course they cannot control and exempts them from the consequences of their acts, of reward or punishment? Is accepting whatever happens and quitting the aspiration of changing things the hallmark of the free man? This paper answers these questions by distinguishing two concepts of freedom, real freedom and free will, as well as two concepts of responsibility. Civil responsibility is grounded in free will, whereas moral responsibility is not grounded in true freedom, but in human power. (shrink)

Stainton argues that since sub-sentential speech acts lack the proper syntactic structure to have logical form, it is not from them that subsententially propositions conveyed derive their logical form, in this brief comment, I develop an argument for the claim that sub-sentential speech acts not only do have the proper syntactic structure, but that according to Stainton's own general pragmatic account of sub-sentential speech, they also satisfy all the criteria put forward by him to be the primary bearers of logical (...) form. Stainton arguye que, dado que los actos de habla suboracionales carecen de la estructura sintáctica apropiada para tener forma lógica, las proposiciones comunicadas de manera suboracional no derivan su forma lógica de ellos. En este breve comentario desarrollo un argumento a favor de la tesis de que los actos de habla suboracionales, no sólo tienen la estructura sintáctica apropiada, sino que — de acuerdo con la propia teoría pragmática general de Stainton sobre el habla suboracional— también satisfacen todos los criterios mencionados por el propio Stainton para ser los portadores básicos de forma lógica. (shrink)

Scritto complesso, compatto e volutamente non sistematico - all'acme della carriera accademica e dell'attività filosofica di Robert Spaemann (1927 - 2018) -, Persone. Sulla differenza tra 'qualcosa' e 'qualcuno' (1996) non è solo un capolavoro del grande pensatore tedesco, ma è innanzitutto una pietra miliare nella filosofia del Novecento sul realismo delle persone. La sua acuta riflessione sa pro-vocare e destare l'uomo di oggi alla 'grande questione' ch'egli da sempre è a se stesso, ponendolo di fronte al senso (...) autentico del suo essere-persona che, dentro i drammi e i rinnegamenti delle persone reali e dentro le traversìe della storia è stato prima obliato dal modo d'esistere dell'uomo moderno, per poi scorrere come fiume carsico nei meandri della travagliata storia della personologia, con un concomitante imporsi, nella forma mentis oggi imperante, della 'dialettica di naturalismo e spiritualismo'. Si offre qui uno studio rigoroso e inedito della filosofia delle persone di Spaemann - miniera ricchissima tutta da scavare -, che prende sul serio la domanda esistenzialmente decisiva sull'enigma della persona, per arrischiare una comprensione della realtà personale che ognuno di noi è, lasciandoci guidare dal 'Socrate tedesco' in un avvincente percorso che raccoglie a piene mani l'eredità e le sfide della tradizione filosofica e restituisce al lettore precisi segnavìa del senso, cioè della vettorialità fondamentale tracciata nell'essere-persona e, resi memori dell'origine e della meta, del senso di marcia a ognuno di noi affidato come compito per divenire le persone uniche che già siamo e sempre più saremo. (shrink)

“Conciencia”, la sección inicial de la Fenomenología de Hegel, se ocupa de la comprensión del mundo físico que nos rodea. La sección siguiente, “Autoconciencia”, comienza a considerar nuestra comprensión de nosotros mismos y de los otros. Este orden de discusión no es ni arbitrario ni meramente conveniente. Por el contrario, una de las principales lecciones que hemos de aprender hacia el final del desarrollo de la “conciencia” es que nuestra mejor concepción del mundo que es el objeto de nuestras actividades (...) cognitivas es inteligible solo como una parte de un relato que además considera la naturaleza del sujeto que se dedica a tales actividades. La razón para esta transición expositiva es un aspecto importante en el idealismo de Hegel. En este capítulo ofrezco una reconstrucción racional de un argumento que veo como el soporte de esta transición y del tipo de idealismo que esta implica. (shrink)

