The capacity to classify social groups legally is a central characteristic of modern states. Social groups, however, often resist the classificatory schemas of the state. This raises the following question: how do modern states exercise symbolic power in social fields beset by acute classification struggles? While existing scholarship has demonstrated that states exercise symbolic power, there has not been a concomitant effort to systematize and theorize the various strategies through which they do so. This article addresses this lacuna through (...) examining classification struggles centered on a number of “heterodox” religious groups that have historically been perceived as deviant from mainstream religions. Specifically, it looks at Falun Gong in China, Mormons in the United States, and Baha’is in Egypt. The analysis draws attention to three strategies through which states exercise symbolic power: coercive classification, wherein the deviant group is forcibly fixed as such in law; juridical normalization, whereby the deviant group is allowed to enter the mainstream by shedding “problematic” ritual practices; and legal erasure, whereby the deviant group is kept out of the official classificatory system so that it becomes a legal non-entity. In summary, this article both identifies the religious field as a critical domain in which states of various ideological orientations exercise symbolic power and deploys this analysis to identify distinct strategies through which they do so. (shrink)

In modern science, classifications occupy a special place. In many areas of knowledge, they are the canonized type of product of scientific activity. That is why all the information obtained by the researchers tends to formulate in the form of those or other classifications of the investigated objects themselves, their separately considered properties, composition, structure, genesis, placement, etc. However, the quality of already built classifications, as a rule, does not suit the specialists. When creating the same new, there are numerous (...) difficulties, which are impossible to overcome, because there are no theoretical and methodological means. The development of these tools is complicated by the lack of clarity of the very concept of classification, the lack of clear notions of classification as a special phenomenon of knowledge. (shrink)

In their efforts to apportion blame and channel retaliatory action in the post September 11 world, scholars and pundits alike have used a series of rhetorical techniques to great effect, manufacturing an image of Islam, the proverbial Other, that is highly conducive to the needs of liberal democracies but hardly a reflection of any one of the many 'authentic' Islams. This has largely been achieved by ignoring the many differences within the Islamic movement and asserting that social identities are based (...) on a stable, uniform kernel that moves unchanged throughout history and across the globe. This inevitably results in caricatures that have many uses; in portraits of dissenting groups it tends towards demonization. In this wide-ranging essay--which considers a variety of discursive sites, from contemporary film and art to the War on Terror--a scholar of religion asks the reader to consider how the classifications we use to name and thereby negotiate our social worlds--foremost among them the classification religion itself--are implicitly political and are being wielded in the public arena to carry out generally undisclosed/under analyzed social work. (shrink)

Duhem is known for his criticism of induction and especially of the way Ampère pretends founding electrodynamics. Despite this criticism, they share philosophical commitments: an attempt to destroy essentialism, a renewal of the link between metaphysics and physics, the use of the concept of “natural classification”. Thanks to this concept of “natural classification”, they are both led to a similar structural realism. In their opinion, if metaphysics should not determine physics, there is still room for it. Actually, the (...) hope of a progress toward a natural classification expressing truth may imply – in Duhem’s and Ampère’s works – a kind of providentialism. (shrink)

Religion: a socio-spiritual phenomenon that pervades and influences human actions in all realms of human existences plays diverse and divergent roles in the society. Therefore, it is difficult to define with a simply and a single category. Hence, on the one hand, Karl Marx saw it as an instrument that supports the status quo and oppresses the less privileged and the powerless and as such a vital force in the legitimization of social ills in the society. On the other hand, (...) Marx Webber and other functional theorists maintain that religion as a social fact is a force in mobilizing social solidarity and unified actions against the social order. In this direction religion therefore plays revolutionary roles in any given society. Against the backdrop of the seeming contradicting and conflicting positions of these two main schools of thought in the field of sociology of religion, this paper is poised to reassess the divergent roles religion has played in history among the oppressed people of the world, using the both Marxian and Webberian paradigms as a matrix. This paper considers oppressive society as a society that maintains a social and economic classification of its members as a norm. It is also noted that it is through such classification of its members in their nexus that social injustice, discriminations, dehumanization are maintained. This situation is the defining paradigm of the global village , governed strictly by economic dictum. To this end therefore, this paper re-invokes the roles religion played in the ‘Antebellum’ America, with a view of applying the same in the modern era, which has great resemblance with the Antebellum America, in terms of oppression, though not in its magnitude. (shrink)

An overview of current publications on new religious movements causes the researcher to feel uncertain. Whatever article or scientific review we have taken, everywhere we find diametrically opposite judgments about the same phenomenon, which is not even defined. The question arises: is there a general methodological research program for this phenomenon? Is there a comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon, in particular, the construction of a satisfactory classification? Here we can recall the words of the famous researcher M. Mueller that (...) the basis of all true science lies in the classification, and if we fail to classify religious beliefs, we will have to conclude that scientific study of religion is impossible. (shrink)

India has been independent for 70 years now, and it is a good time to reflect on the political philosophy that underwrote the movement that gained that independence. When we do so, we discover the origins of a political vocabulary that is still in use today, although sadly not used with the same rigor and precision with which it was used then. We also find that those who recur to Indian political thought from the pre-independence period tend to return to (...) a single strand of that thought—the theorization of ahimsa by Mohandas K. Gandhi, as for instance in the recent essay on Indian political thought in The New York Times by Gopalkrishna Gandhi (Gandhi won’t leave India 2017). In this discussion, we hope to draw attention to some of the less well-known resources offered by pre-independence Indian philosophy and in particular the political thought of the Arya samaji Congressman, philosopher and political activist, Lajpat Rai. His political philosophy is important for understanding the theorization of and debates within the Indian independence movement; we think that it also suggests ways to think about contemporary political and revolutionary movements and merits consideration in current debates in political philosophy. (shrink)

A classic in the area, originally published in 1901, this book is a survey of the past work in the field of philosophy of religion, a conspectus of literature and comparison of methods and theologies from the Reformation to the start of the twentieth century. The Introduction part of the volume offers a classification system to explain the order of the detailed section of the book. Lesser-known theologians are covered as well as great thinkers, a deliberate choice on the (...) part of the author. Within each chapter, types of theism are then broken down into sections on individual thinkers, or group of thinkers with a reference to their main works. (shrink)

This lesson explores the relationship between ethics and religion. There is a tradition of thinking that religion takes explanatory priority in ethics, but there is a counter tradition of philosophy that shows that philosophical questions of the right or the good take priority over religious questions: without answering the philosophical question we are not in a position to endorse a religious tradition as right or good. But on a global scale the issue is fraught with the realities of the colonial (...) context of the classification and minting of religions from prior philosophical traditions. This serves to delegitimize non-Western moral philosophy as a mere traditional practice in need of further philosophical justification, which by default (owing to this process) ends up being philosophical justification from the West. Thinking critically about ethics involves reclaiming the philosophy under the veneer of the political identification of non-Western moral traditions as religions. The idea of religion on a global scale must be criticized as a means of avoiding moral theory and moral philosophy from diverse sources. The argument involves exploring a revised version of the Euthyphro Dilemma that I call "Euthyphro Dilemma 2.0.". (shrink)

