This paper sketches a right-maker account of normative practical reasons along functionalist lines. The approach is contrasted with other similar accounts, in particular John Broome's analysis of reasons as explanations of oughts.

What is a normative reason for acting? In this paper, I introduce and defend a novel answer to this question. The starting-point is the view that reasons are right-makers. By exploring difficulties facing it, I arrive at an alternative, according to which reasons are evidence of respects in which it is right to perform an act, for example, that it keeps a promise. This is similar to the proposal that reasons for a person to (...) act are evidence that she ought to do so; however, as I explain, it differs from that proposal in two significant ways. As a result, I argue, the evidence-based account of reasons I advance shares the advantages of its predecessor while avoiding many of the difficulties facing it. (shrink)

The still dominant virtue-ethical account of right action claims that an action is right just in case a virtuous agent would perform it. Because this account arguably fails to capture what makes actions right, virtue ethicists are well-advised to consider alternatives. I argue that a target-centered account, if suitably developed, succeeds in capturing what makes actions right. First, I explain why a target-centered account shows initial promise in capturing what makes actions right and present an (...) interpretation of the account as developed by its creator, Christine Swanton. Second, I argue that Swanton's and other prominent virtue ethicists’ views of virtuous action are defective, partly in virtue of accepting reasons of the wrong kind for an action’s being virtuous or vicious in respect to a virtue. My arguments, if successful, motivate an alternative version of the target-centered account. Finally, I contribute to the development of such an alternative by sketching a view of virtuous action that avoids the aforementioned defects and thereby promises full success in capturing what makes actions right. (shrink)

It is commonly held that p is a reason for A to ϕ only if p explains why A ought to ϕ. I argue that this view must be rejected because there are reasons for A to ϕ that would be redundant in any ex...

Hobbes conception of reason as computation or reckoning is significantly different in Part I of De Corpore from what I take to be the later treatment in Leviathan. In the late actual computation with words starts with making an affirmation, framing a proposition. Reckoning then has to do with the consequences of propositions, or how they connect the facts, states of affairs or actions which they refer tor account. Starting from this it can be made clear how Hobbes understood the (...) crucial application of this conception to natural law, identified as 'right reason'. (shrink)

As opaque algorithmic systems take up a larger and larger role in shaping our lives, calls for explainability in various algorithmic systems have increased. Many moral and political philosophers have sought to vindicate these calls for explainability by developing theories on which decision-subjects—that is, individuals affected by decisions—have a moral right to the explanation of the systems that affect them. Existing theories tend to suggest that the right to explanation arises solely in virtue of facts about how decision-subjects (...) are affected by opaque systems. But this ignores an important part of the normative landscape: sometimes, facts about a decision-maker’s rights and freedoms can make a difference to whether she owes anyone explanations of her decisions. I illustrate the point by calling attention to examples of artistic, romantic, and supererogatory altruistic decisions; in at least some cases of this sort, even highly influential decisions can legitimately be kept entirely private and opaque. (shrink)

Reasons fundamentalists maintain that we can analyze all derivative normative properties in terms of normative reasons. These theorists famously encounter the Wrong Kind of Reasons problem, since not all reasons for reactions seem relevant for reasons-based analyses. Some have argued that this problem is a general one for many theorists, and claim that this lightens the burden for reasons fundamentalists. We argue in this paper that the reverse is true: the generality of the problem (...) makes life harder for reasons fundamentalists. We do this in two stages. First, we show that reflection on the generality of the distinction between wrong-kind reasons and right-kind reasons shows that not all right-kind reasons are normative reasons. So, not only do reasons-based analyses require a distinction between right-kind reasons and wrong-kind reasons, they also need a distinction between normative right-kind reasons from nonnormative right-kind reasons. We call this the Right Kind of Reasons Problem. In the second stage of the paper, we argue that reasons fundamentalism places tight constraints on its proper solution: in particular, it forbids one from appealing to anything normative to distinguish normative RKRs from nonnormative RKRs. It hence seems that reasons fundamentalists can only appeal to natural facts to solve the problem, but it is unclear which ones can do the job. So, reflection on the generality of the distinction only multiplies the fundamentalist’s problems. We end by exploring several solutions to these problems, and recommend a form of constitutivism as the best. (shrink)

In this paper I wish firstly to argue that moral or practical reasoning is of a different type from theoretical reasoning and not merely an application of it. Secondly I offer some considerations as to why it is nonetheless genuine reasoning which can be right or wrong in the sense of true or false. Thirdly I discuss how in that case we can justify the first principles of practical reason and of the moral systems in which it issues.