Alexy si prefigge di individuare quale argomentazione sia razionale (rationaler), ma soprattutto di quali argomentazioni siano inaccettabili poiché del tutto irrazionali: l'autore intende così fornire un criterio di individuazione che possa soddisfare le esigenze del ragionamento giuridico (principalmente quello giudiziario). La ricerca di Alexy non si propone di affermare un giudizio di valore su cosa possa essere considerato effettivamente morale o giuridico e cosa non possa esserlo, vale a dire una particolare decisione, come esito finale del ragionamento, mentre tutto il (...) suo impegno filosofico è diretto verso la definizione delle condizioni metodologiche per la correttezza del ragionamento stesso, allo scopo di scongiurare o, comunque, individuare eventuali irrazionalità. La teoria dell'argomentazione giuridica di Alexy si presenta come un insieme di regole che possono essere considerate una summa ricavata in parte dalla logica formale: accanto a queste rigorose formulazioni, però, si possono osservare anche i contributi della logica induttiva e gli strumenti della retorica, relativi alla verifica delle premesse, come il principio dell'onere dell'argomentazione o del precedente. Le regole individuate da Alexy si dividono essenzialmente in due principali categorie: la prima concernente il discorso pratico generale, la seconda riguarda invece il discorso giuridico, inteso come caso particolare del primo. Nei capitoli seguenti si procede dunque all'analisi di alcuni aspetti della teoria dell'argomentazione, tenendo conto anche delle osservazioni formulate dallo stesso Alexy in risposta alle critiche ricevute, tentando di distinguere i validi contributi della teoria stessa da quegli aspetti che possono apparire eccessivi e inadeguati rispetto alla metodologia adottata. La posizione metodologica debole di Alexy, che mira solo all'esclusione dell'estrema irrazionalità, non risulta poi davvero così “debole” e provoca le critiche di O. Weinberger, J. Habermas, N. MacCormick e J. Raz. L'obiettivo che la teoria di Alexy sembra prefiggersi e mancare, o quanto meno non essere in grado di giustificare adeguatamente il metodo elaborato per conseguirlo, è soprattutto l'elaborazione di una procedura di giustificazione esterna. I severi limiti che lo stesso Alexy pone preliminarmente al proprio progetto vengono infranti, seppure in senso debole, estendendosi al di fuori dell'orizzonte limitato della razionalità relativa al diritto vigente, qualunque esso sia: Alexy non è del tutto fedele alle proposte avanzate con la sua prospettiva debole, in particolare alla netta separazione tra argomentazione e decisione. La neutralità del criterio di controllo di razionalità contrasta, infatti, con qualsiasi pretesa di giustizia, se, come sostenuto da Alexy, deve essere intesa come relativa ad un ordinamento giuridico positivo. Un contributo importante dell'opera di Alexy è la definizione estensiva del concetto stesso di argomentazione elaborata dall'autore che riafferma la complessità e l'apertura del discorso giuridico ben oltre i limiti posti dalle metodologie che ne costringono l'orizzonte entro un rigido logicismo giuridico. Il metodo adottato da Alexy rappresenta un valido contributo anche per lo statuto epistemologico della scienza giuridica, distinguendo l'elaborazione scientifica delle procedure per garantire il controllo di razionalità dalla certezza dei risultati conseguibili. Una volta accettata la sua funzione solo nei suoi limiti storici e politici di strumento di notevole riduzione dell'ambito dell'irrazionalità del discorso giuridico e dei suoi esiti, si può valutare correttamente tutta la portata della teoria, “non definitiva”, elaborata da Alexy e la sua struttura aperta nei confronti di ogni specie di ragionamento giuridico, come prescritto dall'ultima regola di transizione del discorso pratico generale, che espone tutta la teoria dell'argomentazione ad un perenne confronto dialettico con ogni possibile e diversa tesi. (shrink)

