An inventory of his entire oeuvre provides detailed information on the extant manuscripts. The volume furthermore includes editions of nine of his writings.

This book is about a Muslim Shi’i philosopher of the early 16th century, Najm al-Din Mahmud al-Nayrizi.

This paper argues that gossip can be a central element in inducing cooperation. The underlying assumption here is that human beings value payoffs in most societies, and are willing to have less now for more in the future. This basic interaction is tempered through gossip - as our behavior now may affect our future interactions and subsequent payoffs. As such, reputation matters and plays a crucial role in inducing cooperation. In order for gossip to be an effective policing mechanism a (...) number of conditions must be met: namely, there must be an incentive for behavior and the behavior must be conducted in a credible manner. Herein lies the utility of charisma and perhaps problem, in inducing cooperation. (shrink)

According to a common interpretation, most explicitly defended by Onora O’Neill and Patricia Kitcher, Kant held that epistemic obligations normatively depend on moral obligations. That is, were a rational agent not bound by any moral obligation, then she would not be bound by any epistemic obligation either. By contrast, in this paper, I argue that, according to Kant, some epistemic obligations are normatively independent from moral obligations, and are indeed normatively absolute. This view, which I call epistemicism, has two parts. (...) First, it claims that in the absence of other kinds of obligations, rational agents would still be bound by these epistemic obligations, i. e., that the latter are normatively independent. Second, it claims that, no matter what other obligations are at stake, rational agents are bound by these epistemic obligations, i. e., the normativity of these epistemic obligations is absolute in that it cannot be undercut by any moral or other sort of obligation. The argument turns on an exploratory reading of Kant’s remarks in “What Is Orientation in Thinking?” (1786) about the maxim of “thinking for oneself” as the “supreme touchstone of truth”. In contrast to O’Neill and Kitcher, I argue that if we interpret this maxim as stating the unifying principle of theoretical and practical reason, then we must interpret it as stating an epistemic, and not merely practical imperative. This result, I argue, vindicates epistemicism and illuminates interesting lessons about Kant’s conception of the category of “epistemic” norms. Further, it helps us make headway with Kant’s enigmatic remarks about the unity of practical and theoretical reason in the Groundwork, the first and second Critiques, and the Lectures on Logic. On my proposal, principles of the practical and theoretical uses of reason are unified through a formal epistemic principle. (shrink)

What could Wittgenstein's body of texts contribute to the rapidly growing literature on life's meaning? This book not only examines Wittgenstein's scattered remarks about value and 'sense of life' but also argues that his philosophy and his 'way of seeing' has far reaching implications for the way current strands in the literature (naturalism, supernaturalism, and nihilism) approach the question of life's meaning. Hosseini argues that Wittgenstein's method of doing philosophy would suggest that the focus should be shifted from finding the (...) metaphysical and theoretical conditions of a meaningful life to an anthropological observation of the ways we enquire about life's meaning. Some of the ideas that Hosseini explores and examines are the relation between meaning in life and 'world-picture', the precedence of life over the intentional pursuit of meaning, the absence of doubt in everyday life, the rejection of theoretical dichotomy between the great and ordinary meaning, and the confessional nature of our enquiry into life's meaning. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer a theory of autonomous agency that relies on the re-sources of a strongly cognitivist theory of intention and intentional action. On the proposed account, intentional action is a graded notion that is ex-plained via the agent’s degree of practical knowledge. In turn, autonomous agency is also a graded notion that is explained via the agent’s degree of practical understanding. The resulting theory can synthesize insights from both the hierarchical and the cognitivist theories of autonomy with (...) at least some aspects of the reason-responsiveness theories. Moreover, by treating practical knowledge and practical understanding as gradable no-tions, the paper offers a strategy to respond to enduring objections against cognitivism about intention, control, and autonomy. (shrink)