Let me, to begin with, outline the main points of my paper. First of all, I shall draw a very basic distinction between three parts or aspects of reality. I shall then go on to claim that there are certain kinds of understanding and explanation which correspond to each of these three parts, and to discuss the sort of experience these different kinds of understanding involve. Within this perspective, religion will emerge as one kind of understanding and explanation, different from (...) and parallel to scientific understanding. Having reached this point in the argument, we shall be able to see one demarcation-line between scientific and religious understanding, and to offer one explanation why this demarcation-line is changing and culturally dependent. The next step, leading to Part II of my paper, claims that our attempt to understand our situation in the world involves the formation of an overall or ‘total’ view, an all-inclusive picture of reality. I shall then go on to discuss how the different kinds of understanding explained in Part I affect the formation of a total view. This leads to a classification of world-views into four main types, corresponding to the former distinctions. In this scheme, we see how religion can be a kind of understanding different from but dependent on that pointed out in Part I, and bearing a complicated relation to scientific understanding. In explaining this I shall also discuss the reasonableness of different world-views. (shrink)

This article has two main goals: to examine and classify the ways data can be used to advance normative theorizing in political theory, and to demonstrate such usages in the contested disciplinary field of religion–state relations and specifically regarding the hotly debated model of the separation of religion and state. Regarding the former, it is suggested here that the general observation that evaluation of political institutions must rely on proper understanding of such institutions and hence be data-sensitive, can be further (...) detailed or classified, via the following categories: conversion, institutional clarity, theoretical clarity and finally, theory improvement. With regard to the latter we examine how data regarding religion–state relations enables a better understanding (via the noted novel classifications or categories) of two important debates: ‘delineation’ (i.e. the argument that pure separation of religion and state does not exist) and ‘separation-establishment’ (i.e. arguing that models other than separation are permissible in religion–state relations). (shrink)

Scholarship has grown increasingly nuanced in its grappling with the intersections of religion, science, and technology but requires a new paradigm. Contemporary approaches to specific technologies reveal a wide variety of perspectives but remain too often committed to typological classification. To be vigilant of our obligation to understand and reveal, scholars in the study of religion, science, and technology can adopt a hydra‐logical stance: we can recognize that there are cultural monsters possessing scientific, technological, and religious heads. These heads (...) may work with a common agenda or they might not. They might disagree, pulling their shared body back and forth in a public commotion that lays waste to their surroundings. They might see past one another or move in tandem—purposively or not. Evaluations of climate response and AI benefit from seeing how the various heads are inseparable: indeed, cutting one off simply promotes the growth of new heads. Methodological and analytical clarity, therefore, emerges in the transition from schemes of classification to the recognition of hydras. (shrink)

Ottoman Turkish or Ottoman –as a mumpsimus – is basically Turkish language, over time it has been substantially influenced by Arabic and Persian. Its alphabet is based on Arabic letters. It has borrowed letters from Persian as well. Its vocabulary is essentially Turkish; however, it has borrowed words from Arabic and Persian at a substantial level. Arabic language attracted attention in mosques because it was the language of the religion, and in madrasahs because it was the language of science. As (...) for Persian, it spread in Turkish states as the literary language and this lifted its effectiveness especially in Seljukian palaces. Arabic writing, which is the common writing form for both languages, became the writing form for virtually the entire Islamic world, and thus, Turks employed Arabic writing form to be able to write in their own languages. According to resources, the first written Turkish language grammar book is Muyassiratu’l-ulum by Bergamalı Kadri. Apart from this book, the earliest sources on Ottoman Turkish grammar and principles were started to be written after 1840. While writing activities about Ottoman Turkish grammar increased in late 19th and early 20th centuries, they have gained further acceleration nowadays. In fact, the statement about a generation who cannot read the grave stones of their ancestors has been influential. After providing education on Ottoman Turkish as a compulsory or elective course as part of high school syllabus by the Ministry of National Education, and due to the natural increase in the numbers of students in Theology and Literature Faculties of universities which are, nowadays, almost in every city, writing activities about Ottoman Turkish have become desirable and a sector has been formed in this field. Many researchers who teach this course started to write an Ottoman Turkish grammar book to use in their own lessons, and this caused the number of Ottoman Turkish publications to increase in the market. According to our findings, grammar books of Turkey Turkish were also written in foreign languages, in late 19th and early 20th centuries. Through writing Turkey Turkish grammar work in German, French, English, Italian, Latin, Hungarian, Russian and Greek, foreign authors aimed to teach Turkish to their own nations. Although all of these works were produced in order to contribute teaching of Ottoman Turkish, efforts to generate solutions for certain problematic issues became a lot more complicated. To illustrate, when case about kaaf (ك) letter, which is the subject of this study, is examined either in grammar books written after 1840s, or in the books written by contemporary researchers, two aspects are noteworthy. One of these is the change in the number of letters forming the alphabet, the other one is the classification and nomenclature regarding kaaf (ك) letter, which effects this number. That Ottoman Turkish consists of three languages and uses Arabic alphabet and vocabulary from three different languages resulted in problems like difference in the number of letters in the alphabet and problems in the articulation of certain letters. It has been determined that one of the reasons why the number of letters in the alphabet is different is directly letter kaaf and that there are problems in both articulation and classification of the letter kaaf used in Arabic, Persian and Turkish words. When the books written on Ottoman Turkish grammar starting from the 19th century until today are analysed, no studies have ever been done either about the changes in the numbers forming the alphabet, or about the classification and articulation problems of letter kaaf (ك) and about the solution offersed to these. In this article, by attracting attention to both the number of letters in the alphabet, and to the classification and articulation problems of letter kaaf (ك), findings regarding the solutions of these problems are presented. The study consists of three main chapters. In the first chapter, the function of various letters is presented and especially the effect of kaaf on the number of letters in Ottoman Turkish alphabet is elaborated and after the analyses, the number of letters is determined. In the second chapter, triplet, quartet and quintet classifications of letter kaaf are examined and its nomenclature and articulations are analysed. In the last chapter, problems about classification and articulation of kaaf are evaluated and a new classification is suggested. Yet, it is obvious that either this classification or the previous ones do not contribute to the question of which sound to use while pronouncing kaaf. Therefore, at the end of the study, some determinations have been made for solving the problem of kaaf’s articulation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Prayer in Greek ReligionFrances Hickson–HahnSimon Pulleyn. Prayer in Greek Religion. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. xvi + 245 pp. Cloth, $75.The study of prayer in ancient Greece faces rather daunting obstacles. Only four brief texts remain which scholars agree may represent authentic examples of cultic prayer: the twoword prayer of Eleusinian initiates, the Athenian [End Page 632] prayer to Zeus for rain, a prayer to Demeter for the barley (...) sheaf, and the dithyramb of Elis, for a grand total of forty words. In addition, there are three fifth–century hymns from Epidaurus, a form not universally agreed to be prayer. In the area of epigraphic evidence, the largest body of prayer–like addresses derives from curse tablets which mostly postdate the classical period and which arguably belong not to the study of religion but to that of magic. Votive inscriptions, while plentiful, are rarely in prayer form. Thus, of necessity, the scholar is largely dependent on literary evidence, most of which is poetic.Thus it is a challenging task which Simon Pulleyn took on in this revised version of his doctoral thesis: to describe and interpret the mentality of all types of prayer in archaic and classical Greece in a relatively slight volume (216 pages plus appendices, etc.). The resulting monograph, "the first book–length study of Greek prayer to appear in English" (jacket), will prove a useful introduction to the body of evidence and major lines of research on Greek prayer. His work will be especially welcome to those not competent in the ancient languages, for Pulleyn translates all of the prayers proffered as examples, as well as modern foreign–language quotations. He also includes a brief glossary of fifteen Greek words especially important in the study of prayers. While he quotes an abundance of illustrative prayers, both literary and epigraphic, and devotes considerable space to lexicographic discussions, nevertheless he produces a quite readable text.Rejecting the broader definition of prayer as any address or appeal to supernatural powers, used by Aubriot–Sevin (Prière et conceptions religieuses en Grèce ancienne, Lyon, 1992), Pulleyn defines Greek prayers as "articulate requests directed toward the gods" and proposes a four–part classification of (1) prayers based on ξενία (2) curses (), (3) entreaties (λιταί), and (4) supplications ().While there is considerable ancient evidence to support the association of prayer with petition, such a narrow description leaves in limbo other types of address to the gods, such as thanksgivings and greetings, which are too important to be left out of this or any comprehensive study of prayer. And so Pulleyn is forced to devote much space to the discussion of material which he does not technically consider prayer. In fact, he himself varies between the technical use of the term "prayer" and the more common modern definition, a practice which naturally leads to some confusion. On occasion, he resorts to the term "prayer–like" to describe nonpetitionary addresses to gods.Perhaps the reason for this emphasis on petition is the author's main thesis that is the primary characteristic of the relationship between the ancient Greeks and their gods, and thus of prayer as well. Pulleyn explains thus: "it refers to a whole nexus of related ideas that we would call reciprocity. When one gives something to a god, one is giving in the sense that the offering is pleasing; but equally one is storing up for oneself a feeling of gratitude on the part of the god, which is also The whole two–way relationship can be called one of " (4). [End Page 633]This thesis, which is prominent in the first half of the book, is most fully developed in the second chapter, where Pulleyn examines prayers of the type, known particularly from the Homeric epics. He is especially concerned with the da quia dedi(t) model, which presents an argument for fulfillment of the accompanying request based on sacrifices previously offered. Numerically, in Homer and elsewhere, this is not a common prayer type. Although it would seem to violate the typical pattern of sacrifice offered in conjunction with prayer requests, Pulleyn argues convincingly for interpretation of this prayer type within the context of reciprocity. The connection with... (shrink)

