Dans cette conférence faite à l’Association munichoise des libres-penseurs, en 1903, Raoul Francé s’emploie à démystifier le modèle des premières communautés chrétiennes. L’auteur dénonce des comportements provocants peu conformes à leur réputation de douceur et de pacifisme. Il évoque les divisions internes de ces communautés et la filiation probable entre les Esséniens et les premiers chrétiens. En s’appuyant sur des historiens, il cherche à prouver qu’on a exagéré l’importance de la persécution dont les chrétiens furent victimes sous l’empire romain. (...) La conclusion de cette conférence documentée mais polémique, est que l’histoire du christianisme est celle d’une secte ambitieuse qui a usé de stratégie non seulement pour se répandre mais aussi pour écrire sa propre légende. (shrink)

1. The rise and fall of logos -- 2. The way of negation, Christian and Greek.

Raoul Moati intervenes in the critical debate that divided two prominent philosophers in the mid-twentieth century. In the 1950s, the British philosopher J. L. Austin advanced a theory of speech acts, or the "performative," that Jacques Derrida and John R. Searle interpreted in fundamentally different ways. Their disagreement centered on the issue of intentionality, which Derrida understood phenomenologically and Searle read pragmatically. The controversy had profound implications for the development of contemporary philosophy, which, Moati argues, can profit greatly by (...) returning to this classic debate. In this book, Moati systematically replays the historical encounter between Austin, Derrida, and Searle and the disruption that caused the lasting break between Anglo-American language philosophy and continental traditions of phenomenology and its deconstruction. The key issue, Moati argues, is not whether "intentionality," a concept derived from Husserl's phenomenology, can or cannot be linked to Austin's speech-acts as defined in his groundbreaking _How to Do Things with Words_, but rather the emphasis Searle placed on the performativity and determined pragmatic values of Austin's speech-acts, whereas Derrida insisted on the trace of writing behind every act of speech and the iterability of signs in different contexts. (shrink)

According to many in the West, the liberalizing effects of North America’s free market ideals will generate equality and justice worldwide. I hold that we should be critical of those who justify imposing liberal democratic ideals on underdeveloped nations by simply suggesting that they promote equality and justice. In the West, entrenched disparities have shaped liberal ideals in ways that make inequality and injustice look natural and normal. Indeed, gender, class, and racial oppression have existed right alongside liberal democratic ideals. (...) If liberal ideals can be molded to make inequality and injustice look natural and normal in the West, then these same ideals can justify economic interactions, technology transfers, military cooperation, and mutual benefit agreements that sustain global inequality and injustice. (shrink)

I argue that we do not get an adequate picture of society from liberal conceptions of race and racism. What this analysis does, then, is call for a synthesis of historical, social, and cultural insights to inform and enrich the philosophical conception of race and racism.

In a 2008 paper, Walmsley argued that the explanations employed in the dynamical approach to cognitive science, as exemplified by the Haken, Kelso and Bunz model of rhythmic finger movement, and the model of infant preservative reaching developed by Esther Thelen and her colleagues, conform to Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim’s deductive-nomological model of explanation (also known as the covering law model). Although we think Walmsley’s approach is methodologically sound in that it starts with an analysis of scientific practice rather (...) than a general philosophical framework, we nevertheless feel that there are two problems with his paper. First, he focuses only on the deductivenomological model and so neglects the important fact that explanations are causal. Second, the explanations offered by the dynamical approach do not take the deductive-nomological format, because they do not deduce the explananda from exceptionless laws. Because of these two points, Walmsley makes the dynamical explanations in cognitive science appear problematic, while in fact they are not. (shrink)

