Our sense of entitlement influences our interactions and attitudes in a range of specific relational contexts, one of them being aging parents’ relationships with their adult children. This study aimed to examine the factor structure of the Sense of Relational Entitlement—aging parents toward their offspring, an 11-item questionnaire that assesses aging people’s sense of relational entitlement toward their children, and examine the associations of its subscales with related personality and mental health constructs. One thousand and six participants, aged 65–99, with (...) at least one child, completed the SRE-ao, Brief Symptom Inventory, Loneliness Scale, and General Belongingness scale. The SRE-ao demonstrated good construct structure using confirmatory factor analysis. Both SRE-ao subscales were significantly and positively associated with anxiety, depression, somatization and sense of loneliness and negatively with sense of belonging. When all variables were entered into a regression model, age, anxiety, and low sense of belonging, but not sense of loneliness, positively predicted both restricted and inflated sense of entitlement. Somatization negatively predicted inflated sense of entitlement. The SRE-ao is a reliable and valid scale that can be used in clinical practice and research to enhance our understanding of parent–child relationships throughout the lifespan. (shrink)

We introduce tame abstract elementary classes as a generalization of all cases of abstract elementary classes that are known to permit development of stability-like theory. In this paper, we explore stability results in this new context. We assume that [Formula: see text] is a tame abstract elementary class satisfying the amalgamation property with no maximal model. The main results include:. Theorem 0.1. Suppose that [Formula: see text] is not only tame, but [Formula: see text]-tame. If [Formula: see text] and [Formula: (...) see text] is Galois stable in μ, then [Formula: see text], where [Formula: see text] is a relative of κ from first order logic. [Formula: see text] is the Hanf number of the class [Formula: see text]. It is known that [Formula: see text]. The theorem generalizes a result from [17]. It is used to prove both the existence of Morley sequences for non-splitting and the following initial step towards a stability spectrum theorem for tame classes:. Theorem 0.2. If [Formula: see text] is Galois-stable in some [Formula: see text], then [Formula: see text] is stable in every κ with κμ=κ. For example, under GCH we have that [Formula: see text] Galois-stable in μ implies that [Formula: see text] is Galois-stable in μ+n for all n < ω. (shrink)

This paper presents the design and development of intelligent tutoring system for teaching Oracle. The Oracle Intelligent Tutoring System (OITS) examined the power of a new methodology to supporting students in Oracle programming. The system presents the topic of Introduction to Oracle with automatically generated problems for the students to solve. The system is dynamically adapted at run time to the student’s individual progress. An initial evaluation study was done to investigate the effect of using the intelligent tutoring system on (...) the performance of students. (shrink)

Luck (2009) argues that gamers face a dilemma when it comes to performing certain virtual acts. Most gamers regularly commit acts of virtual murder, and take these acts to be morally permissible. They are permissible because unlike real murder, no one is harmed in performing them; their only victims are computer-controlled characters, and such characters are not moral patients. What Luck points out is that this justification equally applies to virtual pedophelia, but gamers intuitively think that such acts are not (...) morally permissible. The result is a dilemma: either gamers must reject the intuition that virtual pedophelic acts are impermissible and so accept partaking in such acts, or they must reject the intuition that virtual murder acts are permissible, and so abstain from many (if not most) extant games. While the prevailing solution to this dilemma has been to try and find a morally relevant feature to distinguish the two cases, I argue that a different route should be pursued. It is neither the case that all acts of virtual murder are morally permissible, nor are all acts of virtual pedophelia impermissible. Our intuitions falter and produce this dilemma because they are not sensitive to the different contexts in which games present virtual acts. (shrink)

We prove the following main theorem: Let be an abstract elementary class satisfying the joint embedding and the amalgamation properties with no maximal models of cardinality μ. Let μ be a cardinal above the the Löwenheim‐Skolem number of the class. If is μ‐Galois‐stable, has no μ‐Vaughtian Pairs, does not have long splitting chains, and satisfies locality of splitting, then any two ‐limits over M, for, are isomorphic over M.

