Cooperation can evolve in the context of cognitive activities such as perception, attention, memory, and decision making, in addition to physical activities such as hunting, gathering, warfare, and childcare. The social insects are well known to cooperate on both physical and cognitive tasks, but the idea of cognitive cooperation in humans has not received widespread attention or systematic study. The traditional psychological literature often gives the impression that groups are dysfunctional cognitive units, while evolutionary psychologists have so far studied cognition (...) primarily at the individual level. We present two experiments that demonstrate the superiority of thinking in groups, but only for tasks that are sufficiently challenging to exceed the capacity of individuals. One of the experiments is in a brain-storming format, where advantages of real groups over nominal groups have been notoriously difficult to demonstrate. Cognitive cooperation might often operate beneath conscious awareness and take place without the need for overt training, as evolutionary psychologists have stressed for individual-level cognitive adaptations. In general, cognitive cooperation should be a central subject in human evolutionary psychology, as it already is in the study of the social insects. (shrink)

Reformulating a scientific theory often leads to a significantly different way of understanding the world. Nevertheless, accounts of both theoretical equivalence and scientific understanding have neglected this important aspect of scientific theorizing. This essay provides a positive account of how reformulation changes our understanding. My account simultaneously addresses a serious challenge facing existing accounts of scientific understanding. These accounts have failed to characterize understanding in a way that goes beyond the epistemology of scientific explanation. By focusing on cases in which (...) we have differences in understanding without differences in explanation, I show that understanding does not reduce to explanation. (shrink)

In this article I review attempts to define the term “ad hoc hypothesis,” focusing on the efforts of, among others, Karl Popper, Jarrett Leplin, and Gerald Holton. I conclude that the term is unhelpful; what is “ad hoc” seems to be a judgment made by particular scientists not on the basis of any well-established definition but rather on their individual aesthetic senses. Further, a hypothesis considered ad hoc can apparently be retroactively declared non–ad hoc on the basis of subsequent data, (...) rendering the term meaningless. (shrink)

One strategy in recent discussions of theological fatalism is to draw on Harry Frankfurt’s famous counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) to defend human freedom from divine foreknowledge. For those who endorse this line, “Frankfurt counterexamples” are supposed to show that PAP is false, and this conclusion is then extended to the foreknowledge case. This makes it critical to determine whether Frankfurt counterexamples perform as advertised, an issue recently debated in this journal via a pair of articles by (...) David Widerker and John Martin Fischer. I suggest that this debate can be avoided: divine foreknowledge is itself aparadigmatic counterexample to PAP, requiring no support from suspect Frankfurt counterexamples. (shrink)

This paper seeks to rehabilitate St. Augustine’s widely dismissed response to the alleged incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and free will. This requires taking a fresh look at his analysis in On Free Choice of the Will, and arguing its relevance to the current debate. Along the way, mistaken interpretations of Augustine are rebutted, his real solution is developed and defended, a reason for his not anticipating Boethius’s a temporalist solution is suggested, a favorable comparison with Ockham is made, rival solutions (...) are rejected, and the aporetic nature of the problem is explained. (shrink)