Ethics Done Right examines how practical reasoning can be put into the service of ethical and moral theory. Elijah Millgram shows that the key to thinking about ethics is to understand generally how to make decisions. The papers in this volume support a methodological approach and trace the connections between two kinds of theory in utilitarianism, in Kantian ethics, in virtue ethics, in Hume's moral philosophy, and in moral particularism. Unlike other studies of ethics, Ethics Done Right does (...) not advocate a particular moral theory. Rather, it offers a tool that enables one to decide for oneself. (shrink)

There is a tendency in decision‐making research to treat uncertainty only as a problem to be overcome. But it is also a feature that can be leveraged, particularly in social interaction. Comparing the behavior of profitable and unprofitable poker players, we reveal a strategic use of information processing that keeps decision makers unpredictable. To win at poker, a player must exploit public signals from others. But using public inputs makes it easier for an observer to reconstruct that player's strategy (...) and predict his or her behavior. How should players trade off between exploiting profitable opportunities and remaining unexploitable themselves? Using a recent multivariate approach to information theoretic data analysis and 1.75 million hands of online two‐player No‐Limit Texas Hold'em, we find that the important difference between winning and losing players is not in the amount of information they process, but how they process it. In particular, winning players are better at integrative information processing—creating new information from the interaction between their cards and their opponents’ signals. We argue that integrative information processing does not just produce better decisions, it makes decision‐making harder for others to reverse engineer, as an expert poker player's cards act like the private key in public‐key cryptography. Poker players encrypt their reasoning with the way they process information. The encryption function of integrative information processing makes it possible for players to exploit others while remaining unexploitable. By recognizing the act of information processing as a strategic behavior in its own right, we offer a detailed account of how experts use endemic uncertainty to conceal their intentions in high‐stakes competitive environments, and we highlight new opportunities between cognitive science, information theory, and game theory. (shrink)

This paper sets out a novel challenge to consequentialism as a theory in normative ethics. The challenge is rooted in the ontological claim that consequences of actions do not exist at the time required to be that in virtue of which actions are right or wrong, and so consequences cannot play the role attributed to them by consequentialists. The challenge takes the form of a dilemma. The consequentialist is confronted with a set of propositions she will find individually plausible (...) but incompossible if taken in conjunction with consequentialism. The task is to restore consistency. There are ways of maintaining the view that consequences are right-makers, but they come at the cost of endorsing highly implausible and unattractive theses. Versions of what might be called quasi-consequentialism can be rendered metaphysically coherent, but these are consequentialisms in name only, and they are best seen as components of an account of practical rationality that has strong echoes of traditional Natural Law theory. Since this is unlikely to appeal to contemporary consequentialists, their best bet is to reject consequentialism altogether. (shrink)

It is natural to think of causes as difference-makers. What exact difference causes make, however, is an open question. In this paper, I argue that the right way of understanding difference-making is in terms of causal processes: causes make a difference to a causal process that leads to the effect. I will show that this way of understanding difference-making nicely captures the distinction between causing an outcome and helping determine how the outcome happens and, thus, explains why causation (...) is not transitive. Moreover, the theory handles tricky cases that are problematic for competing accounts of difference-making. (shrink)

This work offers a general interpretation of Hegel's philosophy according to which it must be understood and judged as a failed attempt to satisfy a fundamental human need. Schulte contends that Hegel offers us a particular mode of philosophical thinking--the speculative-dialectical--as nothing less than an all-encompassing therapeutic way of life which we must embrace if the lack in human existence left by the Enlightenment's undermining of religion and art is to be met. By establishing reason as paramount in human affairs, (...) and thus by disparaging religion and art as modes of experience in and through which man realizes that he is at home in and at one with the cosmic whole, the Enlightenment introduced the modern problem of alienation. Schulte reads Hegel's philosophy both as symptomatic of this problem which modern rationality created and as an attempt to solve it by substituting a "life" of pure thought for those modes of life which reason had invalidated: Hegel's notion of Geist signifies the process of man's return out of otherness and alienation, a process whose goal is the reintegration of the individual in the universal and whose foundation and vehicle is self-reflective thought. (shrink)

I have recently argued that if the causal theory of reference is true, then, on pain of absurdity, no normative ethical theory is true. In this journal, Michael Byron has objected to my reductio by appealing to Frank Jackson’s moral reductionism. The present essay defends reductio while also casting doubt upon Jackson’s moral reductionism.

In the increasing body of metatheoretical literature on "causal mechanisms," definitions of "mechanism" proliferate, and these increasingly divergent definitions reproduce older theoretical and methodological oppositions. The reason for this proliferation is the incompatibility of the various metatheoretical expectations directed to them: (1) to serve as an alternative to the scientific theory of individual behavior (for some social theorists, most notably Jon Elster); (2) to provide solutions for causal inference problems in the quantitative social sciences, in social history, and in the (...) (3) qualitative research context; and (4) to serve as an alternative for narratives (Charles Tilly). Mechanisms can do (1) only as under-specified law-like regularities, deliver (2) as robust generative processes represented by models, and accomplish (3) as fragile generative processes (stories), but these are not all compatible. (edited). (shrink)

The aim of this article is to further our understanding of the “GM is unnatural” view, and of the critical response to it. While many people have been reported to hold the view that GM is unnatural, many policy-makers and their advisors have suggested that the view must be ignored or rejected, and that there are scientific reasons for doing so. Three “typical” examples of ways in which the “GM is unnatural” view has been treated by UK policy- (...) class='Hi'>makers and their advisors are explored. These are the Government’s position (DEFRA Report), the account of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, and the position of Nigel Halford, a scientist with an advisory role to the Government. I show that their accounts fail to mount a convincing critique. Then, I draw on an empirical research project held during 2003–2004 at the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne in the north east of England. Scientists met with non-scientists in a range of facilitated one-to-one conversations (“exchanges”) on various environmental issues, one of which was on GM. Our findings show that some scientists who rejected the “GM is unnatural” view struggled to do so consistently. Their struggle is interpreted in terms of a conflict between a so-called “scientific” worldview, and a different worldview that underlies the concerns of those who held the “GM is unnatural” view. This worldview is explored further by an examination of their concerns. What distinguishes this worldview from the “scientific” worldview is that the instrumentalization of the nonhuman world is questioned to a larger extent. I conclude that, because the underlying concerns of those who held the “GM is unnatural” view were not with GM as such, yet with a worldview that was considered to be problematic, and of which many GM applications were held to be expressions, policy-makers and their advisors should reflect on the critical worldview of those who claim that GM is unnatural if they want to engage seriously with their concerns. (shrink)