Coference papers from the X National Seminar of Theory and History of the Art carried out in Medellín to address certain implications that the question entails, for both art and philosophy. For art: Why and since when do we think that art without aesthetics is something reprehensible or desirable? For philosophy: Is it irremovable or not the turn that the philosophical aesthetic took towards the experience of art from the eighteenth century? At the heart of these questions is a basic (...) concern: Who needs more aesthetics (taste, pleasure, beauty): art or human life?. (shrink)

A natural starting point for theories of perceptual states is ordinary perception, in which a subject is successfully related to her mind-independent surroundings. Correspondingly, the simplest theory of perceptual states models all such states on perception. Typically, this simple, common-factor relational view of perceptual states has received a perfunctory dismissal on the grounds that hallucinations are nonperceptual. But I argue that the nonperceptual view of hallucinations has been accepted too quickly. I consider three observations thought to support the view, and (...) argue that all three are dealt with equally well by an alternative view, illusionism, on which hallucinations do involve perception. Since this is so, adopting a common-factor relational view of all perceptual states remains a tenable option. (shrink)

Several recent accounts of modeling have focused on the modal dimension of scientific inquiry. More precisely, it has been suggested that there are specific models and modeling practices that are best understood as being geared towards possibilities, a view recently dubbed modal modeling. But modalities encompass much more than mere possibility claims. Besides possibilities, modal modeling can also be used to investigate contingencies, necessities or impossibilities. Although these modal concepts are logically connected to the notion of possibility, not all models (...) are equal in their affordances for these richer modal inferences. This paper investigates the modal extent of selected models and argues that analyzing singular model-target pairings by themselves is typically not enough to explain their modal aptness or to identify the kinds of modalities they can be used to reason about. Furthermore, it is argued that some important concepts that are not explicitly modal - like biological robustness - can be understood modally through their relational nature to a background space of possibilities. In conclusion, it is suggested that the strategy of modal modeling is contrastive, situating particular possibilities in larger modal spaces and studying the structural relations within them. (shrink)

We present Saharon Shelah's Stability Spectrum and Homogeneity Spectrum theorems, as well as the equivalence between the order property and instability in the framework of Finite Diagrams. Finite Diagrams is a context which generalizes the first order case. Localized versions of these theorems are presented. Our presentation is based on several papers; the point of view is contemporary and some of the proofs are new. The treatment of local stability in Finite Diagrams is new.

Critics of multiple realizability have recently argued that we should concentrate solely on actual here-and-now realizations that are found in nature. The possibility of alternative, but unactualized, realizations is regarded as uninteresting because it is taken to be a question of pure logic or an unverifiable scenario of science fiction. However, in the biological context only a contingent set of realizations is actualized. Drawing on recent work on the theory of neutral biological spaces, the paper shows that we can have (...) ways of assessing the modal dimension of multiple realizability that do not have to rely on mere conceivability. (shrink)

The gamer’s dilemma offers three plausible but jointly inconsistent premises: (1) Virtual murder in video games is morally permissible. (2) Virtual paedophelia in video games is not morally permissible. (3) There is no morally relevant difference between virtual murder and virtual paedophelia in video games. In this paper I argue that the gamer’s dilemma can be understood as one of three distinct dilemmas, depending on how we understand two key ideas in Morgan Luck’s (2009) original formulation. The two ideas are (...) those of (1) occurring in a video game and (2) being a virtual instance of murder or paedophelia. Depending on the weight placed on the gaming context, the dilemma is either about in-game acts or virtual acts. And depending on the type of virtual acts we have in mind, the dilemma is either about virtual representations or virtual partial reproductions of murder and paedophelia. This gives us three dilemmas worth resolving: a gaming dilemma, a representation dilemma, and a simulation dilemma. I argue that these dilemmas are about different issues, apply to different cases, and are susceptible to different solutions. I also consider how different participants in the debate have interpreted the dilemma in one or more of these three ways. (shrink)

We present a self-contained exposition of the basic aspects of simple theories while developing the fundamentals of forking calculus. We expound also the deeper aspects of S. Shelah's 1980 paper Simple unstable theories. The concept of weak dividing has been replaced with that of forking. The exposition is from a contemporary perspective and takes into account contributions due to S. Buechler, E. Hrushovski, B. Kim, O. Lessmann, S. Shelah and A. Pillay.

