Methodology might be understood to mean a description of various individual procedures which have led to the successful solution of specific problems. In studying the subject of physics from this point of view, i.e. with special emphasis on method, one would naturally turn his attention to the traditional divisions of experimental and theoretical physics, the former with its measuring devices and the latter with its mathematical technique. In no other sense than this does the term methodology (...) make any direct appeal to the working physicist, and if you would ask him to define his methods he would probably answer with a description of experimental technique or the methods of setting up and solving differential equations. His answer would tell you how he solves his problems, but hardly how he finds them and why he solves them. (shrink)

Many scientific theories purport to describe empirically inaccessible aspects of the world. The agenda of foundational physics is more ambitious still: to characterize the world at the level of 'primitive ontology'. In this pursuit it often posits new and peculiar physical features, a proclivity aided by the abstract, mathematical way in which foundational theories are framed. But how do we decipher their physical content, and in particular the accounts of primitive ontology they offer, and why think that content is (...) true? This dissertation explores the relationship between these questions -- between the problem of ontological interpretation in foundational physics and the nature of scientific realism. I do not argue for a unified account. Rather, I examine three contexts in which their interactions are particularly interesting and philosophically significant. First, I consider the role scientific methodology plays in a prominent naturalistic defense of scientific realism: the no-miracles argument. The most sophisticated form of this argument rests on the broad claim that successful scientific methodology is irredeemably theory dependent. I examine the nature of this theory dependence within the context of Maxwell's development of electromagnetism, and argue that the presence of competing ontological interpretations undermines the realist's attempt to draw sweeping epistemic conclusions from methodological success. I next consider the concept of theoretical reformulation and how it applies to the claim that Lagrangian dynamics is a reformulation of (part of) Newtonian dynamics. How should this claim be understood in light of the fact that the world is non-classical? What can this tell us about the concept of theory reformulation itself, which plays a central role in arguments against scientific realism? I provide an analysis of theory reformulation in terms of counterfactual interpretative judgments, and then cast doubt on its justification in the classical case by developing a non-Newtonian interpretation of Lagrangian dynamics. Finally, I consider whether competing ontological interpretations raise underdetermination problems for realism about foundational physics. After first re-formulating the underdetermination argument to avoid recent objections that it fails to pose any distinctive threat, I suggest a formulation of realism that vitiates the underdetermination threats posed by competing ontological interpretations. (shrink)

(1984). Some methodological and historical considerations in low temperature physics: The case of superconductivity 1911–57. Annals of Science: Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 135-149.

The purpose of the study is to determine the methodological features of the organization of design engineering activities when teaching physics at school. The article focuses on the formation of design and research skills of students, which is a mandatory requirement of the Federal State Educational Standard of the General Education. From our point of view, one of the stages of the implementation of project activities should be design, so the formation of design skills is also reflected in the (...) FSES BGE. The scientific novelty of the research lies in the definition of the concept of "project design activity", the definition of the methodology of the organization of project design activity in teaching physics at school. As a result, the requirements for the content and organization of design engineering activities in teaching physics at school are identified, a model of the methodology of its organization is proposed; the program of the circle is developed and an example of one of the implemented projects is given. (shrink)

The methodology of physics is discussed. The limitations of the empirical method are exposed, and it is argued that these limitations are related to our sensory input. The limitations of mathematics and of the representation of physical theories by mathematical models are also examined. An alternative methodology, the establishing of physical models on neuropsychology, is suggested and demonstrated. A cognitive psychological model of the genesis and the termination of time is explored.

A case study of the development of quantum field theory and of S-matrix theory, from their inceptions to the present, is presented. The descriptions of science given by Kuhn and by Lakatos are compared and contrasted as they apply to this case study. The episodes of the developments of these theories are then considered as candidates for competing research programs in Lakatos' methodology of scientific research programs. Lakatos' scheme provides a reasonable overall description and a plausible assessment of the (...) relative value of these two programs in terms of progressive and degenerating problem shifts. Also discussed are the roles of various types of models as they have been used in these areas of theoretical high-energy physics. (shrink)

