The critics of rational choice theory (RCT) frequently build on the contrast between so-called thick and thin applications of RCT to argue that thin RCT lacks the potential to explain the choices of real-world agents. In this paper, I draw on often-cited RCT applications in several decision sciences to demonstrate that despite this prominent critique there are at least two different senses in which thin RCT can explain real-world agents’ choices. I then defend this thesis against the (...) most influential objections put forward by the critics of RCT. In doing so, I explicate the implications of my thesis for the ongoing philosophical debate concerning the explanatory potential of RCT and the comparative merits of widely endorsed accounts of explanation. (shrink)

The paper argues that the philosophical underpinnings of rational choice theory are vitiated by consideration of the phenomenon of backward-looking motives, such as gratitude, fidelity, and many forms of honesty. Attempts to describe the actions and decisions of those acting from such motives in the terms of rational choice theory fail, and the model of human conduct which is implicit in the theory is both inadequate in itself and pernicious in its general influence. (...) A picture may emerge of the human person as a repository of atomistic ‘experiences’, inhabiting a present from the vantage-point of which his relations to past and future ‘selves’ are contingent, and his responsibilities and commitments correspondingly fluid. And in economics, a supposedly ‘neutral’ account of rational choice in fact encourages and sustains a simple-minded utilitarian ethic. (shrink)

Donald Green and Ian Shapiro discover a curious gulf between the prestige of rational choice approaches and the dearth of solid empirical findings. But we can understand neither the prestige of rational choice theory nor its pathologies unless we see it as a variant of the equilibrium analysis found in physics, economics, and biology. Only such a global perspective on rational choice theory will reveal its core assumptions and the likely shape of (...) its future in political science. In this light, the growing dominance of rational choice theory in political science is all but inevitable and its pathologies are all but inescapable. (shrink)

If one rejects choice theory, one still faces the challenge of explaining what one should do in a self-torture case if one is fully rational, and why. In addition, one faces the more fundamental challenge of explaining what rationality is, if it is not choice theory. Responding to these challenges in a systematic way is one of several key contributions of Andreou’s insightful book Choosing Well, and is my focus here as well. My goal is (...) to highlight questions that arise for Andreou’s view, especially from the perspective of those who are sympathetic to choice theory. (shrink)

The descriptive viewpoint in rational choice has generated an important Standard Rational Choice Theory revision. This viewpoint has meant the introduction of relevant psychological considerations that Rational Choice Theory tied to the neoclassical economics is unable to heed In this paper I suggest a way to expand the descriptive viewpoint by theorizing how some factors, coming from the social and cultural environment, operate within rational choice. That troublesome issue concerning the (...) overall validity of economic laws is also a question here; specifically, if these descriptive proposals expand the explanation of the disturbing causes of economic laws, or if they actually call into question their fundamental principles, encouraging consideration of some economic issues in a quite new, different manner. (shrink)

In this paper, I review the literature on rational choice theory to scrutinize a number of criticisms that philosophers have voiced against its usefulness in economics. The paper has three goals: first, I argue that the debates about RCT have been characterized by disunity and confusion about the object under scrutiny, which calls into question the effectiveness of those criticisms. Second, I argue that RCT is not a single and unified choice theory—let alone an empirical (...) theory of human behavior—as some critics seem to suppose. Rather, there are several variants of RCT used in economics. Third, I propose that we think of RCT as a set of distinct research strategies to appreciate its diversity. This account implies that the effectiveness of any criticism depends on the variant of RCT we are considering. (shrink)

The paper addresses the ‘rational choice only’ reconstruction, characterization, and interpretation of classical and neoclassical economics. It argues that such a reconstruction is inaccurate failing to do justice to the dual theoretical character of classical/neoclassical economics. The paper instead proposes and shows that the latter involves not only elements of ‘rational choice theory’ but also those of an alternative conception. It identifies various and important ideas, observations, and implications of irrational choice and action within (...) classical/neoclassical economics. One class of such ingredients involves forms, expressions, and cases—i.e. specification and classification—of irrational choices in the economy. Another class comprises the social and other factors—i.e. economic sociology or social economics—of irrational choices in the economy. The paper’s intended contribution is to help identify and clarify the extant sources and alternatives of rational choice theory in conventional economics.... (shrink)