How do we assign values to virtual items, which include virtual objects, properties, events, subjects, worlds, environments, and experiences? In this article, I offer a framework for answering this question. After considering different value theses in the literature, I argue that whether we think these theses mutually exclusive or not turns on our view about the number of value-salient kinds virtual items belong to. Virtual monism is the view that virtual Xs belong to only one value-salient kind in relation to (...) X. Virtual pluralism is the view that they belong to more than one value-salient kind. I argue for two claims. First, virtual monism is mistaken. Minimally some virtual Xs are Xs, while others are not. Second, dualistic virtual pluralism is also mistaken because it is too coarse grained. Instead, I argue for fourfold pluralism: virtual items either represent an original's properties or reproduce essential properties and do so to lesser or greater extents. This gives us four value-salient kinds of virtual X: virtual reproductions, simulations, representations, and simulacra of X. I apply this view to various debates in the literature and conclude with a discussion of less basic hybrid kinds. (shrink)

This philosophical game changer looks critically at the Golden Rule in the context of game theory to see where it works and where it doesn’t, when it is applicable and when it isn’t. It shows you why knowing the difference can offer you a powerful way to transform your life from one driven by fear to one driven by love.

Many scientific models in biology are how-possibly models. These models depict things as they could be, but do not necessarily capture actual states of affairs in the biological world. In contemporary philosophy of science, it is customary to treat how-possibly models as second-rate theoretical tools. Although possibly important in the early stages of theorizing, they do not constitute the main aim of modelling, namely, to discover the actual mechanism responsible for the phenomenon under study. In the paper it is argued (...) that this prevailing picture does not do justice to the synthetic strategy that is commonly used in biological engineering. In synthetic biology, how-possibly models are not simply speculations or eliminable scaffolds towards a single how-actually model, but indispensable design hypotheses for a field whose ultimate goal is to build novel biological systems. The paper explicates this by providing an example from the study of alternative genetic systems by synthetic biologist Steven Benner and his group. The case will also highlight how the method of synthesis, even when it fails, provides an effective way to limit the space of possible models for biological systems. (shrink)

Let M be a given model with similarity type L = L(M), and let L' be any fragment of L |L(M)| +, ω of cardinality |L(M)|. We call $N \prec M L'$ -relatively saturated $\operatorname{iff}$ for every $B \subseteq N$ of cardinality less than | N | every L'-type over B which is realized in M is realized in M is realized in N. We discuss the existence of such submodels. The following are corollaries of the existence theorems. (1) If (...) M is of cardinality at least $\beth_{\omega_1}$ , and fails to have the ω order property, then there exists $N \prec M$ which is relatively saturated in M of cardinality $\beth_{\omega_1}$ . (2) Assume GCH. Let ψ ∈ L_{ω_1, ω, and let $L' \subseteq L_{\omega 1, \omega$ be a countable fragment containing ψ. If $\exists \chi > \aleph_0$ such that $I(\chi, \psi) , then for every $M \models \psi$ and every cardinal $\lambda of uncountable cofinality, M has an L'-relatively saturated submodel of cardinality λ. (shrink)

A widely held assumption is that hallucinations are not a type of perception. Coupled with the idea that hallucinations possess phenomenal character, this assumption raises a problem for naive realism, which maintains that phenomenal character is at least partly constituted by perceived worldly objects. Naive realists have typically responded by adopting a disjunctive view of phenomenal character. But in what follows, I argue that to resolve the conflict we should instead reject the idea that hallucinations are not a type of (...) perception. I argue that this idea is supported by six alleged differences between hallucination and perception, but these differences are all accommodated for in a particular type of perception, picture perception. Drawing on picture perception’s resources, I offer an account of hallucinations which construes them as a type of perception, and does so in a way that that preserves their idiosyncrasies and varieties, and in a way compatible with naive realism. (shrink)

Freges Konzeption der Existenz zählt zu seinen einflussreichsten und originellsten Beiträgen zur Philosophie. In diesem Buch wird Freges Konzeption neu interpretiert, historisch eingeordnet, mit den wichtigsten verwandten Konzeptionen verglichen und einer detaillierten systematischen Kritik unterzogen.