I argue that Davidson's conception of motivating reasons as belief-desire pairs suggests a model of normative reasons for action that is superior to the orthodox conception according to which normative reasons are propositions, facts, or the truth-makers of such facts.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 33.1 (2000) 74-93 [Access article in PDF] "Lord Over the Children of Pride": The Vaine-Glorious Rhetoric of Hobbes's Leviathan Haig Patapan Hobbes claimed in the Leviathan that he had, by "industrious meditation," discovered the Principles of Reason that would allow Commonwealths to be everlasting. He claimed, in other words, to have solved the political problem (1968, chap. 30, 378). All that was now required was to (...) have his work "fall in the hands of a Soveraign" who would, "in protecting the Publique teaching of it, convert this Truth of Speculation, into Utility of Practice" (chap. 31, 408). Accordingly, an important element of his political solution was the Leviathan itself, a work that would instruct the people in the Essential Rights of Sovereignty (chap. 30, 379). It would seem, then, that the Leviathan is an essential combination of these two aspects of Hobbes's endeavour; it is a work that is intended to reveal and persuade. Therefore, it is appropriate to evaluate his undertaking, not only in terms of its teaching, but also in the success of its rhetorical ambition. 1I argue in this paper that Hobbesian rhetoric is fundamentally determined by his political theory, in particular, by his discovery of the problem of vaine-glory, or pride. Pride poses a political problem because it is a passion that produces an unrealistic estimation of our abilities and therefore ultimately leads to deadly struggles and war. Hobbesian political science attempts to overcome the problem of pride by instituting a Leviathan, a lord over the children of pride. Once we see the nature of the political problem as Hobbes presents it and his proposed solution, the rhetorical character of Hobbes's writings becomes clearer.The extent to which Hobbes relies upon, and in crucial respects departs from, the traditional rhetoric that drew upon Artistotle's Rhetoric and subsequently Cicero's De Inventione and Quintilan's Institutio Oratoria is a complex question. 2 In this paper, I explore the rhetoric of the Leviathan, especially its first part, "On Man," to distinguish the Aristotelian and Ciceronian tradition from what I call Hobbes's Euclidean rhetoric. More [End Page 74] specifically, I argue that the structure and movement of part 1 of the Leviathan can be better understood when it is seen as a direct assault on human pride, a stripping away of all claims that may lead to vaine-glory. It is a step-by-step, Euclidean reductio that attempts to curb the readers' passion of glorying. This argument about the rhetorical character of the first part of the Leviathan has important theoretical consequences: it suggests that Hobbes's influential formulation of power, rights, and justice also had a profoundly rhetorical character.But how persuasive is Hobbes's rhetoric? For reasons noted above, this question goes to the heart of his political theory. The final part of this paper explores the efficacy of the Hobbesian rhetoric of pride and therefore of Hobbesian science. I argue that the rhetorical descent in the first part of the Leviathan, where the truth about human weakness is revealed to the proud, is simultaneously an ascent that acknowledges independence and self-sufficiency of human beings as "self-makers." Thus I argue that, rather than overcoming the problem of pride, Hobbesian political science re-founds it on the bases of rights and the promise of unlimited progress through science and commerce: Hobbes's rhetoric reformulated, but did not solve, the problem of pride. The problem of pride The importance of pride for Hobbes's psychology and political theory is evident from the title and frontispiece of the Leviathan. 3 The Leviathan, according to the Old Testament, is a creature of the Lord, set over the children of pride (Job 41:34). In Hobbes's reformulation, the Leviathan is an artificial body, made by the "Art of man," whose business is Salus Populi or the peoples' safety (1968, "Introduction," 81). Thus, from the beginning, the revolutionary flavour of Hobbes's enterprise is made evident: Man replaces God; pride is a problem of safety... (shrink)

One of the most important developments over the last twenty years both in logic and in Artificial Intelligence is the emergence of so-called non-monotonic logics. These logics were initially developed by McCarthy [10], McDermott & Doyle [13], and Reiter [17]. Part of the original motivation was to provide a formal framework within which to model cognitive phenomena such as defeasible inference and defeasible knowledge representation, i.e., to provide a formal account of the fact that reasoners can reach conclusions tentatively, reserving (...) the right to retract them in the light of further information. (shrink)

