Predictive processing (PP) has been repeatedly presented as a unificatory account of perception, action, and cognition. In this paper, we argue that this is premature: As a unifying theory, PP fails to deliver general, simple, homogeneous, and systematic explanations. By examining its current trajectory of development, we conclude that PP remains only loosely connected both to its computational framework and to its hypothetical biological underpinnings, which makes its fundamentals unclear. Instead of offering explanations that refer to the same set of (...) principles, we observe systematic equivocations in PP‐based models, or outright contradictions with its avowed principles. To make matters worse, PP‐based models are seldom empirically validated, and they are frequently offered as mere just‐so stories. The large number of PP‐based models is thus not evidence of theoretical progress in unifying perception, action, and cognition. On the contrary, we maintain that the gap between theory and its biological and computational bases contributes to the arrested development of PP as a unificatory theory. Thus, we urge the defenders of PP to focus on its critical problems instead of offering mere re‐descriptions of known phenomena, and to validate their models against possible alternative explanations that stem from different theoretical assumptions. Otherwise, PP will ultimately fail as a unified theory of cognition. (shrink)

There is a current effort to borrow the concept of trauma from medicine and psychiatry and to introduce it into sociological theory. The author explicates the notion of cultural trauma as applicable to the theory of social change. He defines cultural trauma as the culturally defined and interpreted shock to the cultural tissue of a society, and presents a model of the traumatic sequence, describing typical conditions under which cultural trauma emerges and evolves. Drawing on the work of Robert K. (...) Merton on anomie, and of Anthony Giddens on risk, he suggests a number of typical strategies by which societies cope with cultural traumas. Cultural trauma is treated as a link in the ongoing chain of social changes; depending on the number of concrete circumstances, cultural trauma may be a phase in the constructive morphogenesis of culture or in the destructive cycle of cultural decay. (shrink)

The article presents the question of understanding divine causality and its analogical character in the context of Thomas Aquinas’s teaching on Divine Providence. Analyzing Aquinas’s texts concerning the relation of God’s action towards nature and its activities it is necessary to emphasize the proper understanding of mutual relations between secondary causes and the primary cause which are not on the same level. Influenced by the reflection of M. Dodds and I Silva, the author of the article refers to Aquinas’s biblical (...) commentaries which have not been discussed so far from the perspective of the character of God’s action. In the final part of the article, metaphors used by Thomas in reference to the relation of God towards the world will be presented. (shrink)

Abraham Robinson’s framework for modern infinitesimals was developed half a century ago. It enables a re-evaluation of the procedures of the pioneers of mathematical analysis. Their procedures have been often viewed through the lens of the success of the Weierstrassian foundations. We propose a view without passing through the lens, by means of proxies for such procedures in the modern theory of infinitesimals. The real accomplishments of calculus and analysis had been based primarily on the elaboration of novel techniques for (...) solving problems rather than a quest for ultimate foundations. It may be hopeless to interpret historical foundations in terms of a punctiform continuum, but arguably it is possible to interpret historical techniques and procedures in terms of modern ones. Our proposed formalisations do not mean that Fermat, Gregory, Leibniz, Euler, and Cauchy were pre-Robinsonians, but rather indicate that Robinson’s framework is more helpful in understanding their procedures than a Weierstrassian framework. (shrink)

The main goal of the paper is to present a putative role of consciousness in language capacity. The paper contrasts the two approaches characteristic for cognitive semiotics and cognitive science. Language is treated as a mental phenomenon and a cognitive faculty. The analysis of language activity is based on the Chalmers’ distinction between the two forms of consciousness: phenomenal and psychological. The approach is seen as an alternative to phenomenological analyses typical for cognitive semiotics. Further, a cognitive model of the (...) language faculty is described. The model is implemented in SNePS/GLAIR architecture and based on GATN grammar and semantic networks as a representation formalism. The model - reflecting traditionally distinguished linguistic structures - consists of phonological, syntactic, and semantic modules. I claim that the most important role in the phenomenon of language is played by psychological consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness accompanies various stages of language functioning, but is not indispensable in explanations of the language faculty. (shrink)

In this article, I examine Michael Bratman’s account of stability in his planning theory of intention. Future-directed intentions should be stable, or appropriately resistant to change, over time. Bratman claims that the norm of stability governs both intentions and plans. The aim of this article is to critically enrich Bratman’s account of stability by introducing plasticity as an additional norm of planning. I construct plasticity as a kind of stability of intentions which supplements Bratman’s notion of “reasonable stability.” Unlike the (...) latter, plasticity applies mainly to cases in which plan states are abandoned without reconsideration. I focus on the intra-theoretical problems of PTI and elucidate: the distinction between future-directed intentions and plans, the conceptual difference between stability and inertia, which is only implicit in PTI, and the role of the environment of the planner, which has a vestigial role in Bratman’s work. I also defend my incorporation of pl... (shrink)