At the intersection of social and virtue epistemology lies the important, yet so far entirely neglected, project of articulating the social dimensions of epistemic virtues. Perhaps the most obvious way in which epistemic virtues might be social is that they may be possessed by social collectives. We often speak of groups as if they could instantiate epistemic virtues. It is tempting to think of these expressions as ascribing virtues not to the groups themselves, but to their members. Adapting Margaret Gilbert's (...) arguments against individualist accounts of collective beliefs, I show that individualist accounts of group virtues are either too weak or too strong. I then formulate a non-individualist account modeled after Gilbert's influential account of collective beliefs. A crucial disanalogy between collective traits and beliefs, I argue, makes the success of this model unlikely. I conclude with some questions with which the future work on collective epistemic virtues should engage. (shrink)

Cognitive science, is the science of the mind and examines cognition, in all its scope, as a mental-brain process. Cognitive social sciences are resulted from the encounter, interaction and integration of social and cognitive sciences, and are hoped to deepen our understandings and explanations of the social phenomena. This paper will discuss four views about what this integration is and how it takes place, namely explanatory grounding, theoretical unification, constraints, and complementarity. some people have preferred explanatory grounding and constraints approach, (...) and maintain that based on these approaches, social cognitive science will have a better and a clearer perspective. In spite of them, I prefer a complementarity approach, Based on which, cognitive social science can be seen as an extension and improvement of social science and cognitive science, not a product of an interdisciplinary approach, This preferred approach considers the subject of cognitive social science as a socio-cognitive issue. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer a reconstruction of Ghazālī's encounter with scepticism in the Deliverance from Error. For Ghazālī, I argue, radical scepticism about the possibility of knowledge ensues from intellectualist assumptions about the nature of justification. On the reading that I will propose, Ghazālī holds that foundational knowledge can only be justified via actions that lead to transformative experiences.

By using genre analysis, this study investigates the way writers use interpersonal metadiscourse to partly reveal their identity and examines their selected mode of interaction in two major academic fields: the social sciences and natural sciences. A total of 55 academic research articles from the SS and NS were selected as the corpus of this study. A comparison of the two disciplines was made, based on the use of interpersonal metadiscourse through `hedges', `emphatics' and `attitude markers'. The analysis showed that (...) the SS writers employed interpersonal metadiscourse more frequently than the NS writers. One-to-one comparison further showed that they varied significantly in their use of hedges and attitude markers but there was little difference in their use of emphatics. However, the use of hedges and emphatics was significantly different within each discipline. A qualitative in-depth analysis revealed that the choice of validity markers was closely related to the type of article being studied. (shrink)

I offer a reconstructive reading of Ṭūsī’s (1201-1274) account of natural goodness in the Naserian Ethics. I show that Ṭūsī’s version of Aristotelian ethics is especially well-suited to accommodate an intuition that is hard to integrate into a theory of natural goodness: human good is nobler or more elevated than animal and vegetative goods. To do this, I analyze Ṭūsī’s discussion of the relationship between different kinds of perfection from non-living material compounds to vegetative, animal, human, and divine beings. I (...) close by noting that, depending on our reading of Ṭūsī’s conception of di-vine beings and their perfection, his proposal might come at a cost to his Aristotelian naturalist ambitions for ethics. (shrink)

La phénoménologie de Husserl naît de l'interrogation problématique de l'application de la science à la philosophie. Dorénavant, toute question est un problème, la phénoménologie elle-même pouvant également devenir son propre objet. A la recherche du rêve, de l'éveil et de la phantasia, la phénoménologie nous offre une logique d'apparence, voire de transapparence, déterminant l'unité du monde et l'unité universelle en tant que telle. On y constate la rotation charnelle, voire kinesthésique, dans le mouvement des yeux et le mouvement du monde (...) dans son entité avec nous. L'effort de Husserl consiste à formuler l'idée selon laquelle l'éveil est la nécessité du monde de la vie, où le rêve s'éveille au détriment de l'inconscient. La simplicité de la phénoménologie est dans son interrogation approfondie des data de nos vécus et du monde de la vie et en l'occurrence entre le rêve et l'éveil. La phénoménologie se veut transfiguration de la logique du monde et de la vie. (shrink)

This article investigates conceptual metaphors for Covid-19 in two languages, American English and Persian, using two approaches, namely Lakoff & Johnson’s conceptual metaphor theory and Kövecses’s...

