Summary Although Sir William Forbes of Pitsligo's An Account of the Life and Writings of James Beattie has long served as an invaluable resource for those interested in Beattie's life and thought, there has been little scholarship on the genesis of Forbes's book. This article considers the role played by Dugald Stewart—as well as that of his friend, Archibald Alison—in the making of Forbes's Life of Beattie. It also examines the reasons for Forbes's decision not to print Stewart's (...) letter in its entirety in the Life of Beattie and explores the letter's significance for understanding Stewart's philosophical development. (shrink)

This Article presents an innovative institutional strategy for global climate protection, quite distinct from, but ultimately complementary to and supportive of the currently stalled UNFCCC climate treaty negotiations. The bottom-up strategy relies on a variety of smallerscale transnational cooperative arrangements, involving not only states but sub-national jurisdictions, firms, and CSOs, to undertake activities whose primary goal is not climate mitigation but which will achieve greenhouse gas reductions as an inherent byproduct. This strategy avoids the inherent problems in securing an enforceable (...) treaty to secure the global public good of climate protection by mobilizing other incentives - including economic self-interest, energy security, cleaner air, and furtherance of international development - to motivate such actors to cooperate on actions that will also benefit the climate. These bottom-up regimes will contribute to global climate action not only by achieving emissions reductions in the short-term, but also by linking the bottom-up regimes to the UNFCCC system through greenhouse gas monitoring and reporting systems. In these ways, the bottom-up strategy will help secure eventual agreement on a global climate treaty. (shrink)

Each contributor to this book has used personal experience as the basis from which to frame his individual sociological perspectives. Because they have personalized their work, their accounts are real, and recognizable as having come from 'real' persons, about 'real' experiences. There are no objectively-distanced disembodied third person entities in these accounts. These writers are actual people whose stories will make you laugh, cry, think, and want to know more.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 121.2 (2000) 309-313 [Access article in PDF] James Romm. Herodotus. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998. xv 1 212 pp. Cloth, $30; paper, $15. Yale's Hermes series offers this contribution by James Romm on Herodotus, a subject dear to the heart of the series' founding editor, the late John Herington. This series addresses itself, in the words of the editor, to the "nonspecialist (...) adult" or "uninstructed beginning student" (ix). Though an introductory "Hermes book" need not have a thesis to prove, Romm does start with an agendum. He sets out to show, he says, that the best way to appreciate Herodotus is not to worry about the historian's accuracy. Ideally, the reader should use a translation without footnotes and should "otherwise ignore modern fact- oriented treatments of the archaic period" (7). Romm intentionally avoids calling Herodotus a historian (8) in these pages. He concentrates on the first four books of the Histories, which he says readers find puzzling and often skip, moving on to the "more familiar ground of The Persian Wars" (10).But wait: Romm writes for the "uninstructed," for whom the Persian Wars will be presumably just as obscure as early Lydian history. How many Persian wars were there? Who won? Why do we care? Romm gives no early help to the reader who picks up Herodotus for the first time. Instead his first chapter, "Myth and History," begins with an unenlightening quotation from M. Ondaatje's English Patient and then makes the dubious statement (page 1) that "quite possibly" Croesus on his pyre could not have expected to be famous thousands of years later (because of Herodotus' Histories). In fact, Croesus went to great lengths in his lavish dedications at Delphi to make sure he would be remembered, and the Myson vase and Bacchylides 3 attest to the Lydian monarch's public relations success. A prominent Athenian family even apparently named a son after Croesus (CEG 27). Romm's focus on the first four books seems, in fact, to stem more from his own love of geography and ethnography in the early books--as attested in his useful The Edges of the Earth in Ancient Thought (Princeton 1992)--than from concern for the puzzled reader.The second chapter, "From Homer to Herodotus," presents more introductory material. Between Homer and Herodotus, it appears, there is not much that readers of the latter need take into account. One might have expected more substantial treatment (here and later) of Hesiod, the early poets, the Presocratics, and the Sophists. Hippocrates does not even make the index; Aesop gets three pages (15-17). Indeed it seems symptomatic of the shortcomings of this book that Romm avoids, overlooks, or ignores some of the commonplaces of Herodotean criticism. His earlier book, for example, touched on the theme [End Page 309] of the Noble Savage, but it never appears here. Romm's focus on his author and on the text is admirable, but he disserves the beginning reader by presenting Herodotus as a writer with little or no intellectual or literary history.In his next chapter Romm appears to ignore his earlier antihistorical statements by giving "a quick survey of archaic Greek and Near Eastern history" (32). It is here that we first learn of the great battles of 480 and 479 B.C.--but no mention as yet of Marathon. He appears to be providing, albeit sketchily, precisely the historical footnotes he earlier said were to be avoided. We hear, for example, that Cambyses' attack on Egypt was not a "personal vendetta" but "more likely part of a carefully planned program of imperial expansion" (42-43). He may be right, of course, but Herodotus' focus on unpredictable personal motivations instead of rational political ones deserves respect even in our modernist and democratic age. Herodotus would have had no trouble writing the histories of Lyndon Johnson or Richard Nixon.Chapter 4, "The Man and His Work," presents, with curious omissions, standard handbook information about Herodotus' life and his book. Herodotus "undoubtedly" spent time in Athens, "though the Histories gives curiously little evidence of this" (53... (shrink)

