In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:116 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Forms not only as objects of contemplation but as patterns of conduct. Presumably the "physicist " is not interested, as physicist, in completing the dialectical journey. So from a moral point of view he rests in opinion, even though his thought may be conversant with Forms. Gully does not like the idea that the philosopher has a privileged method; Plato "gives no proper reason why (...) one particular method or account is privileged" (p. 146).Methods of "collection and division," as developments within the dialectical method, are discussed in the later dialogues, but they never take us to the end of the dialectical journey. Perhaps we should say that the modesty of Socrates in Books VI and VII of the Republic is prophetic. If one is looking for a completed theory of knowledge, one does not find it. Gulley is in agreement with this point, but he feels that if one wants to look for the area in which Plato could have settled on an adequate theory one will find it in the relationship of pure to applied mathematics. He says that Plato develops in his latest thought "a metaphysical theory restricted to the explanation of mathematical knowledge which provides a more satisfactory explanation of the distinction between a priori and empirical knowledge than does the theory of Forms" (p. 187). Yet with a suggestion of surprise he concludes, on Aristotle's testimony, that Plato 2id not "abandon the more general explanation.., which the theory of Forms provided." I 1o not think Gulley wishes to suggest that Plato should have seen the light as Gulley sees it, ~or Gulley conveys the impression of having confronted a puzzling fact. Some readers may be reassured in their efforts to lop off Level IV and commit it to the flames, but the author has presented his case with impartiality. ROBERT REIN'L Arizona State University Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness. Problems of the Soul in the Neo-Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic Tradition. By Philip Merlan. (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1963. Pp. 154.) Innerhalb der Metaphysik liilit sich ein Kreis yon zentralen Fragen abgrenzen und durch den Titel "Noetik" bezeichnen. Wie ist der Mensch zur Erfassung des Seins oder des Absoluten (oder wie sonst der Gegenstand der Metaphysik bezeiehnet werden mag) ausgeriistet? Wie verhiilt sich dies ausgezeichaete VermSgen, mages po~ oder poS~,ro~7~K&oder intellectus oder Vernunft hei[3en, einmal zu seinem Gegenstand, sodann zu den tibrigen VermSgen der menschlichen Seele? Und sehliel]lieh: welehe Bedeutung hat die Be~tigung dieses VermSgens ffir die menschliche Praxis? Nach der Gliederung der Philosophie, wie sie im nach-kantischen Zeitalter iiblich geworden ist, liil~t sich dieser Fragezusammenhang schwer lokalisieren. In die moderne Topologie gepresst, erscheint er als eine Verquickung yon erkenntnistheoretischer, ontologischer, psychologischer und religiiiser Problematik. Aber durehgehend ist der "noetische Bezug", will sagen die Ausriehtung auf die yon den Griechen als ~o~ (inteIlectus, Geist, Vernunft ) bezeichnete Kraft. Der Zugang zu der Fragestellung ergibt sich yon Plato her. Die Seele "bei sich selbst," abr,} ~aO' a~r~, d.i. in AblSsung vom Leib und der dutch ihn vermittelten Sinneswahrnehmung, schaut das An-sich-seiende, die eI~, und diese "reine" Erkenntnis wird verstanden als Wiedererinnerung yon vorgeburtlieh Erschautem. Schon bei der Geburt des Menschen findet sich also die Seele im Besitz yon ihr selbst nicht zug~nglichen Erkenntnissen. Bei Aristoteles lebt dieser platonische Gedanke in verwandelter Gestalt fort. Das VermSgen unmittelbarer, nieht-sinnlicher Erkenntnis, der vo~, verhiilt sich nach De anima III zu den,,,m~a (intelligibilia) wie die bei sich seiende Seele zu den "Ideen". Dies Erkennen aber unterscheidet sich nach Aristoteles yon aller diskursiven Erkenntnis dadurch, daft der Intellekt die Intigibilia ist, und dieses Eins-werden, modern gesprochen die Aufhebung der Subjekt-ObjektRelation, gibt der Kennzeichnung des Intellekts als "sch6pferisch" (~o~K6~, intellectus agens) ihren Sinn. Aueh darin folgt Aristoteles seinem Lehrer Plato, daI3 er den Gedanken des "Vorbesitzes ", will sagen der Unentstandenheit der intellektualen Erkenntnis beibehiilt. Aber er gibt ibm eine neue Wendung dadurch, daft er die Ananmesis ersetzt durch den Begriff des ~o~ als einer yon keiner Potentialit~it behafteten reinen, immer und yon je t~itigen b~p.ycta, eines "von aul3en" (~bpad~) in den Mensehen eingeftihrten gSttlichen Prinzips. BOOK REVIEWS 117... (shrink)

