A phenomenological reading of Pierre Maine de Brian offers a valuable understanding of one's own body in relation to the ego's apperceptive effort. As an organic mass, the body follows the double movement of this effort, manifested by an inner and an outer resistance. This movement allows the „constitution” of the world as correlative to the deployment of a force, identified with the apperception of the ego itself. This practical radicalization of the cogito can be viewed as the first (...) outstanding achievement of phenomenology itself, even prior to its historical foundation by Husserl. (shrink)

Radical views on cognition are generally defined by a cluster of features including non-representationalism and vehicle-externalism. In this paper, I concentrate on the way radical views on cognition define themselves as revolutionary theories in cognitive science. These theories often use the Kuhnian concepts of “paradigm” and “paradigm shift” for describing their ambitions and the current situation in cognitive science. I examine whether the use of Kuhn’s theory of science is appropriate here. There might be good reasons to think that (...) cognitive science is in a situation of foundational crisis, but that does not entail that the classical paradigm is currently displaced to the benefit of a new paradigm. Larry Laudan’s theory of research traditions is more enlightening than Kuhn’s theory for describing the scope and ambitions of radical views on cognition, and their relations with an anti-intellectualist tradition in philosophy. (shrink)

The chapter presents a brief case study, in which we can observe the impact of Pierre Hadot's ideas on Martin O’Hagan, a person not far removed from us in terms of space, time, and aspirations. Hadot's concept of “Philosophy as a Way of Life (PWL)” could provide an option for a person who, excluded from and/or disillusioned by Academic philosophy, still felt the need to search for answers to a few centrally important questions that had direct impact on his (...) life. Even the characteristic that has returned like a Leitmotif throughout this chapter — analytic philosophy's tendency to ignore the so‐called Big Questions, such as that of the meaning of life — can be illuminated by means of Kuhn's theories. The author hopes that the interest in Hadot's concept of PWL will contribute to the rehabilitation of philosophy as it was before its takeover by Academic philosophy. (shrink)

Should judgments of beauty play a guiding role in theoretical science even if beauty is not a sign of truth? In this paper I argue that they should in certain cases. If we analyze the rationality of theoretical pursuit using decision theory, a theory’s beauty can influence the utilities of the various options confronting the researcher. After considering the views of Pierre Duhem and Thomas Kuhn on aesthetics in science, I suggest that because we value freedom of inquiry (...) we rightly allow scientists some choice in how they value aesthetic properties of theories and thus some freedom to use beauty to guide their research program. (shrink)

This paper investigates the historical origins of the notion of incommensurability in contemporary philosophy of science. The aim is not to establish claims of priority, but to enhance our understanding of the notion by illuminating the various issues that contributed to its development. Kuhn developed his notion of incommensurability primarily under the influence of Fleck, Polanyi, and Köhler. Feyerabend, who had developed his notion more than a decade earlier, drew directly from Duhem, who had developed a notion of incommensurability (...) in 1906. The idea is that in the course of scientific advance, when fundamental theories change, meanings change, which can result in a new conception of the nature of reality. Feyerabend repeatedly used this notion of incommensurability to attack various forms of conceptual conservativism. These include the logical positivists’ foundational use of protocol statements, Heisenberg’s methodological principle that established results must be presupposed by all further research, attempts to separate philosophical accounts of ontology from physics, Bohr’s principle of complementarity, and logical empiricist accounts of reduction and explanation. Focusing on the function of the notion of incommensurability common to Feyerabend’s various critiques explicates Feyerabend’s early philosophy as a series of challenges to forms of conceptual conservativism.Keywords: Incommensurability ; Paul Feyerabend; Thomas Kuhn; Pierre Duhem; Wolfgang Köhler; Ludwik Fleck. (shrink)

La theorie physique? Ce titre, qui fut au debut de notre siecle celui d'un ouvrage controverse, suggere bien une question, celle de savoir si en matiere de science la theorie doit se qualifier en fonction d'un domaine plus particulier d'application. L'auteur, Pierre Duhem, n'aurait pas hesite, semble-t-il, a repondre par l'affirmative en ce qui concerne le vaste champ de la recherche que l'on peut signifier sous le nom de physique. Son ouvrage est en fait construit comme une preparation rigoureuse (...) a une telle reponse et bien que les annees aient modifie considerablement le contexte du champ sus-dit, les analyses proposees ont ete jugees suggestives par de nombreux epistemologues d'aujourd'hui. (shrink)

