Post-foundational politics and democracy -- Agonism and democracy -- A typology of agonistic democracy -- Agonistic democracy and the question of institutions -- Agonistic democracy and the limits of popular participation -- Populism, representation, and the popular will -- Political liberalism, contingency and agonistic pluralism -- Liberalism, agonism, and democracy.

The foundationalism in irrealism is structural foundationalism, according to which reason giving must terminate with some affair beyond the reach of noncircular inferential justification or critique. Even relativist irrealists are structural foundationalists. But structural foundationalism is only as good as the regress argument for it, which presupposes that the relevant forms of inferential justification are all transitive. Since they are not, structural foundationalism fails. So too does the “God’s-eye-view” or look-see argument against realism, to the effect (...) that when it comes to correspondence and universals or samenesses found not made, realists have no noncircular argumentative recourse, hence must gaze on reality bare, looking to see that the categories of our language or thought conform to something in reality. Furthermore, realists can justify their view via nontransitive forms of inferential justífication, without recourse either to look-see or to morally problematic notions of sameness and difference made rather than lovingly found. (shrink)

John Post has argued that the traditional regress argument against nonfoundational justificatory structures does not go through because it depends on the false assumption that “justifies” is in general transitive. But, says Post, many significant justificatory relations are not transitive. The authors counter that there is an evidential relation essential to all inferential justification, regardless of specific inference form or degree of carried-over justificatory force, which is in general transitive. They respond to attempted counterexamples to transitivity brought by (...) Watkins and Salmon as well as to Post’s, arguing that none of these counterexamples apply to the relation they are describing. Given the revived transitivity assumption using this relation, the regress argument does indeed demonstrate the need for foundational stopping points in inferential justification. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 7, Page 992-1013, September 2022. This article examines the connection between populism and post-foundationalism in the context of contemporary debates about populism as a strategy for the Left. I argue that there is something “populist” about every constitutional order, including liberal democratic ones. I argue so drawing on Chantal Mouffe’s theories of hegemony, agonistic democracy, and left populism. Populism is the quintessential form of post-foundational politics because, rightly understood, populism constructs (...) the object it claims to represent, namely the people. As such, it expresses the fact that, because there is no ultimate foundation, politics consists in the construction of contingent foundations. I develop this argument through readings of Jan-Werner Müller and Chantal Mouffe, showing the differences between their respective post-foundational approaches. I show that Müller cannot uphold the distinction between populism and democracy in the way he seeks to do, but I also argue that this does not mean that we must jettison all normativity, only that it requires that we rethink normativity in hegemonic terms. (shrink)

In order to defend the regress argument for foundationalism against Post’s objection that relevant forms of inferential justification are not transitive, Lydia McGrew and Timothy McGrew define a relation E of positive evidence, which, they contend, has the following features: It is a necessary condition for any inferential justification; it is transitive and irreflexive; and it enables both a strengthened regress argument proof against Post’s objection and an argument that nothing can ever appear in its own justificational (...) ancestry. In reply, we construct in their own terms both a counterexample to the would-be transitivity of E, and a related objection to their never-in-its-own-ancestry argument. We also rebut their rejection of certain counterexamples to the would-be transitivity of some forms of inferential justification. By doing so, and by questioning their transitivity claim for E, we aim to further the project of undermining the circularity arguments advanced by a zoo of skeptics, relativists, antirealists and internalists against realism and externalism. (shrink)

Postmodernism precludes philosophical justifications for democracy. This undermines the role of philosophy of education and leaves us with weaker reasons for educational democracy than we need. If the ‘postmodern challenge’ is as Wilfred Carr conceives it, Jürgen Habermas meets that challenge. His work rests on neither Enlightenment essentialism nor foundationalism. Habermas can accept and explain that consciousness is historically and socially situated in discourse, yet still argue to the possibility of emancipation. I defend his conception of rationality from charges (...) of essentialism. Rational thinking can critique its own specific forms, so superior forms of rationality remain universalisable by rational means. A historicising account of such critique avoids situationist relativism. These considerations justify educational democracy and preserve a role for philosophy of education. (shrink)

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1996.