The intuition that consciousness is hard to explain may fade away as empirically adequate theories of consciousness develop. We review socio-historical factors that account for why, as a field, the neuroscience of consciousness has not been particularly successful at developing empirically adequate theories. Based on this we argue that the meta-problem may be a self-fulfilling prophecy, created in part because we inadvertently focused too much on the so-called 'hard problem', limiting scientific progress.

A record of the words and teachings of Confucius, _The Analects_ is considered the most reliable expression of Confucian thought. However, the original meaning of Confucius's teachings have been filtered and interpreted by the commentaries of Confucianists of later ages, particularly the Neo-Confucianists of the Song dynasty, not altogether without distortion.In this monumental translation by Professor D. C. Lau, an attempt has been made to interpret the sayings as they stand. The corpus of the sayings is taken as an organic (...) whole and the final test of the interpretation rests on the internal consistency it exhibits. In other words, _The Analects_ is read in the light of _The Analects._This results in a truer understanding of Confucius' thought than the traditional interpretation and paves the way for a re-assessment of its importance in the history of Chinese thought and its relevance to the present day world.This volume also contains an introduction to the life and teachings of Confucius, and three appendices on the events in the life of Confucius, on his disciples, and on the composition of _The Analects._. (shrink)

Measuring event-related potentials (ERPs) has been fundamental to our understanding of how language is encoded in the brain. One particular ERP response, the N400 response, has been especially influential as an index of lexical and semantic processing. However, there remains a lack of consensus on the interpretation of this component. Resolving this issue has important consequences for neural models of language comprehension. Here we show that evidence bearing on where the N400 response is generated provides key insights into what it (...) reflects. A neuroanatomical model of semantic processing is used as a guide to interpret the pattern of activated regions in functional MRI, magnetoencephalography and intracranial recordings that are associated with contextual semantic manipulations that lead to N400 effects. (shrink)

We discuss cases where subjects seem to enjoy conscious experience when the relevant first-order perceptual representations are either missing or too weak to account for the experience. Though these cases are originally considered to be theoretical possibilities that may be problematical for the higher-order view of consciousness, careful considerations of actual empirical examples suggest that this strategy may backfire; these cases may cause more trouble for first-order theories instead. Specifically, these cases suggest that (I) recurrent feedback loops to V1 are (...) most likely not the neural correlate of first-order representations for conscious experience, (II) first-order views seem to have a problem accounting for the phenomenology in these cases, and either (III) a version of the ambitious higher-order approach is superior in that it is the simplest theory that can account for all results at face value, or (IV) a view where phenomenology is jointly determined by both first-order and higher-order states. In our view (III) and (IV) are both live options and the decision between them may ultimately be an empirical question that cannot yet be decided. (shrink)

Ethics education matters! Contrary to some common beliefs that ethical behavior is inborn, this study suggests that education does matter. This paper examines ethics education and its relationship with students’ ethical awareness and moral reasoning. Attitudes Towards Business Ethics Questionnaire and 10 vignettes were deployed as the major measurement instruments. It is hypothesized that students with ethics education will have both a greater ethical awareness and ability to make more ethical decisions. Hypotheses were tested in two undergraduate business courses at (...) a major research university where 707 students were sampled. Results suggest that ethics education improved students’ ethical awareness and moral reasoning. Interestingly, results also seem to show that students’ readiness moderated their learning outcomes. (shrink)

Externalism with regard to mental content says that in order to have certain types of intentional mental states (e.g. beliefs), it is necessary to be related to the environment in the right way.