Work on the methodology of natural science involves serious difficulties over and above those encountered in any other aspect of natural science or of philosophy. Reference is to the obvious fact that in discussing methodological questions of, for example, physics, so as to be precise, it is not enough to know physics: it is also necessary to familiarize oneself with certain branches of philosophy, the history of science, and so forth. Furthermore, a professional cannot limit himself to (...) "general familiarity" with the material. He has to know the details and, if possible, the entire literature on the question under discussion. However, the volume of literature on physics has, within the memory of the author alone — that is, over approximately forty years — multiplied dozens of times. I cannot say how great has been the increase in the quantity of information on the methodology of natural science and related disciplines. But what is important is that the amount of material that has accumulated to date is enormous. Some notion of the scale of the work may be gained from the abstract journal Obshchestvennye nauki za rubezhom. Seriia 8. Naukovedenie. For example, no. 1 for 1980 contained abstracts of 72 articles and books; this amounts to over 400 titles a year . When we add to this the Soviet literature and the need to include material from many years, we arrive at a figure of four digits. Naturally, only a very small portion of the literature is made use of in any particular piece of work, but it is impossible to know beforehand which items will be specifically needed. (shrink)

Perspectival realists often appeal to the methodology of science to secure a realist account of the retention and continued success of scientific claims through the progress of science. However, in the context of modern physics, the retention and continued success of scientific claims are typically only definable within a mathematical framework. In this article, I argue that this concern leaves the perspectivist open to Cassirer’s neo-Kantian critique of the applicability of mathematics in the natural sciences. To support this (...) criticism, I present a case study on the conservation of energy in modern physics. (shrink)

In this essay I will argue for an interpretation of the remarks of Physics 1.1 that both resolves some of the confusion surrounding the precise nature of methodology described there and shows how those remarks at 184a15-25 serve as important programmatic remarks besides, as they help in the structuring of books 1 and 2 of the Physics. I will argue that “what is clearer and more knowable to us” is what Aristotle goes on to describe in 1.2—namely, (...) that nature exists and that natural things change—his basic starting-point for natural science. This, I shall hope to show, is the kind of “immediate” sense datum which Aristotle thinks must be further analyzed in terms of principles and then causes over the course of Physics books 1 and 2 to lead to knowledge about the natural world.[1] Such an analysis arrives at, as I shall show, a definition of nature not initially available from the starting-point just mentioned, and which is clearer by nature.[2] It is not my aim here to resolve longstanding debates surrounding Aristotle’s original intent in the ordering and composition of the first two books of the Physics, nor how the Physics is meant to fit into the Aristotelian corpus taken as a coherent whole, but rather to show that the first two books of the Physics, as they stand, fit with the picture of methodology for natural science presented to us in 1.1. [1] An interesting consequence of this, and one which I shall not pursue in this paper at any length, is that the progression from what is clearer to us and what is clearer by nature is by necessity a form of revision: i.e., the Physics should not be seen as a work validating the “starting-point” of 1.2 contra the monists, but a work which gradually builds to the language of matter and form as what is clearer by nature. [2] Viz., what we find at the beginning of 2.1: “this suggests that nature is a sort of source and cause of change and remaining unchanged in that to which it belongs primarily of itself, that is, not by virtue of concurrence”. (shrink)

The attempt of modern social science to follow the methods of the physical sciences in seeking verification of its theories by statistical techniques is a result of an outmoded view of the methods of the physicist. The decisive element in verifying a theory is not the amassing of large bodies of data but insightful judgment into a relatively few cases. Because the will is primary in scientific activity, scientific statements, particularly those of social science, have the same cognitive status as (...) religious and ethical beliefs. Continued disagreements are, therefore, inevitable in the social sciences. (shrink)

The Creation of Ideas in Physics: Studies for a Methodology of Theory Construction is a collection of essays by physicists, philosophers, and historians about how physical theories are developed. It includes major, new studies of Newton's methods and of the genesis of the theories of relativity. Also featured are reflective analyses of the alternatives facing contemporary theoretical physicists investigating problems in cosmology and quantum gravity. The book is rich in critical interactions among the authors. Its unusual ambition is (...) to engage thinkers in the diverse disciplines of science studies in a common quest to delineate the creative thinking responsible for major advances in physical theory. The volume explores the possibility of learning something general about what distinguishes productive from abortive directions of theoretical inquiry, something that both illuminates the nature of scientific thought and enriches the methodological prescriptions that guide research. (shrink)

This book recounts a few ingenious attempts to derive physical theories by reason only, beginning with Descartes' geometric construction of the world, and finishing with recent derivations of quantum mechanics from natural axioms.

The final work of the esteemed philosopher William Demopoulos supplants logical empiricism's accounts of physical theories, which fail to satisfactorily engage modern physics. Arguing for a new appreciation of the tightly woven character of theory and evidence, Demopoulos offers novel insights into the distinctive nature of quantum reality.