The perennial problem of the exact nature of epistemic justification has recently become even more interesting upon Laurence BonJour's openly converting himself to foundationalism following a long and successful career built mainly around a strong defense of coherentism cum internalism. Even though the famous debate between foundationalism and coherentism is often associated with the "technical" issues of epistemic regress, basic beliefs, and so on, in this paper I will approach the debate from the standpoint of the post-Wittgensteinian (...) literature and try to provide some useful insights about the justification of those beliefs alleged by the foundationalist to constitute our ultimate touch with reality. More specifically, I will offer a neo-Kantian interpretation of the subvenient basis of supervenience relations believed to take place between the world and our basic cognitive states, and claim that such an approach has a better chance of combining the strengths of the traditional rivals in epistemology and coming up with a viable synthesis on this matter. (shrink)

Foundationalism, a theory about the structure of epistemic justification, is often criticized for excesses that are unnecessary additions to it. But when correctly understood, its main tenets (featuring most prominently the claim that there can be properly basic beliefs) are virtually undeniable. The best way to get at the heart of foundationalism is to focus not on Descartes but on Aristotle and his famous regress argument. Section I unpacks that foundationalist argument. Section II addresses some objections to (...) class='Hi'>foundationalism. Section III considers how foundationalism bears on topics in the epistemology of theology—topics such as Reformed epistemology, natural theology, Biblical criticism, and post-foundationalism. (shrink)

It has sometimes erroneously been thought that theory of knowledge worthy of the name, or even epistemology as such comes to an end with Kant. This view is an error, since there are profound views of knowledge in the post-Kantian philosophical tradition, including that in Hegel’s thought. Now epistemology is a wide topic that includes a variety of themes. One of the main themes in the theory of knowledge in modern philosophy, especially in recent years, has been the issue (...) of foundationalism. The idea of foundationalism has been understood in different ways. But for purposes of this discussion, I will understand “foundationalism” to mean “some form of the Cartesian approach to philosophy through a self-justifying first principle.” In this paper, I will provide a brief, critical study of the theme of foundationalism in the Science of Logic. The aim of my discussion is to point to an unresolved tension between Hegel’s general commitment to epistemological circularity as the appropriate strategy for knowledge and the linear form of argument in this book. (shrink)

ln a number of recent essays, Hendrik Hart has elaborated an account of the nature and function of religious belief that, he believes, is post-modern in inspiration and anti-foundationalist in character. ln this paper, I reconstruct what I take to be Hart’s central claims. While Hart does remind us of some important aspects of the nature of religious belief---aspects often overlooked by many critics---l suggest that there are several problems in the account he provides, that there are tensions between (...) his view of religious belief and his claims about how it can function, and that it is not clear that he ultimately avoids adopting a variant of the foundationalism he explicitly rejects. (shrink)

John Post has argued that the traditional regress argument against nonfoundational justificatory structures does not go through because it depends on the false assumption that “justifies” is in general transitive. But, says Post, many significant justificatory relations are not transitive. The authors counter that there is an evidential relation essential to all inferential justification, regardless of specific inference form or degree of carried-over justificatory force, which is in general transitive. They respond to attempted counterexamples to transitivity brought by (...) Watkins and Salmon as well as to Post’s, arguing that none of these counterexamples apply to the relation they are describing. Given the revived transitivity assumption using this relation, the regress argument does indeed demonstrate the need for foundational stopping points in inferential justification. (shrink)

Empirical philosophy of religion is usually appraised in light of its theological uses, rather than in terms of its relation to philosophical forms of empiricism. The present paper examines the empirical theism of Henry Nelson Wieman by relating it to Carl Hempel's critique of functionalism, Karl Popper's use of falsifiability, and the growth of post–empiricist anti–foundationalism in epis–temology. It is concluded that Wieman's argument commits the fallacy of affirming the consequent; that his theistic perspective nevertheless offers an important (...) heuristic device in line with fal–libilism, and that his radical empiricism anticipates recent anti–foundationalist trends. (shrink)

The chapter explores comparatively the attention to the practical dimension that—each in his own way—Michel Foucault, Friedrich Nietzsche, and the classic pragmatist thinker William James pay when confronted with the challenge of providing a non-skeptical response to the relativist stance on truth that arose in the post-Kantian age. Particular focus will be given to the extent to which these three authors conceived of the practical framework as the only one that allows us to meaningfully address and determine truth.

