An adequate account of testimonial knowledge in general explains how religious knowledge can be grounded in testimony, and even in the context of conflicting testimonial traditions. Three emerging trends in epistemology help to make that case. The first is to make a distinction between two projects of epistemology: “the project of explanation” and “the project of vindication.” The second is to emphasize a distinction between knowledge and understanding. The third is to ask what role the concept (...) of knowledge plays in our conceptual-linguistic economy. Each of these trends, it is argued, helps us to make progress in the epistemology of testimony, and by application in the epistemology of religious belief. (shrink)

Skepticism, Relativism, and Religious Knowledge shows where responses to skepticism and relativism by Karl Barth and Reformed epistemology have led to impasses, and reconstructs their insights in a more robust response that does not depend on making excessive claims about our epistemic capacities. This response is based on a more nuanced conception of the relationship between trust, doubt, faith, and reason, and a Kierkegaardian perspective on religious knowledge that stresses the role of the will and the (...) intellectual and theological virtues. (shrink)

This book addresses the place of religious knowledge in religion, particularly within Christianity. The book begins by examining the difference between the general concepts of knowledge and belief, the relation between faith and knowledge, and reasons why belief as faith, and not knowledge, is central to the Abrahamic religions. The book explores the ambivalence about religious knowledge within Christianity. Some religious thinkers explicitly accepted and sought religious knowledge, as did St. (...) Thomas Aquinas, while others, notably Søren Kierkegaard, cast knowledge and seeking it as incompatible with faith. The book also examines two antithetical religious intuitions about knowledge, both at home in the Christian tradition. For one, faith requires a struggle with doubt. For the other, faith requires a certainty that excludes doubt. For the first, religious knowledge would destroy faith. For the second, religious knowledge is compatible with faith and completes it. Though the book focuses on the Christian tradition, it also considers other traditions, including a chapter on the place of religious knowledge in nontheistic religious traditions. The final chapter examines how coming to Wisdom as personified in the Jewish and Christian traditions may be distinct from attaining religious knowledge. (shrink)

Abstract:Epistemic paternalism occurs when evidence is withheld or shaped in particular ways in order to help an agent arrive at the truth, but this is done without their consent (and sometimes without their knowledge). While general defenses of epistemic paternalism are garnering more attention in the recent literature, little has been said regarding the practice in religious contexts. We explore a defense of epistemic paternalism in religious settings inspired by the work of the medieval Islamic philosopher Averroes. (...) According to Averroes, epistemic paternalism is permissible in cases where it would help a layperson arrive at religious knowledge via imagination because they are incapable of arriving at it by demonstration. We conclude by explaining how the distinction between imagination and demonstration can be used to justify epistemic paternalism in contemporary settings. (shrink)

"This book is designed for those who have this concern and puzzlement (though, of course, it offers no guarantee of resolving such puzzlement). It is not designed to be a highly specialized and technical treatise in philosophy of religion but one which can be read and appreciated by students and educated laymen. It has two specific purposes, that of providing a clear picture of development in contemporary philosophy and the impact of these developments in philosophy of religion, and that of (...) systematically exploring the question, "Is there religious knowledge?" Contemporary philosophy is used as a point of reference for devising a framework within which this question can be answered. Space limitations have forced an all-to-brief treatment of some positions. Such brevity tends to distort but I have made efforts to avoid such distortion." -Author's Preface. (shrink)

This paper will examine two strategies by which religious believers might attempt to defend the rationality of religious belief. The first strategy is a “fine tuning argument.” The main shortcoming of that strategy is that it ignores the crucial issue of the appropriate prior probabilities. The second strategy is what might be called a “trust” strategy. According to this strategy, a belief that is based on trusting someone who knows something is thereby also an instance of knowledge. (...) This strategy might suffice in some respects, but it involves reliance on a mechanism that is doubtful as a prototype for all of our beliefs. (shrink)