A central debate in the philosophy of virtual reality (VR) focuses on the reality of virtual items. Broadly, there are two main disagreements. Some views accept a metaphysical orientation to VR, and disagree on the reality of virtual items. For instance, David Chalmers (Disputatio 9(46):309-352, 2017, Disputatio 11(55):453- 486, 2019, 2022) defends digitalism, the view that virtual items are real digital items. Neil McDonnell & Nathan Wildman (Disputatio 11(55):371-397, 2019), by contrast, defend fictionalism, which maintains that virtual items are unreal (...) fictions. Other views, like Grant Tavinor’s (2021), reject the metaphysical orientation, argu- ing that focusing on the reality of virtual items is a mistake. In what follows I evalu- ate these two disagreements. I argue that experiences of virtual items depend on episodes of picture perception. Recognizing this reveals that the current debates are either easily resolved in favor of one view, or are not disagreeing about the reality of virtual items, but about what virtual items are. (shrink)

The new result of this paper is that for θ-stable we have S1[θ] = D[θ, L, ∞]. S1 is Hrushovski's rank. This is an improvement of a result of Kim and Pillay, who for simple theories under the assumption that either of the ranks be finite obtained the same identity. Only the first equality is new, the second equality is a result of Shelah from the seventies. We derive it by studying localizations of several rank functions, we get the followingMain (...) Theorem. Suppose that μ is regular satisfying μ ≥ |T|+, p is a finite type, and Δ is a set of formulas closed under Boolean operations. If either R[p, Δ, μ+] < ∞ or p is Δ-stable and μ satisfies “for every sequence {μi : i < |Δ| + ℵ0} of cardinals μi < μ we have that equation image holds”, then S[p, Δ, μ+] = D[p, Δ, μ+] = R[p, Δ, μ+].The S rank above is a localized version of Hrushovski's S1 rank. This rank, as well as our systematic use of local stability, allows us to get a more conceptual proof of the equality of D and R, which is an old result of Shelah. A particular case of the theorem offers a new sufficient condition for the equality of S1 and D[·, L, ∞]. We also manage, due to a more general approach, to avoid some combinatorial difficulties present in Shelah's original exposition. (shrink)

Scholars studying the global diffusion of “corporate social responsibility” (CSR) practices and the associated rise of privatized forms of economic governance have tended to shift attention away from the role of corporations in motivating these processes to the one played by nonbusiness forces seeking social control of corporations. We bring corporate power back in by turning the spotlight to the agency of business classes, the business entities capable of pursuing transcorporate, societal-level, macro-political endeavors. Building on a comparative investigation of two (...) of the world’s earliest mass CSR adoptions, in postwar Venezuela and Britain, we argue that business classes responding to anti-capitalist challenges were the original diffusers of CSR practices and, interrelatedly, promoters of CSR-based, privatized forms of regulation and governance. Organized by peak business associations, the purpose of these “business-class CSR mobilizations” was to weaken the state in its relation to corporations and increase the control of business over social trends. We discuss the contribution of our historical perspective and analytical approach to a more complete and balanced picture of the global rise of CSR in late capitalism. (shrink)