Recent studies of the evolution of religion have revealed the cognitive underpinnings of belief in supernatural agents, the role of ritual in promoting cooperation, and the contribution of morally punishing high gods to the growth and stabilization of human society. The universality of religion across human society points to a deep evolutionary past. However, specific traits of nascent religiosity, and the sequence in which they emerged, have remained unknown. Here we reconstruct the evolution of religious beliefs and behaviors in early (...) modern humans using a global sample of hunter-gatherers and seven traits describing hunter-gatherer religiosity: animism, belief in an afterlife, shamanism, ancestor worship, high gods, and worship of ancestors or high gods who are active in human affairs. We reconstruct ancestral character states using a time-calibrated supertree based on published phylogenetic trees and linguistic classification and then test for correlated evolution between the characters and for the direction of cultural change. Results indicate that the oldest trait of religion, present in the most recent common ancestor of present-day hunter-gatherers, was animism, in agreement with long-standing beliefs about the fundamental role of this trait. Belief in an afterlife emerged, followed by shamanism and ancestor worship. Ancestor spirits or high gods who are active in human affairs were absent in early humans, suggesting a deep history for the egalitarian nature of hunter-gatherer societies. There is a significant positive relationship between most characters investigated, but the trait “high gods” stands apart, suggesting that belief in a single creator deity can emerge in a society regardless of other aspects of its religion. (shrink)

Este artigo avalia o impacto das transformações da contemporaneidade em religiões tradicionais como o judaísmo, cujos membros podem assumir uma faceta secular, interferindo no monitoramento de sua presença num território. A restrição da classificação censitária de certos grupos étnicos unicamente ao quesito religião pode confundir a interpretação das oscilações de certos grupos, uma vez que pode camuflar sua real representatividade numérica. Lembramos que um membro de um grupo étnico pode sentir-se livre para assumir uma identidade religiosa diferente de sua etnia (...) ou, ainda, afastar elementos religiosos de sua biografia, apresentando-se como sem religião. Os critérios autodeclarados, que dispensam comprovação, ratificam o pleno exercício das liberdades individuais que, num ambiente de alta refletividade, pode convidar o individuo a transitar livremente, rompendo com laços tradicionais, optando por identidades alternativas, algumas vezes distantes de sua origem étnica. Palavras-chave: Judaísmo laico. Sem religião. Recenseamentos. Reflexividade. Destradicionalização.This article evaluates the impact of the contemporary transformations on traditional religions as the Judaism, that may adopt a secular expression, interfering in the control of its presence in a territory. The isolation of certain ethnic groups inside the field reserved to religion in the census classification may confuse the interpretation of the oscillations of certain goups, once it can produce a camouflage of the real numeric representation. We remind that a member of an ethnic group can feel free to assume a religious identity distant of his familial tradition or, still, to remove the religious elements of his biography, becoming a person without religion. So, at the same time that the census fields that are selfdeclared, with no need of comprobation ratifies the full exercise of the individual freedom in an scenery of high reflexivity, it may invite people to transit freely, breaking up with traditional liaisons, opting for alternative identities, sometimes distant of its ethnic origin. Key-words: Laic Judaism. Without religion. Census. Reflexivity. Detradicionalization. (shrink)