Religious education deals with all aspects of human existence. Evaluating a person from his own point of view, he examines his position and relationships in life. Religious education in our country has come to the present day through various periods in the historical process. The most important changes in the field of religious education and training were made in October 2012, and in addition to the compulsory Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi (Religious Culture and Morality) course, (...) elective courses such as “Kur’an-ı Kerim” (The Noble Qur'an), "Peygamberimizin Hayatı” (The Life of our Prophet) and "Temel Dini Bilgiler” (Basic Religious Knowledge), were added to the program. The “Temel Dini Bilgiler” (Basic Religious Knowledge) course, which is the subject of our research, is 5, 6, 7 and 8 in straight secondary schools. While it is offered as an elective in classes, it is taught a total of 2 times at different grade levels. 6 as a compulsory course in imam hatip secondary schools and 7, it is taught in classes for one hour a week. This study aims to make a comprehensive evaluation of the “Temel Dini Bilgiler İslam I, İslam II” (Basic Religious Knowledge Islam I, Islam II) course curriculum, which was implemented in 2012 and updated in 2017, based on the opinions of teachers, by considering the changes that religious education in Turkey has undergone in the historical process. The research is focused on examining the objectives, content, education and training processes, measurement and evaluation methods and general characteristics of the TDB course. In particular, issues such as the adequacy of the changes made to the program, the effects of the new curriculum on teachers and students, the suitability of units and achievements to student levels constitute the main focuses of the research. The aim of the study is to examine the effectiveness and functionality of the curriculum in areas such as target, content, learning-teaching status and measurement–evaluation based on the experiences of teachers. The research was carried out using the screening model. The main problems and sub-problems of the research have been identified and a 48-item scale has been developed to test the validity of the hypotheses for these problems. While the universe of the research is composed of teachers working in imam hatip secondary schools and secondary schools in Istanbul, the sample consists of 235 teachers determined randomly and by the snowball sampling method. Various data such as demographic characteristics of the participants, gender distribution, faculties they graduated from and schools they worked at were used in the analysis of the findings of the study. The findings of the research revealed the opinions of teachers about various aspects of the TDB course curriculum. According to the research, it has been observed that teachers have different levels of satisfaction in basic areas such as goals, content, learning-teaching process and measurement-evaluation related to the Temel Dini Bilgiler İslam I, II (Basic Religious Information Islam I-II) course curriculum. In general, when looking at the survey answers, it is seen that teachers have a “medium” level of usability perception towards the curriculum. Based on the findings obtained as a result of the study, various suggestions have been made to make the TDB course curriculum more effective. (shrink)

The essay that follows considers two topics. After dealing with relevant preliminaries, it asks: (a) what differences are there in what must be done in order to tell whether there is any religious knowledge if an internalist evidentialist account of knowledge is true, from what must be done in order to tell whether there is any religious knowledge if an externalist reliabilist account of knowledge is true; and (b) does the best current externalist reliabilist (...) account of knowledge require (or perhaps already implicitly contain) an internalist evidentialist element? Put in a nutshell, then, a belief has warrant for a person S only if that belief is produced in S by cognitive faculties functioning properly (subject to no dysfunction) in a cognitive environment that is appropriate for S’s kind of cognitive faculties, according to a design plant that is successfully aimed at truth … when a belief meets these conditions and does enjoy warrant, the degree of warrant it enjoys depends on the strength of the belief, the degree of firmness with which S holds it. This is intended as an account of the central core of our concept of warrant … [Warranted Christian Belief, 156; implicit in reference to a design plan here is another feature—that the belief is subject to no undefeated defeaters; such a belief, if true, constitutes knowledge.]. (shrink)

THE problem of religious knowledge may be stated very simply. If there is a real God, how can we find out that fact? The present discussion assumes that this is just what we must find out, if there is to be any possibility of a philosophically valid religion; for the essential element in religion is God, and consequently the essential philosophical question in regard to religion is that of the reality of God.

The article based on Kuhn’s paradigmatic approach and Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research programmes, analyses certain aspects of selected cognitive functions of religous beliefs. Our approach is based on the search for angalogy between scientific theories on one hand and systems of religious beliefs on the other hand. Contemporary philosophy of science demonstrates that scientific models are the products of creative analogous immagination, data are theory-laden, theories as a whole are resistent to falsification and it is hard (if at (...) all) to find reliable criterions for the selection of a paradigm. These «subjective features» are more evident within religion, since a wider range of models, greater impact of interpretations on data, greater arduousness in regard to the commitment to a paradigm and more ambiguity in the process of the selection of a paradigm, exist in this area. However, with each of these features, I see the difference between science and religion in their degree and not in absolute contrast. (shrink)

In On Liberty, Mill says that ‘the same causes which make … [a person] a Churchman in London, would have made him a Buddhist or a Confucian in Pekin’. Despite Mill's not having drawn it out, there is an argument implicit in his comments that is germane to both externalist and internalist understandings of the epistemic justification of religious beliefs, even though some of these understandings would not wish to use the term ‘epistemic justification’ to refer to whatever it (...) is that they suggest must be added to true belief for it to count as knowledge. In this paper, we shall articulate this argument; examine how it challenges those religious believers who would wish to claim their religious beliefs as knowledge; and consider what they may do to meet this challenge. (shrink)

The paper is a part of the panel discussion with John Greco about his theory of the transmission of religious knowledge. My goal here is not to argue with Greco's theory, but to find out whether it requires any adjustment. I argue that Greco's theory of the social transmission of knowledge requires the transmitted knowledge to be socially verifiable, that is, to be subject to those means of confirmation that pertain to the social system. Unfortunately, some (...) kinds of religious knowledge are not socially verifiable; therefore, they cannot be transmitted via Greco's social mechanism. I conclude that Greco's theory turns out to be applicable to the socially verifiable religious testimonies, and not applicable to the rest. (shrink)

This paper is a reply to David Carr's two recent articles on religious education in this Journal. It argues that the examples Carr cites as distinctively religious are not, and that the present emphasis in schools on education about (rather than in) religion is justified.

