Rajesh Sampath ABSTRACT: This paper will attempt a Hegelian reading of Derrida’s Beast and the Sovereign Vol 1 lectures to unpack certain apories and paradoxes in Ambedkar’s brief 1932 statement on modern India’s founding figure, Gandhi. In that small text Ambedkar is critical of Gandhi’s seemingly saintly attempt at fasting himself to death. Ambedkar diagnoses...

Rajesh Sampath ABSTRACT: This paper attempts a careful reading of chapter I of Division Two, particularly section 53, on death in Heidegger’s Being and Time. Our aim is to deconstruct some of Heidegger’s assumptions while imagining the margins of his text that could warrant a comparison and contrast with the biblical theological material of ….

This paper will pose the question of the future minoritization of the white, gentile, Christian European and EuroAmerican identity, which has dominated world history from colonization through the post-Cold War historical present. The question is not how this is coming to an end in the near future as empirical fact and in what manner, but an attempt to imagine another future, another identity than what has been proscribed in the past. In order to move into this alterity, we will engage (...) in a critical reading of Derrida’s essay “Abraham, The Other,” in the volume titled emJudeities: Questions for Jacques Derrida./em By examining the philosophical complexity of Derrida’s quasi-autobiographical reflection on his Jewish identity, we can prepare the conditions for how the future gentile white European identity could look when not grounded in its self-edifying monotheism of a white, Christiandominated political and cultural state. The relation between the future diversification of European identity is not just a matter of postcolonial immigration and multiculturalism. It has to do with the ontological problem of how to understand the origin and telos of gentile white European identity in its Christian heritage and metaphysics (from the ancient Greeks to Hegel, Nietzsche, and Heidegger) when simple notions of origin and end are erased. This brings in the philosophical problem of historical time, movement, and epochal shifts between today’s Europe and another Europe, today’s future and what is other to that. Derrida’s text provides a guide into what is other to monotheism, unicity, oneness, and—by extension, we will argue—gentile whiteness, Christianness too, which is not simply the opposite of polytheism and today’s racial diversity, i.e., non-white and non-western Christian minorities in Europe, the United States, Canada, and the “west” in general. Having said that, this does have obvious implications regarding justice and equality as European and “western” societies in general diversify. Linking the most archaic, or the farthest in distance beyond the mythic origin of Abraham and therefore of Jewish biblical-historical identity, raises the prospects of “another” Abraham. This Other is not rooted in historical memory. This paper argues that Derrida’s reflections will help us understand an alternative future whose metaphysics is yet to be written, one that is not simply a repetition of the contents of the history of (gentile) religion and philosophy in Europe and its linear, successive, chronological historical time-frame, i.e., the Gregorian calendar./p. (shrink)

In the 1958 lecture, “Hegel and the Greeks,” how does Heidegger intimate a complex sense of historical temporalization when he suggests that the ‘whole of philosophy in its history’ is contained in the title: “Hegel and the Greeks?” Our hypothesis may appear contrarian to contemporary assumptions: a complex notion of origin as paradoxically ‘futural’— particularly in its metaphysical breadth in say the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Science of Logic—is also at work in Heidegger’s thought. This is particularly acute when (...) Heidegger examines the origin of philosophy in ancient Greek thought as a space that opens a future horizon of Being to dawn—that is, some calling that comes from the unforeseeable future to transcend what Heidegger sees as the end, finality, and ‘collapse’ ofphilosophy after Hegel. (shrink)

This work is a two-division study of twentieth century philosophies of history in Europe. Fields engaged in the study are transcendental philosophy, speculative metaphysics, theology, historiographical theory, and intellectual history. The main question concerns the historical finitude of History and its temporal horizon. The work explores the unsolved consequences of G.W.F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit and Martin Heidegger's Being and Time in twentieth-century German and French philosophies of History.

Rajesh Sampath ABSTRACT: This paper begins with several opening passages from the most esoteric writings in Hinduism’s vast, ancient religious-philosophical heritage, namely the Upanishads. The aim is to reveal certain essential connections between the primordial relation between self and sacrifice while exploring uncanny paradoxes of eternity and time, immortals and mortals and their secret linkages. ….