Let κ and λ be infinite cardinals such that κ ≤ λ (we have new information for the case when $\kappa ). Let T be a theory in L κ +, ω of cardinality at most κ, let φ(x̄, ȳ) ∈ L λ +, ω . Now define $\mu^\ast_\varphi (\lambda, T) = \operatorname{Min} \{\mu^\ast:$ If T satisfies $(\forall\mu \kappa)(\exists M_\chi \models T)(\exists \{a_i: i Our main concept in this paper is $\mu^\ast_\varphi (\lambda, \kappa) = \operatorname{Sup}\{\mu^\ast(\lambda, T): T$ is a theory (...) in L κ +, ω of cardinality κ at most, and φ (x, y) ∈ L λ +, ω }. This concept is interesting because of THEOREM 1. Let $T \subseteq L_{\kappa^+,\omega}$ of cardinality ≤ κ, and φ (x̄, ȳ) ∈ L λ +, ω . If $(\forall\mu then $(\forall_\chi > \kappa) I(\chi, T) = 2^\chi$ (where I(χ, T) stands for the number of isomorphism types of models of T of cardinality χ). Many years ago the second author proved that $\mu^\ast (\lambda, \kappa) \leq \beth_{(2^\lambda)^+}$ . Here we continue that work by proving. THEOREM 2. $\mu^\ast (\lambda, \aleph_0) = \beth_{\lambda^+}$ . THEOREM 3. For every κ ≤ λ we have $\mu^\ast (\lambda, \kappa) \leq \beth)_{(\lambda^\kappa)}^+$ . For some κ or λ we have better bounds than in Theorem 3, and this is proved via a new two cardinal theorem. THEOREM 4. For every $\kappa \leq \lambda, T \subseteq L_{\kappa^+,\omega}$ , and any set of formulas $\Lambda \subseteq L_{\lambda^+,\omega}$ such that $\Lambda \subseteq L_{\kappa^+,\omega}$ , if T is (Λ,μ)-unstable for μ satisfying μ μ * (λ, κ) = μ then T is Λ-unstable (i.e. for every χ ≥ λ, T is (Λ, χ)-unstable). Moreover, T is L κ +, ω -unstable. In the second part of the paper, we show that always in the applications it is possible to replace the function I(χ, T) by the function IE(χ, T), and we give an application of the theorems to Boolean powers. (shrink)

Basic results on the model theory of substructures of a fixed model are presented. The main point is to avoid the use of the compactness theorem, so this work can easily be applied to the model theory of L ω 1 ,ω and its relatives. Among other things we prove the following theorem: Let M be a model, and let λ be a cardinal satisfying λ |L(M)| = λ. If M does not have the ω-order property, then for every $A (...) \subseteq M, |A| \leq \lambda$ , and every $\mathbf{I} \subseteq M$ of cardinality λ + there exists $\mathbf{J} \subseteq \mathbf{I}$ of cardinality λ + which is an indiscernible set over A. This is an improvement of a result of S. Shelah. (shrink)

Truth depends in some sense on reality. But it is a rather delicate matter to spell this intuition out in a plausible and precise way. According to the theory of truth-making this intuition implies that either every truth or at least every truth of a certain class of truths has a so-called truth-maker, an entity whose existence accounts for truth. This book aims to provide several ways of assessing the correctness of this controversial claim. This book presents a detailed introduction (...) to the theory of truth-making, which outlines truth-maker relations, the ontological category of truth-making entities, and the scope of a truth-maker theory. The essays brought together here represent the most important articles on truth-making in the last three decades as well as new essays by leading researchers in the field of the theory of truth and of truth-making. (shrink)

Recently, several critics of the multiple realizability thesis have argued that philosophers have tended to accept the thesis on too weak grounds. On the one hand, the analytic challenge has problematized how philosophers have treated the multiple realization relation itself, claiming that assessment of the sameness of function and the relevant difference of realizers has been uncritical. On the other hand, it is argued that the purported evidence of the thesis is often left empirically unverified. This paper provides a novel (...) strategy to answer these worries by introducing a role for multiple realizability in the context of biological engineering. In the field of synthetic biology, bioengineers redesign the evolutionary realizations of biological functions, even constructing artificial chemical surrogates in the laboratory. I show how in the rational design approach to biological engineering, multiple realizability can function as a design heuristic in which the sameness of function and difference of realizers can be controlled. Although practically motivated, this engineering approach has also a theoretical, exploratory component that can be used to study the empirical limitations of multiple realizability. Successful realization of the engineering designs would amount to a concrete demonstration of multiple realizability, taking evidence for MRT beyond what is readily found in nature. (shrink)