Theoretical and empirical research in bioethics frequently focuses on ethical dilemmas or problems. This paper draws on anthropological and phenomenological sources to develop an alternative framework for bioethical enquiry that allows examination of a broader range of how the moral is experienced in the everyday lives of individuals and groups. Our account of moral experience is subjective and hermeneutic. We define moral experience as “Encompassing a person's sense that values that he or she deem important are being realised or thwarted (...) in everyday life. This includes a person's interpretations of a lived encounter, or a set of lived encounters, that fall on spectrums of right-wrong, good-bad or just-unjust”. In our conceptualisation, moral experience is not limited to situations that are heavily freighted with ethically-troubling ramifications or are sources of debate and disagreement. Important aspects of moral experience are played out in mundane and everyday settings. Moral experience provides a research framework, the scope of which extends beyond the evaluation of ethical dilemmas, processes of moral justification and decision-making, and moral distress. This broad research focus is consistent with views expressed by commentators within and beyond bioethics who have called for deeper and more sustained attention in bioethics scholarship to a wider set of concerns, experiences and issues that better captures what is ethically at stake for individuals and communities. In this paper we present our conceptualisation of moral experience, articulate its epistemological and ontological foundations and discuss opportunities for empirical bioethics research using this framework. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Slaves and the Generals of ArginusaePeter HuntIn the second half of 406 B.C. the Athenians made two shocking decisions. They freed the slaves who had fought in the battle of Arginusae and gave them citizenship, and they condemned to death their victorious generals. I suggest that these two events were related. Specifically, I would like to argue, first, that the competition for rowers to man the huge navies (...) of this period had extended even to slaves. The promise of freedom was intended to motivate the slaves: the grant of Athenian citizenship was an attempt to keep them rowing for Athens rather than deserting and ending up in the enemy's navy. Second, I would like to consider the trial of the generals in the context of this costly, divisive, and controversial policy. A priori considerations, historical parallels, and a few admittedly tenuous pieces of direct evidence suggest that their policy of rewarding the slaves contributed to the generals' unpopularity that made them so vulnerable to prosecution.Slaves to CitizensPassages in Aristophanes' Frogs and a scholiast's quotation of Hellanicus tell us that the slaves who fought in the battle of Arginusae were given freedom and citizenship. Most historians believe that the Athenians freed these slaves,1 but, given Athenian exclusiveness-manifest in Pericles' citizenship law-some doubt that they would have allowed a large group [End Page 359] of slaves to become citizens.2 The evidence, however, indicates that this was exactly what happened.Frogs won first prize at the Lenaean festival of 405-406, about six months after the Athenian naval victory at Arginusae. Early in the play, Dionysus and his slave Xanthias are traveling to Hades. When Dionysus mocks Xanthias for complaining about the load he is carrying, Xanthias exclaims:Dash it all, why wasn't I in that naval battle? Then I could really and truly tell you to go to blazes!(Ar. Ran. 33)3Fighting in the naval battle would have freed Xanthias from carrying Dionysus' baggage and allowed him to tell his master off. A bit later, Charon refuses to ferry Xanthias to Hades:I don't take slaves, unless they fought in the life-or-death naval battle.(190-91)4Again, slaves who have fought in a naval battle are treated differently from other slaves. From these passages alone, one might guess that the slaves who fought in some naval battle-Arginusae being the most recent and probable one-were given their freedom: they did not have to serve their masters and could ride with Charon rather than walking around the lake to get to Hades.Ian Worthington argues against this, the traditional reading of these lines. Xanthias' regret at not serving in the naval battle (33) is not that he would be then be free, but rather that then he would be dead and not forced to serve Dionysus.5 Aristophanes, however, was addressing an [End Page 360] audience many of whom had either fought at Arginusae or had relatives who had. We may associate Arginusae primarily with the deaths of the unrescued crews, but in 405 Arginusae was considered a successful relief mission and a great victory. Aristophanes was addressing the living victors, for whom "to fight at the naval battle" could not serve as shorthand for "to die." Worthington's reading of lines 190-91 is also less convincing than the traditional interpretation. He claims that those who "fought in the life-or-death naval battle" are the men whose drowning after the battle gave rise to the trial of the generals. The text gives no hint or suggestion that Charon is talking about this subset of the sailors who fought in the battle. Rather, Charon refers to another subset of those who fought in the battle, the slaves: "I don't take slaves, unless...." So we should stay with the traditional interpretation and the scholia to Frogs 33, which, although not an independent source, accords with our reading of Aristophanes: ("[I]n the previous year, in the archonship of Antigenes, the Athenians... won a naval battle around Arginusae and freed the slaves who had fought along with them").6Our first evidence for... (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article develops an Arendtian conception of resentment and shows that resentment as a response to injustice is in fact only possible within a community of persons engaged in moral and recognitive relations. While Arendt is better known for her work on forgiveness—characterized as a creative rather than vindictive response to injury—this article suggests that Arendt provides a unique way of thinking about resentment as essentially a response to another human's subjectivity. But when injury is massive, so beyond the (...) pale that the possibility of face-to-face human interaction is annihilated, the space for resentment is thereby destroyed. Ironically, while the absence of resentment might at first seem to be an unproblematically good thing, Arendt shows us that the loss of resentment actually signals the loss of the properly human realm. (shrink)