Vesely (experimental physics, U. of Vienna, Austria) provides the basic numerical and computational techniques, followed by an explanation of specific problems of computational physics. Appendices address properties of computing machines and an outline of the technique of Fast Fourier Transformation. The first edition, published by Plenum Press, Ne.

This research is devoted to the study of scientific and methodological aspects of providing students with physical education. The research is based on the works of Russian teachers who have adopted the experience of the new higher education program for bachelor's degree. The starting point for the development of new concepts is the latest edition of the Federal State Educational Standard for Higher Education. The purpose of the study is to analysis of the scientific and methodological support of physical education (...) of students under the Federal State Educational Standard program. In the course of the research, we study the most important aspects of the formation of physical skills with the help of basic and additional types of interaction between a teacher and students. Scientific novelty lies new look at complex education, which includes an expanded set of methods, technologies for the development of cognitive interest, activity, physical skills and motivation for active recreation, a healthy lifestyle. The design technology of 2021, based on the method of new generation projects by Evgenia Semyonovna Polat, is a separate factor. The result of the study was the definition of the scientific and methodological aspects of providing physical education in the main and additional types of interaction between the teacher and students, including physical culture, sports, elite sports, competitive tests, project technology and distance learning format. (shrink)

On December 10th, 1947, John von Neumann wrote to the Spanish translator of his Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics: 1Your questions on the nature of mathematical physics and theoretical physics are interesting but a little difficult to answer with precision in my own mind. I have always drawn a somewhat vague line of demarcation between the two subjects, but it was really more a difference in distribution of emphases. I think that in theoretical physics the main emphasis (...) is on the connection with experimental physics and those methodological processes which lead to new theories and new formulations, whereas mathematical physics deals with the actual solution and mathematical execution of a theory which is assumed to be correct per se, or assumed to be correct for the sake of the discussion. In other words, I would say that theoretical physics deals rather with the formation and mathematical physics rather with the exploitation of physical theories. However, when a new theory has to be evaluated and compared with experience, both aspects mix. (shrink)

Examines the aims and tools of science for creating theories and explanations of phenomena, with an eye to answering the question of whether or not science ...

Qualitative Analysis of Physical Problems ...

The paper is concentrated on Aristotle's "Posterior Analytics" and attempts to show that his account of the sciences is less uniform than it is usually taken to be but shows some awareness of important differences between the mathematical and the physical sciences.

Methodological naturalism is the assumption or working hypothesis that understanding nature (the physical world including humans and their thoughts and actions) can be understood in terms of unguided laws. There is no need to Suppose interventions (miracles) from outside. It does not commit one to metaphysical naturalism, the belief that there is nothing other than nature as we can see and observe it (in other words, that atheism is the right theology for the sound thinker). Recently the Intelligent Design movement (...) has been arguing against methodological naturalism, and in this project they have been joined by the Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga. In this paper I examine Plantinga’s arguments and conclude not only that they are not well taken, but that he does no good service to his religion either. (shrink)

This monograph examines James Clerk Maxwell's contributions to electromagnetism to gain insight into the practice of science by focusing on scientific methodology as applied by scientists. First and foremost, this study is concerned with practices that are reflected in scientific texts and the ways scientists frame their research. The book is therefore about means and not ends.

In nine new essays, distinguished philosophers of science discuss outstanding issues in scientific methodology --especially that of the physical sciences-and address philosophical questions that arise in the exploration of the foundations of contemporary science.

One of the major philosophical problems in physical sciences is what criteria should determine how scientific theories are selected and justified in practice and whether, in describing observable physical phenomena, such theories are effectively constrained to be unique. This book studies the example of a particular theory, the S-matrix theory. The S-matrix program was initiated by Heisenberg to deal with difficulties encountered in quantum field theories in describing particular phenomena. Since then, each theory has at different times been favored as (...) the explanation of observed phenomena. Certainly the S-matrix theory was adequate, feasible and fertile. However, the quantum field theory interpretation is now widely accepted and the study of alternative theories is all but abandoned. By examining the philosophy which influenced the turns in this story, the author explains how an adequate and viable theory fell out of favor and concludes with a critique of different methodologies in the history of science. (shrink)

Because physical theories typically predict numerical values, an improvement in experimental precision reduces the tolerance range and hence increases corroborability. In most psychological research, improved power of a statistical design leads to a prior probability approaching 1/2 of finding a significant difference in the theoretically predicted direction. Hence the corroboration yielded by "success" is very weak, and becomes weaker with increased precision. "Statistical significance" plays a logical role in psychology precisely the reverse of its role in physics. This problem (...) is worsened by certain unhealthy tendencies prevalent among psychologists, such as a premium placed on experimental "cuteness" and a free reliance upon ad hoc explanations to avoid refutation. (shrink)