Nous avons tous retenu la leçon de la phénoménologie l'homme n'est pas le prisonnier de ses représentations subjectives, il est directement un "être-dans-le-monde". Toutefois, tout un chacun a, à chaque instant, à choisir le mende, c'est-à-dire à se choisir et à se fonder dans le monde comme une personne unique et singulière au sein de celui-ci. Cette idée implique l'élaboration d'une discipline complémentaire à la phénoménologie, capable de cerner l'homme dans la réalité et la singularité absolues de son projet dans (...) le monde. Méthode que Sartre nomme, en modifiant la pensée de Freud, psychanalyse existentielle. Que la singularité de notre épreuve personnelle du monde soit tout à la fois ce qui nous est le plus accessible, et ce qui, pourtant, échappe constamment à notre connaissance, constitue un paradoxe, un "mystère en pleine lumière", légitimant la formation d'une psychanalyse, non moins paradoxale, de la conscience. Psychanalyse d'un genre nouveau dont Sartre esquisse dans de nombreux textes théoriques la méthode, qu'il mettra lui-même en application dans ses essais biographiques sur Baudelaire, Mallarmé, Genet et Flaubert. Percer l'identité du monde singulier d'un écrivain afin d'enrichir la compréhension de son oeuvre par celle de son élan unique dans le monde, tels sont les résultats auxquels la méthode psychanalytique sartrienne, permet d'aboutir, par-delà la seule méthode héritée de la phénoménologie. C'est à en dégager le sens et à en comprendre la fécondité aussi bien philosophique que clinique et littéraire que se consacre le présent essai. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that in recent literature on mechanistic explanations, authors tend to conflate two distinct features that mechanistic models can have or fail to have: plausibility and richness. By plausibility, we mean the probability that a model is correct in the assertions it makes regarding the parts and operations of the mechanism, i.e., that the model is correct as a description of the actual mechanism. By richness, we mean the amount of detail the model gives about the (...) actual mechanism. First, we argue that there is at least a conceptual reason to keep these two features distinct, since they can vary independently from each other: models can be highly plausible while providing almost no details, while they can also be highly detailed but plainly wrong. Next, focusing on Craver's continuum of ?how-possibly,? to ?how-plausibly,? to ?how-actually? models, we argue that the conflation of plausibility and richness is harmful to the discussion because it leads to the view that both are necessary for a model to have explanatory power, while in fact, richness is only so with respect to a mechanism's activities, not its entities. This point is illustrated with two examples of functional models. (shrink)

This dissertation focuses on the contemporary debate over moving from an individualist form of liberalism to one that seeks to accommodate the special claims of various groups in modern society. I deal with authors who examine ways that group dynamics affect the individual. They are worried about whether it is possible or wise to extend individualist liberalism into a group-accommodating liberalism. Presently, it is a matter of deep controversy how liberal democracies ought to interpret and accommodate the social reality and (...) normative claims of racial minorities. ;Race denotes privilege, it precipitates class antagonisms, hostility, and anger between various groups, it motivates misconceptions and misunderstandings. Racism is responsible for both immediate and intergenerational harm. And yet, the members of disadvantaged racial groups see their racial identity as something precious that should be preserved. For many the opportunity to identify with others in terms of a common racial heritage is an important source of pride. This disparity poses special problems for philosophical liberalism. What is the philosophical import of race and racism for various political theories within the contemporary Anglo American tradition of individualist liberalism? How ought the liberal tradition, an individualist thesis, to interpret and accommodate racial identity? ;This dissertation casts the philosophical debate concerning race in a new light. I argue that whether racial identities are compatible with liberal democratic ideals depends on how one defines race and the liberal ideals involved. Hence, I urge a critical stance on the issue of race. I am critical of both classical individualist liberalism, and the stand that groups do not pose any problems in a modern liberal democracy. (shrink)

This article provides a critical survey of the debate on intertheoretic relations, with particular emphasis on the cognitive sciences. I begin by distinguishing two opposing sides, reductionism and antireductionism, and proceed by tracking the changes these positions underwent in the twentieth century. It appears that these changes consist to a significant degree in smoothing out the rough edges of both, so that the original positions can be understood as crude extremes. The monistic accounts of intertheoretic relations were traded in for (...) more tolerant and nuanced approaches, a tendency that is chiefly inspired by an increasing focus on actual scientific practice. (shrink)

Analyse les conditions de la déconstruction complète de la métaphysique à partir de la philosophie du langage ordinaire développée par Jacques Derrida.