As one of the most influential commentators on the role of modern philosophy, Richard Rorty's work impacted all areas of philosophical inquiry, including business ethics. Rorty's post-foundational approach to "moral imagination" can inform how we teach business ethics in a diverse and philosophically eclectic manner. A summary of Rorty's critique of philosophy, ethics, and applied ethics will be followed by a discussion of the implications for a critical pedagogy and the pragmatic use of an expansive philosophical lexicon in a (...) business ethics course. (shrink)

Hegel’s Philosophy of Right can be analyzed whether independently from the Science of Logic or on the basis of the metaphysical premises developed in the latter work. In the present paper we enumerate different positions about this question, and we classify a number of attempts which were recently carried out in order to actualize the PhR. the differentiation of five levels of analysis of the articulation of the ethical and the logical in the PhR allows us to conclude that both (...) the thesis on the dependence and the thesis of the independence can be compatible, since they refer to different levels of analysis. (shrink)

Sayer argues that Popper defended a logicist philosophy of science. The problem with such logicism is that it creates what is termed here as a `truncated foundationalism', which restricts epistemic certainty to the logical form of scientific theories whilst having nothing to say about their substantive contents. Against this it is argued that critical realism, which Sayer advocates, produces a linguistic version of truncated foundationalism and that Popper's problem-solving philosophy, with its emphasis on developing knowledge through criticism, eschews (...) all forms of foundationalism and is better able to account for the development of substantive knowledge claims. Key Words: critical realism • fallibilism • logicism • post-positivism • truncated foundationalism. (shrink)

In a remarkable range of disciplines — from legal studies to architecture, from art history to rock music — there is emerging a paradoxically unified approach to the theory of contemporary cultural dissolution. In the humanities in America, three major post-structuralist philosophic movements may be discerned, each describing a separate facet of traditional disciplinary studies yet all having a remarkable cross-departmental impact. These are the anti-foundationalism of Richard Rorty and other end-of-the-line philosophers in the American pragmatist tradition, the (...) textual deconstructionists who swim about Jacques Derrida, and the revisers of Western Marxism, such as Fredric Jameson, various Parisians, and Terry Eagleton, who dialectically step out of history into its forms to tease the future out of the maw of capitalism. (shrink)

This introduction explores the relationship between Europe and its Christianities. It analyses different diagnostic and evaluative approaches to Europe's Christian or post-Christian identity. These are grouped around the concepts of diverse traditional, and, on the other hand, post-Enlightenment Christianities. While the first revolves around a liturgical and mystical account of the church, a Christ-centred humanism, an emphasis on man's future life, noetic theology and a foundationalist claim to universal truth, the second endorses a moralization of the “Christian message,” (...) political implementation of “Christian goals,” rationalism, a this-worldly humanism, and tolerance for religious diversity. Since even the concepts of “traditional” and “post-Enlightenment” Christianity turn out to be deeply ambiguous, the essay concludes with exploring the different ways in which the Christianity of the Apostolic Church, the Enlightenment (along with the “Western” Christianities it shaped), and contemporary liberalism each conceive of their respective endorsements of human freedom as either normative, that is obligatory, value-laden, or contingent, and arbitrary. In each case, a different notion of “tradition” (as well as familial and church authority) is placed either in harmony or in opposition to such freedom. As a result of this conceptual analysis, the deeply fractured identity of Europe, as exemplified by the diverse bioethical positions adopted by the authors in this issue, becomes visible. (shrink)

The Paradox of PostmodernismModernism is, roughly speaking, the Enlightenment belief in a single unified rational perspective, founded on some indubitable evidence given in human experience – either innate conceptsà laDescartes and the rationalists, or sensationsà laLocke and the empiricists – and elaborated according to reliable logical rules. This view was first attacked for its ‘foundationalism.’ Philosophers, such as Nietzsche, Dewey, Heidegger and the later Wittgenstein, denied that there is any indubitable given upon which truth can be founded. There is (...) no experience, no testimony of the senses or of reason that blazons forth the undeniable truth. Rather the ‘given’ is, so to speak, constructed - which is to say, not given to us, but made by us. Some experience or other evidence is interpreted as this or that with this or that epistemological status, on the basis of beliefs that one already has about, say, space or mathematics or sense perception or the nature of what is ultimately real. Postmodernism is an intensification of this attack, with a distinctive political spin. (shrink)

This paper represents an attempt to articulate the basic principles of a hermeneutic philosophy of science. Throughout, the author is at pains to show that both (i) overcoming epistemological foundationalism and (ii) insisting on the multiplicity, patchiness, and heterogeneity of the discursive practices of scientific research do not imply a farewell to an analysis of the constitution of science's autonomous cognitive structure. Such an analysis operates in two directions: “continuous weakening” of epistemological foundationalism and “hermeneutic grounding” of a (...) cognitive structure. Carrying out the analysis in both directions leads to a (post) foundational picture of science. The main thrust of the first part of the paper is to outline the tenets of a constitutional analysis of scientific research. This part focuses especially on the notion of “unified narrativestructures” which refers to the “effective histories” of the main epistemic types of science. (shrink)

Despite Wittgensein's anti-foundationalist stance, clearly expressed in his claim that philosophy is an activity of analyzing language, his philosophy is based on peculiar conceptual scheme. The post-Wittgensteinian philosophy uses this scheme as Wittgenstein had recommended: as an instrument ("ladder") that helps by forming good taste for judging. The latter is used by solving problems of science and life.