Rajesh Sampath ABSTRACT: This paper will articulate the conditions of thinking about the transition of Division II in Heidegger’s Being and Time in order to imagine the architecture of the missing Division III, which never appeared in the published Part I of Being and Time. The paper explores questions of temporality, historical temporality, and...

Rajesh Sampath ABSTRACT: This paper examines Ambedkar’s critical view of certain distortions, contradictions, and instabilities in democratic norms, constitutional validity, and citizens’ rights in India’s secular, constitutional, legal, pluralistic democracy. Through a strident deconstruction utilizing Hegelian resources, the paper exposes the contortions and contradictions underpinning Hindu metaphysics in some of its most abstract texts, namely...

This first article is part of a two-article series labeled Parts I and II. In Part I, we will attempt a close reading of Division Two of Heidegger’s greatest work, Being and Time (1927). We will execute a granular analysis of a few lines and phrases in section 65 in Chapter III, section 69 in Chapter IV, and sections 72 and 74 in Chapter V; those sections cover ‘primordial ecstatic, finite, unified, authentic temporality’ (Heidegger 1962, 380) and the ‘equiprimordiality of (...) the unity of the ecstases’ (Heidegger 1962, 378), ‘the whitherings and horizontal schemas,’ (Heidegger 1962, 416), and the ontological distinction of movement/Bewegtheit and the Western metaphysical tradition on spatialized motion/Bewegung (Heidegger 1962, 427) respectively. Attempting to show the connectedness of these problems in a manner different from Being and Time, itself, requires a bracketing of how we renew our engagement with Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel even after Heidegger’s attempted ‘destruction’ (Heidegger 1962, 41) of the ontological and metaphysical traditions of the West. We want to set up the possibility of reengaging Heidegger on a cryptic moment in the 1962 English translators’ footnote on the ‘swoon’ and ‘clairvoyance’ (Heidegger 1962, 436) that immediately precedes Heidegger’s great articulation of the ‘moment of vision for its time’ and the possibility of an ‘authentic understanding of fate, which is historicality’ (Heidegger 1962, 437). In Part I, we will resume the possibility of an abstract metaphysical undertaking about a four-dimensional temporality that Heidegger could not and did not articulate in Being and Time. This first article constitutes Part I, which then sets up Part II to appear in a second article. In the second article, we will attempt a direct appropriation of Hegel’s The Science of Logic (1813-1816), particularly on his enigmatic introduction of the term ‘quadruplicity’ (Hegel 2010, 746), which comes at the very end of his greatest and most complex work. (shrink)

This is the second article of a two-article series and is labeled Part II. In this article, we pick up where we left off on a clos reading of Division Two of Heidegger’s greatest work, Being and Time (1927). In the first article labeled Part I, we executed a granular analysis of a few lines and phrases in section 65 in Chapter III, section 69 in Chapter IV, and sections 72 and 74 in Chapter V on ‘primordial ecstatic, finite, unified, (...) authentic temporality’ (Heidegger 1962, 380) and ‘equiprimordiality of the unity of the ecstases’ (Heidegger 1962, 378), ‘the whitherings and horizontal schemas’ (Heidegger 1962, 416), and the ontological distinction of movement/Bewegtheit and the Western metaphysical tradition on spatialized motion/Bewegung (Heidegger 1962, 427) respectively. Attempting to show the connectedness of these problems in a manner different from Being and Time itself required a bracketing of how we renew our engagement with Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel even after Heidegger’s attempted ‘destruction’ (Heidegger 1962, 41) of the ontological and metaphysical traditions of the West. In Part I, we attempted to resume the possibility of an abstract metaphysical undertaking about a four-dimensional temporality that Heidegger could not and did not articulate in Being and Time. In this follow-up article labeled Part II, we will attempt a direct appropriation of Hegel’s The Science of Logic (1813-1816), particularly on his enigmatic introduction to the term ‘quadruplicity’ (Hegel 2010, 746) that comes at the very end of his greatest and most complex work. We will try to outline the possibility of articulating the very being of time as an interrelations-movement event beyond the succession and simultaneity of two things. This conceptualization is non-spatial, never an object of representation, intuition, or the imagination, and not reducible to the predominance of the present as the ‘now’ point. We see this work as one long preface to our own independent possibility, apart from Heidegger and Hegel, to articulate a heretofore unknown speculative phenomenological theory of four-dimensional time. (shrink)

