The Covid-19 pandemic has led to severe shortages of many essential goods and services, from hand sanitizers and N-95 masks to ICU beds and ventilators. Although rationing is not unprecedented, never before has the American public been faced with the prospect of having to ration medical goods and services on this scale.

In a recent article, Hofweber presents a new, and surprising, argument for idealism. His argument is surprising because it starts with an apparently innocent premiss from the philosophy of language: that ‘that’-clauses do not refer. I do not think that Hofweber's argument works, and my first aim in this paper is to explain why. However, I agree with Hofweber that what we say about ‘that’-clauses has important metaphysical consequences. My second aim is to argue that, far from leading us into (...) idealism, denying that ‘that’-clauses refer is the first step toward a kind of direct realism about belief. (shrink)

Mit diesem Buch wird erstmals ein umfassendes und systematisches Referenzwerk zu Christian Wolff vorgelegt, das alle wichtigen Aspekte zu Leben und Werk des Philosophen behandelt. Das Handbuch ist von international renommierten Experten verfasst und behandelt neben der Biographie und der philosophiegeschichtlichen Rolle Wolffs sowohl sein philosophisches als auch sein naturwissenschaftlich-mathematisches Werk.

I. PERCEPTION AND THE OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION SOME JUDGMENTS OF PERCEPTION G. E. Moore I want to raise some childishly simple questions as to what we ...

The book aims to revitalise the interdisciplinary debate about evolutionary ethics and substantiate the idea that evolution science can provide a rational and robust framework for understanding morality. It also traces pathways for knowledge-based choices to be made about directions for future long-term biological evolution and cultural development in view of adaptation to the expected, probable and possible future and the ecological sustainability of our planetary environment The authors discuss ethical challenges associated with the major biosocial sources of human variation: (...) individual variation, inter-personal variation, inter-group variation, and inter-generational variation. This book approaches the long-term challenges of the human species in a holistic way. Researchers will find an extensive discussion of the key theoretical scientific aspects of the relationship between evolution and morality. Policy makers will find information that can help them better understand from where we are coming and inspire them to make choices and take actions in a longer-term perspective. The general public will find food for thoughts. (shrink)

Empirically successful scientific theories are intellectual hurricanes. They flood lowlands set aside for worries about definitions. They carry away philosophical reflections that are less dense than the accumulated scientific findings that give these storms their strength, and they fundamentally reshape the conceptual landscape. The history of scholarship reveals that once an empirically corroborated scientific theory explains and predicts phenomena in some domain noticeably better than the available alternatives (whether those alternatives are scientific theories or not), among experts at least, the (...) process of conceptualizing those phenomena, thereafter, mostly floats along on the surface of debates about the comparative scientific merits of that theory and its competitors. Earlier debates about definitions lose most of their interest until new theories arise that generate new, less easily managed empirical findings in the pertinent domains. Across the centuries, the fates of such concepts as ‘inertia’ and ‘planet’ are fitting illustrations of these patterns, as are, more recently, the fates of such concepts as ‘gene’ and ‘deciding’ (aka “decision making”). (shrink)

Over the years, I’ve been asked many times what “logical form” is, as applied to natural language. This is a natural enough question to address to me; after all, I’ve written a book titled Logical Form, and I’ve been asked to write any number of papers on the topic. This question, it seems to me, is certainly a “big” question, and big questions deserve big answers. I must admit, however, to being somewhat baffled as to how to do this satisfactorily, (...) since big answers to big questions unfortunately tend to the trivial. With a nod to Wittgenstein, logical form has always seemed to me to be something that you know it when you see it; it is clear enough when it pops up, but one is hard pressed to say just what it is, to define it. This is so even though the meanings of the words “logical” and “form” seem straightforward enough; what I find puzzling is how the first word is supposed to modify the second. What is it that makes a form logical, as opposed to something else that is not logical? This, it seems to me, is a very hard question to answer indeed, for if we cannot contrast logical form with some other type of form, then every form (or no form) is a logical form, and we have arrived at the triviality previously mentioned. (shrink)

Horse racing has begun to enter an economic decline in many countries, notably represented by a decline in revenues in betting volumes. A number of reasons may be attributed to this: the success of...