In his contribution to this volume, Avrum Stroll makes the assertion that there is ‘a feature of [Wittgenstein's] later philosophy that occurs only in On Certainty. This is a unique form of foundationalism that is neither doxastic nor non-doxastic' (Stroll, this volume, p. 2). He also holds that Wittgenstein’s increased attention to metaphorical language in explicating this foundationalism is yet another feature that sets it apart from the rest of his corpus. I raise doubts about appealing to either (...) of these aspects as a rationale for identifying a third Wittgenstein. I argue that Wittgenstein's commitment to foundationalism – to the extent we should recognise it at all – and his concern with the non-literal are not unprecedented; they are present in his earliest writings. (shrink)

Nancey Murphy's offer to take us “beyond liberalism and fundamentalism” is an exciting one: Who wants to be caught in the clutches of a fruitless theological dispute? She argues that the key to our escape is “Anglo‐American postmodernity.” I analyze what Murphy means by this term and why it may turn out to be a more precarious escape route than one might think. Holism or “post‐foundationalism” is indeed inescapable for science/religion discussions today, but an inclusivist holism is preferable (...) to Murphy's insular holism. (shrink)

As indicated by its title, this book provides an overview of philosophy of science in the twentieth century. It focuses mostly on post-WWII philosophy of science, but it discusses earlier developme...

The increased visibility of feminism in mainstream culture has recently been noted, with the presence of both online and offline campaigns embedding feminist claims in a variety of everyday spaces. By granting recognition to women’s experiences, these campaigns continue the feminist practice of generating critical knowledge on the basis of gendered experience. In the post-truth era, however, the norms governing claims-making are being significantly reconstructed, with significant consequences for critiques of gender inequality. It is argued here that these norms (...) are linked directly to a wider context of anti-feminism in which dismissing women’s claims is consistent with the goal that opponents of gender equality have of seeking and consolidating epistemic power in the face of what is perceived as systemic male disadvantage and victimhood. Returning to earlier debates within feminism, it is argued that the kinds of post-truth rhetoric used to dismiss women’s experience provide a challenge that feminism must confront. This rhetoric is often grounded in the authenticity of individual experience; however, experience cannot provide unmediated access to truth and, therefore, cannot provide the foundation for feminist claims. On the other hand, experience cannot merely offer one of many contested versions of ‘reality’. The excesses of both foundationalist and anti-foundationalist epistemology are countered with the argument that cognition is a human practice mediated by theoretical propositions which illuminate the question of what can be known. This is the role played by feminist theory in defending the role of experience. (shrink)

The foundations of law have been the object ofintense philosophical scrutiny since antiquity.Most importantly, it has been asked whetherthere are really any foundations other thansheer force to be found once more comfortingillusions are abandoned. This paperinvestigates four influential theorists ofradical legal philosophy and postmodern thought who dealwith this problem in comparable ways despitetheir different theoretical outlooks. Themerits of these theories having been assessed,mentalism in ethics and law is introduced as apossible alternative to both the widespreadfoundationalism of the past and theanti- (...) class='Hi'>foundationalism of the postmodern present. (shrink)

The ill?named debate between postmodernists and postlibertarians should be transcended; this requires the abandonment of both foundationalism and its converse, without abandoning common sense as well (which is no mean trick). Similarly, the debate over ?minimal statism? versus the planned economy is outdated. Instead of claiming to be in possession of foundations of our scientific?cum?political knowledge in broad terms, and instead of severely limiting our knowledge to given proofs, we offer the putative heuristics of critique in general and the (...) critical evaluations of contexts in particular. (shrink)

This essay reexamines aspects of F. W. J. Schelling’s philosophy in the context of the recent resurgence of academic interest in anarchist theory, with emphasis on how Schelling’s thought relates to founding anarchist thinker Mikhail Bakunin. Through an examination of aspects of Schelling’s ontology and his critique of Hegel, I discuss how Bakunin’s objections to Schelling can be tempered, all while providing the framework for a “philosophy of existence” which informs Bakunin’s own departure from a Hegelian “philosophy of essence.” I (...) then propose how Schelling’s ontology might go beyond Bakunin to speak to the non-foundationalist aspects of anarchist thinking today. (shrink)