This essay will attempt a line-by-line reading of Lacan’s famous “The Mirror Image as Formative I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience” (1949) published in the collected volume of essays, Ecrits (1966). The article attempts to show that Lacan’s essay opens a space of primordiality, whereby we can revisit Heidegger’s critique of subjectivity and the Cogito, terms that originate with Descartes and evolves to Kant’s Critiques of dogmatic metaphysics, particularly in Heidegger’s Being and Time. These are steps Heidegger takes to (...) set up his attempted critique of Hegel, who in turn tries to surpass the history of philosophy rooted in modern subjectivity, particularly in his Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). However, missing in Lacan’s essay and what remains unarticulated in Heidegger’s Being and Time is the following: relation between time, movement, and the space of primordiality where all notions of factical existence dissolve. Being born in time, developing in time, being in or at time, and being-towards-death, as Heidegger struggles to deconstruct – by way of his unique appropriation of phenomenology in Being and Time – can be questioned. Indeed, what Heidegger fails to develop, and he admits it explicitly, is the other side of his ‘one-sided’ treatment in the investigation: he only analyzed death as a possibility of Dasein’s greatest possibility to ‘be-Whole’ authentically (1962, 277) and completely neglected ‘being-towards-birth’ as the ‘other end’ of Dasein’s movement (1962, 425). We will argue that one is never born as a biological fact of existence, a social construction assigned at physical birth, like a gender or sex, or any religious notions of a created being from God the Creator, or any notions of rebirth, reincarnation, or resurrection, namely from religions in the West, like Roman Catholic Christianity, and the East, like Hinduism. Rather, ‘being-towards-birth’ in relation to the linear time of flowing now-points (past as no longer now, present as now, future as yet to be now), or ‘being-within-time,’ (Heidegger 1962, 457) is temporalized other than a dateable origin in spatialized time or history. (shrink)

This article will offer a close reading of sections 74 and 75 of “Chapter V: Temporality and Historicality” of Division Two of Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927). Our goal is to expand on a speculative metaphysical reconstruction of Chapter 17 of the Gospel of John, when Jesus is finished speaking to the disciples and is addressing the Father alone. This is right before his Passion, namely the arrest, trial, crucifixion, and ultimate Resurrection. The work is not situated in either abstract (...) systematic or biblical theology, which seeks to defend faith, particularly using modern continental philosophical resources, such as the early Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. Then again, it is not a philosophy of religion either, in the sense that it is not concerned with investigating the nature or essence of religion. Rather, it is trying to move within Being and Time to construct anew its ‘missing Division Three’ by creating new terms and distinctions beyond what is offered in the first Two Divisions. Our hypothesis is this: the supersession of Being and Time requires an imaginative metaphysical expansion of hidden secrets buried in the Gospel regarding a strange double temporalization in the discourse of Jesus to his Father. These two temporal planes are phenomenologically irreducible to either the linear sequence of events of his life as narrated in the four Gospels; or the history of theological attempts, particularly twentieth-century theological giants (Barth, Tillich, Rahner, Moltmann, Pannenberg), to think about the time-eternity-history relation with regard to the Kairos (through the Incarnation of the Son) at the fulfilled time and the Parousia, namely the Second Coming at the eschatological end of time. The article concludes with certain criteria regarding judgements on the undecidability of theism vs. atheism when attempting to go beyond Heidegger’s Being and Time. The ontological consequences, and therefore meaning of such an undertaking at a step beyond Being and Time, remain indiscernible for specific reasons. (shrink)

Rajesh Sampath ABSTRACT: This paper excavates certain impulses that are buried in Pierre Klossowski’s 1968 edition of his original 1947 work, Sade My Neighbor. We argue that the self-suffocating nature of our historical present reveals the problem of an epochal threshold: in which twenty-first century democracy itself is threatened with death and violence in delusional ….