Scholars of ethics, and of human behavior more generally, will find this book consistently stimulating and rewarding.

Individuals with body integrity identity disorder seek to address a non-delusional incongruity between their body image and their physical embodiment, sometimes via the surgical amputation of healthy body parts. Opponents to the provision of therapeutic healthy-limb amputation in cases of BIID make appeals to the envisioned harms that such an intervention would cause, harms such as the creation of a lifelong physical disability where none existed before. However, this concept of harm is often based on a normative biomedical model of (...) health and disability, a model which conflates amputation with impairment, and impairment with a disability. This article challenges the prima facie harms assumed to be inherent in limb amputation and argues in favour of a potential treatment option for those with BIID. To do this, it employs the social model of disability as a means to separate the concept of impairment and disability and thereby separate the acute and chronic harms of the practice of therapeutic healthy-limb amputation. It will then argue that provided sufficient measures are put in place to ensure that those with atypical bodily constructions are not disadvantaged, the chronic harms of elective amputation would cease to be. (shrink)

This paper explores the impact that developments in the field of neuroprosthetics will have on the ethical viability of healthy limb amputation, specifically in cases of Body Integrity Identity Dis...

Interventions are medically necessary when they are vital in achieving the goal of medicine. However, with varying perspectives comes varying views on what interventions are (un)necessary and, thus, what potential treatment options are available for those suffering from the myriad of conditions, pathologies and disorders afflicting humanity. Medical necessity's teleological nature is perhaps best illustrated in cases where there is debate over using contentious medical interventions as a last resort. For example, whether it is appropriate for those suffering from body (...) integrity dysphoria to receive healthy limb amputations. This paper explores how one's perception of medicine's goal underpins whether interventions are necessary or unnecessary, using the controversial topic of therapeutic amputation as an example. By contrasting ‘classical’ amputations with their more contentious counterparts, it highlights how the idea of medical necessity influences and restrains clinical decision-making. The paper starts by giving an account of body integrity dysphoria, focusing on the debate concerning elective amputation's justifiability. It then introduces Georges Canguilhem's vitalist theory of health, paying particular attention to his emphasis on adaptability. Then, this paper uses his theory as a lens through which to evaluate the appropriateness of therapeutic amputation as a medically necessary procedure. Ultimately, the paper highlights how the label of medical necessity is withheld from potential therapeutic interventions because they fail to conform to pre-established ideas of medicine's purpose and that by doing so, potential harm befalls those who are left with no effective treatments and must look for solutions in the non-clinical world. (shrink)

The article explains a rule-Utilitarian normative thesis about when actions are morally excused; that an act otherwise morally objectionable in some way is excused if a moral system, The acceptance of which in the agent's society would be utility-Maximizing, Would not condemn it. What is meant by a "moral system condemning" an action is explained. The parallel between this moral thesis and the benthamite theory of criminal justice is developed. It is argued that this rule-Utilitarian thesis implies that an action (...) is morally excused (not blameworthy) if it does not manifest a defective trait of character. (shrink)

