Physics, theoretical knowledge and Weinberg's grand reductionism

Foundations of Science 3 (1):61-77 (1998)
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Abstract

The two main points of this contribution are the following: (1) Applied mathematical theories might complement physical theories in an essential way; some applied mathematical theories allow us to understand phenomena we are unable to explain by resorting to physical theories alone, (2) In the case of social sciences it might be necessary to account for examined phenomena by resorting to the idea of goal-oriented activity (the causal approach typical for natural science might be unsatisfactory). Weinberg's idea of grand reductionism ignores the two above mentioned facts and hence overestimates the foundational role of physics and its methodology.

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