Geoffrey Cantor and Chris Kenny have criticized attempts to classify various ways of relating science and religion. They hold that all typologies are too simple and too static to illuminate the complex and changing historical interactions of science and religion. I argue that typologies serve a useful pedagogical function even though every particular interaction must be seen in its historical context. I acknowledge the problems in making distinctions between categories of classification and examine some alternative typologies that have been (...) proposed. I leave as an open question whether my fourfold typology is applicable to differing religious traditions. Finally I consider some parallels between typologies for science‐religion interactions and typologies for relationships between religions. Can our discussions be both interdisciplinary and interreligious without the danger of imposing the conceptual framework of one discipline or religious tradition on another discipline or tradition? (shrink)

This article is an analysis of the recognition of the Missionary Church of Kopimism as a faith community by the Swedish state. The analysis draws on post-Foucaultian writings on governmentality and seeks to understand what kind of normative and proscriptive understandings of “religion” guide the process. The authors argue that the recognition reveals fundamental aspects of the Swedish state’s performative role in the recognition of faith communities which challenges any unreflective classification of it as “secular.”.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Prayer in Greek ReligionFrances Hickson–HahnSimon Pulleyn. Prayer in Greek Religion. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. xvi + 245 pp. Cloth, $75.The study of prayer in ancient Greece faces rather daunting obstacles. Only four brief texts remain which scholars agree may represent authentic examples of cultic prayer: the twoword prayer of Eleusinian initiates, the Athenian [End Page 632] prayer to Zeus for rain, a prayer to Demeter for the barley (...) sheaf, and the dithyramb of Elis, for a grand total of forty words. In addition, there are three fifth–century hymns from Epidaurus, a form not universally agreed to be prayer. In the area of epigraphic evidence, the largest body of prayer–like addresses derives from curse tablets which mostly postdate the classical period and which arguably belong not to the study of religion but to that of magic. Votive inscriptions, while plentiful, are rarely in prayer form. Thus, of necessity, the scholar is largely dependent on literary evidence, most of which is poetic.Thus it is a challenging task which Simon Pulleyn took on in this revised version of his doctoral thesis: to describe and interpret the mentality of all types of prayer in archaic and classical Greece in a relatively slight volume (216 pages plus appendices, etc.). The resulting monograph, "the first book–length study of Greek prayer to appear in English" (jacket), will prove a useful introduction to the body of evidence and major lines of research on Greek prayer. His work will be especially welcome to those not competent in the ancient languages, for Pulleyn translates all of the prayers proffered as examples, as well as modern foreign–language quotations. He also includes a brief glossary of fifteen Greek words especially important in the study of prayers. While he quotes an abundance of illustrative prayers, both literary and epigraphic, and devotes considerable space to lexicographic discussions, nevertheless he produces a quite readable text.Rejecting the broader definition of prayer as any address or appeal to supernatural powers, used by Aubriot–Sevin (Prière et conceptions religieuses en Grèce ancienne, Lyon, 1992), Pulleyn defines Greek prayers as "articulate requests directed toward the gods" and proposes a four–part classification of (1) prayers based on ξενία (2) curses (), (3) entreaties (λιταί), and (4) supplications ().While there is considerable ancient evidence to support the association of prayer with petition, such a narrow description leaves in limbo other types of address to the gods, such as thanksgivings and greetings, which are too important to be left out of this or any comprehensive study of prayer. And so Pulleyn is forced to devote much space to the discussion of material which he does not technically consider prayer. In fact, he himself varies between the technical use of the term "prayer" and the more common modern definition, a practice which naturally leads to some confusion. On occasion, he resorts to the term "prayer–like" to describe nonpetitionary addresses to gods.Perhaps the reason for this emphasis on petition is the author's main thesis that is the primary characteristic of the relationship between the ancient Greeks and their gods, and thus of prayer as well. Pulleyn explains thus: "it refers to a whole nexus of related ideas that we would call reciprocity. When one gives something to a god, one is giving in the sense that the offering is pleasing; but equally one is storing up for oneself a feeling of gratitude on the part of the god, which is also The whole two–way relationship can be called one of " (4). [End Page 633]This thesis, which is prominent in the first half of the book, is most fully developed in the second chapter, where Pulleyn examines prayers of the type, known particularly from the Homeric epics. He is especially concerned with the da quia dedi(t) model, which presents an argument for fulfillment of the accompanying request based on sacrifices previously offered. Numerically, in Homer and elsewhere, this is not a common prayer type. Although it would seem to violate the typical pattern of sacrifice offered in conjunction with prayer requests, Pulleyn argues convincingly for interpretation of this prayer type within the context of reciprocity. The connection with... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 263 Blaise Pascal, Pensdes sur la Religion et sur quelques autres su/ets. Edited by Jean Steinmann. (Monaco: Editions du Rocher, 1961. Pp. 505 + tables and 3 portraits of Pascal. 16.80 N.F.) This edition of the Pensdes by the late Abb~ Steinmann claims to be the first to utilize the radical discoveries of Tourneur and Lafuma and to incorporate the revisions of the text resulting from their (...) work, while presenting a readable Pascal, unencumbered by tons of erudition. The achievement of Tourneur and Lafuma is one of the most remarkable of modern scholarship. They have shown that the standard text of Pascal was not that which the author left to posterity, and that the manuscript copy (not in Pascal's hand) in the Biblioth~que National, 9203, preserves Pascal's original organization to the extent that he had completed his work, and preserves Pascal's order of the remaining fragments; whereas the holograph manuscript, BN.9202, represents a posthumous ordering of the materials from the early eighteenth century. On the basis of a really fantastic amount of detailed analysis of the paper, the ink, the glue, etc., Tourneur and Lafuma have brought about a monumental revision of the text of one of France's major classics, three centuries after the author's death. It is now finally possible, after a wide variety of reconstructions over a period of almost 300 years since the first edition of the Pensdes, to read the work as Pascal left it, and to see it in the form that Pascal had given it. The revised edition put out by I.afuma in 1951 was primarily a scholar's edition, incorporating all the details that were vital in convincing people that BN.Ms.9203 was the correct text, and that it contained a mine of information about variants. The present edition by Steinmann is an attempt to present the revised text without all of the encumbrances of scholarship, thereby preserving the Pens~es as a readable document. This edition is elegantly printed, following the main classifications of the Lafuma edition, with some of the variants appearing in the margins, and lots of notes in the back giving translations of Biblical and other texts, and some relevant data. In some of the sections the order of the Pens~es differs to some extent from Lafuma's text, and no explanation is offered for the variation. The excellent printing, separation of variants from text, and the absence of footnotes certainly make Steinmann's edition easily readable. The volume includes a section of personal notes of Pascal not intended for publication ("The Memorial," "Mystery of Jesus," and other items), twenty-seven sections classified by Pascal, and the unclassified Pens~es, given in the order of BN.Ms.9203 (excluding the sections on miracles, on the grounds that these were not intended as part of the same work). One grave difficulty in using any of the revised editions is that of locating passages known according to their numbers in the Brunschvicg edition. Stcinmann offers a concordance which is only partially helpful, giving the pages in his edition on which the Brunschvicg items appear. This makes it difficult to identify the Brunschvicg equivalent of one of Steinmann's passages, but not vice versa. This problem, and several others, have been solved in a more recent edition done by Lafuma (Pascal, Oeuvres completes, Macmillan, 1963). Lafuma has presented the text with each pens~e having two numbers, its new one as it appears in the revised text and its Brunschvicg number. (Thus the crucial text on the Wager is now 418-233. Steinmann did not number the individual pens~es.) The variants are given in parentheses in italics, and other features of the author's original are preserved without causing confusion or clutter. On the whole, if one wants to read the "new" Pensdes, with enough additional data, guidelines, and the like, this most recent Lafuma edition seems preferable to Steinmann's because it is more scholarly, and yet easier to follow with the notes, the variants and the numbers 264 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY right at hand, without getting in the way. If it had been printed in... (shrink)