This paper proceeds through four stages. First, it provides an account of the origins and evolution of the concept of educational theory. Second, it uses this historical narrative to show how what we now call 'educational theory' is deeply rooted in the foundationalist discourse of late nineteenth and early twentieth century modernity. Third, it outlines and defends a postfoundationalist critique of the foundationalist epistemological assumptions on which our understanding of educational theory has been erected. Finally, it argues that the only (...) conclusion to draw from this postfoundationalist critique is that educational theory has run its course and should now be brought to a dignified end. (shrink)

I reconstruct Aristotle's epistemology and scientific methodology avoiding some problems which, in my opinion, are attributed to them from inadequate interpretations in terms of foundationalism or coherentism. On the contrary, I credit Aristotle with a hybrid concept of empiricism in which our knowledge is made possible through the integration of two different but cooperative factors: observations and beliefs. By clarifying the implications of Aristotle's concept of experience and the basis for the elaboration of scientific knowledge, I try to give (...) an alternative account of Aristotle's vindication of a positive use of dialectic in science, as well as to show that an integration between dialectical examination of beliefs and scientific analysis of facts is possible and it also gives a plausible methodological image of Aristotle's theory. According to my proposal, some opinions play a conceptual role in the empirical basis of knowledge. But, for Aristotle, this does not amount to any more than a kind of knowledge of the facts, not being equivalent to a scientific knowledge of the causes. Finally, I try to show that within this complex epistemological framework Aristotle's use of induction could also be given an adequate explanation. (shrink)

In contemporary theology, the movement of Radical Orthodoxy has provoked already many ‘new’ debates, especially on the relation between theology and politics, the usefulness of postmodern philosophy, interpretations of secularity and the necessity of ontological reflections within theology. In this article I focus on the thought of John Milbank, whose philosophy and theology can be understood as the backbone of this movement, this in order to clear out some of the fundamental premises of the debate on the relation between theology (...) and modernity. In a first part, I elaborate on his reading of modernity and postmodernity as nihilistic. This is necessary in order to understand why for Milbank a Christian master-narrative should return. In the genealogy of the actual impasse, I limit myself to three core moments in history: Duns Scotus, Immanuel Kant and Jean-François Lyotard. Thereafter, I linger over Milbank’s own epistemology and metaphysics. More specifically, I compare and contrast some of his ideas with the theology of George Lindbeck. Both understand theology as non-foundationalist, but where Lindbeck tries to avoid ontological claims, they clearly return in Milbank’s construal. A third part is dedicated to Milbank’s alternative to the postmodern ontology of violence. Shortly, I deal with his attempt to recontextualise Augustine and with why only a patristic logic can offer us the necessary resources to overcome our actual state of nihilism. After this threefold presentation, one specific idea, namely the problem of intratextuality, is used to come to a critical evaluation of his thought. Is it possible and desirable to do theology purely from within the Christian ‘text’? I conclude with a more general reflection on the problem of ‘tone’ in philosophy and theology? What is the appropriate tone for a Christian theology, specifically in its relation towards modernity? (shrink)

This article investigates using social entrepreneurship as a way of developing sustainable township economies, so that poverty can be eradicated from the townships of South Africa and township dwellers can begin to play a role in the economic development of the country. The author also thinks it is God's purpose for people to enjoy life, free from economic hardship. A reduction in poverty would also bring down the crime rate and other social ills. It starts by defining and clarifying the (...) concepts of 'entrepreneur' and 'social entrepreneurship'. It continues by looking in more depth into township life and its challenges. This is done through reviewing the literature and observations obtained through participant observation research. Post-foundationalist practical theology believes in interdisciplinary dialogue as a means of allowing the concept of social entrepreneurship to bring about a sustainable township economy. From the author's observations, it became apparent that to see the attainment of a sustainable township economy, training and development should start with a strong emphasis on personal identity and interpersonal and business skills. The author, therefore, proposes a holistic approach to social entrepreneurship. (shrink)