The measure of trust that people vest in their fellow citizens or institutions depends on three factors: the `reflected trustworthiness' of the target as estimated by themselves in a more or less rational manner, the attitude of `basic trustfulness' deriving from socialization, and the `culture of trust' pervading their society and normatively encouraging the trusting orientation. The author presents a model of a structural context conducive for the emergence of the culture of trust, and then argues that democratic organization contributes (...) to trust-generating conditions, such as normative certainty, transparency, stability, and accountability. This influence is found to be doubly paradoxical. First, democracy breeds the culture of trust by institutionalizing distrust at many levels of democratic organization. And second, the strongest influence of democracy on the culture of trust may be expected when the institutionalized distrust remains a resource used sparingly and only when there appear significant breaches of trust. (shrink)

The paper discusses possible roles of consciousness in a semiotic activity of a cognitive agent. The discussion, we claim, is based on two related approaches to consciousness: on Chalmers’ theory of phenomenal and psychological consciousness and on Damasio’s neural theory, which draws a distinction between core and extended consciousness. Two stages of cognitive-semiotic processing are discussed: the moment of perception of a sign as a meaningful entity and the metasemiotic processes understood as the human capacity to reflect on signs and (...) their usage, analyse and control processes of recognition, interpretation of signs and to detect and correct errors in semiotic activity. In the case of the first stage, it is argued that signs as meaningful entities have a distincly experiential character. The feeling of meaningfulness is a result of phenomenal consciousness, in particular a result of the so-called valuation features of phenomenal experience. I claim that this aspect of cognitive-semiotic activity is possible owing to a special neural mechanism called a semiotic marker. It is argued that semiotic systems have to be able to use signs as signs, i.e. they should display some metacognitive capacities, in particular an ability to analyse semiosis at a metalevel. It is argued that such metasemiosis is dependent on psychological consciousness and is realized at the neural level in the form of extended consciousness. The paper is based on a particular understanding of cognitive semiotics as a discipline involving analyses of cognitive processes as semiotic processes, i.e. processes requiring usage of signs. (shrink)

The paper first proposes a new definition of religion which features a novel four-layered element and which does not involve any circularity ; thereby, it allows to clearly distinguish the phenomenon of religion from certain other worldviews, in particular from certain political ideologies. Relying on the findings, the paper develops two structural conceptual models which serve to describe religious and non-religious belief systems. Further, the definition and the conceptual models allow to establish a clear criterion to distinguish pivotal structural differences (...) between religious and non-religious belief systems. The criterion is based on the concept of two kinds of rationality: first-level and second-level rationalities. These will demonstrate to what degree religion can be a rational enterprise, and what role logic can play in it. The result is a clear-cut line in the structures of religious and certain consistent non-religious belief systems. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a specific version of theism which I would call apophatic theism. In the first part of the paper, I argue that this in the only tenableversion of theism. Due to the fact that it may seem indistinguishable from a very strong form of agnosticism (or atheism understood in the etymological sense of the word: as a-theism where ‘a’ means ‘without’), in the second part of my paper, I try to distinguish apophatic theism from agnosticism (or (...) a-theism), and from so called “Wittgensteinian” view of religion, which also may seem similar to the position I propose. (shrink)

The articles in this collection focus on philosophical approaches to proper names. The issues discussed include abstract names, empty names, naming and name-using practices, definite descriptions, individuals, reference, designation, sense and semantics. The contributions show the importance and lasting influence of theories proposed by John Stuart Mill, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Donald Davidson, and Saul Kripke. Individual chapters assess traditional analyses and modern controversies, and contribute to the debate on proper names in contemporary philosophy of language.

Lay perceptions of lying are argued to consist of a lie prototype. The latter was found to entail the intention to deceive, belief in falsity and falsity. We proposed and found that the perceptions of the benefits of others are also an important factor that influences the extent, to which an act of intentional misleading someone to foster a false belief is labeled as a lie. Drawing from the intuitionist model of moral judgments we assumed that moral judgment of the (...) behaviour would mediate the relationship. In Study 1 we analyzed data coming from a crosscultural project and found that perceived intention to benefit others was negatively related to lie labeling and that this relationship was mediated by the moral judgment of that act. In Study 2 we found that manipulating the benefits of others influenced the extent, to which an act of intentional misleading in order to foster a false belief is labeled as a lie and that, again, this relationship is mediated by the moral judgment of that act. (shrink)