In 1807 Hegel published thePhenomenology of Spiritwhich calmly asserted that philosophy had, at long last, ceased to be merely the love of knowing and had finally consummated its lust for truth, giving birth to ‘strenge Wissenschaft’ in logic and the system (Hegel, 1807: 3). In 1944, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno circulated mimeographed copies ofDialectic of Enlightenment, ominously asserting that the same process of reason's self-clarification which Hegel described brings us, not, as he claimed, to truth and freedom, but to (...) barbarism. Somehow critical reflection's efforts to liberate humanity from superstition, darkness, and oppression has lead instead to Auschwitz.A crucial aspect of Horkheimer and Adorno's critique of enlightenment is the notion that enlightenment and its seeming antithesis, myth, are inextricably linked. In thePhenomenologyHegel had already investigated the underlying link between the rationality of the Enlightenment period and faith, its ostensible arational other, in Chapter VI. In various places Horkheimer and Adorno acknowledge the influence of Hegel, and they make suggestive passing references to thePhenomenology. Obviously, their connecting of enlightenment and myth bears more than a family resemblance to Hegel's pairing of enlightenment and faith. Just as Hegel disclosed that enlightenment and faith have more in common than usually thought, Horkheimer and Adorno aim to show that there is an important aspect of enlightenment already in myth and further, that enlightenment has itself fallen back into the essential features of myth it purports to be have overcome. (shrink)

Farming of fish and other aquatic species has increased in recent decades and never before have there been more controversial debates on animal welfare in fish husbandry. The practices used and associated welfare issues are becoming increasingly focused on by scientists, consumers and policy makers. International and national organisations have issued recommendations and guidelines concerning fish welfare but there is still a lot of information lacking. Due to § 2 of the German animal protection law, animals must be adequately (...) nourished, cared for and behaved in a proper manner, and pain or avoidable suffering or damage must be avoided. Keeping fish in accordance with the animal protection laws should be part of a good professional aquaculture practice and is indispensable for ethical, legal and economic reasons. As other vertebrates fish have the right of a healthy life with physical and mental integrity, under which they can perform adequately.The paper provides and discusses legal aspects of animal protection applied to fish taking the German welfare act and EU regulations as example. First possible indicators for the assessment of well-being will be mentioned. The assessment of fish welfare indicators should be carried out within the frame of daily and regular working routines, e. g. feeding, harvesting, grading or slaughtering. Further customer’s perception and human interpretation of welfare in fish are discussed and set into the context of human sentiments, projected on fish and the debate on consciousness in fish. (shrink)

That a constitution should express the will of 'the people' is a long-standing principle, but the identity of 'the people' has historically been narrow. Women, in particular, were not included. A shift, however, has recently occurred. Women's participation in constitution-making is now recognised as a democratic right. Women's demands to have their voices heard in both the processes of constitution-making and the text of their country's constitution, are gaining recognition. Campaigning for inclusion in their country's constitution-making, women have adopted (...) innovative strategies to express their constitutional aspirations. This collection offers, for the first time, comprehensive case studies of women's campaigns for constitutional equality in nine different countries that have undergone constitutional transformations in the 'participatory era'. Against a richly-contextualised historical and political background, each charts the actions and strategies of women participants, both formal and informal, and records their successes, failures and continuing hopes for constitutional equality. (shrink)

This article offers a theoretical and doctrinal solution to a vexing question in public law: how to determine the justifiability of Charter rights-limiting administrative decisions. The jurisprudence suggests three approaches, or modes of reasoning: minimal impairment analysis, ‘interest balancing’, and ‘values-advancing reasoning’. Like Cerberus, the guard dog of Hades, Canadian public law has become three-headed. While scholars and courts argue about which mode of reasoning is categorically best, the culture of justification compels us to ask instead which provides the most (...) compelling explanation for each rights-limiting decision. Just as cutting off one of Cerberus’s heads would diminish his effectiveness as a guard dog, rejecting either of the modes of reasoning would limit decision makers’ capacity to explain their decisions and undermine a culture of justification. The article makes a theoretical case for retaining all three modes of reasoning and sets out a doctrinal approach to determining when each is applicable. (shrink)

We address the way verb-based and rule-content knowledge are combined in understanding institutional deontics. Study 1 showed that the institutional regulations used in our studies were readily categorised into one of two content groups: rights or duties. Participants perceived rights as benefiting the addressees identified by the rule, whereas they perceived duties as benefiting the collective that imposed the rule. Studies 2, 3, and 4 showed that rule content had clear effects on perceptions of violations and relevance of cases for (...) explaining the rule, even when controlling for deontic verb, phrasing of the action permitted by a right, or the formality of the deontic verb. These effects are incompatible with a simple pragmatic disambiguation approach to pragmatic modulation, as they often induce permissibility judgments that contradict the core semantic meanings of the deontic verbs. Other ways of reconciling verb meaning with rule content should be considered in a fuller the.. (shrink)

Widely recognized as a crucial text in his corpus, and a popular object of scholarly attention, Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit remains controversial, generating almost as many vexing questions about its meaning and significance as it has inspired divergent interpretive approaches. With Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit, Michael N. Forster has made a significant contribution to the literature, one certain to stimulate much discussion and likely to spark many responses. His study is a work of first-rate scholarship in a (...) philosophical area where, sadly, this is more often the exception rather than the rule. This is a valuable and important book indeed, for a number of reasons. (shrink)

The author deals with the operational core oflogic, i.e. its diverse procedures ofinference, in order to show that logicallyfalse inferences may in fact be right because –in contrast to logical rationality – theyactually enlarge our knowledge of the world.This does not only mean that logically trueinferences say nothing about the world, butalso that all our inferences are inventedhypotheses the adequacy of which cannot beproved within logic but only pragmatically. Inconclusion the author demonstrates, through therelationship between rule-following andrationality, that it (...) is most irrational to wantto exclude the irrational: it may, at times, bemost rational to think and infer irrationally.Focussing on the operational aspects of knowingas inferring does away with the hiatus betweenlogic and life, cognition and the world(reality) – or whatever other dualism one wantsto invoke –: knowing means inferring, inferringmeans rule-governed interpreting, interpretingis a constructive, synthetic act, and aconstruction that proves adequate (viable) inthe ``world of experience'', in life, in thepraxis of living, is, to the constructivistmind, knowledge. It is the practice of livingwhich provides the orienting standards forconstructivist thinking and its judgments ofviability. The question of truth is replaced bythe question of viability, and viabilitydepends on the (right) kind of experiential fit. (shrink)