Ḥadīths have been preserved and recorded in various ways since the Companions. These activities continued dur-ing the Tābiīn (the successors of the Companions) Period. So much so that these methods have formed the infra-structure of other methods that will emerge later. In this context, before the 70's (A.H.), works named al-Aṭrāf appeared. However, these first works consisted of the notes that they wrote some of the ḥadīths before coming to the science assemblies to help students remember in ḥadīth learning. Ḥadīth (...) scholars have adopted and applied this method in a very short time. Thus, this method also provided the opportunity for the formation of the first written ḥadīth documents. In addition, with the writing of ḥadīth works, it has turned into a system of al-Taṣnīf and al-Takhrīj in order to make maximum use of these books and to reach the source of a narration that is tried to be found. As a result, al-Aṭrāf literature, which can be evaluated as index, has emerged. As a matter of fact, the first examples of this literature, arranged alphabetically according to the names of the Companions or ḥadīth texts, started to be given since the 4th (A.H.) century. In this way, the way to quickly benefit from the accumulation of the ḥadīth area has been opened. This article focuses on the historical adventure of al-Aṭrāf and their contributions to the ḥadīth field, as well as literature knowledge of the works of al-Aṭrāf which are of great importance for both al-Kitābah, al-Taṣnīf and al-Takhrīj.Summary: In order to understand and practice the religion of Islām, great efforts have been made both in the past and later periods in order to convey the words, verbs, interpretations and qualifications of the Prophet to the next genera-tions as they are protected from all kinds of falsification and changes. This process, which started with memoriza-tion and partly writing at the beginning, has gained momentum with the use of other methods since the period of Tābiīn. In this context, the method of aṭrāf was started to be used to facilitate memorization, to be a reminder, and to transmit the ḥadīth through the hearing of the ḥadīth sheikh. The first examples of this method were seen by Muḥammad b. Sīrīn during his participation of his teacher Abīde/Ubayda Salmān in the scholarly assembly. At this stage, the relevant method was manifested as writing a passage from the beginning of the ḥadīth. Thus, the aforementioned method, which had great contributions in recording and memorizing ḥadīths in accordance with the original, has gained widespreadness and application among the ḥadīth scholars like Ubeydullaḥ b. Omar, Shu’bah b. al-Ḥajjāj, Sufyān as-Sawrī, Mālik b. Anas, Ismāīl b. Ayyāş and Vakī b. Jarrāḥ in a very short time. In this context, Yazīd b. Zuray’ stated that he went to his teacher without his aṭrāf work of ḥadīths which he transmitted from Shu’bah and listened to ḥadīth in this way. Therefore, this mentioned event is important in terms of putting forth that Shu’bah allowed the aṭrāf method in his assemblies. The method was used by Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, who traveled to Madīnah to convey the reports recorded with the mentioned method of his teacher Abū Alḳama al-Farawī and at the same time listen to the related transfers from him, but who could not reach his goal. Therefore, the related narrations show that aṭrāf method was used effectively by ḥadīth scholars to remember the ḥadīths in the 1st and 2nd centuries, so sections from the narrations were written during the preparatory stage before coming to the scholarly assembly. Ultimately, the importance of these works, which manifest in different ways and offer great contributions to writing, is an undeniable reality for the history of ḥadīth.Aṭrāf, the plural form of taraf that literally means the side and edge of something, mean a section, phrase or first part that indicates the whole of the ḥadīth. This method, along with the formation of ḥadīth literature, has been started to be given as a name to the works organized alphabetically according to the name of the Companions or ḥadīth texts by mentioning some of the ḥadīths with the 4th century. In this sense, aṭrāf has started to become a unique literature in a sort of taṣnīf and takhrīj method in order to make use of the ḥadīth writing easier.Aṭrāf studies may aim to bring together the isnāḍs (chains of transmitters) in all books, or they can be limited to the chains in certain books. Aṭrāf books contain the ḥadīths in the Ṣaḥīḥān or Kutub al-Sittah and are written in alphabetical form based on the name of the companions or according to the texts of ḥadīth. The first of these, which has the attribute of the musnad in a sense, is arranged in alphabetical order according to the name of the Companion, and if there are many people who narrate from him, according to the names of the tābiīn and taba-i tābiīn (successors of the tābiīn). Accordingly, the narrations of each companion were determined and listed in al-phabetical order in aṭrāfs in musnad-type, and a passage was written from the ḥadīths and marked as books/chapters in the places of relevant narration. On the other hand, the second type of aṭrāf books were ar-ranged by giving a few words from a section that allows remembering the head or all of the ḥadīths without in-cluding chains, and then placing these texts in alphabetical order.The type of aṭrāf offers the opportunity to see different chains of narrations together and provides many facilities for the ḥadīth researchers. Therefore, ḥadīth researchers show great interest in this genre. Aṭrāfs provide many benefits for both ḥadīth chain and text. In this respect, it is possible to talk about many advantages of the ḥadīth to its transmister such as the determination of mutawātīr, garīb, azīz, mashhūr, mutābī or the testimony of ḥadīth; to provide facility to make a reputation research of a riwāyah (narration), to provide an opportunity to determine the location of the narrations in the primary sources; to detect the link or any blackout in the chain, to reach the nu-merical knowledge of ḥadīth narrated by a companion or other narrators, to obtain information about narrators whose identity is not explicitly stated, to know the first narrator, to provide the protection of the ḥadīths from taḥrīf or alteration, to give the opportunity to identify the subject they contain, to be able to obtain text integrity by getting various chains, the detection of the sabab al-wurūd (the context of ḥadīth).Due to the contributions we have mentioned above, many books on aṭrāf literature that started with Abu’l-Ḥasen Ali b. Omar ad-Dārakutnī have been published. Among them Aṭrāfu’s-ṣaḥīḥayn/el-Jem`u bayna’s-ṣaḥīḥayn by Abū Mas`ūd Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad b. Ubayd ad-Dimashkī, Aṭrāfu’s-ṣaḥīḥayn by Abū Muḥammad Ḥalaf b. Muḥammad b. Ali al-Vasiṭī, Zaḫāiru’l-mavārīs fi’d-dalālati alā mavāzi`i’l-hadīs by Abdülganī b. İsmāīl en-Nāblūsī and Tuḥfatu’l-ashrāf bi ma`rifati’l-aṭrāf by Abu’l-Ḥajjāj Yūsuf b. Abdurrahman el-Mizzī can be mentioned. Some of the related works are arranged in musnad style while others are arranged according to the first word of ḥadīth texts. As a result, the method of aṭrāf has become a kind of indexer in order to facilitate reaching the source of the re-ports and make the highest level of use required by the classification and bookings of the ḥadīths in the 3rd centu-ry. These works, arranged alphabetically in the name of the Companions or according to the texts of the ḥadīth, have taken their place in the history of the ḥadīth with their many examples, both in the form of taṣnīf and the method of takhrīj by mentioning a part of the ḥadīth by the head. (shrink)