Pushing back against the potential trivialization of moral psychology that would reduce it to emotional preferences, this book takes an enactivist, self-organizational, and hermeneutic approach to internal conflict between a basic exploratory drive motivating the search for actual truth, and opposing incentives to confabulate in the interest of conformity, authoritarianism, and cognitive dissonance, which often can lead to harmful worldviews. The result is a new possibility that ethical beliefs can have truth value and are not merely a result of ephemeral (...) altruistic or cooperative feelings. It will interest moral and political psychologists, philosophers, social scientists, and all who are concerned with inner emotional conflicts driving ethical thinking beyond mere emotivism, and toward moral realism, albeit a fallibilist one requiring continual rethinking and self-reflection. It combines 'basic emotion' theories with hermeneutic depth psychology. The result is a realist approach to moral thinking emphasizing coherence rather than foundationalist theory of knowledge. (shrink)

As its title suggests, the subject of this book is the nature of self-fulfillment, which the author defines as “carrying to fruition one’s deepest desires or one’s worthiest capacities”. It treats this subject as a specifically ethical one. The motivation behind it lies in the author’s conviction that all other norms and ideals have value only insofar as they serve to advance this one.

I distinguish between a _metaphysical_ problem generated by the argument for theological fatalism, and a _theological_ problem posed by the argument. Some responses to the argument, including ones associated with Boethius, Aquinas and Ockham, address only the theological problem. Even if such responses succeed in showing that God's foreknowledge doesn't threaten human freedom, they fail to take the full measure of the argument for theological fatalism, since the metaphysical problem remains to be solved.

The principle that one cannot deliberate over what one already knows is going to happen, when suitably qualified, has seemed to many philosophers to be about as secure a truth as one is likely to find in this life. Fortunately, it poses little restriction on human deliberation, since the conditions which would trigger its prohibition seldom arise for us: our knowledge of the future is intermittent at best, and those things of which we do have advance knowledge are not the (...) sorts of things over which we would deliberate in any case. But matters appear to stand otherwise with an all-knowing agent such as God is traditionally conceived to be; for what an omniprescient deity ‘already knows is going to happen’ is everything that is going to happen; and if He cannot deliberate over such things, there is nothing over which He can deliberate. (shrink)

This paper explores what the epistemic account of vagueness means for theories of legal interpretation. The thesis of epistemicism is that vague statements are true or false even though it is impossible to know which. I argue that if epistemicism is accepted within the domain of the law, then the following three conditions must be satisfied: Interpretative reasoning within the law must adhere to the principle of bivalence and the law of excluded middle, interpretative reasoning within the law must construe (...) vague statements as an epistemic phenomenon, and epistemicism must be expanded to include normative considerations in order to account for legal theories that are consistent with the first two conditions. The first two conditions are internal to a particular theory of legal interpretation, while the third condition is external to a particular theory of legal interpretation. My conclusion shows that there are legal theories that are internally consistent with the fundamental features of epistemicism. However, within the domain of law—and specifically in the case of legal theories that are internally consistent with epistemicism—I show that vagueness cannot be explained simply by our ignorance of the meaning and use of vague expressions. Rather, epistemicism must also account for ignorance of the requisite normative considerations in legal theories with which it is otherwise consistent. (shrink)