The relationship between the photographic and optical images and time has been the subject of great deal of debate. Despite their differences, what many of these considerations have in common is their focus on the receiver, whether mechanical, biological, social or the memory and imagination of the observer. My aim here is to shift the emphasis from the receiver to the object or vista that is photographed or viewed and to explore how the constraints implied by our modern understanding of (...) the Universe, concerning space and time, impact on the way we perceive photographic and optical images. Viewed from this perspective, photographs can be treated as light projections of sections of the four-dimensional observable world onto two-dimensional spatial photographic or viewing surfaces. I shall show that despite the severe reduction that such projections imply, these modern considerations have the important consequence of bestowing a complex temporality upon optical images, including photographs. This realization dramatically changes the way we view photographs. I give examples of this rich temporality through considerations of terrestrial images – and more significantly images of the Sky, where these temporal effects are far more pronounced. (shrink)

Le problème de l’inaction des intellectuels est un thème récurrent dans les écrits de Ralph Waldo Emerson. Les commentateurs ont accordé beaucoup d’attention à «l’intellectuel américain», mais moins à ses remarques concernant l’«intellectuel pâle». Dans cet article, je me concentre sur ce dernier point, en montrant qu’une compréhension de la manière dont évoluent les idées d’Emerson sur ce qui compte pour l’action permettrait non seulement d’approfondir notre compréhension de sa philosophie ainsi que son orientation vers la conduite de la vie, (...) mais aussi d’expliquer pourquoi, selon Emerson, il ne semble pas y avoir de réconciliation possible entre «la théorie et la pratique de la vie». (shrink)

Infinity, in various guises, has been invoked recently in order to ‘explain’ a number of important questions regarding observable phenomena in science, and in particular in cosmology. Such explanations are by their nature speculative. Here we introduce the notions of relative infinity, closure, and economy of explanation and ask: to what extent explanations involving relative or real constructed infinities can be treated as reasonable?

It is reasoned that mind-body is a modern issue and is not ever discussed in ancient Greek philosophy or middle Ages. The current study has reviewed these reasoning and concluded that typical categorizations of mind-body issue must be divided into general and specific. Separating the issue of mind-body from the problem of mind-body underlines the multiplicity of issues. Proofs are, then, submitted that axial issue in Sadraic psychology is soul-body rather than mind-body. Thus, the solutions and ideas from the earlier (...) cannot be generalized into the latter. Despite that, it is possible to compare mind-body issue against Sadraic philosophy and use its advantages to solve the issue. Such a comparison stands in the need of some modification in the underpinnings or the conclusions of Sadraic philosophical psychology. These findings are meta-philosophical and offer suggestions for methodology and content of Sadraic psychology. Keywords. (shrink)

Islam politik sejak peristiwa 11 September 2001 telah menjadi trend dalam wacana Islam kontemporer dan menjadi tema utama dalam ruang-ruang diskusi baik formal maupun informal. Tumpukan wacana Islam politik menyebabkan minimnya pemahaman atas historisitas yang panjang dari islamisme. Padahal dalam historisitas tersebut akan terlihat bahwa banyak pemikir-pemikir Muslim, selain Jamaluddin al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, Rasyid Ridha dan seterusnya, yang memikirkan tentang Islam politik. Salah satunya adalah Tan Malaka. Artikel ini mengkaji pemikiran Tan Malaka dalam konteks Islam politik. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode (...) penelitian filsafat dengan teknik studi historis-faktual tokoh yang berfokus pada pemikiran salah seorang filsuf atau tokoh, baik pada topik tertentu dalam karyanya, maupun dalam seluruh karyanya. Di samping itu juga digunakan konsep eksternalisasi sebagai pendekatan analisis. Hasilnya adalah bahwa Tan Malaka memikirkan Islam Politik dalam konteks gerakan Pan-Islamisme. Pan-Islamisme merupakan gerakan mempersatukan umat muslim di seluruh dunia untuk perjuangan kemerdekaan dari kolonialisme. Namun untuk mempersatukan umat Muslim diperlukan penyelesaian terhadap problem mistik dominasi kapitalisme. Tan Malaka mengatakan bahwa jika ingin mempersatukan umat muslim di dunia, maka harus melawan kapital dunia. (shrink)