In her paper, Robinson asserts that if one is convinced by the arguments assigning personhood according to a threshold criterion, one should also be open to the potential for a secondary personhood threshold, satisfied when one is pregnant, which confers temporary enhanced moral status. Rather than grounding such a claim on a fetus’s possession, or lack thereof, of personhood, Robinson argues that the pregnant person’s status as a ‘unique being’ is enough to satisfy the requirements of such an additional personhood (...) classification. 1 She justifies her claim via three arguments: (1) that the pregnant person is, in fact, more than a singular individual; (2) that pregnant people play a critical role in the human race’s continuation and (3) that the significant harms and burdens to which pregnant people have been exposed to historically and contemporary requires counterbalancing with enhanced protections. Unfortunately, despite Robinson’s best efforts, she does not... (shrink)

This essay demonstrates proof-theoretically the consistency of a type-free theoryC with an unrestricted principle of comprehension and based on a predicate logic in which contraction (A (A B)) (A B), although it cannot holds in general, is provable for a wide range ofA's.C is presented as an axiomatic theoryCH (with a natural-deduction equivalentCS) as a finitary system, without formulas of infinite length. ThenCH is proved simply consistent by passing to a Gentzen-style natural-deduction systemCG that allows countably infinite conjunctions and in (...) which all theorems ofCH are provable.CG is seen to be a consistent by a normalization argument. It also shown that in a senseC is highly non-extensional. (shrink)

This essay critically examines justificatory arguments on behalf of justice for nonmainstream groups, focusing on two demands. The first is for mainstream groups to provide recognition by "fusing horizons" with the oral traditions of nonmainstream groups. Fusing horizons requires members of mainstream cultures to be transformed by the study of the other and thus to avoid ethnocentric evaluations of others. This demand involves the problematic idea that mainstream cultural norms and traditions are a priori morally deficient to evaluate alternative cultural (...) norms. The second demand is to provide group-differentiated rights on terms that aim to protect disadvantaged minority cultures because they provide a horizon for autonomous choice, not because their customs make a presumptive claim for others' recognition. This demand may produce legal rights, but not recognition in a psychologically robust sense insofar as it secures rights on terms that are foreign to the comprehensive goods according to which minority cultures understand and esteem themselves. The aim of this paper is to distinguish between these two demands, explain each as resulting from different specifications of equality, and suggest how the need to balance recognition and rights might occur in political practical reasoning. (shrink)

Clarke and Beck import certain assumptions about the nature of numbers. Although these are widespread within research on number cognition, they are highly contentious among philosophers of mathematics. In this commentary, we isolate and critically evaluate one core assumption: the identity thesis.

As biological organisms, we age and, eventually, die. However, age’s deteriorating effects may not be universal. Some theoretical entities, due to their synthetic composition, could exist independently from aging—artificial general intelligence (AGI). With adequate resource access, an AGI could theoretically be ageless and would be, in some sense, immortal. Yet, this need not be inevitable. Designers could imbue AGIs with artificial mortality via an internal shut-off point. The question, though, is, should they? Should researchers curtail an AGI’s potentially endless lifespan (...) by deliberately making it mortal? It is this question that this article explores. First, it considers what type of AGI is under discussion before outlining how such beings could be ageless. Then, after clarifying the type of immortality under discussion and arguing that imbuing an AGI with synthetic aging would be person-affecting, the article explores four core conundrums: (i) deliberately causing a morally significant being’s death; (ii) immortality’s associated harms; (iii) concerns about immortality’s unequal assignment; and (iv) the danger of immortal AGI overlords. The article concludes that while prudence requires we create an aging AGI, in the face of the material harm such an action would constitute, this is an insufficient reason to justify doing so. (shrink)

Opponents of the provision of therapeutic, healthy limb amputation in Body Integrity Identity Disorder cases argue that such surgeries stand in contrast to the goal of medical practice – that of health restoration and maintenance. This paper refutes such a conclusion via an appeal to the nuanced and reflective model of health proposed by Georges Canguilhem. The paper examines the conceptual entanglement of the statistically common with the normatively desirable, arguing that a healthy body can take multiple forms, including that (...) of an amputee, provided that such a form enables the continuing ability to initiate new norms of existence. It concludes that the practice of healthy limb amputation in cases of Body Integrity Identity Disorder is not only compatible with the goal of medicine but is potentially the only method of achieving this goal in the face of a complex and often mischaracterized disorder. (shrink)

In their study, Dasgupta et al. interviewed seven Indian-based experts to gauge their views on using cognitive enhancement (CE) technologies from a low-and-middle-income country perspective. Specif...