Polskie przepisy prawne formułujące warunki dopuszczalności eksperymentu medycznego, a więc ipso facto wyznaczające jego granice, można różnorako interpretować, zwłaszcza w tym zakresie, w jakim określają wymagany dla przeprowadzenia eksperymentu bilans związanych z nim możliwych korzyści i szkód. W artykułach prawniczych komentujących te przepisy w zasadzie jednak brak prób systematycznego i (na tyle, na ile pozwala na to sam przedmiot analizy) ścisłego wyróżnienia tych interpretacji w języku tzw. teorii racjonalnego wyboru (rational choice theory), teorii szczególnie przydatnej w tym (...) kontekście z uwagi na jej rozbudowany aparat pojęciowy pozwalający badać różnorakie konfiguracje relacji między costs i benefits. Artykuł próbuje wypełnić tę lukę: wyróżnione w nim zostały różne interpretacje przepisów prawnych określających warunki dopuszczalności eksperymentu medycznego; interpretacje te zostały również poddane ocenie. (shrink)

Although rational choice theory has enjoyed only modest predictive success, it provides a powerful explanatory mechanism for social processes involving strategic interaction among individuals and it stimulates interesting empirical inquiries. Rather than present competing theories to compare against rational choice, Don Green and Ian Shapiro have merely alluded to alternative explanatory variables such as culture, institutions, and social norms, without showing either how these factors can be incorporated into a more powerful theory, or how (...) they are inconsistent with rational choice theory. It is likely that any eventual theory of the origin and maintenance of social institutions, norms, and values will have to reserve a central place for rational action. (shrink)

The value of rational choice theory for the social sciences has long been contested. It is argued here that, in the debate over its role, it is necessary to distinguish between claims that people maximise manifest payoffs, and claims that people maximise their utility. The former version has been falsified. The latter is unfalsifiable, because utility cannot be observed. In principle, utility maximisation can be adapted to fit any form of behaviour, including the behaviour of non-human organisms. (...) Allegedly 'inconsistent' behaviour is also impossible to establish without qualification. This utility-maximising version of rational choice theory has the character of a universal 'explanation' that can be made to 'fit' any set of events. This is a sign of weakness rather than strength. In its excessive quest for generality, utility-maximising rational choice theory fails to focus on the historically and geographically specific features of socio-economic systems. As long as such theory is confined to ahistorical generalities, then it will remain highly limited in dealing with the real world. Instead we have to consider the real social and psychological determinants of human behaviour. (shrink)

This paper aims to contribute to the development of a “third-generation” rational choice theory by introducing a Multiple Player Approach for analysing collective action problems. Drawing on the foundational first and second generation works of Olson (The logic of collective action, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1965) and Ostrom (Scand Polit Stud 23(1):3–16), we introduce five player types that we believe capture essential empirical features of many real world collective action problems: Blind Riders, Tough Riders, Hard Riders, Easy (...) Riders, and Low Riders. We consider the complex interaction and dynamics that unfold among them. The main novelty of the analysis is to draw attention to the need for active societal support to effectively empower and reward hard riders for resolving collective action problems, particularly when facing external shocks such as the Covid-19 pandemic, Brexit, and financial crises. (shrink)

James Coleman attempted to reconcile rational choice theory with the classical sociological concerns: the relationship between the individual and society, and the historical and normative status of rationality. He identifies limits to the rational choice model, and suggests some promising but ultimately unconvincing ways around them. His project does, however, offer an important critique of Weber's theory of bureaucracy, which is of value in analyzing relationships between corporate actors and particular persons.