In multicellular organisms, cells are frequently programmed to die. This makes good sense: cells that fail to, or are no longer playing important roles are eliminated. From the cell’s perspective, this also makes sense, since somatic cells in multicellular organisms require the cooperation of clonal relatives. In unicellular organisms, however, programmed cell death poses a difficult and unresolved evolutionary problem. The empirical evidence for PCD in diverse microbial taxa has spurred debates about what precisely PCD means in the case of (...) unicellular organisms. In this article, we survey the concepts of PCD in the literature and the selective pressures associated with its evolution. We show that definitions of PCD have been almost entirely mechanistic and fail to separate questions concerning what PCD fundamentally is from questions about the kinds of mechanisms that realize PCD. We conclude that an evolutionary definition is best able to distinguish PCD from closely related phenomena. Specifically, we define “true” PCD as an adaptation for death triggered by abiotic or biotic environmental stresses. True PCD is thus not only an evolutionary product but must also have been a target of selection. Apparent PCD resulting from pleiotropy, genetic drift, or trade-offs is not true PCD. We call this “ersatz PCD.”. (shrink)

This first English-language translation captures the excitement of the original text-already a contemporary classic, and will likely become a standard reference in the history of eighteenth-century thought, politics, and society, and in the ...

In this 1999 book Pierre Keller examines the distinctive contributions, and the respective limitations, of Husserl's and Heidegger's approach to fundamental elements of human experience. He shows how their accounts of time, meaning, and personal identity are embedded in important alternative conceptions of how experience may be significant for us, and discusses both how these conceptions are related to each other and how they fit into a wider philosophical context. His sophisticated and accessible account of the phenomenological philosophy of (...) Husserl and the existential phenomenology of Heidegger will be of wide interest to students and specialists in these areas, while analytic philosophers of mind will be interested by the detailed parallels which he draws with a number of concerns of the analytic philosophical tradition. (shrink)

Self-Interest before Adam Smith inquires into the foundations of economic theory. It is generally assumed that the birth of modern economic science, marked by the publication of The Wealth of Nations in 1776, was the triumph of the 'selfish hypothesis'. Yet, as a neo-Epicurean idea, this hypothesis had been a matter of controversy for over a century and Smith opposed it from a neo-Stoic point of view. But how can the Epicurean principles of orthodox economic theory be reconciled with the (...) Stoic principles of Adam Smith's philosophy? Pierre Force shows how Smith's theory refutes the 'selfish hypothesis' and integrates it at the same time. He also explains how Smith appropriated Rousseau's 'republican' critique of modern commercial society, and makes the case that the autonomy of economic science is an unintended consequence of Smith's 'republican' principles. (shrink)

Whereas most previous and later discussions of Marx’s transformation of values into prices of production have focused on his mathematical procedure, Henryk Grossman addressed the logic of its place in the structure ofCapital. On this basis he criticised underconsumptionist and disproportionality theorists of economic crises for inappropriately basing their accounts on the level of analysis of the value schemas in the second volume ofCapital. Such a criticism cannot be made of Grossman’s and Marx’s explanation of systemic crises in terms of (...) the tendency for the rate of profit to fall. Grossman’s article still provides insights into Marx’s analysis of capitalism and his theory of economic crises, unsurpassed in the subsequent literature. (shrink)

We study the role of meeting numbers in pcf theory. In particular, Shelah's Strong Hypothesis is shown to be equivalent to the assertion that for any singular cardinal σ of cofinality ω, there is a size collection Q of countable subsets of σ with the property that for any infinite subset a of σ, there is a member of Q meeting a in an infinite set.