Need the moral be repeated? There exist two distinct circuits, each with its own final market. The equilibrium of the economic process is conditioned by the balance of the two circuits: each must be allowed the possibility of continuity, of basic outlay yielding an equal basic income and surplus outlay yieldingan equal surplus income, of basic and surplus income yielding equal basic and surplus expenditure, and of these grounding equivalent basic and surplus outlay. But what cannot be tolerated, much less (...) sustained, is for one circuit to be drained by the other. That is the essence of dynamic disequilibrium. (shrink)

Where do Paul Tillich's views of the relationship between religion and science fit in Ian Barbour's four classifications of conflict, independence, dialogue, and integration? At different levels of analysis, he fits in all of them. In concrete religions and sciences, some conflict is evident, but religion and science can be thought of as having parallel perspectives, languages, and objectives. Tillich's method of correlation itself is a form of dialogue. His theology of nature in “Life and the Spirit” (Part 4 (...) of his Systematic Theology) fits the integration type. His strong “Two Types of Philosophy of Religion” (in Theology of Culture) is a latent natural theology. His system of the sciences is a form of synthesis, a type of integration. (shrink)

PeterKevern believes that the cognitive science of religion (CSR) provides a justification for the idea of spiritual care in the health services. In this paper, I suggest that he is mistaken on two counts. First,CSRdoes not entail the conclusionsKevern wants to draw. His treatment of it consists largely of nonsequiturs. I show this by presenting an account ofCSR, and then explaining whyKevern's reasons for thinking it rescues ‘spirituality’ discourse do not work. Second, the debate about spirituality‐in‐health is about classification: (...) what shall count as a ‘spiritual need’ and what shall count as ‘spiritual care’. It is about the politics of meaning, an exercise in persuasive definition. The function of ‘spirituality’ talk in health care is to change the denotation of ‘spiritual’, and attach its indelibly religious connotations to as many health‐related concepts and practices as possible.CSR, however plausible it may be as a theory of the origins and pervasiveness of religious belief, is irrelevant to this debate. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Works cited Additional recommendations by editors.

A discussion of how Hegel manages his classification and ordering of specific religions, and a critique of his method.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 22 (2002) 115-121 [Access article in PDF] Instrumentality, Complexity, and Reason: A Christian Approach to Religions Terry C. Muck Asbury Theological Seminary I want to call into question The Paradigm, the threefold classification of Christian approaches to other religions as Exclusivism, Inclusivism, and Pluralism. I call this classification The Paradigm, with a capital T and a capital P, because it is the way (...) we have categorized Christian theological approaches to the other religions ever since 1982, when Alan Race proposed this "broad typological framework within which most of the current Christian theologies of religions can be placed," in his book Christians and Religious Pluralism: Patterns in the Christian Theology of Religions (Orbis Books). 1Race's was not the first attempt at such a paradigm. He was preceded by others, most notably Owen Thomas, who classified Christian responses to other religions under the headings of rationalism, romanticism, relativism, exclusivism, dialectic, reconception, tolerance, dialogue, catholicism, and presence. 2 But Thomas's categories have not stuck like Race's, perhaps because of the larger number and perhaps because they seem a mixture of apples and oranges, that is, a conglomeration of logical positions, emotive states, and simple demographics. Although this hodgepodge may be more true to the reality of the complex ways Christians relate to people of other faiths, Race's paradigm, simple and straightforward, has won out in the descriptive derby.I think it is time to question whether Race's paradigm should continue to be the primary way we classify the many ways Christian theologians and other Christians relate to the world's other religious traditions. I will describe why I think The Paradigm is losing its usefulness, make a proposal for a new way of looking at the other religions, and list both the losses/dangers and benefits of thinking in a new way. The Problem with the Paradigm The first sign that The Paradigm is showing its age is that very few people seem to really fit in any one of the three categories. I suspect that few of us here would be willing to say unambiguously, "I am an exclusivist," or "I am an inclusivist," or "I am [End Page 115] a pluralist." 3 And even if we were willing to identify with one or another of the options, then most likely we would in the same breath quickly say something like, "But let me tell you what I mean when I say I am an exclusivist (or inclusivist or pluralist)." That is, we quickly define the words in qualifying ways that address the objections that have been raised in reference to each of the positions:Exclusivists, for example, struggle to counter the charges of being inhumane, 4 or of making God seem inhumane, 5 or of being narrow, or of being misinformed, 6 or of being unscholarly. 7Inclusivists, for their part, struggle to counter the charges of being Christian exclusivists in disguise, 8 or of being offensive to non-Christians, 9 or of being pluralists in disguise, 10 or of holding a philosophically unstable position.Pluralists, in turn, make sure we know they are not relativists, 11 that they are not necessarily universalists, 12 that being a pluralist does not mean they are a-religious or that they consider themselves above the fray of common religious commitment. 13I don't think that this problem has just to do with the fact that the paradigm is what Max Weber called an ideal-type paradigm, where we set up ideal types as a way of clearly delineating logically possible positions vis-à-vis a presenting issue as a heuristic device. 14 Were that the case, it seems to me that we could still embrace The Paradigm as a way of talking about interreligious interchange and explicitly/implicitly acknowledge to one another that we recognize the ambiguity of the categories when it comes to applying them to complex individual adherents of complex religious traditions. 15I think dissatisfaction with The Paradigm goes beyond frustration with it as an ideal-type typology. The Paradigm has come to stand for... (shrink)