This chapter addresses the question whether the notion of ownedness or authenticity in Being and Time can serve as a model for social change. To answer this question, I build on the late Dreyfus’s understanding of owned Dasein as a “world transformer”, Butler’s understanding of contingent foundations, and Kyle Stroh’s conception of owned Dasein in the plural, in order to develop a notion of social ownedness. In my reading, ownedness concerns primarily the transparency of ontological structures on the part of (...) the owned self, including a proper understanding of the role of the anyone. The owned self realizes that the anyone remains the foundation of intelligibility, but understands it as a contingent foundation and thereby contests its absolutization and the tendency of conformism. After an interpretation of Heidegger’s remarks on “nullity” and “abyss of ground “ in relation to Butler’s theory of post-foundationalism, and a discussion of “historicality” in relation to Butler’s notion of performativity as iterability, I offer a reinterpretation of the figure of the “world transformer” and end with a proposal on how to understand social ownedness. (shrink)

The history of political philosophy is marked by a conception of politics as inherently tragic. As such, it has hardly ever been systematically contrasted with the other model of dramatic art, comedy. In this article, I explore the relation between Hegel's twofold notion of drama as an ordered genre of disorder – what he considers to be the highest form of self-reflective art – and the post-foundational concept of radical democracy. After outlining the interplay between order and disorder in (...) post-foundationalist theories of political difference, I summarize the way in which the steps of Hegel's poetics consecutively build on each other and elaborate the role of the dramatic genres. By means of a genealogical reconstruction of the respective concepts of democracy and drama, I demonstrate the extent to which these two methodologies correspond to poetic and political order formation in a structural homology. This conceptualization concludes with the assertion of a constitutive dramatization of political modernity which does not, however, culminate in the concept of political tragedy but points towards a still-to-be-realized, comically ordered democracy. (shrink)

Resumen: El artículo estudia los aspectos fundamentales de la crítica de Dussel al modelo formal de hegemonía desarrollado por Laclau. En este contexto, se presenta la propuesta de una hegemonía popular ligada a la centralidad de la reproducción de la vida como criterio normativo de la política y se denuncia el decisionismo abstracto de la teoría populista laclauniana. Pero también en este texto se ofrece, siguiendo la lectura de Castro-Gómez, una crítica de las tesis de Dussel desde un punto de (...) vista postfundacionalista, lo que supone cuestionar la idea misma de un universal incondicionado. Finalmente, concluimos exponiendo una crítica a algunas de las coordenadas teóricas compartidas por ambos autores, identificando las limitaciones del concepto mismo de hegemonía.: This article studies the fundamental aspects of Dussel’s critique of the formal model of hegemony developed by Laclau. In this context, a concept of popular hegemony tied to the centrality of the reproduction of life as a normative criterion in politics is proposed, as well as an argument against the abstract decisionism of the populist theory of Laclau. The text also offers -as suggested by Castro-Gomez’s reading- a critique of Dussel’s ideas from a post-foundationalist perspective, which leads to questioning the very idea of an unconditional universal. Finally, we conclude by positing a critique of some of the theoretical viewpoints shared by both authors, identifying the limitations of the very concept of hegemony. (shrink)

In 2017, the Faculty of Theology celebrates its centenary at the University of Pretoria. Celebrating a centennial is as much as looking back as looking forward. In a changing world with changing paradigms how does one remain relevant? Different challenges and expectations presented to tertiary institutions of education in a new dispensation puts all concerned with higher education in South Africa under pressure. The question addressed in this article is how will a Faculty of Theology remain relevant to such an (...) extent that it is continued to be viewed as desirable to have such a faculty present at a university, participating in the academic process and simultaneously continues to contribute to the well-being of the South African society. The author suggests the following guidelines for consideration. In order to remain relevant for the next couple of hundred years the Faculty of Theology should engage contextually with society, practise interdisciplinary Theology, engage in interreligious dialogue while still remaining connected to faith communities. A paradigm of post-foundationalism enables Theology to exercise Theology in a relevant and meaningful manner. (shrink)

I suggest some ways in which a certain type of ‘post-foundationalism’ has had a deleterious effect in theological ethics. Much ‘post-foundationalism’ is in truth still foundationalism, albeit less reflective and more permissive, leading to a balkanised plethora of foundationalist systems. Although Wittgenstein is critical of foundationalism, it is by applying Wittgensteinian insights that we are able to avoid some of the reductive and unipolar thinking that has characterised some recent theological discussion.