Non-cognitive gadgets are fancy tools shaped to meet specific, local needs. Cecilia Heyes defines cognitive gadgets as dedicated psychological mechanisms created through social interactions and culturally, not genetically, inherited by humans. She has boldly proposed that many human cognitive mechanisms are gadgets. If true, these claims would have far-reaching implications for our scientific understanding of human social cognition. Here we assess Heyes’s cognitive gadget approach as it applies to mindreading. We do not think that the evidence supports Heyes’s thought-provoking thesis (...) that human children are taught to read minds the way they are taught to read words. We highlight a potential circularity lurking behind this analogy, and we explain why we are unpersuaded by Heyes’s anti-mentalistic proposal for handling data inconsistent with the gadget view, which others take to be evidence for mindreading in human infancy. We conclude that while human minds may well be filled with gadgets, mindreading is unlikely to be one of them. (shrink)

Let$\kappa $be a regular uncountable cardinal, anda cardinal greater than or equal to$\kappa $. Revisiting a celebrated result of Shelah, we show that ifis close to$\kappa $and(= the least size of a cofinal subset of) is greater than, thencan be represented (in the sense of pcf theory) as a pseudopower. This can be used to obtain optimal results concerning the splitting problem. For example we show that ifand, then no$\kappa $-complete ideal onis weakly-saturated.

One of the defining features of the modern age is the apotheosis of natural history. Natural History is, of course, the title of Buffon's monumental work, written in the second half of the 18th century. Also, until the rise of the Industrial Revolution, natural history provided an integrated technology, stretching from the voyages of discovery to the establishment of colonies devoted to the cultivation of the resources discovered there, whether one considers sugar cane in its migration west, or vanilla plants (...) on Reunion Island. Beginning in the 16th century, and in such works as Jean de Léry's The Singularities of the French Antarctic, voyagers described, in written accounts of what they saw in far-off lands, exotic substances with singular properties. Jean Nicot returned with tobacco. Parmentier took it upon himself to introduce the cultivation of the potato to France. From both Madame de Sévigné and a secular cantata of Bach we know of the immediate vogue that coffee enjoyed from its introduction in Europe. Later, in the 18th century, after his disastrous expedition to measure the meridian at the equator, La Condamine returned from the Amazon with two substances that would prove crucial to the technical development of the West: rubber and curare. (shrink)

« Ma seconde maxime était d’être le plus ferme et le plus résolu en mes actions que je pourrais, et de ne suivre pas moins constamment les opinions les plus douteuses, lorsque je m’y serais une fois déterminé, que si elles eussent été très assurées. Imitant en ceci les voyageurs qui, se trouvant égarés en quelque forêt, ne doivent pas errer en tournoyant, tantôt d’un côté, tantôt d’un autre, ni encore moins s’arrêter en une place, mais marcher toujours le plus (...) droit qu’ils peuvent vers un mêm.. (shrink)

Abstract This paper compares Heidegger's conception of time with more prevalent physical and broadly psychological analyses of time. The ?vulgar? notion of time, as Heidegger understands it, is based on the assumption that time, regardless of whether it is identified with tense or not, is something that is essentially measurable by clocks. Heidegger maintains that the vulgar notion of time is a distortion of his own preferred conception of temporality. I show how temporality may be understood as the non?sequential tensed (...) structure underlying tensed discourse. I argue against any straightforward reduction of this tensed structure and the direction of time to physical occurrences. Nevertheless I argue that temporality can be distinguished from purely psychological analyses of temporal experience and from traditional conceptions of time as tensed experience. The selectiveness of demonstrative discourse provides the basis for Heidegger's critique and reconstruction of time understood as tensed discourse about things. Heidegger's scepticism about the interpretation of time as a sequence of nows that underlies the dominant interpretation of tense is due to his appropriation of the relativity of simultaneity from special relativity. But his interpretation of physical theory leads him to the thesis that time is pre?supposed but not completely analysed in physical theory. The meta?language of physical theory makes covert use of temporal notions, for entities can themselves only be understood in covertly temporal ways. I show how this claim may be understood and defended in the light of current physical theory. Heidegger's analysis gives us some basis for thinking that his own notion of temporality is built into an understanding of temporal experience. But I argue that Heidegger fails to make the case that physical time is ontologically dependent on human existence. (shrink)

Attributing the creation of new features to categorization requirements implies that the exemplars displayed are correctly assigned to their category. This constraint limits the scope of Schyns et al.'s proposal to supervised learning. We present data suggesting that this constraint is unwarranted and we argue that feature creation is better thought of as a byproduct of the attentional, on-line processing of incoming information.