The paper that follows continues a discussion with Tomis Kapitan in the pages of this journal over the compatibility of divine agency with divine foreknowledge. I had earlier argued against two premises in Kapitan's case for omniscient impotence: (i) that intentionally A-ing presupposes prior acquisition of the intention to A, and (ii) that acquiring the intention to A presupposes prior ignorance whether one will A. In response to my criticisms, Kapitan has recently offered new defences for these two premises. I (...) show in reply why neither defence succeeds in rehabilitating the case against omniscient agency. (Note that the very first sentence of the published version has a misprint: instead of "To claim that divine foreknowledge is inconsistent with divine agency has been pressed with increasing frequency of late . . .", it should read, "_The_ claim . . ."!). (shrink)

Healthcare user fees present an important barrier for accessing services for the poorest (indigents) in Burkina Faso and selective removal of fees has been incorporated in national healthcare planning. However, establishing fair, effective and sustainable mechanisms for the removal of user fees presents important challenges. A participatory action-research project was conducted in Ouargaye, Burkina Faso, to test mechanisms for identifying those who are indigents, and funding and implementing user fee removal. In this paper, we explore stakeholder perceptions of ethical considerations (...) relating to participation and partnership arising in the action-research. (shrink)

According to the thesis of divine ‘middle knowledge’, first propounded by the Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina in the sixteenth century, subjunctive conditionals stating how free agents would freely respond under counter-factual conditions may be straightforwardly true, and thus serve as the objects of divine knowledge. This thesis has provoked considerable controversy, and the recent revival of interest in middle knowledge, initiated by Anthony Kenny, Robert Adams and Alvin Plantinga in the 1970s, has led to two ongoing debates. One is (...) a theoretical debate over the very intelligibility of middle knowledge;1 the other is a practical debate over its philosophical and theological utility.2. (shrink)

This volume brings together research in the GeoHumanities from various intellectual perspectives to illustrate the benefits of humanities-inspired approaches in understanding and confronting historically entrenched and recently emergent health-related challenges. In three main sections, this volume seeks to foreground the richness of work entangling medicine and health with the concerns of geography and of the Humanities. This volume will be of interest to academics and researchers in the Geographies of health and medicine, social sciences in GeoHumanities, and health humanities, and (...) students in programs focusing on the humanities and health. In the book's first section, Bodies, the authors explore the material, sensory and more than physical capacities of bodies in accounting for experiences of death, air raids, immigration, dance therapy, asthma and blindness. Section two, Voice, addresses the nature of evidence, HIV/AIDS policy, patient voices in animal research, homelessness, and constructions of truth. The final section, Practice, focuses on creative writing, as well as the pedagogic tools of teaching with the asylum, the creative practice of nuclear emergency planning zones, arts-based care for the elderly, and cartographic practices within health research. (shrink)

When clinical services aspire to quality improvement, creative and innovative approaches to old problems are needed to drive such change. Whilst new ef orts should be applauded, information on this topic can be somewhat grey from an ethical and research point of view. Within the mental health profession there is currently an expectation to routinely evaluate care and disseminate i ndings. The notion of service enhancements under the guise of routine practice is an interesting and untested ethical issue. Should clinical (...) innovation continue to enjoy such impunity as patient autonomy is often compromised as they are often compelled to accept treatment under the coercion of mental health legislation? We believe that it should not. All involvement in any form of research is voluntary, thus patients should also have the right to decline participation in quality projects if they wish to do so. (shrink)

The traditional doctrine of divine omniscience ascribes to God the fully exercised power to know all truths. but why is God’s excellence with respect to knowing not treated on a par with his excellence with respect to doing, where the latter requires only that God have the power to do all things? The prima facie problem with divine ”omni-knowledgeability’ -- roughly, being able to know whatever one wants to know whenever one wants to know it -- is that knowledge requires (...) an internal representation, whereas mere ”knowledgeability’ does not. I argue to the contrary that knowledge does not require an internal representation, and that even if it did, an omni-knowledgeable God would satisfy this requirement. omni-knowledgeability therefore represents a distinct understanding of God’s cognitive excellence while satisfying the traditional insistence on full omniscience. (shrink)