Alexy intende fornire un criterio di individuazione di cosa sia razionale, ma soprattutto di cosa non possa rientrare in una tale definizione nel ragionamento giuridico. La razionalità cui si riferisce l'autore può essere identificata con la ragion pratica di Kant, per quanto concerne il discorso pratico, alla quale si associano le esigenze della specifica razionalità giuridica, come nel caso della “dogmatica” così definita da Alexy, che si propone dichiaratamente di formulare una teoria procedurale del discorso giuridico inteso come caso particolare (...) del discorso pratico, procedendo ad un'attenta analisi delle dottrine filosofiche, in special modo della filosofia tedesca, spaziando dal pensiero aristotelico alla filosofia del linguaggio di Wittgenstein, comprendendo i più recenti sviluppi della filosofia giuridica e di teorie critiche della società e della comunicazione come quelle di Habermas. La natura del discorso giuridico, secondo Alexy, è contrattuale, fondata sull'accordo tra i parlanti. Alexy si pone la questione della razionalità del discorso giuridico, delle argomentazioni, nell'ambito di un qualsiasi ordinamento giuridico positivo. Elementi centrali del discorso giuridico sono, per Alexy, la pretesa di correttezza (che costituisce il punto di saldatura tra diritto e morale) e il principio di universalizzabilità. La pretesa di correttezza è il nodo da cui si sviluppa la posizione non positivista dell'autore, introducendo la possibilità di una verifica, non solo formale, del discorso giuridico. Da un lato la correttezza comporta l’osservanza formale di un ordinamento vigente, dall'altro si eleva al di sopra di ogni particolare diritto positivo. Il principio di universalizzabilità ripropone l'approccio morale kantiano come istanza di controllo, anche nell’analisi del discorso giuridico. Le regole definite da Alexy, a dispetto della natura procedurale della sua teoria, non si limitano solo alla struttura formale e logica del linguaggio, ma comprendono anche condizioni e comportamenti di natura esterna alla sola analisi filosofica del linguaggio. Le regole individuate da Alexy si dividono essenzialmente in due principali categorie: la prima concernente il discorso pratico generale, la seconda riguarda invece il discorso pratico giuridico, inteso come caso particolare del primo. (shrink)

Robert Norton considera que la concepción de “alma bella” de Jakob Fries es similar a la esbozada por Hegel a través de su obra. Sin embargo, el autor de la Filosofía del Derecho no incluye explícitamente a Fries dentro del elenco de representantes del pensamiento del “alma bella”. Sostengo que su ausencia sólo puede explicarse porque el autor de Julius und Evagoras no poseía una noción de “alma bella” similar a la de Hegel.

Neo-teleology is the two part thesis that, e.g., (i) we have hearts because of what hearts are for: Hearts are for blood circulation, not the production of a pulse, so hearts are there--animals have them--because their function is to circulate the blood, and (ii) that (i) is explained by natural selection: traits spread through populations because of their functions. This paper attacks this popular doctrine. The presence of a biological trait or structure is not explained by appeal to its function. (...) To suppose otherwise is to trivialize natural selection. (shrink)

Natural selection is commonly interpreted as the fundamental mechanism of evolution. Questions about how selection theory can claim to be the all-sufficient explanation of evolution often go unanswered by today's neo-Darwinists, perhaps for fear that any criticism of the evolutionary paradigm will encourage creationists and proponents of intelligent design.In Biological Emergences, Robert Reid argues that natural selection is not the cause of evolution. He writes that the causes of variations, which he refers to as natural experiments, are independent of (...) natural selection; indeed, he suggests, natural selection may get in the way of evolution. Reid proposes an alternative theory to explain how emergent novelties are generated and under what conditions they can overcome the resistance of natural selection. He suggests that what causes innovative variation causes evolution, and that these phenomena are environmental as well as organismal.After an extended critique of selectionism, Reid constructs an emergence theory of evolution, first examining the evidence in three causal arenas of emergent evolution: symbiosis/association, evolutionary physiology/behavior, and developmental evolution. Based on this evidence of causation, he proposes some working hypotheses, examining mechanisms and processes common to all three arenas, and arrives at a theoretical framework that accounts for generative mechanisms and emergent qualities. Without selectionism, Reid argues, evolutionary innovation can more easily be integrated into a general thesis. Finally, Reid proposes a biological synthesis of rapid emergent evolutionary phases and the prolonged, dynamically stable, non-evolutionary phases imposed by natural selection. (shrink)

Recent debates over adults' theory of mind use have been fueled by surprising failures of perspective-taking in communication, suggesting that perspective-taking may be relatively effortful. Yet adults routinely engage in effortful processes when needed. How, then, should speakers and listeners allocate their resources to achieve successful communication? We begin with the observation that the shared goal of communication induces a natural division of labor: The resources one agent chooses to allocate toward perspective-taking should depend on their expectations about the other's (...) allocation. We formalize this idea in a resource-rational model augmenting recent probabilistic weighting accounts with a mechanism for (costly) control over the degree of perspective-taking. In a series of simulations, we first derive an intermediate degree of perspective weighting as an optimal trade-off between expected costs and benefits of perspective-taking. We then present two behavioral experiments testing novel predictions of our model. In Experiment 1, we manipulated the presence or absence of occlusions in a director–matcher task. We found that speakers spontaneously modulated the informativeness of their descriptions to account for “known unknowns” in their partner's private view, reflecting a higher degree of speaker perspective-taking than previously acknowledged. In Experiment 2, we then compared the scripted utterances used by confederates in prior work with those produced in interactions with unscripted directors. We found that confederates were systematically less informative than listeners would initially expect given the presence of occlusions, but listeners used violations to adaptively make fewer errors over time. Taken together, our work suggests that people are not simply “mindblind”; they use contextually appropriate expectations to navigate the division of labor with their partner. We discuss how a resource-rational framework may provide a more deeply explanatory foundation for understanding flexible perspective-taking under processing constraints. (shrink)