My concern in this essay is a family of liberal theories that I shall call “public reason liberalism,” which arose out of the social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. These social contract accounts stressed that the justification of the state depended on showing that everyone would, in some way, consent to it. However, by relying on consent, social contract theory seemed to suppose a voluntarist conception of political obligation and authority: I am only bound by political authority if (...) I choose to be bound.1 Only in Kant, I think, does it become clear that consent is not fundamental to a social contract view: Kant insists that we have a duty to agree to act according to the idea of the “original contract.”2 Rawls’s revival of the social contract tradition in A Theory of Justice also made no important appeal to consent, though the apparatus of an “original agreement” of sorts persisted. The aim of the original position, Rawls announced, is to settle “the question of justification…by working out a problem of deliberation.”3 As the question of public justification takes center stage (we might say as contractualist liberalism becomes justificatory liberalism), it becomes clear that posing the problem of justification in terms of a deliberative or a bargaining problem is simply a heuristic: the real issue is “the problem of justification”4 — what principles can be justified to all reasonable persons. (shrink)

The notion of a non-sensory mental state or event that plays a prominent role in coming to understand, an epistemic achievement distinct from mere knowledge, featured prominently in historical writings on philosophy, and philosophical methodology. It is, however, completely absent from contemporary discussions of the subject. This paper argues that intuition plays an epistemic role in understanding, including philosophical understanding, and offers an explanation of how intuition manages to play this role, if and when it does. It is argued, subsequently, (...) that this role is autonomous, in the sense that a source of understanding cannot be reduced to a source of justification, evidence, or reason. Finally, it is noted that such autonomy implies that popular forms of skepticism about intuition do not impugn intuition’s epistemic significance with respect to its status as a source of understanding. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:DISTINGUISHING CHARITY AS GOODNESS AND PRUDENCE AS RIGHTNESS: A KEY TO THOMAS'S SECUNDA PARS JAMES F. KEENAN, S.J. Weston School of Theology Cambridge, Massachusetts HE RESPECTIVE functions of charity and prudence Thomas Aquinas's moral theology provide a key to his nderstanding of the virtues. Charity and prudence serve distinct functions. In Thomas's position, a person can have the acquired virtues without having charity; such a person has a virtuous (...) life, but it is unified by prudence, not by charity. But why is such a person without charity? Is this absence of charity due simply to the absence of faith? Is this person with the four acquired virtues but without charity simply an unbeliever? Or is this person simply a rightly-ordered person whose lack of charity is due to the absence of personal moral goodness? Is such a person simply one who, in common parlance, is a well-integrated person but not necessarily a morally good one? In a word, is moral goodness a necessary condition for the acquired moral virtues? To answer this question we will begin with the contemporary distinction between goodness and rightness and then discuss the two virtues and their functions. In the final section we will relate our findings to present-day problems in the ethics of virtue. I. Goodness an_d Rightness Since Democritus we have realized that living rightly is not necessarily an indication of being good. Democritus noted that being good required not only that we act rightly but that we want 407 408 JAMES F. KEENAN, S.J. to act rightly.1 Over the centuries philosophers and theologians have consistently made reference to the fact that living rightly, or as they called it " doing the good," was not a sufficient condition for describing a person as good. From Ambrose and Augustine to the present, authors have insisted that a moral description of persons is more than a mere deduction from external activity.2 Some writers, however, did not simply make reference to this distinction, but rather spent considerable time in commenting on the insight involved. Kant, for instance, in his Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals distinguished from the beginning between action!> done out of duty (Handeln aus Pfiicht) and dutiful actions (pfiichtmiissiges H andeln). In attempting to describe the only thing which we can call " good," that is, the will, Kant argued that a dutiful act was only good if the act was done out of duty. For example, a state executioner who executes on account of his duty to execute is good and the action is good. But if the executioner performs the dutiful act on some other account, then the action is not good, though it is dutiful. Interestingly Kant did not consider whether an act not dutiful could be called good: Is an executioner who acts out of duty but botches the job still to be called good? George Moore in his Ethics made a similar point but for different reasons. Unlike Kant's interest in goodness, Moore wanted to describe a right action free of any consideration of an agent's motives and his solution was utilitarianism. In the process of separating the agent's action, Moore realized that the right act of a person with bad motivations involves a paradox: " A man may actually deserve the strongest moral condemnation for choosing an action which is morally right." 3 However, like 1 See his Fragmenta M oralia, no. 109, as cited in Stephen Toulmin, An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), 170. 2 Bruno Schuller of Miinster provides ample historical evidence in his Die Begrundung sittlicher Urteile (Diisseldorf: Patmos, 1980), 140. 3 George Moore, Ethics (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1912), 193-5. Cf. H. J. Paton, "The Alleged Independence of Goodness," in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, ed. P. Schilpp (New York: Tudor, 1952), 113-134; Richard Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964). GOODNESS AND PRUDENCE AS RIGHTNESS 409 Kant, Moore did not discuss a person who sought to act rightly but who failed actually to perform a right action. Contemporary moral theology has carried the distinction further. Moral theologians like Bruno... (shrink)