In her controversial paper, Anna Smajdor proposes that brain-dead people could be used as gestation units for prospective parents unable or unwilling to undertake the act themselves—what she terms whole body gestational donation (WBGD). She explores the ethical issues of such an idea and, comparing it with traditional organ donation, asserts that such deceased surrogacy could be a way of outsourcing pregnancy’s harms to a populace unable to be affected by them. She argues that if the prospect is unacceptable, this (...) may reveal some underlying problems with traditional cadaveric organ donation. Smajdor’s analysis, however, overlooks several problems arising from WBGD. This paper provides an account of those issues and argues that, in addition to WBGD being viscerally unpleasant, it is also ethically unviable. The paper starts by providing an account of WBGD before acknowledging its negative response within traditional and social media. After arguing that such cursory and gut reactions are insufficient to reject the proposal outright, this paper then provides three concerns regarding WBGD omitted by Smajdor: (i) the co-opting of life-saving organs for reproduction, (ii) the discrepancy between using cadaveric organs to save a life versus creating one, and (iii) the universalization of feminist concerns regarding reproductive body commodification. The paper concludes by tentatively agreeing with Smajdor that considering WBGD may help reveal vulnerable assumptions regarding organ donation and surrogacy, but that the significant ethical issues raised may prove insurmountable and make the intervention—thought experiment or otherwise—untenable. (shrink)

Systems-oriented social epistemology, studies epistemic systems in which individuals work together to determine the epistemic status (true, justified, true beyond a reasonable doubt, e...

In their paper, Hildt (2023) surveys several socio-ethical and regulatory issues arising from research into, and the potential emergence of, artificial consciousness—synthetic beings with a claim t...

Sexual violence is explained using a social psychological theory of aggression that emphasizes bounded rationality. The approach challenges feminist approaches that examine violence against women in isolation and attribute it to sexism. It suggests that sex differences in sexuality lead men to attempt to influence women to have sex using various means. Sex differences in physical strength create opportunities for them to use violence while chivalry encourages them to act like “gentlemen.” Research on the age of victims, sexual arousal, self-reported (...) motives, legalized prostitution, and modus operandi support the commonsense notion that most incidents are sexually motivated. As a result of sexual motivation, rape is as much a crime against teenagers as it is a crime against women. However, evidence suggests that some rapes–like other violent crimes– are motivated by real or imagined grievances. The role of grievances is supported by research on self-reported motives and justifications, and the offender’s use of gratuitous violence during the incident. It is argued that sexual assault can be explained by bounded rationality and well-established social psychological processes. (shrink)

Kögel et al propose a multicriteria alternative to the standard early clinical selection method for xenotransplantation trials. As they note, existing recommendations for inclusion criteria indicate that only the most seriously ill—those lacking any viable alternative—should be considered for xenotransplantation. Rather than basing selection on, to put it indelicately, a Hail Mary in the face of certain death, Kögel et al recommend a selection system based on four ethical criteria: medical need, capacity to benefit, patient choice and compliance (the latter (...) being an exclusion criterion). Taken together, they paint a picture of an ethically ideal first-in-human xenotransplantation clinical trial participant: someone ‘in need of a heart replacement with a good capacity to benefit from a xenotransplantation who [has] a choice in terms of alternative potentially life-sustaining treatment options.’1 In other words, they argue that potential xenotransplantation organ recipients (they specify heart, but said criteria would apply to any vital organ recipient) should not be facing their imminent demise as this would inherently constrain that person’s freedom of choice, thus rendering them vulnerable. Instead, Kögel et al argue that trial participants should be selected from groups possessing genuine alternatives to xenotransplantation but opt to receive an animal organ. Now, their concern regarding the presence of coercion in the context of what is an experimental medical intervention is fully justified, as is their claim that those facing limited viable choices at the end of their lives are an inherently vulnerable population. Autonomy and consent are largely uncontroversial bedrocks on which most medical and research ethics theories are built. We are, all of us, familiar with the horrors from history—both distant and recent—where participant consent has taken …. (shrink)