Versions of the “Idealist” position dominated twentieth century Continental Philosophy, although this position has recently come in for influential criticism from contemporary “Speculative Realists”. My paper shows, however, that the basis for a forceful critique of the Idealist position was already laid by two crucial but poorly understood figures in the twentieth century continental tradition: Levinas and Sartre. I propose to defend herea Neo-Realist view together with Levinas and Sartre based on a demonstration of a “transphenomenality of being” against the (...) Idealist option taken by the first phenomenologists. The goal of this work is to build arguments in favor of the Realist position against Husserl’s Idealism through a close reading of Levinas’ and Sartre’s ontological phenomenologies. (shrink)

Dans cet article de 1903 paru dans une revue positiviste, le naturaliste Raoul Francé (1874-1943) se réfère l’école critique d’exégèse biblique (de Strauss à Wrede) pour faire entendre la voix des libres penseurs qui remettent en question l’existence historique de Jésus. Francé considère le texte des Evangiles comme une des expressions du mouvement messianique juif, qu’il faut comprendre symboliquement et non comme un récit historique. La postface de l’éditeur de la revue, le positiviste Heinrich Molenaar, rappelle que Comte interprétait (...) déjà la figure de Jésus comme une extrapolation. (shrink)

In this paper, I explicate and discuss performance-similarity reasoning as a strategy for mechanism schema evaluation, understood in Lindley Darden’s sense. This strategy involves inferring hypotheses about the mechanism responsible for cognitive capacities from premises describing the performance of those capacities; performance-similarity reasoning is a type of Inference to the Best Explanation, or IBE. Two types of such inferences are distinguished: one in which the performance of two systems is compared, and another when the performance of two systems under intervention (...) is compared. Both types of inferences are illustrated with examples taken from cognitive science. I conclude that performance-similarity reasoning is an important strategy for evaluating mechanistic hypotheses. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to examine the scope of the commentary made by Jacques Lacan in his Séminaire on the concept of phenomenological intentionality. By re-writing the object of the drive in a topological space / curve, Lacan intended to give full value to a certain number of defining traits of Freudian drive against its interpretation into any kind of non-critical intentionalism. This specifically required that the French psychoanalyst emphasize the vicariousness of the drive in relation to any (...) defined object / goal which induces the irreducible “perverse polymorphic” nature of any drive. Our article also seeks to demonstrate that Lacan did not agree with the repudiation of the concept of “intention” which he had inherited from phenomenology and which he had reworked under Freud’s patronage, but had subverted its scope in the passage from intentionality to pulsionality by which he expected to achieve disidentification of the desired objective / goal from the pulsional satisfaction goal. Through this complication, we seek to re-open the issue of limits that the concept of intentionality encounters when it meets post-Freudian metapsychology. (shrink)

The recognition and reconciliation of ‘opposites’ lies at the heart of our most personal and global problems. These problems are ‘wicked’ in the sense that they are difficult or impossible to solve and arise at the interface of interdependent polarities. By exploring the human tendency to divide the world into two parts, _Wicked Problems & the Reconciliation of Opposites_ argues that our relationship with such pairings and polarities is profoundly important to the way we recognise and resolve wicked problems. Using (...) an original theory of bi-relational development, Adam proposes that our everyday ways of knowing and being can be powerfully located and understood in terms of the creation, emergence, opposition, convergence, collapse and trans-positioning of dyadic constituents. Chapters use this concept to frame key debates in and across domains of knowledge, including education, psychology, law and theology, as well as to offer a new perspective on the most profound problems of the twenty-first century: globalisation, sustainability and secularisation. This book is a comprehensive study of dyadic structrures and relationships and provides a multidisciplinary and original approach to human development. It will be of great interest to students and academics of social psychology, psychosocial development, psychoanalysis and transpersonal psychology, but it is also relevant within the fields of education, human development and theology. (shrink)