Historically, culture has been treated as an object in international documents. One consequence of this is that cultural rights in international law have been understood as rights of access and consumption. Recently, an alternative conception of culture, and of what cultural rights protect, has emerged from international documents treating indigenous peoples. Within these documents culture is treated as an activity rather than a good. This activity is ascribed to peoples as well as persons, and protecting the capacity of both peoples (...) and persons to engage in culture is taken to be as basic a component of human dignity as are freedom of movement, freedom of speech, and freedom from torture. It is not an accident that this treatment of culture has emerged from international documents treating indigenous peoples. However, the value of this treatment of culture extends beyond the human rights of indigenous peoples. Treating culture as an activity establishes an understanding of what cultural rights protect that clarifies the relationship between cultural rights and other mechanisms for protecting minorities and frames the role of cultural communities in the realization of human dignity as an important physical and political issue, not just a psychological one. For these reasons, the norms regarding cultural rights that are emerging from international documents treating indigenous peoples are a much-needed step forward for peoples' rights more generally. (shrink)

The case of Terri Schiavo, a young woman who spent 15 years in a persistent vegetative state, has emerged as a watershed in debates over end-of-life care. While many observers had thought the right to refuse medical treatment was well established, this case split a family, divided a nation, and counfounded physicians, legislators, and many of the people they treated or represented. In renewing debates over the importance of advance directives, the appropriate role of artificial hydration and nutrition, and (...) the responsibilities of family members, the case also became one of history's most extensively litigated health care disputes. The Case of Terri Schiavo assembles a team of first-hand participants and content experts to provide thoughtful and nuanced analyses. In addition to a comprehensive overview, the book includes contributions by Ms. Schiavo's guardian ad litem, a neurologist and lawyer who participated in the case, and scholars who examine issues related to litigation, faith, gender, and disability. The volume also includes a powerful dissent from the views of many scholars in the bioethics community. The book is intended for students, health care professionals, policy makers, and other in search of carefully reasoned analyses of the case that will shape our view of death and end-of-life medical care for decades. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:530 BOOK REVIEWS Reason and Right. By GARTH HALLETT. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984. Pp. x + 189. $16.95 cloth; $8.95 paperback. Teacher's Guide $5.00. This book is clearly intended to be used as a textbook in introductory ethics courses. This fact almost certainly accounts for four of its most attractive features: its area of focus, its lucid structure and exposition, its relative brevity, (...) and its large number of discussions of current moral issues. Professor Hallett contends that an introductory course in moral philosophy should do three main things: discuss specific moral problems, arquaint with background theory, and train in moral reasoning. The last equips students to deal maturely with problems they will encounter throughout life. Yet this area is neglected, if not omitted, in most ethics text books. Hence the focus of Reason ancl Right. Other topics are approached through their relation to such reasoning. For example, Professor Hallett uses the case of Kitty Genovese (who was murdered while thirtyeight witnesses remained passive) to arrive at a discussion of the nature of moral reasoning, as distinguished from "thoughts" and reasoning in general. In this context he injects a treatment of areas that might be thought to belong to background theory: psychological egoism, ethical egoism, psychological altruism, ethical altruism. Before commenting further on the book's method of exposition, I should like to mention another consideration which, although not examined at length by the author, brackets his entire discussion and is not without implications for ethical questions passed over in this work. Early on, Professor Hallett suggests that one reason for teaching moral philosophy is to encourage in students a concern for moral issues. Using the Genovese case, he says: Doubtless we too might be more open than we are, more perceptive of others and their needs, more alive to the appeals, muted or screamed, that reach us, more or less frequently, more or less clearly, according as we are tuned to receive them. That is one function of an ethics course. Through examples and discussion it jogs the moral imagination (p. 7). The author ties the desire to aet ethically with his discussion of moral reasoning by noting that rationalization is often inferior reasoning insofar as the merely self-coneerned agent may deliberately ignore pertinent facts. On the other hand, one who genuinely wants solutions to ethical problems will seek to reason well, which requires practice in identifying effective reasoning. In a " Retrospect " redolent of these points, Professor Hallett explicitly raises the Socratic question of the relation between knowledge BOOK REVIEWS 531 and living well. He ends with an invitation to examine this issue, suggesting its importance for the course as a whole. Indeed, without demeaning the motives of students, the ethics professor who concurs with the classical attitude toward the goal of the study of moral philosophy must take seriously this role of jogging the moral impulse. As St. Aquinas (who held that despite original sin the human orientation toward acting morally well remains intact) recognized, genuinely moral action requires free choice, and systematically morally good behavior must be preceded by commitment. Clever is Professor Hallett's approach to exposing logical shortcoming (in arguments proffered for a variety of reasons) that may result from the lack of such commitment. Who wants to admit being deliberately defective in logic? At least such a consideration may jog one to reflect upon the humanly deficient state of one generally unconcerned about ethics. The subject of moral motivation provides a bridge to the more theoretical debate, not taken up in this book, about the nature of value-judgments. If descriptive, they can be true or false. If prescriptive, they are inherently action-guiding but are not statements of fact, and hence not true or false. Prescriptivists emphasize the logical impossibility of one's adhering to a value-judgment while not acting according to it in the relevant circumstances. For all value-judgments are said to be both prescriptive and universalizable; an attempt to exclude oneself from an apparently embraced universal directive, provided one is physically and psychologically capable of acting according to it, reveals insincerity. Sin, then, becomes impossible. Much has been said about this... (shrink)