A new formulation involving fulfillment of all the Kolmogorov axioms is suggested for acomplete probability theory. This proves to be not a purely mathematical discipline. Probability theory deals with abstract objects—images of various classes of concrete objects—whereas experimental statistics deals with concrete objects alone. Both have to be taken into account. Quantum physics and classical statistical physics prove to be different aspects ofone probabilistic physics. The connection of quantum mechanics with classical statistical mechanics is examined and the (...) origin of the Schrödinger equation is elucidated. Attention is given to the true meaning of the wave-corpuscle duality, and the incompleteness of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics is explained. (shrink)

"Methodological Solipsism and the Multiverse" defends the many-universes interpretation of quantum physics, but draws attention to a major philosophical obstacle to the interpretation's acceptance: the question of why, if there are many universes, all on a par with one another, at a particular time the 'I' is manifest in only one. This is known as the 'preferred basis' problem. The so-called methodological solipsism approach, introduced by Driesch and employed by philosophers, such as Putnam and Fodor, is used to answer (...) the question. (shrink)

Neural correlates of consciousness (for brevity NCC) are foundational to the scientific study of consciousness. Chalmers (2000) has provided the most informative and influential definition of NCC, according to which neural correlates are minimally sufficient for consciousness. However, the sense of sufficiency needs further clarification since there are several relevant senses with different entailments. In section one of this article, we give an overview of the desiderata for a good definition of NCC and Chalmers’s definition. The second section analyses the (...) merit of understanding the sufficiency of neural correlates for corresponding consciousness according to three relevant types of sufficiency: logical, metaphysical, and physical. In section three, a theoretical approach to consciousness studies is suggested in light of the sense in which NCC are sufficient for consciousness. Section four addresses a concern some might have about this approach. By the end, it will become apparent that our conception of NCC has important implications for research methodology, neuroethics, and the vitality of the search for NCC. (shrink)

The two main points of this contribution are the following: (1) Applied mathematical theories might complement physical theories in an essential way; some applied mathematical theories allow us to understand phenomena we are unable to explain by resorting to physical theories alone, (2) In the case of social sciences it might be necessary to account for examined phenomena by resorting to the idea of goal-oriented activity (the causal approach typical for natural science might be unsatisfactory). Weinberg's idea of grand reductionism (...) ignores the two above mentioned facts and hence overestimates the foundational role of physics and its methodology. (shrink)

Astroparticle physics is an interdisciplinary field embracing astronomy, astrophysics and particle physics. In a recent paper on this topic, Brigitte Falkenburg defended that only scientific realism can make sense of it and that realist beliefs constitute an indispensable methodological principle of research in this discipline. The aim of this work is to show that there exists an anti-realist alternative to this account, along the lines of what Bas van Fraassen showed in his famous book The Scientific Image. Problems (...) and results of astroparticle physics can be understood from an empiricist point of view too, namely that of van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism, which is a more modest and metaphysics-free alternative to scientific realism. Although constructive empiricism can make sense of science no worse than scientific realism does, van Fraassen’s goal is not to demonstrate that his stance is the only viable position, but just that it is not incoherent or proven false by his opponents. In this paper it will be shown that the constructive empiricist stance constitutes a legitimate alternative to scientific realism even when it gets to astroparticle physics and that it does indeed make sense of this new discipline, pace Falkenburg. (shrink)

Imre Lakatos' philosophical and scientific papers are published here in two volumes. Volume I brings together his very influential but scattered papers on the philosophy of the physical sciences, and includes one important unpublished essay on the effect of Newton's scientific achievement. Volume II presents his work on the philosophy of mathematics (much of it unpublished), together with some critical essays on contemporary philosophers of science and some famous polemical writings on political and educational issues. Imre Lakatos had an influence (...) out of all proportion to the length of his philosophical career. This collection exhibits and confirms the originality, range and the essential unity of his work. It demonstrates too the force and spirit he brought to every issue with which he engaged, from his most abstract mathematical work to his passionate 'Letter to the director of the LSE'. Lakatos' ideas are now the focus of widespread and increasing interest, and these volumes should make possible for the first time their study as a whole and their proper assessment. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question as to whether the methodology followed in building/assessing string theory can be considered scientific in the same sense, say, that the methodology followed in building/assessing the Standard Model of particle physics is scientific, by focussing on the "founding" period of the theory. More precisely, its aim is to argue for a positive answer to the above question – there is no real change of scientific status in the way of proceeding and reasoning (...) in fundamental physical research – in the light of a historical analysis of the early developments of the string theoretical framework. (shrink)