Child visual discourse: The use of language, gestures, and vocalizations by deaf preschoolers1 This exploratory study examined the linguistic activity and conversational skills of deaf preschoolers by observing child-child dyads in free-play situations. Deaf child of deaf parents - deaf child of deaf parents pairs were compared with deaf child of hearing parents - deaf child of hearing parents pairs. Children from the two groups were videotaped during dyadic peer interactions in a naturalistic play situation. The findings indicated that deaf (...) children were able to engage in successful communicative interaction. However, statistically significant differences were found between the two groups of deaf preschoolers with regard to some categories of communicative behaviors from the point of view of sign and spoken languages. For example, DCHP were found to be less actively than DCDP through using speech. The results of this study suggest that intervention efforts should be focused on improving the language learning environment by facilitating signing by the parents and increasing their skills in visual-gestural strategies. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to investigate into the relations between basic moral categories, namely those of norms, ideals and supererogation. I discuss, firstly, the ways of understanding these categories, secondly, how moral acting can be described using them and thirdly, how they relate within certain moral system. Yet, what is of a special importance is the relation between norms and ideals and their complementary character. For it might be argued that omission of one these categories may lead to (...) posing important limitations on the possibilities of grasping certain moral issue adequately and setting the full range of possible solutions. Hence, I argue that to resign from two-level form of moral analysis may lead to the atrophy of the very idea of ethics itself. (shrink)

OBJECTIVE PREDICATION The author claims that there are two kinds of predicates that are used to describe cognitive states of mind like beliefs or perception. Using some of them, one can describe the cognitive states of mind directly, whereas using some others, one can describe these states in comparison with one’s own. For example, one can say that a person has a belief or one can say that that person’s belief is according to his own beliefs. In the latter situation, (...) he uses the predicate “to know”. The conditions that Peter uses correctly the sentence “John knows that p” are as follows: (1) Peter believes that John believes that p; (2) Peter believes that p; (3) Peter believes that the reasons for which John believes that p have a good justification. In a similar way one can ascribe to somebody a visual impression of an object x or to compare that person’s impressions with his own cognitive states. In the latter situation one uses the predicate “to see” (to perceive). The conditions that Peter uses correctly the sentence “John can see x” are the following: (I) Peter believes that John has visual impression of object x; (II) Peter believes that object x exists; (III) Peter believes that this that John has visual impression of object x is according to the laws of vision. When one uses predicates that describe cognitive states of mind of a person (possession of beliefs or sensory impressions), one speaks subjectively, whereas when one speaks objectively, he uses predicates that allow him to compare cognitive states of mind of a person with his own. Keywords: PREDICATION, BELIEFS, PERCEPTION. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to present the sources of Alasdair MacIntyre’s political conception. Considering his criticism of contemporary culture as known, the issue of man’s subjectivity, its intellectual character, and perception of community as a place of thereby understood realization of the human nature follow. At the same time, an emphasis of the importance of philosophical reflection for self-knowledge of an average member of such a community somehow forces a conclusion on a political nature of an intellectual activity.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the basis for the moral obligation to remember. As the moral relation to the past is primarily a matter of shared identity, the kind of obligation in question splits into two related issues, namely, that of political, state-oriented and state-organized memory on which the political identity rests and that of memory labour grounded in social identities based in shared, time-extended projects. Drawing upon tensions between these two, I discuss time control and the (...) accumulation of identity as central to memory labour and, referring to John Zerzan’s critique of symbolical roots of power, pinpoint the moral basis of such an accumulation. On the basis of this, I argue for nesting the duty to remember in acknowledging the agent’s recognition of the relatedness and dependency of their agency and possibilities of flourishing which can be obtained thanks to adjusting the field of the virtue of practical wisdom so that it includes members of the time-extended community. (shrink)

Public opinion has it that ethics should be concerned with studying and providing precise and reliable rules of conduct. This view is based in a long philosophical tradition which begins with the Stoics and continues at least to Kant; it is, however, a false view. There are good reasons to turn our attention to these aspects of moral thinking which refer to and emphasize the element of risk and uncertainty. In the article I briefly discuss two of such reasons: the (...) problem of moral luck and the problem of action based on ignorance. Consideration of these two problems leads to the conclusion that the most tricky element in moral thinking is the firm belief of the subject in the truth of the premises on which they base their actions and in the irrelevance of external factors to the assessment of their deeds. In this light I argue that the basic requirement for a moral justification of a particular action is not its conformity to a certain set of rules but the subject’s critical reflection on their course of action. Indeed, what turns an attitude into a moral attitude is an amoral, epistemological factor: criticism and openness to uncertainty. (shrink)