Rational choice theory is often presented as essential to the truly scientific study of economics. To the contrary, in this paper I argue that when rational choice is treated as the key to a science of human agency, it ensnares economics in certain intractable dilemmas. Drawing on hermeneutic philosophy, I argue that economists need to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate uses of rational choice theory. Failure to do so not only leads to self-defeating (...) research goals, but also mires the discipline in an extreme form of free-market ideology. Economists thus have not only empirical but also ethical and political reasons for rejecting the mainstream deployment of rational choice. The paper concludes by briefly sketching a philosophically defensible use of rational choice in economics – one that is more sensitive to the expressive dimensions of human agency and the limits of mechanistic causality. (shrink)

The increasingly wide spread use of RCM, rational choice modeling, and RCT, rational choice theory, in disciplines like economics, law, ethics, psychology, sociology, political science, management facilitates interdisciplinary exchange. This is a great achievement. Yet it nurtures the hope that a unified account of rational active choice making might arise from ‘reason’ in terms of intuitively appealing axioms. Such ‘rationalist’ characterizations of rational choice neglect real human practices and empirical accounts of (...) those practices. This is theoretically misleading and practically dangerous. Searching for a wide reflective equilibrium, WRE, on RCT in evidence-oriented ways can explicate ‘rational’ without rationalism. (shrink)

In his paper, ‘Patients, doctors and risk attitudes’, Makins argues that doctors, when choosing a treatment for their patient, need to follow their risk profile.1 He presents a pair of fictitious diseases facing a patient who either has ‘exemplitis’, which requires no treatment or ‘caseopathy’, which is severe and disabling and for which there is a treatment with unpleasant side effects. The doctor needs to decide whether the patient should pursue the unpleasant treatment, just in case he has caseopathy. Makins (...) believes that rational-choice theory is a productive way to approach this problem. This theory frames all decisions as gambles. Each possible gamble (eg, not to pursue treatment) leads, probabilistically, to a set of outcomes (life with no disease and no side effects, but also, possibly, life with a disabling disease, since no treatment is taken). Utilities of these outcomes and probabilities that they will happen are combined to yield a number—expected utility. One is supposed to gamble—to make a choice—in a way that maximises this expected utility. Makins takes this framework for granted and is focused on an additional complication, the patient’s risk preference. He believes that, in his hypothetical example, even if expected utility were exactly the same, withholding treatment …. (shrink)

Using Rational Choice Theory to account for moral agency has always had some uncomfortable aspect to it. Economists’ attempts to include the moral dimension of behaviour either as a preference for moral behaviour or as an external constraint on self-interested choice, have been criticized for relying on tautologies or lacking a realistic picture of motivation. Homo Oeconomicus, even when conceptually enriched by all kinds of motivations, is ultimately still characterized as caring only for what lies in (...) his interest. Amartya Sen has drawn the economists’ attention to a specific blind spot in rational choice theory (henceforth RCT), i.e. the idea of commitment. By starting from the premise that the human capacity to commit is a necessary precondition for moral behaviour, our aim in this paper is twofold: first, we argue that taking the idea of commitment seriously in economics requires an enriched concept of rationality. Second, we reject a Kantian interpretation of Sen’s concept of commitment and argue that Harry Frankfurt’s views about caring can be used to develop the concept of commitment in a direction that is compatible with Rational Choice Theory. (shrink)

This article attempts to assess Jon Elster's contribution to rational choice in Ulysses and the Sirens and Sour Grapes. After reviewing Elster's analysis of functional versus intentional explanations, the essay moves on to the crucial distinction between the thin and broad theories of rationality. The former elabo rates on the traditional economist's preference / feasible set apparatus; the latter is the more demanding theory which inquires into the rationality of beliefs and preferences. Elster's approach to the broad (...) theory normally consists in using the thin theory as a reference point and in making purposefully limited departures from it. The essay illustrates the method while commenting on Elster's discus sion of autonomous preferences in Sour Grapes. It goes on to stress some impor tant analogies between Elster's use of the thin and broad theories, on one hand, and Weber's ideal-typical method, on the other. The final assessment is phrased in terms of these analogies; it is suggested that Elster is at his best when the ideal-typical method and his own separate from each other, that is, when he comes to grips with the broad theory in its own terms. (shrink)