Thomist solution to the problem of love -- Remarks on the elements of the Thomist solution in Greek and medieval thought -- Two medieval sketches of the physical theory -- First characteristic : duality of the lover and the beloved -- Second characteristic : the violence of love -- Third characteristic : irrational love -- Fourth characteristic : love as the final end -- Appendix 1: The postulation of the problem of love in the first scholastics -- Appendix 2: The (...) formal identification of love and understanding in William of St. Thierry. (shrink)

This paper assesses the scope and limits of a widely influential model of goal-ascription by human infants: the shared-intentionality model. It derives much of its appeal from its ability to integrate behavioral evidence from developmental psychology with cognitive neuroscientific evidence about the role of mirror neuron activity in non-human primates. The central question raised by this model is whether sharing a goal with an agent is necessary and sufficient for ascribing it to that agent. I argue that advocates of the (...) shared-intentionality model underestimate both the distinction between the target and the goal of a goal-directed action and the gap between sharing and ascribing a goal. (shrink)

We employ a pragmatic model of inquiry to distinguish the epistemological character of exploratory experimentation. Exploratory experimentation is not constituted by any intrinsic characteristics of an episode of experimentation but depends on the context and aims of the experiment and the ways in which these shape decisions about how the experimental inquiry is to be conducted: its tasks, resources, and aims, as well as the critical assessment of all of these. To demonstrate the usefulness of our pragmatist model, we apply (...) it to the contrast between two kinds of searches for new physics at the Large Hadron Collider. Some searches are exploratory while others target specific Beyond Standard Model hypotheses, but this contrast can be understood only by considering the relations between these searches, their aims, and the way that these aims shape their respective experimental parameters and procedures. Our approach provides a model for establishing the epistemological significance of details of experimental practice. (shrink)

This paper shows that the Clauser–Horne–Shimony–Holt test of locality of correlations which was originally designed to be used with binary observables can actually be used for any couples of quantum-like bounded continuous observables, and then for any experimental situation describable within the mathematical framework of quantum theory.

Contents Preface General Introduction 1 | Science and Pseudoscience Introduction Karl Popper, Science: Conjectures and Refutations Thomas S. Kuhn, Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research? Imre Lakatos, Science and Pseudoscience Paul R. Thagard, Why Astrology Is a Pseudoscience Michael Ruse, Creation-Science Is Not Science Larry Laudan, Commentary: Science at the Bar---Causes for Concern Commentary 2 | Rationality, Objectivity, and Values in Science Introduction Thomas S. Kuhn, The Nature and Necessity of Scientific Revolutions Thomas S. Kuhn, Objectivity, (...) Value Judgment, and Theory Choice Ernan McMullin, Rationality and Paradigm Change in Science Larry Laudan, Kuhn’s Critique of Methodology Helen E. Longino, Values and Objectivity Kathleen Okruhlik, Gender and the Biological Sciences Commentary 3 | The Duhem-Quine Thesis and Underdetermination Introduction Pierre Duhem, Physical Theory and Experiment W. V. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism Donald Gillies, The Duhem Thesis and the Quine Thesis Larry Laudan, Demystifying Underdetermination *Colin Howson and Peter Urbach, The Duhem Problem Commentary 4 | Induction, Prediction, and Evidence Introduction Peter Lipton, Induction Karl Popper, The Problem of Induction Wesley C. Salmon, Rational Prediction Carl G. Hempel, Criteria of Confirmation and Acceptability Peter Achinstein, Explanation v. Prediction: Which Carries More Weight? *Nelson Goodman, The New Riddle of Induction Commentary 5 | Confirmation and Relevance: Bayesian Approaches Introduction Wesley C. Salmon, Rationality and Objectivity in Science *Deborah G. Mayo, A Critique of Salmon’s Bayesian Way *Alan Chalmers, The Bayesian Approach Paul Horwich, Therapeutic Bayesianism Commentary 6 | Models of Explanation Introduction Rudolf Carnap, The Value of Laws: Explanation and Prediction Carl G. Hempel, Two Basic Types of Scientific Explanation Carl G. Hempel, The Thesis of Structural Identity Carl G. Hempel, Inductive-Statistical Explanation Peter Railton, A Deductive-Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation *Philip Kitcher, Explanatory Unification *James Woodward, The Manipulability Conception of Causal Explanation Commentary 7 | Laws of Nature Introduction A. J. Ayer, What Is a Law of Nature? Fred I. Dretske, Laws of Nature D. H. Mellor, Necessities and Universals in Natural Laws Nancy Cartwright, Do the Laws of Physics State the Facts? Commentary 8 | Intertheoretic Reduction Introduction Ernest Nagel, Issues in the Logic of Reductive Explanations Paul K. Feyerabend, How to Be a Good Empiricist *Jerry A. Fodor, Special Sciences Philip Kitcher, 1953 and All That: A Tale of Two Sciences Commentary 9 | Empiricism and Scientific Realism Introduction Grover Maxwell, The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities Bas C. van Fraassen, Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism Alan Musgrave, Realism versus Constructive Empiricism Larry Laudan, A Confutation of Convergent Realism *Juha T. Saatsi, On the Pessimistic Induction and Two Fallacies Ian Hacking, Experimentation and Scientific Realism David B. Resnik, Hacking’s Experimental Realism *Martin Carrier, What Is Right with the Miracle Argument Arthur Fine, The Natural Ontological Attitude Alan Musgrave, NOA’s Ark---Fine for Realism Commentary Glossary Bibliography Name Index Subject Index. (shrink)