La fenomenología de la religión es una de las ciencias de las religiones surgida en el siglo XIX. Tras una época dorada, las dificultades epistemológicas y los debates suscitados en torno al estatuto del saber la abocaron a una profunda crisis interna. En la actualidad, existen dos formas de entender la fenomenología de la religión: la primera, como historia comparada de las religiones, centrada en la descripción y clasificación de los fenómenos religiosos; la segunda, como fenomenología hermenéutica, centrada en la (...) comprensión del fenómeno religioso. Ambas corrientes constituyen dos visiones divergentes de la fenomenología de la religión. Sin embargo, podrían concebirse como dos fases fenomenológicas convergentes que apuntan a la consolidación de una antropología filosófica de la religión. En este artículo, analizamos el objetivo, los principales representantes, las dificultades epistemológicas y los logros de cada una de estas for-mas de comprender la fenomenología de la religión y su posible conjugación en la configuración de una filosofía fenomenológica de la religión.The phenomenology of religion is one of the sciences of religions emerged in the 19th century. After a golden age, the epistemological difficulties, and the debates about the status of knowledge led to a deep internal crisis. At present, there are two ways of understanding the phenomenology of religion: the first, as a com-parative history of religions, focused on description and classification of religious phenomena; the second, as a hermeneutical phenomenology, focused on the understanding of religious phenomena. Both currents constitute two divergent views of phenomenology of religion. However, they can be conceived as two convergent phenomenological phases that point to the consoli-dation of a philosophical anthropology of religion. In this paper, we analyze the goal, main representatives, epistemological difficulties and achievements of each of these ways of understanding the phenomenology of religion and its possible conjugation in the configuration of a phenomenological philosophy of religion. (shrink)

This book gathers together eight essays which are loosely united by the thin thread of gnosticism. In fact, this thread is not long enough to extend to the last three chapters which embrace a different theme, namely, philosophy of religion, broadly understood. The first and second chapters complement each other nicely. The first treats the early gnostics and in so doing raises such basic questions as the complex origins of gnosticism and the multifarious expressions which can be identified under this (...) heading. Hanratty’s specific interest is in the gnostic movement with its “spectrum of ideas and attitudes which formed the many sided heresy of the early Christian centuries”. The second chapter moves from these issues of the early gnostics to a wider investigation of gnostic thought through the centuries. These first chapters provide a useful introductory overview of certain key figures and concepts. Following F. C. Baur’s classification of Hegel as a modern gnostic, Hanratty asserts in the next essay that Hegel’s early development took place within a gnostic framework which subsequently affected his own approach to reality. The next essay turns to Simone Weil and interprets her thought within the boundaries of gnostic elitism. A similar explanation of the ideas of Carl Jung—albeit from the vantage of psychology— is advanced in the fifth essay. (shrink)

The history of mental illnesses is as old as human history. Mental disorders are affected by changing social and cultural factors during the historical process, and have been conceptually restructured and their definitions and classifications have been changed. The evolution of obssessive-compulsive disorders with roots as old as human history into modern concepts took place in the 19th century. The first scientific views on the spiritual origin of OCD belong to S. Freud. Freud observed that mental causes in OCD are (...) different from other mental disorders, and he examined obsession as a separate and specific disorder. Over time, it has been understood that OCD is a very common disorder. The American Psychiatric Association (APA) has classified OCD under an independent title in the latest version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) by removing it from the category of anxiety disorders. OCD is a mental disorder caused by mental actions such as obsessive thoughts (obsessions) and / or repetitive and compulsive behaviors (compulsion). The patient is often aware that such thoughts and behaviors are irrational and absurd. For this reason, he tries to get away obsessive thoughts that he finds contrary to his beliefs, opinions, moral values and logic from his mind. However, as he tries, obsessive thoughts become more and more frequent and create a great anxiety in the person. This time, the patient resorts to compulsions to alleviate the anxiety he feels or to get rid of it completely. As his compulsions repeat, his anxiety increases and he goes into a vicious circle. There are many symptom subgroups of OCD that seriously worsen the quality of life of the individual. One of these, and even the most overwhelming, is religious obsessions. It has been thought that there has been a relationship between religion and OCD for a long time in the psychology literature, and some remarkable studies have been conducted to clarify this relationship. Although there are many research findings showing that religion is an indispensable element in the protection of the mental health integrity of the individual, some forms of religious understanding and some experiences gained as a result of religious experiences may affect the concerns about OCD. This stage of religiosity is closely related to some sub-symptom groups of OCD. The explanations of the founder of the psychoanalytic method, Freud psychoanalytic method, and his followers made a great contribution to the understanding of OCD. However, since the psychoanalytic method exhibits a theoretically reductionist approach to religion, it is possible that the individual's devotion to religion is initially evaluated as a pathology or at least an important obstacle to insight. Today, cognitive behavioral psychotherapies are considered the most effective psychological treatment method for OCD, but their success rates in the treatment of religious OCD are low. Since religious OCD concerns often involve spiritual issues rather than concrete repeatable situations, behavioral methods can be quite difficult to apply in the treatment of religious OCD. Therefore, traditional psychotherapy approaches, even if they are not openly against religions, are insufficient to relieve the suffering in the lives of individuals with religious obsessions, as they generally neglect the religious dimension. Due to the vacuum that arises from restricting spiritual treatments to secular approaches, religious patients are threatened by the illegal practices of people who abuse religious feelings. Clinically, religious obsessions are more worrying and overwhelming. Therefore, their treatment is more difficult than others. Selective approaches that use different scientific disciplines together in the treatment of OCD and can stretch around religious beliefs and values can create more effective treatment models. Thus, the success rate in the treatment of religious OCD can be carried to higher levels thanks to the appropriate cooperation of the disciplines of medicine, psychology and theology. There is a rich religious cultural heritage that can support this collaboration in terms of theological disciplines. As an example, Abū Zayd al-Balkhī (d. 322/934), in his Maṣāliḥ al-abdān wa-l-anfus, probably made a clear distinction between neuroses and psychosis and classified neurotic disorders for the first time about ten centuries before Freud. In this study, the importance of approaching to religious obsessions as both a psychological disorder and a theological problem is emphasized. For this reason, cooperation of psychiatric and psychological approaches with spiritual counseling and guidance is recommended in the treatment of religious OCD. The difficulty in distinguishing whether the symptoms seen in a religious person are normal, natural religious thoughts and behaviors of religious life or abnormal appearances in the religious guise necessitates this interdisciplinary cooperation. (shrink)

Typologies like Ian Barbour's have been widely used—and critiqued—in religion-and-science. Several alternatives have been proposed by, for example, John Haught, Willem Drees, Mikael Stenmark, and Shoaib Ahmed Malik. However, there has been a surprising deficit in discussion of what we wish typologies to do in religion and science in the first place. In this article, I provide a general analysis of typologies in religion-and-science by (1) providing a classification of existing typologies as conclusion- or concept-oriented; (2) showing that typologies (...) are used, or expected to be used, as first-order categorizations of how religion and science are related and as second-order classifications of scholars/scholarly works; (3) discussing several aims which we might want typologies to achieve in their second-order usage; and (4) presenting a new kind of typology focused on the methods used by scholars which achieves those aims in a unique way. (shrink)

This book provides a comprehensive discussion regarding the sacred aspects of human existence in their relationship with the material world.