This paper focuses on Sen?s concept of contrapreferential choice. Sen has developed this concept in order to overcome weaknesses of the rational choice theory. According to rational choice theory a decision-maker can be always seen as someone who maximises utility, and each choice he makes as the one that brings to him the highest level of personal wellbeing. Sen argues that in some situations we chose alternatives that bring us lower level of (...) wellbeing than we could achieve if we had chosen some other alternative available to us. This happens when we base our decisions on moral principles, when we act out of duty. Sen calls such action a commitment-based action. When we act out of commitment we actually neglect our preferences and thus we make a contrapreferential choice, as Sen argues. This paper shows that, contrary to Sen, a commitment-based action can be explained within the framework of rational choice theory. However, when each choice we make can be explained within the framework of rational choice theory, when in everything we do maximisation principle can be loaded, then the variety of our motives and traits is lost, and the explanatory power of the rational choice theory is questionable. (shrink)

The most common argument against the use of rational choice models outside economics is that they make unrealistic assumptions about individual behavior. We argue that whether the falsity of assumptions matters in a given model depends on which factors are explanatorily relevant. Since the explanatory factors may vary from application to application, effective criticism of economic model building should be based on model-specific arguments showing how the result really depends on the false assumptions. However, some modeling results in (...) imperialistic applications are relatively robust with respect to unrealistic assumptions. Key Words: unrealistic assumptions • economics imperialism • rational choice • as if • robustness. (shrink)

Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications on Political Science, Donald P. Green and Ian ShapiroThe Rational Choice Controversy: Economic Models of Politics Reconsidered. Jeffrey Friedman.

Because it consists of an entire family of specific theories derived from the same first principles, rational choice offers one approach to generate explanations that provide for micro-macro links, and to attack a wide variety of empirical problems in macrosociology. The aims of this paper are (1) to provide a bare skeleton of all rational choice arguments; (2) to demonstrate their applicability to a range of macrosociological concerns by reviewing a sample of both new and classic (...) works; and (3) to discuss the weaknesses of current rational choice theory and the possibilities for its future development. (shrink)

Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, EarlyView.

Zusammenfassung Der vorliegende Beitrag geht erstens der Frage nach, inwieweit das Phänomen des ehrenamtlichen Engagements in Sportvereinen mit den Grundannahmen der Rational-Choice-Theorie vereinbar ist. Die Entscheidungslogiken werden sowohl auf der Ebene des Vereinsmitgliedes als auch des Vereins analysiert und mathematisch modelliert. In diesem Zusammenhang wird die wichtige Rolle der Sozialisation im Sportverein für ehrenamtliches Engagement beleuchtet und in das Modell integriert.

Green and Shapiro's critique of rational choice theory underestimates the value of unification and the necessity of universalism in science. The central place of intentionality in social life makes both unification and universalism feasible norms in social science. However, ?universalism? in social science may be partial, in that the independence hypothesis?that the causal mechanism governing action is context independent?may hold only locally in certain classes of choice domains.

