Artykuł stanowi próbę autorskiej interpretacji dwóch kluczowych kategorii w filozofii Jaspersa: znak egzystencji i szyfr transcendencji. Pokazane zostało, jaka pomiędzy nimi zachodzi różnica i jakie łączą je relacje. Autorowi szczególnie chodziło o podkreślenie znaczenia Jaspersowskiego terminu „transcendencja”, często niesłusznie pojmowanego jako po prostu zaświaty. „Transcendencja” wywodzi się bowiem od „transcendowania ku” i oznacza takie transcendowanie, które nie zwraca się ani ku przedmiotom świata empirycznego, ani ku ukrytemu charakterowi ludzkiej osoby, którym to charakterem jest egzystencja, a mimo to staje się nieodłączne (...) od ludzkiego działania. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to present views and opinions of the representatives of Lvov-Warsaw School upon subject, tasks, methods of aesthetics and its place among others sciences. Although writings on aesthetical problems appeared in the Lvov-Warsaw School relatively late, many scholars from that scientific circle contributed very much to the development of aesthetics - among others - Stanisław Ossowski, Mieczysław Wallis, Leopold Blaustein, Władysław Tatarkiewicz, Tadeusz Czeżowski, Stefan Baley, Władysław Witwicki and Tadeusz Witwicki. The opinions of these philosophers (...) and psychologists (and also other representatives of Lvov-Warsaw School which were not interested in particular aesthetical problems) upon subject of aesthetics and its place among sciences are varied, but they agree that aesthetics is a philosophical science and that the concepts and thesis of aesthetics should be clear and well constructed, whereas incorrectly posted problems - eliminated. (shrink)

The aim of the article is a review of the wide spectrum of lobbying formulations and definitions to answer questions regarding the areas of lobbying activity. The author argues that lobbying is a wide scope of activities that lobbyists undertake according to their expectations and preferences. Ethical reflections on lobbying activity should then take into consideration the conditions in which the main players on the democratic political scene interact with each other.

Dla materialnej etyki wartości typowa jest teza, że wartości są ujmowane w akcie czucia. W artykule rozważam pytanie, co jest właściwym przedmiotem czucia wartości w etyce N. Hartmanna, który odróżnia wartościowy charakter, treść wartości oraz powinność. Stwierdzenie, że takim przedmiotem jest wartość, jest zatem zbyt ogólne. Analiza poglądów Hartmanna ukazuje, że w aksjologicznym czuciu dane są wprawdzie wszystkie te momenty wartości, ale niejasno. Faktem jest jednak, że tylko czucie ujmuje wartościowy charakter oraz powinność. Tę rolę czucie spełnia zarówno w praktycznym (...) życiu, jak i w badaniu filozoficznym. (shrink)

The main aim of the paper is to define trade mark and to indicate varied semiotic functions which it fulfils. We define trade mark as a product of man used on the market to identify products or services of a certain firm or to distinguish products or services of a certain firm from those of other firms. All trade marks fulfil an identificative or differentional function. We distinguish trade mark from trade name: the trade name becomes a trade mark iff (...) it has such-and-such a specified visual form. We claim that trade name is a proper name which refers to a certain firm and has no connotation. Trade mark in advertising (1) refers to particular products or services and (2) connotates the product’s (service’s) property being produced or distributed by a particular firm. The trade mark placed on the package of some product is both: (1) an index sign, which “points to” the fact that the object in the package is produced or distributed by such-and-such a firm and (2) a performative (a sign which generates a new state of affairs), which certifies that the object in the package is produced or distributed by such-and-such a firm. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes’ standpoint concerning the right for death seems to be coherent as well as justifiable. On one hand he points at the fear of death as the main source of law, but on the other hand he formulates minimum basic rules which safeguard man’s life. Though nobody is obliged to rescue someone else at the cost of their own life, but at the same time nobody has a right to kill anyone. Also nowadays the same rule can be found (...) in many legal systems: even if people are obliged to help others, they are not compelled to undertake heroic deeds or risk their lives. Thus Hobbes’ position can be given the name of ethical individualism, or even egoism in which no form of instrumentalism of human life is allowed. The value of any individual is absolute, which excludes the possibility to sacrifice their life for the sake of others. Hobbes does not share assumptions of utilitarianism and his solution might seem utopian from the perspective of the strategy of social actions, but from the perspective of values and rights of an individual it seems justifiable. (shrink)