Nearly four decades after David Raynor attributed to David Hume an allegorical Scots militia pamphlet from the early 1760s popularly known as Sister Peg, there is still no scholarly consensus about whether the author was in fact Hume or his friend Adam Ferguson. Using new evidence that has emerged since the appearance of Raynor’s edition in 1982 – including information about Sister Peg’s publication history, Ferguson’s handwritten corrections and revisions in the Abbotsford copy of the work, a 1767 newspaper article (...) by James Boswell and a copy of a 1775 letter by Sir John Dalrymple that both named Ferguson as the author, two volumes of Ferguson’s correspondence published in 1995, and a recently discovered letter by Ferguson from 1809 – this article seeks to resolve this controversy by establishing that Sister Peg was written by Ferguson, as his fellow militia agitator Alexander Carlyle asserted in his memoirs. In the process, the article refutes Raynor’s arguments about Ferguson’s supposed incapacity for writing a satirical pamphlet like Sister Peg and clarifies the nature of Hume’s views and actions in regard to the Scots militia cause during the Seven Years’ War. The article also throws light on several related issues affecting Hume and Ferguson’s circle. (shrink)

Rodger et al argue for the disenhancement of animals intended for xenotransplantation; that is, the transference of tissues or organs from one species to another. The crux of their claim is that the conditions necessary to facilitate xenotransplantation will be hostile to those subjected to them. Thus, to minimise the suffering of living under such conditions, ‘ethically defensible xenotransplantation should entail the use of genetic disenhancement if it becomes possible to do so and if that pain and suffering cannot be (...) eliminated by other means.’1 In other words, if we can eliminate or meaningfully reduce the suffering of animals destined for xenotransplantation by obliterating their experiential capacity and lacking a less contentious method to achieve the same result, we should do so. When isolated, this argument is compelling. Suffering is terrible and should be avoided. Additionally, when we have the option to reduce another’s suffering—be that human, animal or otherwise—there are strong prima facie arguments that we should do so. This point is reinforced when we collectively are responsible for that suffering, as would be the case with xenotransplantation, and it is true regardless of how justified we are in causing that suffering. Thus, on the restrictive terms of Rodger et al ’s argument, I agree with them. We should eliminate, or if not possible, reduce, suffering wherever we can, and this applies to animals too. Having said that, when situated in the xenotransplantation context, issues with their proposal …. (shrink)

What system of morals should rational people select as the best for society? Using a contemporary psychological theory of action and of motivation, Richard Brandt's Oxford lectures argue that the purpose of living should be to strive for the greatest good for the largest number of people. Brandt's discussions range from the concept of welfare to conflict between utilitarian moral codes and the dictates of self-interest. Copyright © Libri GmbH. All rights reserved.

This paper critically assesses three claims on behalf of the Iraq war made by the Bush administration and by various defenders of the war. Then it steps back from the specifics of these three rationales to ask whether they are in fact of the same sort.

This is the text of The Lindley Lecture for 1963, given by Richard B. Brandt (1910-1997), an American philosopher.

This article assays Paul Ramsey's influential attempt to conceive possible nuclear deterrents within the confines of just war tenets. I look first at Ramsey's construction of just war ideas according to a protection paradigm, one in which agape is deontically defined. I also note a subtle sub-theme in Ramsey's construction of just war ideas, what I call a preservation motif. I then assess Ramsey's discussion of nuclear deterrence, closing with a critique of his treatments of intention and proportionality. I conclude (...) by arguing that Ramsey's argument falters, and that the weaknesses of his argument can be rendered intelligible by noting how the full implications of the protection paradigm are attenuated by the preservation motif. (shrink)