Este texto presenta la traducción al español (precedida de un estudio introductorio) de la Parte III, sección VI de la obra “Una investigación cuidadosa y estricta de las nociones modernas prevalecientes de la libertad de la voluntad” de Jonathan Edwards. Esta sección se titula: “La libertad de indiferencia no sólo es innecesaria para la virtud, sino que es completamente inconsistente con ella; y todas las inclinaciones y los hábitos, ya sean virtuosos o viciosos, son inconsistentes con las nociones arminianas de (...) la libertad y de la agencia moral”. En ella JEdwards hace una dura crítica a lo que él denomina la “libertad de indiferencia”. El estudio introductorio pone este escrito en un contexto más contemporáneo, identificando como este tipo de libertad a propuestas como el libertarismo de Robert Kane. (shrink)

Individuals are a prominent part of the biological world. Although biologists and philosophers of biology draw freely on the concept of an individual in articulating both widely accepted and more controversial claims, there has been little explicit work devoted to the biological notion of an individual itself. How should we think about biological individuals? What are the roles that biological individuals play in processes such as natural selection (are genes and groups also units of selection?), speciation (are species individuals?), and (...) organismic development (do genomes code for organisms)? Much of our discussion here will focus on organisms as a central kind of biological individual, and that discussion will raise broader questions about the nature of the biological world, for example, about its complexity, its organization, and its relation to human thought. (shrink)

Mesoscale modeling is often considered merely as a practical strategy used when information on lower-scale details is lacking, or when there is a need to make models cognitively or computationally tractable. Without dismissing the importance of practical constraints for modeling choices, we argue that mesoscale models should not just be considered as abbreviations or placeholders for more “complete” models. Because many systems exhibit different behaviors at various spatial and temporal scales, bottom-up approaches are almost always doomed to fail. Mesoscale models (...) capture aspects of multi-scale systems that cannot be parameterized by simple averaging of lower-scale details. To understand the behavior of multi-scale systems, it is essential to identify mesoscale parameters that “code for” lower-scale details in a way that relate phenomena intermediate between microscopic and macroscopic features. We illustrate this point using examples of modeling of multi-scale systems in materials science and biology, where identification of material parameters such as stiffness or strain is a central step. The examples illustrate important aspects of a so-called “middle-out” modeling strategy. Rather than attempting to model the system bottom-up, one starts at intermediate scales where systems exhibit behaviors distinct from those at the atomic and continuum scales. One then seeks to upscale and downscale to gain a more complete understanding of the multi-scale system. The cases highlight how parameterization of lower-scale details not only enables tractable modeling but is also central to understanding functional and organizational features of multi-scale systems. (shrink)

Author Robert Wright shows how Buddhist meditative practice can loosen the grip of anxiety, regret, and hatred, and deepen your appreciation of beauty and other people." -- Adapted from book jacket.

Group beneficial norms are common in human societies. The persistence of such norms is consistent with evolutionary game theory, but existing models do not provide a plausible explanation for why they are common. We show that when a model of imitation used to derive replicator dynamics in isolated populations is generalized to allow for population structure, group beneficial norms can spread rapidly under plausible conditions. We also show that this mechanism allows recombination of different group beneficial norms arising in..

Hegel's holistic metaphysics challenges much recent ontology with its atomistic and reductionist assumptions; Stern offers us an original reading of Hegel and contrasts him with his predecessor, Kant.