Understanding cooperation and punishment in small-scale societies is crucial for explaining the origins of human cooperation. We studied warfare among the Turkana, a politically uncentralized, egalitarian, nomadic pastoral society in East Africa. Based on a representative sample of 88 recent raids, we show that the Turkana sustain costly cooperation in combat at a remarkably large scale, at least in part, through punishment of free-riders. Raiding parties comprised several hundred warriors and participants are not kin or day-to-day interactants. Warriors incur substantial (...) risk of death and produce collective benefits. Cowardice and desertions occur. (shrink)

1. We are unknown to ourselves, we knowing ones, we to our own selves, and for a good reason. We have never sought ourselves – so how could it happen, that one day we would find ourselves? Someone once correctly said: “where your treasure is, there your heart will be also”;1 our treasure is where the beehives of our knowledge are. We are always on the way to finding it; as winged creatures and honey-gatherers of the spirit, we truly care (...) for only one thing from the heart: to “bring something home.” Whatever else concerns life, the so-called “experiences” – who among us has enough seriousness for them? Or enough time? In these matters we have been, I fear, somewhat distracted: our hearts have not quite been in it, and not even our ears! More often, like some divine scatter-brain absorbed-in-himself into whose ear the bell has tolled the twelve strikes of noon at full power, who then suddenly wakes up and asks himself, “What was really just struck?”, just like that we rub our ears afterwards and ask, completely amazed, completely embarrassed, “what did we really experience?” and further, “who are we really?” and afterwards, as said, count the twelve trembling bell-strikes of our experience, our life, our being – ugh! and miscount them . . . We necessarily remain strangers to ourselves, we do not understand ourselves, we must get ourselves wrong, for us the saying “Each is furthest from himself” holds for all eternity – we are not “knowing ones” with respect to ourselves. (shrink)

Medical ethics changed dramatically in the past 30 years because physicians and humanists actively engaged each other in discussions that sometimes led to confrontation and controversy, but usually have improved the quality of medical decision-making. Before then medical ethics had been isolated for almost two centuries from the larger philosophical, social, and religious controversies of the time. There was, however, an earlier period where leaders in medicine and in the humanities worked closely together and both fields were richer for it. (...) This volume begins with the 18th century Scottish Enlightenment when professors of medicine such as John Gregory, Edward Percival, and the American, Benjamin Rush, were close friends of philosophers like David Hume, Adam Smith, and Thomas Reid. They continually exchanged views on matters of ethics with each other in print, at meetings of elite intellectual groups, and at the dinner table. Then something happened, physicians and humanists quit talking with each other. In searching for the causes of the collapse, this book identifies shifts in the social class of physicians, developments in medical science, and changes in the patterns of medical education. Only in the past three decades has the dialogue resumed as physicians turned to humanists for help just when humanists wanted their work to be relevant to real-life social problems. Again, the book asks why, finding answers in the shift from acute to chronic disease as the dominant pattern of illness, the social rights revolution of the 1960's, and the increasing dissonance between physician ethics and ethics outside medicine. The book tells the critical story of how the breakdown in communication between physicians and humanists occurred and how it was repaired when new developments in medicine together with a social revolution forced the leaders of these two fields to resume their dialogue. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion, as found in his brief remarks on religious belief and on magic, is as controversial as his philosophy of mathematics and his philosophy of mind. In fact, many scholars who tend to follow Wittgenstein in these latter areas are reluctant to accept what he has to say about religious belief and related topics. Wittgenstein seems to insulate religion from standard forms of rational criticism, and this is unacceptable to many philosophers who think they have good reasons (...) for rejecting any form of theism. (shrink)

The second volume in the Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science series, this collection presents recent work in the fields of phonology, morphology, semantics, and neurolinguistics. Its overall theme is the relationship between the contents of grammatical formalisms and their real-time realizations in machine or biological systems. Individual essays address such topics as learnability, implementability, computational issues, parameter setting, and neurolinguistic issues. Contributors include Janet Dean Fodor, Richard T. Oehrle, Bob Carpenter, Edward P. Stabler, Elan Dresher, Arnold Zwicky, Mary-Louis Kean, and (...) Lewis P. Shapiro. (shrink)

This article explores the relations among and between intimacy, psychotherapeutic relationships and moral advice. The article concludes that a psychotherapeutic relationship is not usefully explained in terms of intimacy. Instead, a psychiatric relationship is a form of moral advice, and it is this dimension of a psychotherapeutic relationship as a form of moral advice that poses a natural limit to the confidentiality necessary for engaging in psychotherapy.

The Turing Test blurs the distinction between a model and irrelevant) instantiation details. Modeling only functional modules is problematic if these are interconnected and cognitively penetrable.

Nietzsche’s self-proclaimed ‘anti-political’(EH ‘wise’ 3; cf. TI 8.4) stance is often ignored.1 Commentators, that is, often interpret Nietzsche’s texts as responding to familiar issues within political philosophy, and as furnishing a novel position therein. This could indeed be the appropriate hermeneutic response. Dismissing one of Nietzsche’s proclamations is, on a variety of different grounds, hermeneutically reasonable. In this particular case, given all that Nietzsche has to say about sociality and the roles of public institutions in modern life, dismissal might even (...) seem compelling. Here, however, I wish to recuperate Nietzsche’s anti-political stance. That is, I shall argue that Nietzsche’s self-proclamation does in fact reflect his deep commitments, and thus compels a reassessment of the political interpretations of his thought. (shrink)