Worldview Religious Studies brings the study of religion, spirituality, secularism, and other mixed attitudes of life under the overarching scheme of worldview studies. This book introduces and defines worldviews more generally before establishing a framework specific to religious studies. The drive for meaning-making is explored through ritual-symbolic activities, ideas of 'play', and the power of emotions to transform simple ideas into values and beliefs that frame identity and signpost destiny. Identity and its sacralisation are discussed alongside gift/reciprocity theory in their (...) relation to ideas of merit, karma, and salvation in Eastern and Western traditions. This theoretical background is used to introduce a new classification of worldviews - natural, scientific, ancestral, karmic, prophetic-sectarian, mystical, and ideological. Organised thematically by chapter, this book brings together familiar and unfamiliar authors, theories, and sources to challenge students and teachers of Religious Studies, Theology, and Ethics. It introduces worldview religious studies as a framework through which to re-think human endeavours to identify, cope and even transcend life's flaws and perils. (shrink)

The research is devoted to the study of the phenomenon of spiritual culture of Modern times - creationism. Authors analyze the causes of creationist teachings, as well as develop a classification of forms of creationism. As such, the following are distinguished and analyzed: biblical creationism, scientific creationism, theological evolutionism, teleological creationism, alterism, missionary creationism. Biblical creationism is a literal understanding of the texts of the Bible relating to the creation of the Earth and man. Scientific creationism is an attempt (...) by individual scientists to combine scientific knowledge with religious beliefs. It gathers scientific evidence in favor of the biblical narrative, and, at the same time, rational arguments against the scientific theory of evolution. On the contrary, theological evolutionism, especially in the form of concordism, tries to reconcile the scientific and religious view of evolution. This is achieved through the interpretation of Biblical symbols through modern scientific concepts, or by the creation of a new pseudo-religion (for example, Teilhardism). Teleological creationism, in the modern form of Intelligent Design theory, popular in Western Protestantism, using the data of natural sciences, criticizes the foundations of the theory of biological evolution, thus demonstrating the gap of natural causality in order to justify the supernatural purposefulness of the Universe. Alterism asserts that the very nature of the world before original sin was different, therefore, the current knowledge of nature cannot correspond to the original plan of God reflected in the Bible. For the first time, highlighted and explored in this work, missionary creationism seeks to interpret the Bible from the point of view of concepts of modern science in order to bring a person with an already formed scientific picture of the world to faith. It is shown that most of the above forms demonstrate a pseudoscientific or pseudo-religious essence. The authors make an assumption about the origins of creationist teachings rooted in the introduction of elements of Neoplatonic philosophy into Christian teaching. The seeming contradiction between science and religion in understanding the evolution of nature finds its explanation through the disclosure of creationism's claim to understand the world as a "thing in itself". (shrink)

In contrast to interreligious dialogue, which has been the subject of careful scrutiny by both Ukrainian and foreign researchers of religion, attention to interreligious organizations remains disproportionately lower than their role in public life and in the international arena. This article aims to present a systematic review of the main directions of current researches on interreligious organizations. It consistently covers four aspects: (1) the possible reasons for the previous low research attention to interfaith organizations (in particular, the impact of the (...) secularization theory and the relative "youth" of the majority of interfaith organizations); (2) the problem of interpretation the term "interreligious organizations" (e.g., expansion of the range of actors who can act on behalf of religious organizations; correlation of approaches to interreligious organizations in religious studies with the UN criteria for defining international organizations); (3) current approaches to the classification of interreligious organizations based on the pool of participants and difficulties of adapting these classifications to the Ukrainian context – untranslatabilities, changes of emphasis, national preferences and connotations; (4) functions of interfaith organizations on international arena and its challenges: threats of political instrumentalization of religion, problem of representativeness and inclusion of all actors, which is especially relevant for Ukrainian religious organizations, most of which do not have independent representation in international interfaith organizations. The conclusions outline the prospects for further study of the topic in the context of growing diversity of interreligious organizations and of the entry of Ukrainian religious organizations in the international religious field. (shrink)

Metaphysics can be used to help us understand the world, and has applications both within philosophy and beyond. Within philosophy, metaphysical questions arise whether we are thinking about ethics, art, religion, or science. Beyond philosophy, there are many areas where metaphysics can be applied. Case studies in this chapter include applied ontology in information science, social ontology in both philosophy and the social sciences, and questions about classification and kinds in psychiatry.

The introduction to the topic of this issue is an overview of the research articles authored by Russian, Lithuanian, and Indian scholars on various problems of Mahayana Buddhist philosophy. While explaining the status of the terms “Mahāyāna” and “Hīnayāna,” the author emphasizes that since they are represent the apologetic conceptualizations of Mahayanists, the appellation “Hīnayāna” (“Lesser Vehicle”, etc.) is not recognized either by those Buddhists who are supposed to be characterized by it, or by scholars striving for a neutral appellation. (...) This creates difficulties, including the need for a generally accepted designation for this Buddhist tradition. However, despite the apologetic nature of the Mahāyāna - Hīnayāna opposition, the difference between the two is captured very plausibly. The first one teaches about the individual way of achieving liberation from the cycle of endless rebirths (saṃsāra) through a personal, individual self-perfection (the path of the arhat) leading to enlightenment (bodhi) and nirvāṇa (extinction of passions). The second one develops a full-fledged religion with its own pantheon and rituals, in which nirvāṇa and individual liberation, while remaining, more or less theoretically, the ultimate goal, are pushed to a distant plane. At the same time, the idea of compassion and the ideal of bodhisattva who, having taken a vow to help all living beings to get rid of sufferings, continues to remain in saṃsāra, is put forward in the center. However, despite this major difference a Buddhist discipline known as Abhidharma which consists in analysis and classification of discrete states of consciousness (dharmas), identified in meditation, remains a reference point in both traditions. Three authors touch upon it (Helen Ostrovskaya, Pradeep Gokhale, and Vladimir Korobov). Two of them (Ostrovskaya and Gokhale) focus on the problems of murder and death, and the third one (Korobov) dwells on the methodology of Abhidharma. Vladimir Ivanov offers a new interpretation of the structure of Śāntarakṣita’s treatise “Tattva-saṃgraha” with Kamalaśīla’s “Pañjikā” commentary. Yangutov and Lepekhov explore the specificity of Buddhism reception in China, Tibet, Mongolia, and Russia. Nesterkin publishes for the first time B. Baradiin’s theses for Agvan Dordjiev’s lecture, which exemplifies the Buryat Buddhist Renovationists’ interpretation of Buddhism. Burmistrov analyzes the views of Indian historians of philosophy on the history of Buddhism, Volkova - the concepts of Buddhist ethics in contemporary analytical philosophy. (shrink)