The introduction by Merold Westphal sets the scene: "Two books, two visions of philosophy, two friends and sometimes colleagues...". Modernity and Its Discontents is a debate between Caputo and Marsh in which each upheld their opposing philosphical positions by critical modernism and post-modernism. The book opens with a critique of each debater of the other's previous work. With its passionate point-counterpoint form, the book recalls the philosphical dialogues of classical times, but the writing style remains lucid and uncluttered. Taking (...) the failure of Englightenment ideals as their common ground, the debaters challenge each other's ideas on the nature of post-foundationalist critique. At the core of the argument lies the timely question of the role that each person can play in creating a truly humane society. (shrink)

Albert Camus's existential thinking has been the object of renewed interest over the past decade. Political theorists have looked to his work to shed light on the contradictions and violence of modernity and the dynamics of postcolonial justice. This article contends that Camus's account of the modern human condition provides a means of engaging critically with one of the most compelling ideas linked to thinking about global politics today: cosmopolitanism. By developing Camus's position on absurdity and rebellion, it suggests that (...) the idea of cosmopolitanism should be situated in a post-foundationalist and post-teleological nexus to prevent it becoming a new political ideology of immutable truth. In order to make this argument, the article focuses on how Camus's thinking supports a rebellious cosmopolitan disposition towards global transformations. In so doing, it shows that cosmopolitanism must strive against the injustices of a deeply divided world, yet at the same time accept theoretical, factual and moral limits on its vision and actions. (shrink)

This article is concerned with the question of the relative priority between political and social ontology within left-Heideggerianism, a tradition recently reconstructed by Oliver Marchart. Although the title seems to imply that this question is an open and live one within left-Heideggerianism – that the two paths at the crossroads have been clearly delineated when, in fact, the current predicament of left-Heideggerianism resembles more a one-way street – this is somewhat misleading: the identification of left-Heideggerianism with a post-foundationalist political (...) ontology that enjoys systematic priority over the social has contributed to the suppression of the question of the Being of the social and, therefore, prevented a critical re-examination of its relationship to the political. The aim of this article is both modest and ambitious: modest, in that it merely seeks to pose and motivate the question of the social within left-Heideggerianism both at an exegetical and at a systematic level; ambiti... (shrink)

Resumen: El objetivo de este artículo es describir y analizar cómo se han ido transformando históricamente los conceptos de comunidad y sujeto desde sus orígenes hasta la actualidad en el pentecostalismo. A partir del análisis de la literatura más significativa en Chile sobre de este movimiento socioreligioso, mostraremos cómo tanto la literatura especializada como el movimiento pentecostal mismo han pasado desde una concepción fundacionalista de la comunidad y los sujetos pentecostales, a una concepción postfundacionalista de los mismos. Metodológicamente hemos revisado (...) y analizados todos los artículos y libros de sociología y antropología del pentecostalismo publicado desde 1967 hasta la actualidad. Nos hemos encontrado una crisis y desencanto religioso en el movimiento pentecostal, y un debilitamiento de la fuerza aglutinante de las nociones fundacionalistas del pentecostalismo. El movimiento pentecostal se encuentra en un momento postfundacionalista, que hemos denominado provisoriamente postpentecostalismo.: The aim of this paper is to describe and analyse how the concepts of community and people have historically evolved from their origins up to these days in Pentecostalism. Considering an analysis of the most relevant literature in Chile on this religious movement, we will show how the specialized literature and the movement itself have shifted from foundationalist notions of community and subject, towards post-foundationalist notions of these concepts. Methodologically we have reviewed and analysed all the articles and books of sociology and anthropology of Pentecostalism published from 1967 to the present. We have encountered a crisis and religious disenchantment in the Pentecostal movement, and a weakening of the agglutinating force of the foundational notions of Pentecostalism. The Pentecostal movement is at a postfoundationalist moment, which we have tentatively called postpentecostalism. (shrink)

After the presentation of different views on the relation between narrative and life it is argued that Paul Ricoeur's view offers a framework that allows an answer to questions that remain unanswered in the work of MacIntyre and Carr. Although Ricoeur's view has its own flaws, the concepts of triple mimesis and of narrative identity can be incorporated in a post-foundationalist view. Within this resulting frame of reference narratives in narrative research are interpreted as compositions, as the result of (...) emplotment. Thus the characteristics of a narrative apply to the participant's stories, to personal identity and to the researcher's narrative. (shrink)

The Handbook on Governmentality discusses the development of an interdisciplinary field of research, focusing on Michel Foucault's post-foundationalist concept of governmentality and the ways it has been used to write genealogies of modern states, the governance of societal problems and the governance of the self. Bringing together an international group of contributors, the Handbook examines major developments in debates on governmentality, as well as encouraging further research in areas such as climate change, decolonial politics, logistics, and populism. Chapters explore (...) how governmentality reshapes policy analysis as political practice, the relationship between Foucault's ideas of government and postcolonial experiences, and how governmentality can illuminate discourse on the green economy and biopolitics. Analysing how contemporary socio-political issues including feminist politics, migration, and racialized medicine are interwoven with the concept of governmentality, this Handbook sheds light on the modern-day uses of Foucault's work. Providing a comprehensive overview of research on governmentality, this Handbook will be essential reading for students and scholars of development studies, geopolitics, political economy, organizational studies, political geography, postcolonial theory, and public policy. It will also be a key resource for policy makers in the field looking for a deeper theoretical understanding of the topic. (shrink)