The first unquestionably big idea in the history of philosophy was the idea of form. The idea of course belonged to Plato, and was then domesticated at the hands of Aristotle, who paired form with matter as the two chief principles of his metaphysics and natural philosophy. In the medieval period, it was Aristotle’s conception of form and matter that generally dominated. This was true for both the Islamic and the Christian tradition, once the entire Aristotelian corpus became available. For (...) this reason, although there is much to say about the fate of Platonic Forms in medieval thought, the present chapter will focus on the Aristotelian tradition.1 Aristotelian commentators have been puzzled by form and matter for as long as there have been Aristotelian commentators. Indeed, it would not be too much to say that these are topics about which Aristotelians have never formed a very clear conception, and that their failure to do so was the principal reason why Aristotelianism ceased to be a flourishing research program from the seventeenth century onward. For those who aspire to a modern revival of Aristotelianism, the concepts of form and matter can easily take on the aspect of a kind of Holy Grail, such that if only we could get these ideas clearly in focus, we could see our way forward on any number of philosophical fronts, such as the union of mind and body, the coherence and endurance of substances, the nature of causality, and so on. The historical record, however, suggests that this hope is a snare and delusion, insofar as there has never been any such thing as the theory of form and matter. Although medieval philosophers of all kinds used this terminology incessantly, it had no more of a fixed meaning than does the ubiquitous contemporary philosophical talk of “properties.” Hence, the most a general survey of the topic can do is consider some of the more important areas of agreement and disagreement. (shrink)

Selected by CHOICE as an Outstanding Academic Book for 1995.

This essay argues that aristotle's doctrine of nominal definition is his semantic theory for natural-Kind terms. It offers a new interpretation of that doctrine. On this interpretation nominal definitions are initial working theoretical accounts of natural kinds which serve as starting points for scientific inquiry. As such, Nominal definitions have existential import. They make an implicit reference to the most familiar actual instances of the kinds they define and they define the essences of those kinds by reference to those instances. (...) Nominal definitions are, Thus, Accounts of real essences as much as real definitions. They are initial incomplete accounts of such essences and it is as such that they explicate the meanings of (natural-Kind) terms. (shrink)

In this paper, I first present the ideas and arguments put forward by evolutionary psychologists that humans evolved certain capacities to creatively problem solve. Specifically, Steven Mithen thinks that creative problem solving is possible because the mind has evolved a conscious capacity he calls cognitive fluidity, the flexible exchange of information between and among mental modules. While I agree with Mithen that cognitive fluidity acts as a necessary condition for creative problem solving, I disagree that cognitive fluidity alone will suffice (...) for such an activity. I argue further that the flexible exchange of information between and among modules, as well as what I call scenario visualization - a conscious ability to segregate and integrate visual images in future scenarios - evolved in our species and accounts for certain kinds of creative problem solving. (shrink)

An application of Young's Habermasian critical theory of education to classroom communication problems of teachers in schools, with a special focus on the question/answer cycle and its educational role. The book uses classroom transcripts extensively in the analysis.

Complexity–nonlinear dynamics for my purposes in this essay–is rich with metaphysical and epistemological implications but is only recently receiving sustained philosophical analysis. I will explore some of the subtleties of causation and constraint in Rayleigh-Bénard convection as an example of a complex phenomenon, and extract some lessons for further philosophical reflection on top-down constraint and causation particularly with respect to causal foundationalism.

Exploring Certainty: Wittgenstein and Wide Fields of Thought considers how, where, and to what extent the thoughts and ideas found in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty can be applied to other areas of thought, including: ethics, aesthetics, religious belief, mathematics, cognitive science, and political theory. Robert Greenleaf Brice opens new avenues of thought for scholars and students of the Wittgensteinian tradition, while introducing original philosophies about human knowledge and cognition.

It is often held that to have a conscious experience presupposes having some form of implicit self-awareness. The most dominant phenomenological view usually claims that we essentially perceive experiences as our own. This is the so called “mineness” character, or dimension of experience. According to this view, mineness is not only essential to conscious experience, it also grounds the idea that pre-reflective self-awareness constitutes a minimal self. In this paper, we show that there are reasons to doubt this constituting role (...) of mineness. We argue that there are alternative possibilities and that the necessity for an adequate theory of the self within psychopathology gives us good reasons to believe that we need a thicker notion of the pre-reflective self. To this end, we develop such a notion: the Pre-Reflective Situational Self. To do so, we will first show how alternative conceptions of pre-reflective self-awareness point to philosophical problems with the standard phenomenological view. We claim that this is mainly due to fact that within the phenomenological account the mineness aspect is implicitly playing several roles. Consequently, we argue that a thin interpretation of pre-reflective self-awareness—based on a thin notion of mineness—cannot do its needed job within, at least within psychopathology. This leads us to believe that a thicker conception of pre-reflective self is needed. We, therefore, develop the notion of the pre-reflective situational self by analyzing the dynamical nature of the relation between self-awareness and the world, specifically through our interactive inhabitation of the social world. (shrink)