The field of socio-legal research has encountered three fundamental challenges over the last three decades - it has been criticized for paying insufficient attention to legal doctrine, for failing to develop a sound theoretical foundation and for not keeping pace with the effects of the increasing globalization and internationalization of law, state and society. This book examines these three challenges from a methodological standpoint. It addresses the first two by demonstrating that legal sociology has much to say about justice as (...) a kind of social experience and has always engaged theoretically with forms of normativity, albeit on its own empirical terms rather than on legal theory's analytical terms. The book then explores the third challenge, a result of the changing nature of society, by highlighting the move from the industrial relations of early modernity to the post-industrial conditions of late modernity, an age dominated by information technology. It poses the question whether socio-legal research has sufficiently reassessed its own theoretical premises regarding the relationship between law, state and society, so as to grasp the new social and cultural forms of organization specific to the twenty-first century's global societies. (shrink)

La brève histoire de la philosophie moderne en Iran exposée dans cet ouvrage se présente comme un préambule à la connaissance des hommes de lettres iraniens et à leur pensée dans une société tissée de paradoxes. L'herméneutique est sans doute l'un des exemples les plus significatifs de la modernisation théorique en cours en Iran. Après avoir acquis une nouvelle forme de langage, dépourvue de fondements, et créé une conception qui permet de travestir la réalité du monde, elle s'est substituée à (...) son image classique pour devenir une manière de camoufler la décadence de la pensée traditionnelle. De même, l'iconoclasme, phénomène qui touche la conscience visuelle de la société iranienne, représente un autre exemple de ce paradoxe originel, à double tranchant, d'une vision qui ne parvient pas à identifier son trait ontologique et à déterminer l'éducation de la vue. Ainsi le sacré ne supporte pas de se voir et de percevoir l'autre comme sacré, car une conscience séculaire qui n'a pas accès à la vision demeure dans le domaine de la divinité obscurantiste moderne. (shrink)

This study examined cross-sectional links of the theistic and non-theistic sanctification of marriage and positive and negative religious coping with marital adjustment for 316 married Muslims from Iran. Perceiving marriage to be a manifestation of God and reflective of sacred qualities as well as engaging in positive and negative religious/spiritual coping strategies each uniquely contributed variance to marital adjustment, after controlling for each other and global indicators of devotion to Islam, and demographic variables. Specifically, theistic sanctification, non-theistic sanctification, and positive (...) r/s coping were uniquely tied to higher marital adjustment whereas negative r/s coping was uniquely tied to lower marital adjustment theistic in a hierarchical regression model with all primary variables and controls entered. These findings replicate and extend prior findings on the perceived sanctity of marriage with US samples of predominantly Christians to Muslims living in the Middle East, and offer novel cross-cultural insights into the possible roles that sanctification of marriage and r/s coping may play for marital well-being for non-distressed married Muslims. (shrink)

Mental being has always been an issue of paramount importance and interest to Muslim philosophers. The first philosopher to raise mental being as an independent philosophical case is Fakhr al-din Razi. Others including Khwaje Nassir Tusi, Katebi Qazwini, Taftazani and Mulla Sadra have also used various reasons to prove the existence of mental being. In his famous book of Asfar, Mulla Sadra introduces three philosophical reasons:a) Istibsar i.e. envisaging possible beings which are non-existing as well as impossible beingsb) Celestial revelation; (...) he considers mental being a heart-felt reality revealed to him through inspiration.c) Tanbeeh i.e. envisaging things which have once been possible but are presently impossible such as miracles. (shrink)

