We generalize two well-known model-theoretic characterization theorems from propositional modal logic to first-order modal logic. We first study FML-definable frames and give a version of the Goldblatt–Thomason theorem for this logic. The advantage of this result, compared with the original Goldblatt–Thomason theorem, is that it does not need the condition of ultrafilter reflection and uses only closure under bounded morphic images, generated subframes and disjoint unions. We then investigate Lindström type theorems for first-order modal logic. We show that FML has (...) the maximal expressive power among the logics extending FML which satisfy compactness, bisimulation invariance and the Tarski union property. (shrink)

This paper attempts to explore a number of conceptual issues surrounding genetic testing. It looks at the meaning of the terms, genetic information and genetic testing in relation to the definition set out by the Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing in the UK, and by the Task Force on Genetic Testing in the USA. It argues that the special arrangements that may be required for the regulation of genetic tests should not be determined by reference to the nature or technology (...) of the test, but by considering those morally relevant features that justify regulation. Failure to do so will lead to the regulation of genetic tests that need not be regulated, and would fail to cover other tests which should be regulated. The paper also argues that there is little in the nature of the properties of gene tests, using DNA or chromosomes, that in itself justifies a special approach. (shrink)

The article studies two related issues. First, it introduces the notion of the contraposition of quantifiers which is a “dual” notion of symmetry and has similar relations to co-intersectivity as symmetry has to intersectivity. Second, it shows how symmetry and contraposition can be generalised to higher order type quantifiers, while preserving their relations with other notions from generalized quantifiers theory.

An algebraic semantics, based on factor algebras, for one-way and two-way implicative verbs is proposed. Implicative verbs denote elements of filters or of ideals generated by identity functions in factor algebras. This semantics explains in particular the problem of implicational equivalence raised by two-way implicative verbs, and shows that the negation necessary to establish the implicativity of these verbs is the negation which preserves the presuppositions of sentences with implicative verbs. In addition, it follows from the proposed semantics that any (...) two implicative verbs denoting in the same algebra but belonging to different categories, are semantically related. (shrink)

This paper presents a unifying framework for the study of artificial life, intelIigence and reality. By providing this framework we can give a clear and concise introduction to the fundamental arguments of all three artificial sciences and facilitate the translation of arguments from any one domain to the other two. The framework is based on a variant of functionalism that does not exclude the role of the observer.

It is shown that the notion of the partition of a set can be used to describe in a uniform way the meaning of the expression the same, in its basic uses in transitive and ditransitive sentences. Some formal properties of the function denoted by the same, which follow from such a description are indicated. These properties indicate similarities and differences between functions denoted by the same and generalised quantifiers.

We provide necessary and sufficient conditions determining how monotonicity of some classes of reducible quantifiers depends on the monotonicity of simpler quantifiers of iterations to which they are equivalent.

Comment l'intention apologétique de Blondel dans L’Action est-elle compatible avec le caractère philosophique de l’œuvre ? Comment éviter le soupçon de préjugé, de pétition de principes ? R. Virgoulay montre comment le projet mis en œuvre dans L’Action et défini dans la Lettre de 1896, ouvrait la philosophie à l'examen du problème religieux par la détermination a priori de la notion de surnaturel. Après avoir exposé « la méthode de L’Action » pour faire passer d'une conviction subjective, d'un témoignage vécu, (...) à une « science », c'est-à-dire à l'exposé qui conjugue nécessité et universalité, il s'attarde sur la cinquième partie de L’Action. Celle-ci, après l'élaboration des quatre autres parties, peut être alors une philosophie de la religion qui porte sur le contenu même du Christianisme, et pour laquelle la notion décisive est celle du surnaturel. Les questions que pose cette notion amènent l'auteur à comparer la problématique blondélienne à celle de Laberthonnière, comparaison qui manifeste la différence entre la démarche théologique de ce dernier et celle, philosophique, de Blondel. Alors que laberthonnière tente de justifier théologiquement l'entreprise philosophique de Blondel, la Lettre distingue rigoureusement la théologie de la philosophie. How is the apologetic intention of Blondel in Action compatible with the philosophical character of the work ? How can one avoid the suspicion of prejudice, of begging the question ? R. Virgoulay shows how the project put to work in Action and defined in the Lettre of 1896, opened philosophy to the examination of the religious problem by the a priori determination of the notion of the supernatural. After discussing « the method of Action » in order to move from a subjective conviction, from a lived witnessing, to a « science », that is to say, to an analyses that conjugate necessity and universality, the author concentrates on the fifth part of Action. This latter, after, the elaboration of the four other parts, could be, then, a philosophy of religion that carries to the very content of Christianity, and for which the decisive notion is that of the supernatural. The questions that this idea brings up led the author to compare Blondel’s field of inquiry to that of Laberthonnière, a comparison that, manifests the difference between a theological approach of the latter and that, philosophical, of Blondel. While Laberthonnière tries theologically to justify the philosophical enterprise of Blondel, the Lettre rigorously distinguishes theology from philosophy. (shrink)