In this essay I will defend the thesis that proper nouns are primarily used as proper names—as atomic singular referring expressions—and different possible predicative uses of proper nouns are derived from this primary use or an already derived secondary predicative use of proper nouns. There is a general linguistic phenomenon of the derivation of new meanings from already existing meanings of an expression. This phenomenon has different manifestations and different linguistic mechanisms can be used to establish derived meanings of different (...) kinds of expressions. One prominent variation of these mechanisms was dubbed in Nunberg. (Linguist Philos 3:143–184, 1979, J Semant 12:109–132, 1995, The handbook of pragmatics. Blackwell, Oxford, 2004 meaning transfer.) In the essay I will distinguish two different sub-varieties of this mechanism: occurrent and lexical meaning transfer. Nunberg conceives of meaning transfer as a mechanism that allows us to derive a new truth-conditional meaning of an expression from an already existing truth-conditional meaning of this expression. I will argue that most predicative uses of proper nouns can be captured by the mentioned two varieties of truth-conditional meaning transfer. But there are also important exceptions like the predicative use of the proper noun ‘Alfred’ in as sentence like ‘Every Alfred that I met was a nice guy’. I will try to show that we cannot make use of truth-conditional meaning transfer to account for such uses and I will argue for a the existence of second variant of meaning transfer that I will call use-conditional meaning transfer and that allows us also to capture these derived meanings of proper nouns. Furthermore, I will try to show that the proposed explanation of multiple uses of proper nouns is superior to the view supported by defenders of a predicative view on proper names. (shrink)

Fatimid history is considered one of the main periods of Islamic history in Egypt, so we cannot talk about the cultural metropolis of Egypt, the city of Cairo, without mentioning its founder, Jawhar al-Siqilli, the leader of the Fatimid Caliph al-Muizz Li-Din Allah al-Fatimid. The same is true of the Al-Azhar Mosque, which since its establishment until now has gained international fame in the Islamic world, throughout the historical stages, in addition to many of the Fatimid monuments scattered in Old (...) Cairo such as mosques, schools and alleys, all of this appears when talking about Egypt in general and Islamic Egyptin particular. The Fatimids sought to seize the Egyptian country a lot, as two military campaigns from North Africa to Egypt were launched, each of them failed. Then, the third campaign succeeded, led by Jawhar al-Siqilli, after the Fatimid Caliph al-Muizz prepared the equipment this time and arranged the army well, and had previously sent missionaries to this geography through the city of Alexandria and others, to herald the demise of the Ikhshidid state and the coming of the savior from this injustice and economic stagnation under which Egypt has fallen. He took several measures to try to declare Fatimid control over the Egyptian country. A delegation of the Egyptians sought to obtain a covenant from the Fatimid leader Jawhar al-Siqilli, to reassure them and remove their fears, especially with regard to their beliefs and religious matters. Indeed, the Fatimid leader issued this covenant, which included many things to reassure the Egyptians, among them that the Companions of the prophet are the most honorable people contrary to the famous Shiite belief- and that each will leave his belief, but it was not long before this covenant until many things were sealed. Our research here focuses on these matters.The research is divided into three main ponits: the first is the sectarian history of Egypt before the Fatimid occupation, and the second is the attempts to impose the Shiite sect on the Egyptians. The last point is the resistance or what hinders this imposition, and it is this last part that limited these influences to the Fatimid monuments such as buildings, mosques and schools. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to present the main components of my non-standard interpretation of Frege’s views on existence to the English-speaking public. First, I will outline the standard interpretation and show how to a great but not full extent the standard interpretation can be justified on the basis of Frege’s writings. Second, I show that the main error of the standard interpretation consists in the assimilation of the contents of the ordinary language expressions “exist” and “there is” according to (...) Frege. Third, I evaluate possible sources for this unfounded assimilation. After that, I outline my alternative interpretation that distinguishes in opposition to other non-standard interpretations between a substantive and a deflationary part of Frege’s complete conception of existence in analogy to Frege’s analysis of truth and negation. Fifthly, I justify my interpretation by the reconstruction of a so far overlooked master argument of Frege against the above-mentioned assimilation. In the last section, I introduce and discuss five objections against my interpretation that came to my attention. (shrink)