It is commonly held that epistemic standards for S ’s knowledge that p are affected by practical considerations, such as what is at stake in decisions that are guided by that p . I defend a particular view as to why this is, that is referred to as “pragmatic encroachment.” I then discuss a “new argument against miracles” that uses stakes considerations in order to explore the conditions under which stakes affect the level of epistemic support that is required (...) for knowledge. Finally, I generalize my results to include other religiously significant propositions such as “God exists” and “God does not exist.”. (shrink)

Epistemic paternalism occurs when a decision is made for an agent which helps them arrive at the truth, though they didn’t consent to that decision (and sometimes weren’t even aware of it). Common defenses of epistemic paternalism claim that it can help promote positive veritistic results. In other words, epistemic paternalism is often good for inquiry. I argue that there is often a better alternative available to epistemic paternalism in the form of what I call Open Group Inquiry. I then (...) examine how Open Group Inquiry can be applied to cases of religious inquiry, while noting that epistemic paternalism is impermissible in cases of general religious inquiry. I argue that in the case of religious inquiry, there are serious questions about what constitutes evidence along with how to evaluate it. Rather than posing a particular worry for Open Group Inquiry, I suggest these questions pose a problem for religious inquiry in general. I conclude that while it very much matters how concepts like religious knowledge, religious faith, scepticism, etc., are defined, these considerations may well pave the way for a novel argument for religious scepticism. (shrink)

If God exists, where can we find adequate evidence for God's existence? In this book, Paul Moser offers a new perspective on the evidence for God that centers on a morally robust version of theism that is cognitively resilient. The resulting evidence for God is not speculative, abstract, or casual. Rather, it is morally and existentially challenging to humans, as they themselves responsively and willingly become evidence of God's reality in receiving and reflecting God's moral character for others. Moser calls (...) this 'personifying evidence of God,' because it requires the evidence to be personified in an intentional agent - such as a human - and thereby to be inherent evidence of an intentional agent. Contrasting this approach with skepticism, scientific naturalism, fideism, and natural theology, Moser also grapples with the potential problems of divine hiddenness, religious diversity, and vast evil. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to (...) be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Globalizing processes have rendered as analytically insufficient accounts of authority in the Muslim world that rely exclusively on the interaction between text, discursive method and personified knowledge. The construction and negotiation of globalized authority in Islam, it is argued, can only be understood by reference to a set of pluralizing processes that intensify and in some instances radicalize a tendency towards authoritative pluralism that has long been present in Islam. This can be understood in terms of (1) functionalization, or (...) changes in terms of how individual Muslims understand the social purpose and ends of knowledge seeking; (2) respatialization; and (3) mediatization or interrelated changes in terms of how far away and in what kinds of spaces and media one seeks authority or authorization. Collectively, such pluralizing processes combine to construct global Islamic authority in diverse forms that transcend or challenge conventional understandings of religious knowledge, its location and mode of articulation. Reference is made throughout to illustrative ethnographic examples, social movements and practices. (shrink)

In this paper I will take it for granted that Zagzebski's position articulates a broadly Catholic perspective, and that Plantinga's position accurately represents a broadly Calvinist one. But I will argue that so construed, the Catholic and the Calvinist are much closer than Zagzebski implies: both views are person-based in an important sense of that term; both are internalist on Zagzebski's usage and externalist on the standard usage; and Plantinga's position is consistent with the social elements that Zagzebski stresses in (...) her view. In the second part of the paper I will identify what I think is the real issue between Zagzebski and Plantinga. Namely, Zagzebski thinks that knowledge requires epistemic responsibility, in the sense that instances of knowledge must be appropriately praiseworthy. Plantinga thinks that no such condition is required for knowledge or warranted belief. I will argue that on this issue Zagzebski is right, and that her virtue approach gives us resources for seeing why. Finally, I will look at the consequences for religious knowledge. Here I will argue that the consequences are minimal. Even if knowledge requires responsibility, Plantinga can still make a good case that religious belief is properly basic. And even if religious belief is properly basic, natural theology can still have an important role in the justification of religious belief. (shrink)