This essay makes three suggestions: first, that it is attractive to conceive individualistic justification as one of the hallmarks - maybe even the one hallmark - of human rights; secondly, that combining this conception of human rights with standard worries about socioeconomic rights can tempt one to take the phrase "human rights" to refer to any individualistically justified weighty normative consideration (including considerations that are not rights); and thirdly, that reflections on the individuation of rights and rights' dynamic quality give (...) us some reason to resist this temptation - though this reason is interestingly inconclusive. (shrink)

The questions raised by Māori identity are not static, but complex and changing over time. The ethnicity known as “Māori” came into existence in colonial New Zealand as a new, pan-tribal identity concept, in response to the trauma of invasion and dispossession by large numbers of mainly British settlers. Ideas of Māori identity have changed over the course of succeeding generations in response to wider social and economic changes. While inter-ethnic marriages and other sexual liaisons have been common throughout the (...) Māori-Pākehā relationship, the nature of such unions, and the identity choices available to their descendants, have varied according to era and social locus. In colonial families, the memory of a Māori ancestor was often deliberately suppressed, and children were encouraged to deny that part of their history and “become” European New Zealanders: a classic form of what we call “trans-ethnicity.” From a Māori perspective, the relationship with Pākehā has been marked by a series of losses: loss of land, language, social cohesion, even loss of knowledge of whakapapa. This article explores this last form of loss, which leads to “suppressed” Māori identities, and possible effects of attempting to recover such lost Māori identity rights. (shrink)

Anna Stilz’s Territorial Sovereignty (2019) aims to be a revisionist account of territorial rights that puts the value of individual autonomy first, without giving up the value of collective self-determination. In what follows I examine Stilz’s definition of occupancy rights and her emphasis on the moral relevance of what she calls ‘located’ life plans. I suggest that, if it aims at being truly revisionist, her theory should work with a broader definition of occupancy. So long as it doesn’t, these rights (...) will be mainly the preserve of groups of settlers and peoples with predictable patterns of movement. Moreover, insofar as occupancy rights ground collective rights to self-determination, they actually have the potential to trump individual rights to what I call ‘dynamic’ or non-located occupancy. This is worrying, I claim, for at least two reasons. First, rights to dynamic occupancy are arguably as central for respecting individual autonomy as rights to located occupancy. And second, rights to dynamic ocupancy should be seen as key in helping to form the kind of political allegiances required to overcome the most pressing collective action problems that humanity faces. (shrink)

My aim is to explain the relation of ‘right reason’ to Ockham's voluntarism by analysing what Ockham takes individual liberty to mean and how men come to know of it. The Christian law of liberty reveals what individuals come to know by other means — from their own experiences and reason, about certain rights which can never be alienated either to Church or ‘state’. It is argued that his distinctive and later political positions can be supported by positions maintained (...) in his earlier logical, psychological and philosophical writings from his Oxford period. He explains the three sources of our knowledge as experience, natural reason and infallible scriptural authority. Based on his explanation of how Scripture is to be interpreted and linking this to his epistemology which starts with intuitive cognition, it is argued that Ockham's understanding of the separate roles of ‘state’ and Church can be defended. From his earlier positions can also be derived his understanding of corporation theory, his defence of individual members of the community's consent to the constitution of government and the limits on absolute government, no matter what its constitutional form. Because right reason always operates in social contexts with their respective, prevalent knowledge, Ockham has some startling things to say about men's access to the truth. (shrink)

Ethicists, policy-makers, and the general public have questioned whether artificial entities such as robots warrant rights or other forms of moral consideration. There is little synthesis of the research on this topic so far. We identify 294 relevant research or discussion items in our literature review of this topic. There is widespread agreement among scholars that some artificial entities could warrant moral consideration in the future, if not also the present. The reasoning varies, such as concern for the effects (...) on artificial entities and concern for the effects on human society. Beyond the conventional consequentialist, deontological, and virtue ethicist ethical frameworks, some scholars encourage “information ethics” and “social-relational” approaches, though there are opportunities for more in-depth ethical research on the nuances of moral consideration of artificial entities. There is limited relevant empirical data collection, primarily in a few psychological studies on current moral and social attitudes of humans towards robots and other artificial entities. This suggests an important gap for psychological, sociological, economic, and organizational research on how artificial entities will be integrated into society and the factors that will determine how the interests of artificial entities are considered. (shrink)

