This article focuses on Bob Zajonc’s views on unconscious emotion, especially in the context of the debates about the independence of affect and cognition. Historically, Bob was always interested in the “mere”—basic, fundamental processes. His empirical demonstrations of precognitive and preconscious emotional processes, combined with his elegant expositions of them, sharply contrasted with cold and complex cognitive models. Interestingly, Bob tended to believe that whereas the causes of emotion can be unconscious, the emotional state itself tends to be conscious. However, (...) he reconsidered this assumption and in his later work showed that subjects in affective priming experiments do not experience conscious affect, but instead act on basic preferences. Today, Bob’s insights continue to inspire research on “unconscious emotion.”. (shrink)

In the paper we examine the method of axiomatic rejection used to describe the set of nonvalid formulae of Aristotle's syllogistic. First we show that the condition which the system of syllogistic has to fulfil to be ompletely axiomatised, is identical to the condition for any first order theory to be used as a logic program. Than we study the connection between models used or refutation in a first order theory and rejected axioms for that theory. We show that any (...) formula of syllogistic enriched with classical connectives is decidable using models in the domain with three members. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze the basis for the moral obligation to remember. As the moral relation to the past is primarily a matter of shared identity, the kind of obligation in question splits into two related issues, namely, that of political, state-oriented and state-organized memory on which the political identity rests and that of memory labour grounded in social identities based in shared, time-extended projects. Drawing upon tensions between these two, I discuss time control and the (...) accumulation of identity as central to memory labour and, referring to John Zerzan’s critique of symbolical roots of power, pinpoint the moral basis of such an accumulation. On the basis of this, I argue for nesting the duty to remember in acknowledging the agent’s recognition of the relatedness and dependency of their agency and possibilities of flourishing which can be obtained thanks to adjusting the field of the virtue of practical wisdom so that it includes members of the time-extended community. (shrink)

Les références à la crémation sont extrêmement rares dans les textes bibliques. L’histoire de Saül et de ses trois fils reste un cas unique d’usage de l’incinération (1 S 31, 12-13). La signification de ce geste inhabituel dans le contexte biblique n’est pas claire. Depuis longtemps, le passage de 1 Samuel 31, 12 pose problème aux exégètes et aux historiens de la religion de l’ancien Israël. Cet article présente les diverses hypothèses qui furent proposées au sujet de la crémation de (...) Saül à partir de sources textuelles et matérielles provenant des fouilles de sépultures. (shrink)

El artículo trata sobre el proceso por el que el hombre llegó a ser un modelo para la metodología patrística. Presenta algunas articulaciones esenciales de la antropología filosófica, implícitas en toda la teología patrística. Afirma que la antropología como hermenéutica de la teología patrística, debe entenderse como un intento de presentar la importancia de las enseñanzas patrísticas y su interpretación específica, desde la importancia de las enseñanzas patrísticas y su interpretación específica, desde la perspectiva antropológica de los Padres de la (...) Iglesia. (shrink)

A class of quantum probabilities is reformulated in terms of non-Newtonian calculus and projective arithmetic. The model generalizes spin-1/2 singlet state probabilities discussed in Czachor (Acta Physica Polonica:139 70–83, 2021) to arbitrary spins _s_. For \(s\rightarrow \infty\) the formalism reduces to ordinary arithmetic and calculus. Accordingly, the limit “non-Newtonian to Newtonian” becomes analogous to the classical limit of a quantum theory.

English title: Master Eckhart’s God Confronted with Nietzschean Critique of Christianity. Author tries to demonstrate that the way of thinking about Christian God developed in the late Middle Ages by Master Eckhart goes beyond the interpretation which underlies Nietzsche’s criticism of Christianity as a religion of the other world. In the paper, Author first presents the said criticism, followed by the vision of God outlined by Eckhart. He demonstrates that Christianity, criticized by Nietzsche, uses a commonsense vision of God’s transcendence (...) based on spatial images. The author also demonstrates that Eckhart defines this transcendence in such a way that it does not fall under Nietzsche’s criticism, in particular it cannot lead to the depreciation of worldliness in favour of an invented other world, which Nietzsche observes. Eckhart’s thought makes room for Christianity ‘after Nietzsche.’. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to present moral philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre in its relation to Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics. For that purpose, his specific understanding of the tradition, a mode of its relation with an individual, and the distinction between practical and theoretical knowledge are discussed in the paper. Considered primarily as Thomist and Marxist thinker, MacIntyre’s conceptions emerge as strongly influenced by continental hermeneutics. From the hermeneutical point of view, some key elements of MacIntyre’s thought can be understood (...) in a new way, enabling in this way to overcome the most commonly expressed reservations formulated against his views.Key words MORAL PHILOSOPHY, HERMENEUTICS. (shrink)

Philippa Foot once said: I'm not clever at all. I have a certain insight into philosophy, cost I think. But I'm not clever, I don't find complicated arguments easy to follow. Foot's cleverness enticed many thinkers to take these Gombrowiczian lines seriously.

W artykule podejmujemy zagadnienie udziału emocji w~podejmowaniu decyzji w sytuacjach dylematów moralnych. Prezentujemy stanowisko, jakie w tej sprawie głosi współczesna neuroetyka. Według badaczy-neuroetyków podczas podejmowania decyzji w sytuacji dylematów osobistych biorą górę czynniki emocjonalne, natomiast w dylematach nieosobistych — czynniki poznawczo-kontrolne. Postulują oni też istnienie specjalnej klasy emocji — emocji moralnych — uczestniczących w wydawaniu sądów moralnych w sytuacjach dylematów moralnych. W artykule proponujemy własne odróżnienie dwóch rodzajów emocji moralnych — emocji nie-epistemicznych i epistemicznych.

Artykuł dotyczy miejsca i roli filozofii dziejów w całości myślenia filozoficznego w jego historycznym rozwoju. Kluczowe staje się tu określenie przedmiotu zainteresowania tej dyscypliny filozoficznej w jej specyficznych, historycznych ujęciach, a także wskazanie teoretycznych przesłanek do rozróżnienia terminów „historiozofia” i „filozofia dziejów” jako pojęć odrębnych znaczeniowo.

Celem artykułu jest ukazanie w perspektywie historiozoficznej, dla której naczelną wartością staje się stosunek do świadomości historycznej. Jednym z jej wyznaczników jest relacja wobec czasu historycznego. Na tym tle można mówić o utopiach antyhistorycznych, ahistorycznych i historycznych.

THE PROBLEM OF BEING IN PLATONISM FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THOMAS AQUINAS. A META-SYSTEMATIC ESSAY In spite of the apparent opposition to Plato, Aristotle accepted a lot from the thought of his master. The intuition, which plays the key role in the system of Plato, was understood by Aristotle in terms of how we grasp the middle term of syllogism. It is not, therefore, the intuition of being, but the reasoning, departing from the experience (nature’s “intention”), which is the way (...) of the cognition of the ultimate. The teleology of being, which Plato was so keen on finding, was found by Aristotle in the physical world as a counterpart of motion. Alas, Aristotle lost sight of what is most valuable in Plato: the sense of being that transgresses the categories. According to Thomas, being is what is the most perfect in things; so, consequently, what is the proper effect of the Ultimate Cause, and what is Its primary aim. It is better to be, i.e. to exist. Each thing craves for being. Being, however, is, in the Dionysius’ sense, a problem; it might guide us to God, but veil Him before us as well. It is a perfection, but not the Perfection itself, Plato was right at this point. Keywords: BEING, PLATO, ARISTOTLE, THOMAS AQUINAS. (shrink)