This study examines the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on CSR performance in an emerging economy, China. Because of the need of gaining legitimacy in the new institutional context, Chinese firms have to adopt global CSR practices in order to remain competitive. Using the corporate governance framework, this study examines how board composition, ownership, and TMT composition influence corporate social performance. The propositions are tested using data gathered from 471 firms in China. By and large, empirical findings supported the hypothesized (...) relationships. (shrink)

The question of whether humans represent grammatical knowledge as a binary condition on membership in a set of well-formed sentences, or as a probabilistic property has been the subject of debate among linguists, psychologists, and cognitive scientists for many decades. Acceptability judgments present a serious problem for both classical binary and probabilistic theories of grammaticality. These judgements are gradient in nature, and so cannot be directly accommodated in a binary formal grammar. However, it is also not possible to simply reduce (...) acceptability to probability. The acceptability of a sentence is not the same as the likelihood of its occurrence, which is, in part, determined by factors like sentence length and lexical frequency. In this paper, we present the results of a set of large-scale experiments using crowd-sourced acceptability judgments that demonstrate gradience to be a pervasive feature in acceptability judgments. We then show how one can predict acceptability judgments on the basis of probability by augmenting probabilistic language models with an acceptability measure. This is a function that normalizes probability values to eliminate the confounding factors of length and lexical frequency. We describe a sequence of modeling experiments with unsupervised language models drawn from state-of-the-art machine learning methods in natural language processing. Several of these models achieve very encouraging levels of accuracy in the acceptability prediction task, as measured by the correlation between the acceptability measure scores and mean human acceptability values. We consider the relevance of these results to the debate on the nature of grammatical competence, and we argue that they support the view that linguistic knowledge can be intrinsically probabilistic. (shrink)

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Conscious experiences involve subjective qualities, such as colours, sounds, smells and emotions. In this Perspective, we argue that these subjective qualities can be understood in terms of their similarity to other experiences. This account highlights the role of memory in conscious experience, even for simple percepts. How an experience feels depends on implicit memory of the relationships between different perceptual representations within the brain. With more complex experiences such as emotions, explicit memories are also recruited. We draw inspiration from work (...) in machine learning as well as the cognitive neuroscience of learning and decision making to make our case and discuss how the account could be tested in future experiments. The resulting findings might help to reveal the functions of subjective experience and inform current theoretical debates on consciousness. (shrink)

It is usually taken as given that consciousness involves superior or more elaborate forms of information processing. Contemporary models equate consciousness with global processing, system complexity, or depth or stability of computation. This is in stark contrast with the powerful philosophical intuition that being conscious is more than just having the ability to compute. I argue that it is also incompatible with current empirical findings. I present a model that is free from the strong assumption that consciousness predicts superior performance. (...) The model is based on Bayesian decision theory, of which signal detection theory is a special case. It reflects the fact that the capacity for perceptual decisions is fundamentally limited by the presence and amount of noise in the system. To optimize performance, one therefore needs to set decision criteria that are based on the behaviour, i.e. the probability distributions, of the internal signals. One important realization is that the knowledge of how our internal signals behave statistically has to be learned over time. Essentially, we are doing statistics on our own brain. This ‘higherorder’ learning, however, may err, and this impairs our ability to set and maintain optimal criteria for perceptual decisions, which I argue is central to perception consciousness. I outline three possibilities of how conscious perception might be affected by failures of ‘higher-order’ representation. These all imply that one can have a dissociation between consciousness and performance. This model readily explains blindsight and hallucinations in formal terms, and is beginning to receive direct empirical support. I end by discussing some philosophical implications of the model. (shrink)

Brieven van de Nederlandse filosoof (1898-1955) uit de periode 1917-1927 aan een vriend.