Le processus fondateur d’une alliance à une organisation radicale, la mécanique de son engrenage et les échecs de tentatives de « déradicalisation » restent souvent énigmatiques. L’auteur émet l’hypothèse que le lien d’alliance radical, tel un couplage des familles d’origine de deux partenaires, a une fonction économique psychique de remaillage inter-contenants réciproque des liens de filiation et d’affiliation entre le contenant familial de l’adepte et celui de l’organisation radicale. À partir d’une expérience clinique dans des contextes géopolitiques et des dispositifs (...) très différents, il décrit l’attaque de la filiation et la figure d’un néo-père mythique comme une caractéristique paradigmatique de l’architecture des liens structurant le maillage contenant de ces organisations groupales qu’il définit comme radicales et totalitaires. Il analyse le processus du pacte d’alliance radicale comme une néo-conversion à un néo-mythe d’auto-engendrement avec des néo-rituels à partir de la rencontre entre une demande, en résonance à une vulnérabilité, et une offre d’une organisation prédatrice totalitaire. (shrink)

Versé autant dans les arts libéraux que dans les arts mécaniques, Spinoza fut aussi tailleur de verre à Amsterdam, sans doute acteur de théâtre, probablement dessinateur. Il fréquenta la boutique d'antiquaire de Franciscus Van den Enden et fut proche de la société des arts Nil volentibus arduum ; il habitait non loin de Rembrandt et Potter et appréciait la compagnie de peintres et de décorateurs. Élaborée au coeur du siècle d'or de la peinture hollandaise, cette philosophie a souvent inspiré les (...) artistes. Comment expliquer un tel regard non philosophique sur une philosophie qui ne présente pas une pensée développée sur les arts? Comment expliquer qu'on ait tenté d'emprunter les voies de l'esthétique pour pénétrer une philosophie qui ne constitue pas ce champ de réflexion en un domaine autonome? (shrink)

L'altérité est l'un des phénomènes les plus étudiés et l'un des concepts les plus utilisés au cours des trente dernières années, mais c'est aussi une notion des plus polysémiques et des plus controversées, jusque dans les usages idéologiques qu'on peut en faire aujourd'hui. Ce livre interroge les bases philosophiques, le contexte sociohistorique et la portée éthique et esthétique de ce phénomène ou de cette notion à la lumière de ses différentes valeurs. L'autre est à la fois l'étranger, exclu ou minorisé, (...) pour les études culturelles, l'un des pôles de la construction identitaire pour certaines théories du sujet, l'expression même de la Loi et du Symbolique pour d'autres, la figure emblématique de la responsabilité pour une certaine pensée éthique, le fondement de toute relation intersubjective et de tout dialogisme ou, plus radicalement encore, la manifestation de la nature essentiellement hétérogène de l'existence. Chaque fois, ce qui est en jeu concerne nos manières de vivre-ensemble et nos façons de faire et de créer. Les auteurs réunis dans cet ouvrage analysent les "politiques de l'altérité" que notre histoire impose ou propose comme choix de société et " les poétiques de l'autre" que les différentes pratiques artistiques, ancrées dans la mémoire et l'imaginaire collectifs, déploient comme possible ou comme alternative face à notre situation historique. (shrink)