Standard philosophical accounts attempt to understand physical modality either in terms of special metaphysical entities and relationships or in terms of the organization of non-modal information, as in Best Systems Analysis. This paper defends an alternative to both these approaches in which invariance and various independence conditions play a central role. The methodological importance of separating law-claims from claims about initial and boundary conditions is highlighted.

In modern physics, various fundamental problems have become topics of debate. There was the 20th century climb to a Standard Model, still accurate at the highest energy levels obtainable so far. But, since the 1970's, a different approach to physics advocates for theories such as string theory, known for their mathematical elegance, even though they either cannot be verified in data or contradict presently known experimental results. In philosophy of physics, there is a gradually emerging consensus that (...) philosophy of physics and physics somehow contribute to a common enterprise. But, there is little sign of progress toward consensus about the nature of that unity. All the while, it is generally recognized that physics is interdisciplinary. There are, of course, differences in focus. But, implicitly at least, there are no "sharp dividing lines" between physics and philosophy of physics; pure and applied physics; physical chemistry; biophysics; medical physics; history and philosophy of physics; physics and society; physics education; and so on. What, then, is progress in physics? The question here is not about ideal structures, but asks about what is going on in physics. Beginnings in discerning the presence of eight main tasks help reveal the (pre-) emergence of a normative omni-disciplinary basis for collaboration that, once adverted to, promises to be constitutive of a new and increasingly effective control of meaning. Originally discovered by Bernard Lonergan in 1965, progress in the new collaboration will not seek to eliminate specialized expertise. It will, though, divide tasks within an eightfold functional division of labor. This book invites attention to data for each of the eight main tasks evident and self-evident in existing scholarship in the community. (shrink)

Written for both the layman and the professional, this may be the long-awaited revolution in physical science.

This provocative and critical work addresses the question of why scientific realists and positivists consider experimental physics to be a natural and empirical science. Taking insights from contemporary science studies, continental philosophy, and the history of physics, this book describes and analyzes the metaphysical presuppositions that underwrite the technological use of experimental apparatus and instruments to explore, model, and understand nature.

The science of physics has been extremely successful over the last four centuries, mainly for one reason: It does everything it can to disregard anything that has to do with non-physical parts of reality. Although the human body is a physical body, large parts of what distinguishes human beings, sometimes briefly called the human condition, does not belong to the physical domain. This implies that physics (and other sciences of the material universe) offers nothing more than self-imposed helplessness (...) when it comes to questions as to what it means to be human. Yet it is possible to scrutinize the way in which physics (and other sciences) is delineated from the rest of reality: to reconsider its boundaries as they were set about four centuries ago. In other words, it is possible to look for features within the physical that are related to something outside the physical which physics itself ignores. The key concept to do so is proposed to be meaning, in its two variants of reference and sense. Meaning provides a viable perspective to illuminate the deep structure of reality as it extends beyond physics and across its boundaries. (shrink)

Kant's revolution in methodology limited metaphysics to the conditions of possible experience. Since, following Hume, analysis—the “method of discovery” in early modern physics—could no longer ground itself in sense or in God's constituting reason a new arché, “origin” and “principle,” was required, which Kant found in the synthesis of the productive imagination, the common root of sensibility and understanding. Charles Bigger argues that this imaginative “between” recapitulates the ancient Gaia myth which, as used by Plato in the Timaeus, (...) offers a way into this originary arché. Since it depends on myth and the “likely story” rather than on a self-certain apprehension of Being, this facilitates an imaginative approach to the natural sciences which, through its synthetic a priori formations, can claim to be Kantian. Bigger explores Kant's ethics as an alternative to metaphysics that holds open the prospect of a Good beyond Being—and phenomenology—whose traces nevertheless appear in original synthesis. Though wary of its reductive implications, Bigger uses Derrida's difference, a medial, feminine arché, as a way into this creative and procreative metaxu. As Emmanuel Levinas suggests, this is Plato's gap [chaos] between being and becoming, whose possibility, beyond both, lies in chora and the Good. This Open also presents the possibility for a new, yet still Kantian, understanding of the formal and material conditions for the natural sciences. (shrink)