The paper outlines a deflationary interpretation of Hegel’s metaphysics, as presented in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. It focuses mainly on the Science of Logic as a theory of categories, which explores the movement of the Concept. The major idea is to read Hegel’s identification of logic and metaphysics as a thesis on deflating metaphysics into logic and semantics. Hegel’s metaphysics, which may better be called logico-metaphysics, does not describe the objective world directly. Rather, as a second-order theory, it (...) unfolds and makes transparent the fundamental concepts that are necessary for our understanding of the world and our orientation in it. -/- The paper begins with a brief discussion of Hegel’s idea of philosophy as system. The argument is made that Hegel should be interpreted holistically, in contrast to the popular approach of distinguishing between what is living and what is dead in his philosophy. In the second and third parts of the paper, an analysis is given of Hegel’s criticism of Kant, with an explanation of how Hegel’s Logic further develops Kant’s project of transforming traditional metaphysics. Here, the interesting fact that Hegel’s logical categories are not derived from an absolute first principle is pointed out. Instead, the task of Hegel’s Logic is to comprehend and systematize the concepts that have already been evolved in the history of philosophy. In the last part of the paper, the deflationary approach is extended to Hegel’s Realphilosophie. While Hegel’s Logic takes the place of ontology, his Philosophy of Nature and Spirit offers a comprehensive metaphysica specialis, laying conceptual foundations for understanding various dimensions of reality, from nature through the ethical-political world to different cultural domains. The paper takes Hegel’s Philosophy of Objective Spirit as an example to illustrate how the deflationary interpretation sheds light on Hegel’s “practical” philosophy as a second-order theory that does not aim to uncover first-order normative principles for guiding actions, but rather to develop the concepts necessary for normative judgments. (shrink)

It has been over a decade and half since Christof Koch and the late Francis Crick first advocated the now popular NCC project (Crick and Koch, 1990), in which one tries to find the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) for perceptual processes. In his chapter in this book Chris Frith provides a splendid review of how neuroimaging has contributed greatly to this project. For the sake of contrast, this chapter takes a more critical stance on what we have actually learned. (...) Many authors have written on whether looking for the neural correlates would eventually lead to an explanatory theory of consciousness, while the proponents defend that focusing on correlates is a strategically sensible first step, given the complexity of the problem (Crick and Koch, 1998;Crick and Koch, 2003). My point here is not to argue whether studying the NCC is useful, but rather, to question whether we are really studying the NCC at all. I argue that in hoping to sidestep the difficult conceptual issues, we have sometimes also missed the phenomenon of perceptual consciousness itself. (shrink)

It has been over a decade and half since Christof Koch and the late Francis Crick first advocated the now popular NCC project (Crick and Koch, 1990), in which one tries to find the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) for perceptual processes. In his chapter in this book Chris Frith provides a splendid review of how neuroimaging has contributed greatly to this project. For the sake of contrast, this chapter takes a more critical stance on what we have actually learned. (...) Many authors have written on whether looking for the neural correlates would eventually lead to an explanatory theory of consciousness, while the proponents defend that focusing on correlates is a strategically sensible first step, given the complexity of the problem (Crick and Koch, 1998;Crick and Koch, 2003). My point here is not to argue whether studying the NCC is useful, but rather, to question whether we are really studying the NCC at all. I argue that in hoping to sidestep the difficult conceptual issues, we have sometimes also missed the phenomenon of perceptual consciousness itself. (shrink)

Collected works of ʼJam-dbyaṅs Blo-gter-dbaṅ-po on Nyingmapa and Sakyapa doctrines, philosophy, rituals etc.

2020 Center for Biblical Studies Book Award (New Testament) Our culture often views shame in a negative light. However, Paul's use of shame, when properly understood and applied, has much to teach the contemporary church. Filling a lacuna in Pauline scholarship, this book shows how Paul uses shame to admonish and to transform the minds of his readers into the mind of Christ. The author examines Paul's use of shame for moral formation within his Jewish and Greco-Roman context, compares and (...) contrasts Paul's use of shame with other cultural voices, and offers a corrective understanding for today's church. Foreword by Luke Timothy Johnson. (shrink)

This paper gives a contextualized reading of Kant's theory of real definitions in geometry. Though Leibniz, Wolff, Lambert and Kant all believe that definitions in geometry must be ‘real’, they disagree about what a real definition is. These disagreements are made vivid by looking at two of Euclid's definitions. I argue that Kant accepted Euclid's definition of circle and rejected his definition of parallel lines because his conception of mathematics placed uniquely stringent requirements on real definitions in geometry. Leibniz, Wolff (...) and Lambert thus accept definitions that Kant rejects because they assign weaker roles to real definitions. (shrink)