The concept of political difference concerns the distinction between politics and the political. The political refers to the ontological making possible of the different domains of society, including the domain of politics in the narrow sense. Political difference was introduced as a reaction to the theoretical controversy between foundationalism and anti-foundationalism. This reaction took the form of post-foundationalism. According to Marchart, post-foundationalism does not entirely deny the possibility of grounding. It denies only the possibility (...) of an ultimate transcendent foundation insofar as this ontological impossibility makes possible the historical and contingent grounds in plural.The Heideggerian concept of ontological difference also undermines the possibility of an ultimate ontical ground which establishes the presence of all the other beings. If one wants to think beyond the concept of ground, one should obtain a clear understanding of Being as Being, namely one should grasp the Being in its difference from beings. All the same, Heidegger tends to replace the ontical grounds of metaphysics with Being itself as a new kind of ultimate ontological foundation.On the other hand, one can detect in many points of Heideggerian argumentation traces of a second alternative understanding of ontological difference which does not belong in Heidegger’s intentions and which undermines the primordiality of Being. This alternative understanding establishes a reciprocity between Being and beings. In our view, political difference not only is based in this second way of understanding but, at the same time, develops more decisively the mutual interdependence between Being and beings.In political difference the grounding part, namely the political, possesses both a grounding character and a derivative one. Politics and political both grounds and dislocate each other in an incessant and oscillating, historical procedure which undermines any form of completion of the social. (shrink)

Why problematology? : a new philosophical approach to social science -- Problematology : a new foundation for reason -- The problematological critique of post-foundationalism -- Questioning in the philosophy of social science -- Questioning, contingency and meaning -- Problematology and the emotions -- Rhetoric and social distance -- Conclusion : problematology and social inquiry.

It has become all too common in discussing Rorty’s work, to distinguish the reasonable and constructive Rorty from the outrageous, destructive and irresponsible enfant terrible of twentieth century American philosophy. According to this familiar reading, one can unproblematically distinguish those rhetoric flourishes that have enraged so many of his philosophical colleagues from the substantive, and one might even say constructive, insights that are hidden in his work. However, as I will argue in this paper, this distillation process is not only (...) hermeneutically suspicious, but actually hinders our ability to make sense of what Rorty was trying to say. Rorty’s call was to “break the crust of convention”; not for destruction’s sake but to warn us against the dangers of all forms of fundamentalism and dogmatism and more importantly, open up the possibilities of a post-foundationalist, post-representationalist culture where solidarity and imagination at the service of human dignity replace the old obsession with objectivity and the quest for certainty. (shrink)

This paper attempts to integrate discourse theories, mainly the theory of hegemony by Essex School, and Tartu–Moscow School’s cultural semiotics, andsets for itself the modest task to point to the applicability of semiotic approach in political analysis. The so-called post-foundationalist view, that is common for discourse theories, is primarily characterized by the rejection of essentialist notions of ground for the social, and the inauguration of cultural and discursive characteristics (such as asymmetry and entropy; explosion; antagonism; insurmountable tension between organization (...) and disorganization, regularity and irregularity, etc.) into the wider social scientific paradigm. Customarily, those characteristics have been attributed to contingent or peripheral events and phenomena that by nature do not belong to the social structure proper. Grounds for such ‘groundless’ contingencies are found in philosophy (Marchart), or for instance from the psychoanalytic notion of affect (Laclau). Many discourse theorists proceed here from Derrida’s position that in the process of signification there is an overabundance of meaning which renders final closure impossible (Howarth; Glynos). However, it seems that despite placing communication at the heart of their conceptions of discourse, the communicative character of constructing power relations remains undertheorized in those conceptions. This article attempts to approach the above mentioned problem by way of the concepts of communication and autocommunication (Lotman). The outcomes stemming from the latter are unavoidable, since the result of any possible research (text) itself belongs to culture or a larger discourse and opera tes as the organizing function of the latter. Hence, research practice and its results always need to be looked at as mutually affecting each other. (shrink)