Theories of rational choice are arguably the most prominent approaches to human behaviour in the social and behavioral sciences. At the same time, they have faced persistent criticism. In this paper, I revisit some of the core criticisms that have for a long time been levelled against them and discuss to what extent those criticisms are still effective, not only in light of recent advancements in the literature but also of the fact that there are different variants of (...) rational choice theories that have not been considered explicitly when criticizing them. (shrink)

Habermas has argued that many of the endemic socio- economic problems of Western society are either symptoms or prod ucts of a 'lopsided' process of cultural rationalization, one that has emphasized instrumental forms of rationality over communicative. But other than presenting a rather general typology of lifeworld pathologies, Habermas has not done much to specify what these problems might be, nor has he provided any 'middle-range' analysis of the mechanisms through which they might be generated. This paper discusses some of (...) the ways in which, consistent with Haber mas's general framework, rational choice theory can be used for pre cisely this task. In this analysis, rational choice theory is not presented as a comprehensive theory of action, but is employed as a critical- diagnostic tool that allows the theorist to identify undesirable social interaction patterns that arise from a broader instrumentalization of the lifeworld. Key Words: critical theory • Habermas • instrumental rationality • market failure • rational choice theory. (shrink)

_Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory_, a book written by Donald Green and Ian Shapiro and published in 1994, excited much controversy among political scientists and promoted a dialogue among them that was printed in a double issue of the journal Critical Review in 1995. This new book reproduces thirteen essays from the journal written by senior scholars in the field, along with an introduction by the editor of the journal, Jeffrey Friedman, and a rejoinder to the essays by (...) Green and Shapiro. The scholars—who include John Ferejohn, Morris P. Fiorina, Stanley Kelley, Jr., Robert E. Lane, Peter C. Ordeshook, Norman Schofield, and Kenneth A. Shepsle—criticize, agree with, or build on the issues raised by Green and Shapiros critique. Together the essays provide an interesting and accessible way of focusing on competing approaches to the study of politics and the social sciences. (shrink)

Rational choice theories have been falsified by experimental tests of economic behavior and have not been supported by analyses of behavior in the market. Politics is an even less fertile field of application for rational choice theories because politics deals with ends as well as means, thus preventing ends?means rationality; voters have partisan loyalties often ?fixed? in adolescence; political benefits have no common unit of measurement; ?rational ignorance? inhibits rational choices; and there is no (...) market?like feedback to facilitate learning. Research comparing public and private efficiency does not support rational choice. Ironically, while law and business schools are now employing better microeconomic theories, political scientists are taking up rational choice theory, regardless of the disconfirming evidence. (shrink)

In public political deliberation, people will err and lie in accordance with definite patterns. Such discourse failure results from behavior that is both instrumentally and epistemically rational. The deliberative practices of a liberal democracy cannot be improved so as to overcome the tendency for rational citizens to believe and say things at odds with reliable propositions of social science. The theory has several corollaries. One is that much contemporary political philosophy can be seen as an unsuccessful attempt (...) to vindicate, on symbolic and moral grounds, the forms that discourse failure take on in public political deliberation. Another is that deliberative practices cannot be rescued even on non-epistemic grounds, such as social peace, impartiality, participation, and equality. To alleviate discourse failure, this book proposes to reduce the scope of majoritarian politics and enlarge markets. (shrink)

Is it rational to be moral? How do rationality and morality fit together with being human? These questions are at the heart of David Schmidtz's exploration of the connections between rationality and morality. This inquiry leads into both metaethics and rational choice theory, as Schmidtz develops conceptions of what it is to be moral and what it is to be rational. He defends a fairly expansive conception of rational choice, considering how ends as (...) well as means can be rationally chosen and explaining the role of self-imposed constraints in a rational life plan. His moral theory is dualistic, ranging over social structure as well as personal conduct and building both individual and collective rationality into its rules of recognition for morals. To the "why be moral" question, Schmidtz responds that being moral is rational, but he does not assume we have reasons to be rational. Instead, Schmidtz argues that being moral is rational in a particular way and that beings like us in situations like ours have reasons to be rational in just that way. This approach allows him to identify decisive reasons to be moral; at the same time, it explains why immorality is as prevalent as it is. This book thus offers a set of interesting and realistic conclusions about how morality fits into the lives of humanly rational agents operating in an institutional context like our own. (shrink)