The paper addresses some of the aspects of the neo-Aristotelian concept of good on the basis of Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. The author’s general thesis is that the idea of good organizes its normativity along two vectors pointed towards nature and emancipation, which are interlinked, that is — the normativity of the good is always organized by both of them and it is inappropriate to refer to one of them only. This fault is made, the author believes, by Nussbaum who (...) does not offer enough resources to establish a sound naturalistic evaluative standard in her theory. To address this issue the author starts by discussing the capabilities approach as a form of the concept of good and proceeds by analysing Nussbaum’s view on family as an exemplar of the inadequacies of the approach. (shrink)

The article focuses on the anti-naturalism of Menger and Mises. It presents a methodological approach formulated by both scholars as stemming from epistemological anti-naturalism and demonstrating similarities to social phenomenology. The article also discusses the development of the anti-naturalistic perspective on the basis of Hayek’s conception of sensory order. The latter allowed addressing the problem of validity of methodological dualism and established a sound foundation for the methodological approach of the Austrian School of Economics.

In my paper I present a critique of Dorota Brylla’s interpretation of the dialogue by Nicholas of Cusa - De Deo abscondito, and a critique of her stance on apophatic theology. I consider Brylla’s position an exemplification of a more widespread philosophical point of view in terms of both the interpretation of Nicholas thought and the apophatic tradition as such. I also present an alternative reading of both his dialogue and apophatic theology. Finally, I point out some implications of adopting (...) my position for philosophical theology and the philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Przedmiotem artykułu jest rozważenie znaczenia zmian, jakie dla form działania podmiotowego (duchowości) mają zmiany technologicznie. Przyjmując, że pewne punkty zaczepienia takiej refleksji dostępne są w popkulturowych formach oswajania postępu, jako osiowe wybieram pojęcie „dżihadu buteriańskiego” z powieści Diuna Franka Herberta, scalające kilka istotnych aspektów tak rozwoju technicznego, jak i refleksji nad nim. W części pierwszej, koncentrując się na drugim składniku tego wyrażenia, omawiam pogląd Samuela Butlera oraz wskazuję na znaczenie wystąpienie luddystów w początkach XIX w. W części drugiej rozwijam ten (...) wątek, omawiając krytykę społeczeństwa technologicznego formułowaną przez współczesnych anarchoprymitywistów. W części trzeciej zwracam uwagę na pierwszy element wyrażenia Herberta by wskazać na podmiotowe aspekty zmian technologicznych. W konsekwencji wskazuję kierunki analizy, dzięki którym etyka cnót może wypracować adekwatną odpowiedź na zagrożenia płynące ze strony technologii przy akceptacji korzyści zeń płynących. (shrink)

The expression “moral experience”, along with the concomitant notion of experience itself, seems to have been understood in divergent ways. Taking as a background three views currently operative in our culture - emotivism, the ethics of duty, and the notion of an ethics “beyond good and evil” - a conception of ethical experience will be presented based on the findings of Edith Stein as elaborated in her work "Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities".

The paper deals with the problem of digital restitution of art to post-colonial and postdependency countries. A new model of digital restitution composed of two elements: creation of a digital copy with a NFT attached and creation of new property right in a physical and digital object has been proposed. A system of balances between the rights and duties based on the prior user concept has been developed.

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest prezentacja koncepcji brytyjskiego filozofa zorientowana na normatywną stronę jego myśli, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem (w części pierwszej) rewolucyjnego, wyrastającego z marksistowskiego zaplecza MacIntyre ujęcia problematyki moralnej. W części drugiej omawiam etyczny składnik „rewolucyjnego arystotelizmu” MacIntyre’a, akcentując emancypacyjny, zakorzeniony w owym zapleczu charakter rozwijanej przez niego teorii cnót i praktyk, by w części trzeciej omówić przynajmniej niektóre konsekwencje społeczne (praktyczne) omawianego projektu.

Praca poświęcona jest naturze dobrego życia. Zastosowanie odnowionej w połowie XX wieku myśli Arystotelesa pozwala tu uchwycić i przezwyciężyć zarówno miałkość propozycji „przemysłu szczęścia”, jak i akademickiej filozofii. Autor interpretuje koncepcję starożytnego filozofa przy użyciu współczesnych narzędzi filozoficznych wskazując jak ich zastosowanie pozwala uchwycić węzłowe problemy życia (jak pytanie o szczęście i sens) oraz wskazać te metody myślenia, które umożliwiają krytyczny namysł nad rzeczywistością społeczną. Pytanie o dobro jest zatem zarówno o to, jak kształtować własne życie, ale też jak myśleć (...) o relacjach z ludźmi, z innymi istotami oraz jak współdziałać w dążeniu do dóbr wspólnych. Te ostatnie okazują się przy tym nie tylko dobrami publicznymi, infrastrukturalnymi, ale przede wszystkim formami kooperacji i współżycia. (shrink)