The traditional approaches to epistemology are task-oriented and enjoy prescriptive aspects. They do not allow the employment of empirical sciences in epistemology. This is because they believe that such sciences lack any kind of prescriptive aspect and enjoy a descriptive nature. Some contemporary epistemological theoreticians, such as realist naturalists, believe that we have no choice but to employ empirical sciences in epistemology, for they provide us with a more accurate understanding of concepts such as justification and knowledge. It appears that (...) we are able to provide the necessary answers to the problems posed by traditional epistemologists in this regard. Therefore, the use of empirical sciences in epistemology is not only permissible but also necessary. (shrink)

The recent literature on epistemic virtues advances two general projects. The first is virtue epistemology, an attempt to explicate key epistemic notions in terms of epistemic virtue. The second is epistemic virtue theory, the conceptual and normative investigation of cognitive traits of character. While a great deal of work has been done in virtue epistemology, epistemic virtue theory still languishes in a state of neglect. Furthermore, the existing work is non-naturalistic. The present paper contributes to the development of a naturalistic (...) epistemic virtue theory by presenting a virtue-theoretic evaluation of need for cognition as informed by the relevant psychological studies. (shrink)

The current study aimed to explore effective strategies for preventing cheating in online examinations by surveying students to determine their cheating strategies. A total of 406 Iranian students at BA, MA, and PhD levels in four programs, including English language teaching, English literature, Linguistics, and English language translation, participated in this study using a convenient sampling technique. The sample was drawn from 83 universities across all 31 provinces of Iran. The researchers developed a 30-item questionnaire and a 4-item interview to (...) collect data. The results revealed that searching in PDFs and using social media groups were the most commonly used cheating strategies. To prevent this form of academic dishonesty, teachers used various strategies, the most effective being the use of conceptual questions and one-by-one oral exams with turned-on webcams. The main reason for students to cheat was their desire to perform better. The implications of this study are relevant for educational stakeholders, particularly teachers, and students, in promoting academic integrity. (shrink)

We consider the domain of applicability of general relativity (GR), as a classical theory of gravity, by considering its applications to a variety of settings of physical interest as well as its relationship with real observations. We argue that, as it stands, GR is deficient whether it is treated as a microscopic or a macroscopic theory of gravity. We briefly discuss some recent attempts at removing this shortcoming through the construction of a macroscopic theory of gravity. We point out that (...) such macroscopic extensions of GR are likely to be nonunique and involve non-Riemannian geometrical frameworks. (shrink)

I argue that practical knowledge can be understood as constituted by a kind of imagining. In particular, it is the knowledge of what I am doing when that knowledge is represented via extramental imagination. Two results follow. First, on this account, we can do justice both to the cognitive character and the practical character of practical knowledge. And second, we can identify a condition under which imagination becomes factive, and thus a source of ob-jective evidence. I develop this view by (...) extracting an account of self-knowledge via extramental imagination from the writings of Ibn ‘Arabi (1165-1240). (shrink)