The present paper aims at addressing a crucial legal conflict in the information society: i.e., the conflict between security and civil rights, which calls for a “fine and ethical balance”. Our purpose is to understand, from the legal theory viewpoint, how a fine ethical balance can be conceived and what the conditions for this balance to be possible are. This requires us to enter in a four-stage examination, by asking: (1) What types of conflict may be dealt with by means (...) of balancing? (2) What is meant by balancing? Is it a metaphor that hides and dissimulates discretionary powers and subjective decisions or a rational instrument that helps us cope with conflicts between fundamental values and interests? (3) What models of balancing are available to us? Are these models irreducible to each other? What can provide us with a common understanding of different models of balancing? (4) How can the crucial issues of rational controllability, predictability, and homogeneity of legal decisions be dealt with? Our paper will try to answer those questions by trying to reconstruct the act of balancing in terms of a rational legal reasoning, which relies upon information. In fact, every judicial decision contains some information that is delivered to the legal system: that information may serve as the basis for future evaluations, decisions, and actions, and thus influence the way we recognize and hence we protect our values, interests, and rights. In this perspective, our examination will attempt to understand those questions in informational terms. This informational treatment can provide us with a more universalistic understanding of those issues and offer us a novel way to conceptually deal with them. To this aim, we will avail yourself of Luciano Floridi’s philosophy of information: notably, we believe his constructionist conception of epistemology is crucial, based on the Maker’s Knowledge approach and his solution of the upgrading problem (i.e., from information to knowledge) in terms of a network theory of account. The informational approach will help us having a better understanding of the balance between competing interests. (shrink)

This article considers a recent attempt by Alon Harel ((1997) 17 OJLS 101) to shed light on the nature of rights by examining the way derivative rights are recognized as instances of more fundamental rights. It criticizes the way Harel seeks to make a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic reasons for rights, and so to establish a distinctive operation of practical reasoning for rights. The rationales linked to particular rights, and stated more generally within competing rights theories, are considered; (...) as well as the significance of finding rights expressed in a generalized form, and the link between moral and legal rights.Whilst endorsing Harel's observation that an investigation of the basis for derivative rights will illuminate our understanding of rights, the conclusion is reached that the justification for rights has to be found in wider factors than found in their rationale, which of itself is incapable of providing a distinctive operation of practical reasoning. (shrink)

In this paper, in line with the general framework of value-sensitive design, we aim to operationalize the general concept of “Meaningful Human Control” in order to pave the way for its translation into more specific design requirements. In particular, we focus on the operationalization of the first of the two conditions investigated: the so-called ‘tracking’ condition. Our investigation is led in relation to one specific subcase of automated system: dual-mode driving systems. First, we connect and compare meaningful human control with (...) a concept of control very popular in engineering and traffic psychology, and we explain to what extent tracking resembles and differs from it. This will help clarifying the extent to which the idea of meaningful human control is connected to, but also goes beyond, current notions of control in engineering and psychology. Second, we take the systematic analysis of practical reasoning as traditionally presented in the philosophy of human action and we adapt it to offer a general framework where different types of reasons and agents are identified according to their relation to an automated system’s behaviour. This framework is meant to help explaining what reasons and what agents play a role in controlling a given system, thereby enabling policy makers to produce usable guidelines and engineers to design systems that properly respond to selected human reasons. In the final part, we discuss a practical example of how our framework could be employed in designing automated driving systems. (shrink)

A central concern in recent ethical thinking is reasons for action and their relation to obligations, rights, and values. This collection of recent essays by Robert Audi presents an account of what reasons for action are, how they are related to obligation and rights, and how they figure in virtuous conduct. In addition, Audi reflects in his opening essay on his theory of reasons for action, his common-sense intuitionism, and his widely debated principles for balancing religion and (...) politics. Reasons are shown to be basic elements in motivation, grounded in experience, and crucial for justifying actions and for understanding rights. Audi's clear and engaging essays make these advanced debates accessible to students as well as scholars, and this volume will be a valuable resource for readers interested in ethical theory, political theory, applied ethics, or philosophy of action. (shrink)

Right- and wrong-making features ("moral grounds") are widely believed to play important normative roles, e.g. in morally apt or virtuous motivation. This paper argues that moral grounds have been systematically misidentified. Canonical statements of our moral theories tend to summarize, rather than directly state, the full range of moral grounds posited by the theory. Further work is required to "unpack" a theory's criterion of rightness and identify the features that are of ground-level moral significance. As a result, it is (...) not actually true that maximizing value is the relevant right-making feature even for maximizing consequentialists. Focusing on the simple example of utilitarianism, I show how careful attention to the ground level can drastically influence how we think about our moral theories. (shrink)

I first began working on emotions as a project in philosophy of action, without particular reference to moral philosophy. My thought was that emotions have a distinctive role to play in rationality that tends to be underappreciated by philosophers. Bringing this out was meant to counter a widespread tendency to treat emotions as “blind” causes of action (for the general picture, see Greenspan 2009.) Instead, I thought that emotions could be seen as providing reasons. I took their significance as (...) moral motivators to be hard to miss. Of course, philosophers and others sometimes rightly insist that we need to put emotions aside in order to formulate satisfying moral principles, but I would have been surprised to hear anyone deny that moral motivation typically rests on emotion and that we need that basis in early life in order to get to the stage of acting on moral principles. However, I have since come to think that none of the main philosophical approaches to ethics fully appreciates the significance of emotion, in part because of a misconception of practical reasons. Reasons for action are commonly taken as prima facie requirements, so that moral reasons would yield requirements just insofar as they outweigh competing reasons such as reasons of simple self-interest. Someone who recognizes a moral reason as holding “all things considered” would be irrational not to act on it. But I argue in recent work (starting with Greenspan 2005) that even all-things-considered reasons may in one sense be optional: a rational agent can legitimately “discount” them, cancelling their deliberative weight and their force for motivation. What keeps us from setting aside reasons of the sort that underlie moral.. (shrink)