Understanding cooperation and punishment in small-scale societies is crucial for explaining the origins of human cooperation. We studied warfare among the Turkana, a politically uncentralized, egalitarian, nomadic pastoral society in East Africa. Based on a representative sample of 88 recent raids, we show that the Turkana sustain costly cooperation in combat at a remarkably large scale, at least in part, through punishment of free-riders. Raiding parties comprised several hundred warriors and participants are not kin or day-to-day interactants. Warriors incur substantial (...) risk of death and produce collective benefits. Cowardice and desertions occur. (shrink)

Rice, Robert James William Gleeson was born in Balaklava, a town in the mid-north of South Australia, on 24 December 1920. The son of John Joseph Gleeson and Margaret Mary O'Connell, he was the third born of six children - the elder brother of Thomas, John and Raphael (Ray), and the younger brother of Mary. The first-born child, also Mary, born in Balaklava on 6 May 1918, died one hour after birth. She was baptised during her short life.

The first five chapters of the second book of Aristotle's Politics contain a series of criticisms levelled against Plato's Republic. Despite the abundance of studies that have been done on Aristotle's Politics, these chapters have for the most part been neglected; there has been no book-length study of them this century. In this important new book, Robert Mayhew fills this unfortunate gap in Aristotelian scholarship, analyzing these chapters in order to discover what they tell us about Aristotle's political philosophy. (...) Mayhew demonstrates that in Politics II 1-5, Aristotle is presenting his views on an extremely fundamental issue: the unity of the city. Indeed, he states, almost all of Aristotle's criticisms of the Republic center on this important subject in one way or another. Only by understanding Aristotle's views on the proper unity of the city, Mayhew explains, can we adequately discover his views on the proper relationship between the individual and the city. Students and scholars of classical political philosophy will be greatly interested in this innovative book. (shrink)

1. We are unknown to ourselves, we knowing ones, we to our own selves, and for a good reason. We have never sought ourselves – so how could it happen, that one day we would find ourselves? Someone once correctly said: “where your treasure is, there your heart will be also”;1 our treasure is where the beehives of our knowledge are. We are always on the way to finding it; as winged creatures and honey-gatherers of the spirit, we truly care (...) for only one thing from the heart: to “bring something home.” Whatever else concerns life, the so-called “experiences” – who among us has enough seriousness for them? Or enough time? In these matters we have been, I fear, somewhat distracted: our hearts have not quite been in it, and not even our ears! More often, like some divine scatter-brain absorbed-in-himself into whose ear the bell has tolled the twelve strikes of noon at full power, who then suddenly wakes up and asks himself, “What was really just struck?”, just like that we rub our ears afterwards and ask, completely amazed, completely embarrassed, “what did we really experience?” and further, “who are we really?” and afterwards, as said, count the twelve trembling bell-strikes of our experience, our life, our being – ugh! and miscount them . . . We necessarily remain strangers to ourselves, we do not understand ourselves, we must get ourselves wrong, for us the saying “Each is furthest from himself” holds for all eternity – we are not “knowing ones” with respect to ourselves. (shrink)

In this accessible and comprehensive work, Robert Solomon and Kathleen Higgins cover the entire history of philosophy--ancient, medieval, and modern, from cultures both East and West--in its broader historical and cultural contexts. Major philosophers and movements are discussed along with less well-known but interesting figures. The authors examine the early Greek, Indic, and Chinese philosophers and the mythological traditions that preceded them, as well as the great religious philosophies, including Christianity, Hinduism, Judaism, and Taoism. Easily understandable to students without (...) specialized knowledge of philosophy, A Short History of Philosophy demonstrates the relevance of philosophy to our times, illuminating the impact of the revolutions wrought by science, industry, colonialism, and sectarian warfare; the two world wars and the Holocaust; and the responses of philosophy in the schools of existentialism, postmodernism, feminism, and multiculturalism. In addition, the authors provide their own twists and interpretations of events, resulting in a broad view of the nature of philosophy as an intellectual discipline and its sometimes odd and dramatic consequences. (shrink)

We compare Gödel’s and Brouwer’s explorations of mysticism and its relation to mathematics.

Based on the thesis of R. Muller (doctoral)--Universite de Paris IV.

"This book discusses the vast and complex range of choices in between blanket amnesty and total accountability through criminal justice, and does so with ...