Sayyid Sadr al-din Mohammad Dashtaki Shirazi is the inventor of the division of composition into unified composition and composition by join. With this division, Dashtaki has expressed a new theory about the composition of the material object from first matter and form, as well as the composition of man from soul and body, and considers these compositions as an alliance and unification, not simply the parts joining to each other. In this paper, we will present Dashtaki’s arguments on the theory (...) of unified composition. We will also examine three objections to this theory and responses to them. Finally, we will examine the background of this theory in Bahmanyar's phrases. Dashtaki believes that when the components in the compound have a real plurality, i.e. each one exists separately from the other, a composition by join is created, such as the composition of a house from numerous clays. But if the components in the compound are united and none of them are separate from the others and exists actually, the resulting composition will be an alliance and union. He believes that in the unified composition, every component is identical to any other component and is identical to the whole. Accordingly, Reza is a unique being, both human and writer. In order to achieve a composition, a plurality is needed and in order to form a single composition, there must be plural components related to each other. An important question is that, principally how is a composition possible, if unified composition comes to existence only when the components are made united with each other and with the whole? In other words, unified composition is not possible, because the first condition of the acquisition of the composition, i.e., the plurality of the constituent components, is not satisfied. Dashtaki strives to express a difference between the components in the union compound. He believes that the conditions of the realization and the survival of the components are different, and that is enough for them to be different. In Dashtaki's point of view, in the unified composition the components are analytical, not being separate and plural, in reality. In other words, the components do not have actual and "in-the-world" plurality, which means that it is our intellect that separates them and looks at them as independent objects. Therefore, unity and identity are in-the-world and plurality and discernibility are analytical and in the mind. Dashtaki's first argument for his theory in general is as follows: the three major material objects (solid, plant and animal) are undoubtedly real compounds. But in these compositions, components exist potentially, and in a unified composition, components do not exist actually. Therefore, these objects are unified compounds. The second argument is that the accuracy of predication implies unity. In the unified composition, the components are identical with the whole, and therefore, the components can be predicated to the composition. In Dashtaki's view, if A is predicated to B, then it could be concluded that they are identical and unified. The first objection to this theory is that the unity is incompatible with causality. From the perspective of the Peripatetics, form is the cause of the matter, and this is incompatible with the union of the two. Dashtaki states that in case of causality, there is no need for cause and effect to be two different and discernible entities, but a single entity may be from one aspect the cause and, from another, the effect. In other words, the foresaid causality is analytical causality. When mind analyses something, and then finds analytical components, it can see between those analytical and intellectual components, causality, and find some of them as the cause of the others. The second objection is the incorrectness of the unity in compounds with components not being similar. only in the compounds having similar parts, one can accept the unity of matter and form. For example, in compounds such as horses, it is not possible to accept the union of matter and form, because in horses, there are components with different natures, such as bones, flesh and nerves. Unity of These parts with each other and with the whole is not plausible. Dashtaki’s respond is that the horse is also a natural unit and has no actual plurality. Components having similar or different natures does not make any difference. According to the theory of unified composition, the horse's components are united with the horse's form and have only analytical plurality. Horse’s components are just analytical components, not actual, independent ones. The third objection is the incompatibility of the actual existence of components with their unity. But Dashtaki maintains that a unique actual personal entity cannot have actual plural components. He states that compounds such as horses exist objectively, but objective and real existing is divided into two kinds: dependent existence, and independent existence as a single real thing. Therefore, the two characteristics of "being a component" and "being independent" are incompatible and do not come together in a real being. Dashtaki has also quoted phrases from Bahmanyar to confirm his point of view. Bahmanyar says that the properties of an animal belong to the whole and compound, not to each component. For example, it is a horse that feels, not its bone or brain, as the eye is also a compound, but seeing is the work of the eye, not the work of any of its components. Therefore, the animal, which is something compound, has characteristics that none of its components have. So the animal is something over and above its components. Bahmanyar thinks the components in the animal are potential. Then he states a general rule: any compound in which unity is real, its components do potentially exist. Therefore, Bahmanyar considers the body parts of the living organism as a potential being and generally believes that the components of any compound that have true unity are potential. The potentiality of the components in a real compound does not that mean that the components are destroyed and a new thing is produced. The components are also available, but they do not have the effects they had separately before the composition comes into existence. In other words, the components have found a unique identity together and therefore have a new effect.. It seems that Bahmanyar has expressed the same idea that Dashtaki is looking for in the theory of unified composition. Therefore, it can be said that before Dashtaki, Bahmanyar has come up with the thought of a unity. Of course, Bahmanyar has not explained much about this, and Dashtaki is the first who has organized and completed this idea as a philosophical theory. (shrink)