In this chapter, we discuss a selection of current views of the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). We focus on the different predictions they make, in particular with respect to the role of prefrontal cortex (PFC) during visual experiences, which is an area of critical interest and some source of contention. Our discussion of these views focuses on the level of functional anatomy, rather than at the neuronal circuitry level. We take this approach because we currently understand more about experimental (...) evidence at this coarse level and because these results are appropriate for arbitrating between current theoretical frameworks. We discuss the Two-Visual-Systems Hypothesis (Milner & Goodale 1995; 2006), Local Recurrency (Lamme 2010; Lamme 2006), Higher Order (Lau 2008; Lau & Rosenthal 2011) and Global Workspace theories (Baars 1997; Baars 2005; Dehaene & Naccache 2001; Dehaene 2014). Despite the apparent stark differences between conscious and unconscious perceptual processing, available evidence suggests that their neural substrates must be largely shared. This indicates that the difference in neural activity between conscious and unconscious perceptual processing is likely to be subtle and highly specialized. We argue that current experimental evidence about the involvement of specific activity in prefrontal cortex supports the higher order neural theory of consciousness. In consequence, imaging techniques that focus only on marked differences between conscious and unconscious level of activity are likely to be insensitive to the relevant neural activity patterns that underlie conscious experiences. Finally, it follows from the evidence we discuss that the functional advantages of conscious over unconscious perceptual processing may be more limited than commonly thought. (shrink)

The rationalist lover accepts that whom she ought to love is whom she has most reason to love. She also accepts that the qualities of a person are reasons to love them. This seems to suggest that if the rationalist lover encounters someone with better qualities than her beloved, then she is rationally required to trade up. In this paper, I argue that this need not be the case and the rationalist lover can have just about as normal if not (...) a better romantic life than anyone could hope for. This is because we often do possess most reason to love our beloveds. To see why this is so, we have to think more carefully about (i) how we come to possess reasons for love and (ii) the higher-order reasons that govern whether we should seek or refrain from possessing said reasons. Reflection on these issues leads to what I call the Possession-Commitment Account of Love’s Reasons. I use this account to address additional worries for love rationalism and highlight how being rational about love can potentially get us out of romantic messes. I conclude that if being a rationalist about love is plausible after all, then we have reason to hope that being rational about other areas of our practical lives is plausible as well. (shrink)

aFunctional Imaging Laboratory, Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, University College London, 12 Queen Square, London WC1N 3BG, UK bDepartment of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, UK cOxford Centre for Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the Brain, UK dDepartment of Psychiatry and Oxford Centre for Clinical Magnetic Resonance Research, University of Oxford, UK..

In the ‘analytic tradition’, Hans Sluga wrote thirty years ago in his book Gottlob Frege, there has been a ‘lack of interest in historical questions — even in the question of its own roots. Anti-historicism has been the baggage of the tradition since Frege’ (Sluga, 1980, p. 2). The state of the discussion of Frege among analytic philosophers, Sluga claimed, illustrated well this indifference. Despite the numbers of pages devoted to Frege, there was still, Sluga claimed, little understanding of the (...) sources of Frege’s ideas, his intellectual debts, and the historical circumstances of his thought. Sluga singled out Michael Dummett’s Frege: Philosophy of Language ‘as a paradigm for the failure of analytic philosophers to come to grips with the actual, historical Frege’. In that book, Dummett famously wrote that the logical system that Frege put forward in his 1879 Begriffsschrift ‘is astonishing because it has no predecessors: it appears to have been born from Frege’s brain unfertilized by external influences’ (Dummett, 1981a, p. xxxv) — and Dummett devoted almost none of its 700 pages to the relationship between Frege and his contemporaries. (shrink)

Der fruhe oder vormarxistische Sozialismus bildet nicht nur die Grundlage der heutigen Sozialdemokratie: Die Ideen der visionaren Vordenker und Vordenkerinnen aller modernen Gesellschaftstheorien haben auf vielfaltige und ideologieubergreifende Weise Eingang in die Gegenwart gefunden. Diese Arbeit leistet einen sinnvollen Beitrag zur rechtswissenschaftlichen Erforschung des fruhen Sozialismus. Dreissig Lebenslaufe der wichtigsten fruhen Sozialisten und Sozialistinnen verleihen der Arbeit Anschaulichkeit. Eine ubersichtliche Bibliographie bildet ein wertvolles, wissenschaftliches Instrument im Bereich des vormarxistischen Sozialismus.".