Whether in a new Austrian constitution a preamble, with or without reference to God I with or without reference to the religious, in particular Christian legacies, should precede the normative text, is a question that is discussed from a historical and constitutional point of view, and answered negatively: European constitutions since the Enlightenment transform the »subjects«, who would not have any other appeal than to God, into »citizens« who are protected by human rights as constitutional law; citizens are the origin (...) and the goal of all political activities. Their participation in shaping the state's policies is based on their own concience only, even if their concience is determined by religious beliefs. (shrink)

Published posthumously in 1908, Ecce Homo was written in 1888 and completed just a few weeks before Nietzsche’s complete mental collapse. Its outrageously egotistical review of the philosopher’s life and works—featuring chapters called Why I Am So Wise and Why I Write Such Good Books—are redeemed from mere arrogance by masterful language and ever-relevant ideas. In addition to settling scores with his many personal and philosophical enemies, Nietzsche emphasizes the importance of questioning traditional morality, establishing autonomy, and making a commitment (...) to creativity. Essential reading for students of philosophy, this unique memoir is crucial to an understanding of Nietzsche’s other works. (shrink)

In the debate about values in science, it is a time-honored tradition to distinguish between the normative question of whether non-cognitive values should play a role in science and the descriptive question of whether they in fact do so or not.1 Among philosophers of science, it is now an accepted view that the descriptive question has been settled. That is, it is no longer disputed that non-cognitive values play a role in science. Hence, all that is left to do on (...) the descriptive front is to describe these values and their roles in more detail. In the words of Longino: “We should stop asking whether social values play a role in science and ask which values and whose values play a role and how” (2004, p. .. (shrink)

In the literature on dynamical models in cognitive science, two issues have recently caused controversy. First, what is the relation between dynamical and mechanistic models? I will argue that dynamical models can be upgraded to be mechanistic as well, and that there are mechanistic and non-mechanistic dynamical models. Second, there is the issue of explanatory power. Since it is uncontested the mechanistic models can explain, I will focus on the non-mechanistic variety of dynamical models. It is often claimed by proponents (...) of mechanistic explanations that such models do not really explain cognitive phenomena . I will argue against this view. Although I agree that the three arguments usually offered to vindicate the explanatory power of non-mechanistic dynamical models are not enough, I consider a fourth argument, namely that such models provide understanding. The Voss strong anticipation model is used to illustrate this. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that explaining cognitive behavior can be achieved through what I call hybrid explanatory inferences: inferences that posit mechanisms, but also draw on observed regularities. Moreover, these inferences can be used to achieve unification, in the sense developed by Allen Newel in his work on cognitive architectures. Thus, it seems that explanatory pluralism and unification do not rule out each other in cognitive science, but rather that the former represents a way to achieve the latter.

Dopo aver affermato che non è più possibile ridurre il pensiero sartriano a degli schemi ermeneutici semplificatori, il saggio individua il tema della singolarità quale filo rosso che percorre quegli scritti nei quali Sartre dichiara di voler definire l’ambito e il metodo di un’antropologia marxista. Sono gli scritti che hanno come fulcro la Critica della ragione dialettica, in particolare il testo che ne diventerà l’Introduzione, cioè le Questioni di metodo, dove Sartre chiarisce quale funzione può giocare l’esistenzialismo nel conferire al (...) marxismo un rigore metodologico che gli permetta di costituirsi come un rigoroso materialismo storico. Il cuore dell’ontologia di L’essere e il nulla è rappresentato dalla nozione di «realtà umana», la versione «antropologizzata» del Dasein heideggeriano. Ispirandosi a Heidegger, ma mutandone l’orientamento di pensiero, Sartre attribuisce alla «realtà umana» il tratto del bisogno come mancanza organica. Così, gli schemi marxisti di intelligibilità dei processi storici e materiali sono rivisitati alla luce della natura contingente e finita della «realtà umana». È ciò che spinge Sartre a una revisione della dialettica, con lo scopo di aprirla alla comprensione della singolarità di ciascun uomo e a un sapere storico che possa finalmente ambire alla concretezza. (shrink)